Sigma rules: 0d

title: Advanced IP Scanner - File Event
id: fed85bf9-e075-4280-9159-fbe8a023d6fa
related:
    - id: bef37fa2-f205-4a7b-b484-0759bfd5f86f
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.
references:
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2019/12/09/snatch-ransomware-reboots-pcs-into-safe-mode-to-bypass-protection/
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html
    - https://labs.f-secure.com/blog/prelude-to-ransomware-systembc
    - https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20444693/fbi-pin-egregor-ransomware-bc-01062021.pdf
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/18/all-that-for-a-coinminer
author: '@ROxPinTeddy'
date: 2020-05-12
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\Advanced IP Scanner 2'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative use
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_advanced_ip_scanner/info.yml

title: Azure Active Directory Hybrid Health AD FS New Server
id: 288a39fc-4914-4831-9ada-270e9dc12cb4
status: test
description: |
    This detection uses azureactivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the creation or update of a server instance in an Azure AD Hybrid health AD FS service.
    A threat actor can create a new AD Health ADFS service and create a fake server instance to spoof AD FS signing logs. There is no need to compromise an on-prem AD FS server.
    This can be done programmatically via HTTP requests to Azure.
references:
    - https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC
date: 2021-08-26
modified: 2023-10-11
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1578
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        CategoryValue: 'Administrative'
        ResourceProviderValue: 'Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService'
        ResourceId|contains: 'AdFederationService'
        OperationNameValue: 'Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/servicemembers/action'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate AD FS servers added to an AAD Health AD FS service instance
level: medium

title: Browser Execution In Headless Mode
id: ef9dcfed-690c-4c5d-a9d1-482cd422225c
related:
    - id: 0e8cfe08-02c9-4815-a2f8-0d157b7ed33e
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects execution of Chromium based browser in headless mode
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1478234484881436672?s=12
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/e/managed-xdr-investigation-of-ducktail-in-trend-micro-vision-one.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-12
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1564.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\brave.exe'
            - '\chrome.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\opera.exe'
            - '\vivaldi.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '--headless'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low

title: Certutil payload obfuscation (command)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to abuse certutil command to download obfuscated malicious payload. Tools like Tchopper can trigger this rule.
references:
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/suspicious-certutil-commands.html
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/certutilexe-could-allow-attackers-to-download-malware-while-bypassing-av/
- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil
- https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/malware-living-off-land-with-certutil/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1140
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection:
    NewProcessName|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      #- urlcache # see other related rule
      - decode
      - encode
      - encodehex
      - decodehex
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- CSAT Cyber Security Assessment Tool
level: high

title: Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service - Linux
id: 19bf6fdb-7721-4f3d-867f-53467f6a5db6
status: test
description: Detects an executable accessing an ngrok tunneling endpoint, which could be a sign of forbidden exfiltration of data exfiltration by malicious actors
references:
    - https://twitter.com/hakluke/status/1587733971814977537/photo/1
    - https://ngrok.com/docs/secure-tunnels/tunnels/ssh-reverse-tunnel-agent
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-03
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1567
    - attack.t1568.002
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1102
    - attack.s0508
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: network_connection
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|contains:
            - 'tunnel.us.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.eu.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.ap.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.au.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.sa.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.jp.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.in.ngrok.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of ngrok
level: high

title: CurrentControlSet Autorun Keys Modification
id: f674e36a-4b91-431e-8aef-f8a96c2aca35
related:
    - id: 17f878b8-9968-4578-b814-c4217fc5768c
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
    - https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d # a list with registry keys
author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    system_control_base:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control'
    system_control_keys:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\InitialProgram'
            - '\Terminal Server\Wds\rdpwd\StartupPrograms'
            - '\SecurityProviders\SecurityProviders'
            - '\SafeBoot\AlternateShell'
            - '\Print\Providers'
            - '\Print\Monitors'
            - '\NetworkProvider\Order'
            - '\Lsa\Notification Packages'
            - '\Lsa\Authentication Packages'
            - '\BootVerificationProgram\ImagePath'
    filter_empty:
        Details: '(Empty)'
    filter_cutepdf:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe'
        TargetObject|contains: '\Print\Monitors\CutePDF Writer Monitor'
        Details:
            - 'cpwmon64_v40.dll'
            - 'CutePDF Writer'
    filter_onenote:
        Image: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe
        TargetObject|contains: 'Print\Monitors\Appmon\Ports\Microsoft.Office.OneNote_'
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
    filter_poqexec:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\NetworkProvider\Order\ProviderOrder'
    filter_realvnc:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Print\Monitors\MONVNC\Driver'
        Details: 'VNCpm.dll'
    condition: all of system_control_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason
    - Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_currentcontrolset/info.yml

title: Disable Security Tools
id: ff39f1a6-84ac-476f-a1af-37fcdf53d7c0
status: test
description: Detects disabling security tools
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
author: Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-19
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    launchctl_unload:
        Image: '/bin/launchctl'
        CommandLine|contains: 'unload'
    security_plists:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'com.objective-see.lulu.plist'                     # Objective-See firewall management utility
            - 'com.objective-see.blockblock.plist'               # Objective-See persistence locations watcher/blocker
            - 'com.google.santad.plist'                          # google santa
            - 'com.carbonblack.defense.daemon.plist'             # carbon black
            - 'com.carbonblack.daemon.plist'                     # carbon black
            - 'at.obdev.littlesnitchd.plist'                     # Objective Development Software firewall management utility
            - 'com.tenablesecurity.nessusagent.plist'            # Tenable Nessus
            - 'com.opendns.osx.RoamingClientConfigUpdater.plist' # OpenDNS Umbrella
            - 'com.crowdstrike.falcond.plist'                    # Crowdstrike Falcon
            - 'com.crowdstrike.userdaemon.plist'                 # Crowdstrike Falcon
            - 'osquery'                                          # facebook osquery
            - 'filebeat'                                         # elastic log file shipper
            - 'auditbeat'                                        # elastic auditing agent/log shipper
            - 'packetbeat'                                       # elastic network logger/shipper
            - 'td-agent'                                         # fluentd log shipper
    disable_gatekeeper:
        Image: '/usr/sbin/spctl'
        CommandLine|contains: 'disable'
    condition: (launchctl_unload and security_plists) or disable_gatekeeper
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate activities
level: medium

title: Disable Windows Firewall by Registry
id: e78c408a-e2ea-43cd-b5ea-51975cf358c0
status: test
description: Detect set EnableFirewall to 0 to disable the Windows firewall
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.md
author: frack113
date: 2022-08-19
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1686.003
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - \SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\StandardProfile\EnableFirewall
            - \SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\DomainProfile\EnableFirewall
        Details: DWORD (0x00000000)
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: LockBit Black - Unusual Windows firewall registry modification -cmd
      technique: T1686
      atomic_guid: a4651931-ebbb-4cde-9363-ddf3d66214cb

title: File Download And Execution Via IEExec.EXE
id: 9801abb8-e297-4dbf-9fbd-57dde0e830ad
status: test
description: Detects execution of the IEExec utility to download and execute files
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ieexec/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-05-16
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\IEExec.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'IEExec.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application
id: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
status: test
description: Detects the creation of files with an executable or script extension by an Office application.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
author: Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng (Rule), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    # Note: Please add more file extensions to the logic of your choice.
    selection1:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\excel.exe'
            - '\msaccess.exe'
            - '\mspub.exe'
            - '\powerpnt.exe'
            - '\visio.exe'
            - '\winword.exe'
    selection2:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.bat'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.com'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.ocx'
            - '.proj'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.scf'
            - '.scr'
            - '.sys'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.wsh'
    filter_main_localassembly:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\assembly\tmp\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.dll'
    filter_optional_webservicecache: # matches e.g. directory with name *.microsoft.com
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Users\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\WebServiceCache\AllUsers'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.com'
    filter_optional_webex:
        Image|endswith: '\winword.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\webexdelta\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
    filter_optional_backstageinappnavcache: # matches e.g. C:\Users\xxxxx\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\BackstageInAppNavCache\ODB-user@domain.com
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Users\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\BackstageInAppNavCache\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.com'
    condition: all of selection* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Fortinet CVE-2018-13379 Exploitation
id: a2e97350-4285-43f2-a63f-d0daff291738
status: test
description: Detects CVE-2018-13379 exploitation attempt against Fortinet SSL VPNs
references:
    - https://devco.re/blog/2019/08/09/attacking-ssl-vpn-part-2-breaking-the-Fortigate-ssl-vpn/
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2020-12-08
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2018-13379
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query|contains|all:
            - 'lang=/../../'
            - '/dev/cmdb/sslvpn_websession'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: HackTool - Certify Execution
id: 762f2482-ff21-4970-8939-0aa317a886bb
status: test
description: Detects Certify a tool for Active Directory certificate abuse based on PE metadata characteristics and common command line arguments.
references:
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-17
modified: 2023-04-25
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1649
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\Certify.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Certify.exe'
        - Description|contains: 'Certify'
    selection_cli_commands:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.exe cas '
            - '.exe find '
            - '.exe pkiobjects '
            - '.exe request '
            - '.exe download '
    selection_cli_options:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /vulnerable'
            - ' /template:'
            - ' /altname:'
            - ' /domain:'
            - ' /path:'
            - ' /ca:'
    condition: selection_img or all of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: LOL-Binary Copied From System Directory
id: f5d19838-41b5-476c-98d8-ba8af4929ee2
related:
    - id: fff9d2b7-e11c-4a69-93d3-40ef66189767
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects a suspicious copy operation that tries to copy a known LOLBIN from system (System32, SysWOW64, WinSxS) directories to another on disk in order to bypass detections based on locations.
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20180331144337/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/sanny-malware-delivery-method-updated-in-recently-observed-attacks.html
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/08/28/html-smuggling-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/14e722855605ba78dc1d21153f0e1be90e7528149f2cd2d7d6eba8ef27534bdc/behavior
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-29
modified: 2025-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_tools_cmd:
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'copy '
    selection_tools_pwsh:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'copy-item'
            - ' copy '
            - 'cpi '
            - ' cp '
    selection_tools_other:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\robocopy.exe'
              - '\xcopy.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'robocopy.exe'
              - 'XCOPY.EXE'
    selection_target_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\System32'
            - '\SysWOW64'
            - '\WinSxS'
    selection_target_lolbin:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: add more binaries to increase coverage
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\calc.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cmdl32.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\ie4uinit.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_tools_* and all of selection_target_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_copy_system_dir_lolbin/info.yml

title: NTDS.DIT Creation By Uncommon Parent Process
id: 4e7050dd-e548-483f-b7d6-527ab4fa784d
related:
    - id: 11b1ed55-154d-4e82-8ad7-83739298f720
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects creation of a file named "ntds.dit" (Active Directory Database) by an uncommon parent process or directory
references:
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration
    - https://www.n00py.io/2022/03/manipulating-user-passwords-without-mimikatz/
    - https://pentestlab.blog/tag/ntds-dit/
    - https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/414ee1104526d7057f9adaeee196d91ae447283e/Gather/Copy-VSS.ps1
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-11
modified: 2023-01-05
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
    definition: 'Requirements: The "ParentImage" field is not available by default on EID 11 of Sysmon logs. To be able to use this rule to the full extent you need to enrich the log with additional ParentImage data'
detection:
    selection_file:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\ntds.dit'
    selection_process_parent:
        # Note: ParentImage is a custom field and is not available by default on Sysmon EID 11
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\httpd.exe'
            - '\nginx.exe'
            - '\php-cgi.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\w3wp.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    selection_process_parent_path:
        # Note: ParentImage is a custom field and is not available by default on Sysmon EID 11
        ParentImage|contains:
            - '\apache'
            - '\tomcat'
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\Public\'
            - '\PerfLogs\'
    condition: selection_file and 1 of selection_process_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Homoglyph Attack Using Lookalike Characters
id: 32e280f1-8ad4-46ef-9e80-910657611fbc
status: test
description: |
    Detects the presence of unicode characters which are homoglyphs, or identical in appearance, to ASCII letter characters.
    This is used as an obfuscation and masquerading techniques. Only "perfect" homoglyphs are included; these are characters that
    are indistinguishable from ASCII characters and thus may make excellent candidates for homoglyph attack characters.
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/socgholish/#threat-socgholish
    - http://www.irongeek.com/homoglyph-attack-generator.php
author: Micah Babinski, @micahbabinski
date: 2023-05-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_upper:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - "\u0410" # А/A
            - "\u0412" # В/B
            - "\u0415" # Е/E
            - "\u041a" # К/K
            - "\u041c" # М/M
            - "\u041d" # Н/H
            - "\u041e" # О/O
            - "\u0420" # Р/P
            - "\u0421" # С/C
            - "\u0422" # Т/T
            - "\u0425" # Х/X
            - "\u0405" # Ѕ/S
            - "\u0406" # І/I
            - "\u0408" # Ј/J
            - "\u04ae" # Ү/Y
            - "\u04c0" # Ӏ/I
            - "\u050C" # Ԍ/G
            - "\u051a" # Ԛ/Q
            - "\u051c" # Ԝ/W
            - "\u0391" # Α/A
            - "\u0392" # Β/B
            - "\u0395" # Ε/E
            - "\u0396" # Ζ/Z
            - "\u0397" # Η/H
            - "\u0399" # Ι/I
            - "\u039a" # Κ/K
            - "\u039c" # Μ/M
            - "\u039d" # Ν/N
            - "\u039f" # Ο/O
            - "\u03a1" # Ρ/P
            - "\u03a4" # Τ/T
            - "\u03a5" # Υ/Y
            - "\u03a7" # Χ/X
    selection_lower:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - "\u0430" # а/a
            - "\u0435" # е/e
            - "\u043e" # о/o
            - "\u0440" # р/p
            - "\u0441" # с/c
            - "\u0445" # х/x
            - "\u0455" # ѕ/s
            - "\u0456" # і/i
            - "\u04cf" # ӏ/l
            - "\u0458" # ј/j
            - "\u04bb" # һ/h
            - "\u0501" # ԁ/d
            - "\u051b" # ԛ/q
            - "\u051d" # ԝ/w
            - "\u03bf" # ο/o
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Commandlines with legitimate Cyrillic text; will likely require tuning (or not be usable) in countries where these alphabets are in use.
level: medium

title: Potential Raspberry Robin CPL Execution Activity
id: 92020b88-9caf-464f-bad8-cd0fb0aa2a81
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of a ".CPL" file located in the user temp directory via the Shell32 DLL "Control_RunDLL" export function.
    This behavior was observed in multiple Raspberry-Robin variants.
references:
    - https://tria.ge/240226-fhbe7sdc39/behavioral1
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/browse/signature/RaspberryRobin/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2024-03-07
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.011
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # Example: "C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" Shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL "C:\Users\xxxx\AppData\Local\Temp\xxxx.CPL"
    selection_parent_img:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\control.exe'
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'shell32.dll'
            - 'Control_RunDLL'
            - '.CPL'
    selection_path:
        CommandLine|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Suspicious Change To Sensitive/Critical Files
id: 86157017-c2b1-4d4a-8c33-93b8e67e4af4
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes of sensitive and critical files. Monitors files that you don't expect to change without planning on Linux system.
    These files include, but are not limited to, system configuration files, authentication files, and critical application files.
    Attackers often target these files to maintain persistence, escalate privileges, or disrupt system operations.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/file-integrity-monitoring-overview#which-files-should-i-monitor
author: '@d4ns4n_ (Wuerth-Phoenix)'
date: 2023-05-30
modified: 2026-03-18
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1565.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img_1:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/cat'
            - '/echo'
            - '/grep'
            - '/head'
            - '/more'
            - '/tail'
        CommandLine|contains: '>'
    selection_img_2:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/emacs'
            - '/nano'
            - '/sed'
            - '/vi'
            - '/vim'
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/login'
            - '/bin/passwd'
            - '/boot/'
            - '/etc/*.conf'
            - '/etc/cron.' # Covers different cron config files "daily", "hourly", etc.
            - '/etc/crontab'
            - '/etc/hosts'
            - '/etc/init.d'
            - '/etc/sudoers'
            - '/opt/bin/'
            - '/sbin' # Covers: '/opt/sbin', '/usr/local/sbin/', '/usr/sbin/'
            - '/usr/bin/'
            - '/usr/local/bin/'
    filter_main_mdadm.conf:
        Image|endswith: '/bin/sed'
        CommandLine|startswith:
            - 'sed -i /^*'
            - 'sed -ne s/^'
        CommandLine|endswith: '/etc/mdadm/mdadm.conf'
    condition: 1 of selection_img_* and selection_paths and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Some false positives are to be expected on user or administrator machines. Apply additional filters as needed.
level: medium

title: Suspicious Inbox Forwarding Identity Protection
id: 27e4f1d6-ae72-4ea0-8a67-77a73a289c3d
status: test
description: Indicates suspicious rules such as an inbox rule that forwards a copy of all emails to an external address
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#suspicious-inbox-forwarding
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.t1114.003
    - attack.collection
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'suspiciousInboxForwarding'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - A legitimate forwarding rule.
level: high

title: Suspicious Java Children Processes
id: d292e0af-9a18-420c-9525-ec0ac3936892
status: test
description: Detects java process spawning suspicious children
references:
    - https://www.tecmint.com/different-types-of-linux-shells/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '/java'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/sh'
            - 'bash'
            - 'dash'
            - 'ksh'
            - 'zsh'
            - 'csh'
            - 'fish'
            - 'curl'
            - 'wget'
            - 'python'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious RunAs-Like Flag Combination
id: 50d66fb0-03f8-4da0-8add-84e77d12a020
status: test
description: Detects suspicious command line flags that let the user set a target user and command as e.g. seen in PsExec-like tools
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/k/hack-the-real-box-apt41-new-subgroup-earth-longzhi.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-11
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_user:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -u system '
            - ' --user system '
            - ' -u NT'
            - ' -u "NT'
            - " -u 'NT"
            - ' --system '
            - ' -u administrator '
    selection_command:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -c cmd'
            - ' -c "cmd'
            - ' -c powershell'
            - ' -c "powershell'
            - ' --command cmd'
            - ' --command powershell'
            - ' -c whoami'
            - ' -c wscript'
            - ' -c cscript'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Suspicious Use of /dev/tcp
id: 6cc5fceb-9a71-4c23-aeeb-963abe0b279c
status: test
description: Detects suspicious command with /dev/tcp
references:
    - https://www.andreafortuna.org/2021/03/06/some-useful-tips-about-dev-tcp/
    - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/shells/shells/linux
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1046/T1046.md#atomic-test-1---port-scan
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-10
modified: 2023-01-06
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
logsource:
    product: linux
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'cat </dev/tcp/'
        - 'exec 3<>/dev/tcp/'
        - 'echo >/dev/tcp/'
        - 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/'
        - 'sh -i >& /dev/udp/'
        - '0<&196;exec 196<>/dev/tcp/'
        - 'exec 5<>/dev/tcp/'
        - '(sh)0>/dev/tcp/'
        - 'bash -c ''bash -i >& /dev/tcp/'
        - 'echo -e ''#!/bin/bash\nbash -i >& /dev/tcp/'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Suspicious WSMAN Provider Image Loads
id: ad1f4bb9-8dfb-4765-adb6-2a7cfb6c0f94
status: test
description: Detects signs of potential use of the WSMAN provider from uncommon processes locally and remote execution.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/chadtilbury/status/1275851297770610688
    - https://bohops.com/2020/05/12/ws-management-com-another-approach-for-winrm-lateral-movement/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/winrm/windows-remote-management-architecture
    - https://github.com/bohops/WSMan-WinRM
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-06-24
modified: 2026-07-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    request_client:
        - ImageLoaded|endswith:
              - '\WsmSvc.dll'
              - '\WsmAuto.dll'
              - '\Microsoft.WSMan.Management.ni.dll'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'WsmSvc.dll'
              - 'WSMANAUTOMATION.DLL'
              - 'Microsoft.WSMan.Management.dll'
    respond_server:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        OriginalFileName: 'WsmWmiPl.dll'
    filter_general:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\PowerShell\6\pwsh.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\PowerShell\7\pwsh.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\6\pwsh.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7\pwsh.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\services.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell_ise.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe'
    filter_svchost: # not available in Sysmon data, but Aurora logs
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s BITS'
            - 'svchost.exe -k GraphicsPerfSvcGroup -s GraphicsPerfSvc'
            - 'svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Wecsvc'
            - 'svchost.exe -k netsvcs'
    filter_mscorsvw: # Image: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\mscorsvw.exe
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v'
            - 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v'
            - 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\FrameworkArm\v'
            - 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\FrameworkArm64\v'
        Image|endswith: '\mscorsvw.exe'
    filter_gethelp:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.GetHelp_'
        Image|endswith: '\GetHelp.exe'
    filter_svr_2019:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\Configure-SMRemoting.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\ServerManager.exe'
    filter_nextron:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\'
    filter_citrix:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Citrix\'
    filter_upgrade:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\Sources\'
    filter_mmc:
        Image|endswith: '\mmc.exe'
    svchost:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
    commandline_null:
        CommandLine: null
    condition: ( request_client or respond_server ) and not 1 of filter* and not ( svchost and commandline_null )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Zerologon Exploitation Using Well-known Tools
id: 18f37338-b9bd-4117-a039-280c81f7a596
status: stable
description: This rule is designed to detect attempts to exploit Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472) vulnerability using mimikatz zerologon module or other exploits from machine with "kali" hostname.
references:
    - https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon
    - https://bi-zone.medium.com/hunting-for-zerologon-f65c61586382
author: 'Demyan Sokolin @_drd0c, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, oscd.community'
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2021-05-30
tags:
    - attack.t1210
    - attack.lateral-movement
logsource:
    service: system
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 5805
            - 5723
    keywords:
        - kali
        - mimikatz
    condition: selection and keywords
level: critical