Sigma rules: 0l

title: Active Directory Group Enumeration With Get-AdGroup
id: 8c3a6607-b7dc-4f0d-a646-ef38c00b76ee
status: test
description: Detects usage of the "Get-AdGroup" cmdlet to enumerate Groups within Active Directory
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1018/T1018.md
author: frack113
date: 2022-03-17
modified: 2022-11-17
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1069.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Get-AdGroup '
            - '-Filter'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low

title: Add SafeBoot Keys Via Reg Utility
id: d7662ff6-9e97-4596-a61d-9839e32dee8d
related:
    - id: fc0e89b5-adb0-43c1-b749-c12a10ec37de
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of "reg.exe" commands with the "add" or "copy" flags on safe boot registry keys. Often used by attacker to allow the ransomware to work in safe mode as some security products do not
references:
    - https://redacted.com/blog/bianlian-ransomware-gang-gives-it-a-go/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-02
modified: 2024-03-19
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_safeboot:
        CommandLine|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot'
    selection_flag:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' copy '
            - ' add '
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_add_safeboot/info.yml

title: Blue Mockingbird
id: c3198a27-23a0-4c2c-af19-e5328d49680e
related:
    - id: ce239692-aa94-41b3-b32f-9cab259c96ea
      type: merged
status: test
description: Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/
author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick)
date: 2020-05-14
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.t1047
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    sc_cmd:
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'sc config'
            - 'wercplsupporte.dll'
    wmic_cmd:
        Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith: 'COR_PROFILER'
    condition: sc_cmd or wmic_cmd
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: CMSTP Execution Process Creation
id: 7d4cdc5a-0076-40ca-aac8-f7e714570e47
status: stable
description: Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20190720093911/http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/
author: Nik Seetharaman
date: 2018-07-16
modified: 2020-12-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.003
    - attack.g0069
    - car.2019-04-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # CMSTP Spawning Child Process
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\cmstp.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate CMSTP use (unlikely in modern enterprise environments)
level: high

title: DNS Query To Katz Stealer Domains - Network
id: 6b0c762f-0e1b-435f-a829-5943b08fe36a
related:
    - id: 9c3d6e32-f4c8-4d73-8b8f-95c3b383a13c
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects DNS queries to domains associated with Katz Stealer malware.
    Katz Stealer is a malware variant that is known to be used for stealing sensitive information from compromised systems.
    In Enterprise environments, DNS queries to these domains may indicate potential malicious activity or compromise.
references:
    - Internal research
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-05-22
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: dns
detection:
    selection:
        query|contains:
            - 'katz-panel.com'
            - 'katz-stealer.com'
            - 'katzstealer.com'
            - 'twist2katz.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: DNS Server Error Failed Loading the ServerLevelPluginDLL
id: cbe51394-cd93-4473-b555-edf0144952d9
related:
    - id: e61e8a88-59a9-451c-874e-70fcc9740d67
      type: derived
    - id: f63b56ee-3f79-4b8a-97fb-5c48007e8573
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a DNS server error in which a specified plugin DLL (in registry) could not be loaded
references:
    - https://medium.com/@esnesenon/feature-not-bug-dnsadmin-to-dc-compromise-in-one-line-a0f779b8dc83
    - https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc735829(v=ws.10).aspx
    - https://twitter.com/gentilkiwi/status/861641945944391680
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-05-08
modified: 2023-02-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: dns-server
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 150
            - 770
            - 771
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Extended rights backdoor obfuscation (via localizationDisplayId attribute)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker modifies the "configuration" partition in order to obfuscate sneaky changes that will allow him to introduce a stealthy AdminSDholder backdoor.
requirements: auditing SACL ("Write all properties") must be placed on the "configuration" partition using the ADSI console (https://www.manageengine.com/products/active-directory-audit/active-directory-auditing-configuration-guide-configure-object-level-auditing-manually.html). More precisely, you need to browse to Configuration > CN=Configuration > CN=ExtendedRights.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1546-Event%20Triggered%20Execution
- https://adds-security.blogspot.com/2017/08/adminsdholder-backdoor-via-substitution.html
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1564
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5136
    OperationType: '%%14674' # Value added
    AttributeLDAPDisplayName: localizationDisplayId
    ObjectDN|contains: "CN=Extended-Rights,CN=Configuration"
  filter:
    SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high

title: Harvesting Of Wifi Credentials Via Netsh.EXE
id: 42b1a5b8-353f-4f10-b256-39de4467faff
status: test
description: Detect the harvesting of wifi credentials using netsh.exe
references:
    - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2020/04/new-agenttesla-variant-steals-wifi-credentials/
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades), oscd.community
date: 2020-04-20
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1040
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\netsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'netsh.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'wlan'
            - ' s'
            - ' p'
            - ' k'
            - '=clear'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Lace Tempest PowerShell Evidence Eraser
id: b377ddab-502d-4519-9e8c-5590033d2d70
status: test
description: |
    Detects a PowerShell script used by Lace Tempest APT to erase evidence from victim servers by exploiting CVE-2023-47246 as reported by SysAid Team
references:
    - https://www.sysaid.com/blog/service-desk/on-premise-software-security-vulnerability-notification
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'cleanLL'
            - 'usersfiles.war'
            - 'Remove-Item -Path "$tomcat_dir'
            - 'SysAidServer'
            - 'sleep '
            - 'while(1)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: macOS ESF Suspicious File Creation in Persistence Locations
id: b2c3d4e5-f6a7-8901-bcde-f23456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects file creation in macOS persistence locations that could indicate malware installation
author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
date: 2025/01/15
modified: 2025/01/15
logsource:
    product: macos
    service: endpointsecurity
    category: file_create
detection:
    selection:
        event.action: create
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '/Library/LaunchAgents'
            - '/Library/LaunchDaemons'
            - '/System/Library/LaunchAgents'
            - '/System/Library/LaunchDaemons'
            - '~/Library/LaunchAgents'
            - '/Library/StartupItems'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software installation
    - System updates
level: high
tags:
    - attack.persistence

title: MacOS Scripting Interpreter AppleScript
id: 1bc2e6c5-0885-472b-bed6-be5ea8eace55
status: test
description: Detects execution of AppleScript of the macOS scripting language AppleScript.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1059.002/T1059.002.md
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/applescript/
author: Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-21
modified: 2026-05-21
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/osascript'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -e '
            - '.scpt'
            - '.js'
    filter_optional_opencode:
        # OpenCode uses osascript to handle copying text from the TUI on MacOS devices. See https://github.com/anomalyco/opencode/blob/ca723f1cbc6fc4244ae57e61e9de8c4e37380ed4/packages/opencode/src/cli/cmd/tui/util/clipboard.ts#L65 for reference.
        ParentImage|endswith: 'opencode'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'osascript'
            - ' -e '
            - 'set imageData to the clipboard'
            - 'set fileRef'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Application installers might contain scripts as part of the installation process.
level: medium

title: Modify Group Policy Settings - ScriptBlockLogging
id: b7216a7d-687e-4c8d-82b1-3080b2ad961f
related:
    - id: ada4b0c4-758b-46ac-9033-9004613a150d
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detect malicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1484.001/T1484.001.md
author: frack113
date: 2022-08-19
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1484.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_path:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: \SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System
    selection_key:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - GroupPolicyRefreshTimeDC
            - GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffsetDC
            - GroupPolicyRefreshTime
            - GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffset
            - EnableSmartScreen
            - ShellSmartScreenLevel
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_modify_group_policy_settings/info.yml

title: New Federated Domain Added
id: 58f88172-a73d-442b-94c9-95eaed3cbb36
related:
    - id: 42127bdd-9133-474f-a6f1-97b6c08a4339
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the addition of a new Federated Domain.
references:
    - https://research.splunk.com/cloud/e155876a-6048-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002/
    - https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/
author: Splunk Threat Research Team (original rule), Harjot Singh @cyb3rjy0t (sigma rule)
date: 2023-09-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1484.002
logsource:
    service: audit
    product: m365
detection:
    selection_domain:
        Operation|contains: 'domain'
    selection_operation:
        Operation|contains:
            - 'add'
            - 'new'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider.
level: medium

title: Potential Persistence Via MyComputer Registry Keys
id: 8fbe98a8-8f9d-44f8-aa71-8c572e29ef06
status: test
description: Detects modification to the "Default" value of the "MyComputer" key and subkeys to point to a custom binary that will be launched whenever the associated action is executed (see reference section for example)
references:
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/01/18/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-55/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-09
modified: 2024-01-11
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer'
        TargetObject|endswith: '(Default)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely but if you experience FPs add specific processes and locations you would like to monitor for
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Netsh Helper DLL
id: 56321594-9087-49d9-bf10-524fe8479452
related:
    - id: c90362e0-2df3-4e61-94fe-b37615814cb1
      type: similar
    - id: e7b18879-676e-4a0e-ae18-27039185a8e7
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of netsh with "add helper" flag in order to add a custom helper DLL. This technique can be abused to add a malicious helper DLL that can be used as a persistence proxy that gets called when netsh.exe is executed.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.007/T1546.007.md
    - https://github.com/outflanknl/NetshHelperBeacon
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20160928212230/https://www.adaptforward.com/2016/09/using-netshell-to-execute-evil-dlls-and-persist-on-a-host/
author: Victor Sergeev, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.007
    - attack.s0108
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'netsh.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\netsh.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'add'
            - 'helper'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potential WinAPI Calls Via CommandLine
id: ba3f5c1b-6272-4119-9dbd-0bc8d21c2702
related:
    - id: 03d83090-8cba-44a0-b02f-0b756a050306
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the use of WinAPI Functions via the commandline. As seen used by threat actors via the tool winapiexec
references:
    - https://twitter.com/m417z/status/1566674631788007425
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-06
modified: 2025-03-06
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'AddSecurityPackage'
            - 'AdjustTokenPrivileges'
            - 'Advapi32'
            - 'CloseHandle'
            - 'CreateProcessWithToken'
            - 'CreatePseudoConsole'
            - 'CreateRemoteThread'
            - 'CreateThread'
            - 'CreateUserThread'
            - 'DangerousGetHandle'
            - 'DuplicateTokenEx'
            - 'EnumerateSecurityPackages'
            - 'FreeHGlobal'
            - 'FreeLibrary'
            - 'GetDelegateForFunctionPointer'
            - 'GetLogonSessionData'
            - 'GetModuleHandle'
            - 'GetProcAddress'
            - 'GetProcessHandle'
            - 'GetTokenInformation'
            - 'ImpersonateLoggedOnUser'
            - 'kernel32'
            - 'LoadLibrary'
            - 'memcpy'
            - 'MiniDumpWriteDump'
            # - 'msvcrt'
            - 'ntdll'
            - 'OpenDesktop'
            - 'OpenProcess'
            - 'OpenProcessToken'
            - 'OpenThreadToken'
            - 'OpenWindowStation'
            - 'PtrToString'
            - 'QueueUserApc'
            - 'ReadProcessMemory'
            - 'RevertToSelf'
            - 'RtlCreateUserThread'
            - 'secur32'
            - 'SetThreadToken'
            # - 'user32'
            - 'VirtualAlloc'
            - 'VirtualFree'
            - 'VirtualProtect'
            - 'WaitForSingleObject'
            - 'WriteInt32'
            - 'WriteProcessMemory'
            - 'ZeroFreeGlobalAllocUnicode'
    filter_optional_mpcmdrun:
        Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'GetLoadLibraryWAddress32'
    filter_optional_compatTelRunner:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\CompatTelRunner.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'FreeHGlobal'
            - 'PtrToString'
            - 'kernel32'
            - 'CloseHandle'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Some legitimate action or applications may use these functions. Investigate further to determine the legitimacy of the activity.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_inline_win_api_access/info.yml

title: Potentially Over Permissive Permissions Granted Using Dsacls.EXE
id: 01c42d3c-242d-4655-85b2-34f1739632f7
status: test
description: Detects usage of Dsacls to grant over permissive permissions
references:
    - https://ss64.com/nt/dsacls.html
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc771151(v=ws.11)
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-20
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\dsacls.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: "DSACLS.EXE"
    selection_flag:
        CommandLine|contains: ' /G '
    selection_permissions:
        CommandLine|contains: # Add more permissions as you see fit in your environment
            - 'GR'
            - 'GE'
            - 'GW'
            - 'GA'
            - 'WP'
            - 'WD'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrators granting over permissive permissions to users
level: medium

title: Potentially Suspicious Azure Front Door Connection
id: 8cb4d14e-776e-43c2-8fb9-91e7fcea32b4
status: test
description: |
    Detects connections with Azure Front Door (known legitimate service that can be leveraged for C2)
    that fall outside of known benign behavioral baseline (not using common apps or common azurefd.net endpoints)
references:
    - https://lots-project.com/site/2a2e617a75726566642e6e6574
    - https://medium.com/r3d-buck3t/red-teaming-in-cloud-leverage-azure-frontdoor-cdn-for-c2-redirectors-79dd9ca98178
    - https://www.fortalicesolutions.com/posts/hiding-behind-the-front-door-with-azure-domain-fronting
author: Isaac Dunham
date: 2024-11-07
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1102.002
    - attack.t1090.004
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|contains: 'azurefd.net'
    filter_main_web_browsers:
        Image|endswith:
            - 'brave.exe'
            - 'chrome.exe'
            - 'chromium.exe'
            - 'firefox.exe'
            - 'msedge.exe'
            - 'msedgewebview2.exe'
            - 'opera.exe'
            - 'vivaldi.exe'
    filter_main_common_talkers:
        Image|endswith: 'searchapp.exe' # Windows search service uses signifcant amount of Azure FD
    filter_main_known_benign_domains:
        DestinationHostname|contains:
            - 'afdxtest.z01.azurefd.net' # used by Cortana; Cisco Umbrella top 1m
            - 'fp-afd.azurefd.net' # used by Cortana; Cisco Umbrella top 1m
            - 'fp-afdx-bpdee4gtg6frejfd.z01.azurefd.net' # used by Cortana; Cisco Umbrella top 1m
            - 'roxy.azurefd.net' # used by Cortana; Cisco Umbrella top 1m
            - 'powershellinfraartifacts-gkhedzdeaghdezhr.z01.azurefd.net' # Used by VS Code; Cisco Umbrella top 1m
            - 'storage-explorer-publishing-feapcgfgbzc2cjek.b01.azurefd.net' # Used by Azure Storage Explorer; Cisco Umbrella top 1m
            - 'graph.azurefd.net' # MS Graph; Cisco Umbrella top 1m
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Results are not inherently suspicious, but should be investigated during threat hunting for potential cloud C2.
    - Organization-specific Azure Front Door endpoints
level: medium

title: Read Contents From Stdin Via Cmd.EXE
id: 241e802a-b65e-484f-88cd-c2dc10f9206d
related:
    - id: 00a4bacd-6db4-46d5-9258-a7d5ebff4003
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detect the use of "<" to read and potentially execute a file via cmd.exe
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.md
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220306121156/https://www.x86matthew.com/view_post?id=ntdll_pipe
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-03-07
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cmd:
        - OriginalFileName: 'Cmd.Exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '<'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmd_stdin_redirect/info.yml

title: Registry Hive File Staged Outside Standard User Profile Path
id: a7f3c891-2e4d-4b6a-9f8c-d5e2a1b04c73
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the creation of a registry hive file (UsrClass.dat or NTUSER.DAT) outside of the standard user profile path.
    These files generally contain various user-specific registry settings and are typically located in the user's profile directory.
    Staging these files outside of the standard path can be indicative of an attacker attempting to manipulate user registry settings
    for persistence, privilege escalation, or dump user registry hives for credential harvesting.
references:
    - https://github.com/MSNightmare/LegacyHive
    - https://git.projectnightcrawler.dev/NightmareEclipse/LegacyHive
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-07-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\UsrClass.dat'
            - '\NTUSER.DAT'
    filter_main_usrclass:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat'
    filter_main_ntuser:
        TargetFilename|re|i: '^C:\\Users\\[^\\]+\\NTUSER\.DAT$'
    filter_main_system:
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\config\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SYSVOL\'
            - 'C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Backup or profile migration software
    - Forensic acquisition tools
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_registry_hive_file_creation/info.yml

title: RemCom Service Installation
id: 9e36ed87-4986-482e-8e3b-5c23ffff11bf
status: test
description: Detects RemCom service installation and execution events
references:
    - https://github.com/kavika13/RemCom/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-07
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_eid:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
    selection_service:
        - ServiceName: 'RemComSvc'
        - ImagePath|endswith: '\RemComSvc.exe'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Renamed Schtasks Execution
id: f91e51c9-f344-4b32-969b-0b6f6b8537d4
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of renamed schtasks.exe binary, which is a legitimate Windows utility used for scheduling tasks.
    One of the very common persistence techniques is schedule malicious tasks using schtasks.exe.
    Since, it is heavily abused, it is also heavily monitored by security products. To evade detection, threat actors may rename the schtasks.exe binary to schedule their malicious tasks.
references:
    - https://x.com/JangPr0/status/1932034543026065833
    - https://ss64.com/nt/schtasks.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.003
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cmd_operation:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' /create '
            - ' /delete '
            - ' /query '
            - ' /change '
            - ' /run '
            - ' /end '
    selection_cmd_flags:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' /tn '
            - ' /tr '
            - ' /sc '
            - ' /st '
            - ' /ru '
            - ' /fo '
    selection_pe:
        OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    filter_main_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains: 'schtasks'
    filter_main_img:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
    condition: (all of selection_cmd_* and not filter_main_cmd) or (selection_pe and not filter_main_img)
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Run PowerShell Script from Redirected Input Stream
id: c83bf4b5-cdf0-437c-90fa-43d734f7c476
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell script execution via input stream redirect
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/4db780e0f0b2e2bb8cb1fa13e09196da9b9f1834/yml/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Powershell.yml
    - https://twitter.com/Moriarty_Meng/status/984380793383370752
author: Moriarty Meng (idea), Anton Kutepov (rule), oscd.community
date: 2020-10-17
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        CommandLine|re: '\s-\s*<'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Shell Process Spawned by Java.EXE
id: dff1e1cc-d3fd-47c8-bfc2-aeb878a754c0
related:
    - id: 0d34ed8b-1c12-4ff2-828c-16fc860b766d
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects shell spawned from Java host process, which could be a sign of exploitation (e.g. log4j exploitation)
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20231230220738/https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades), Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2021-12-17
modified: 2024-01-18
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\java.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
    filter_main_build:
        ParentImage|contains: 'build'  # excluding CI build agents
        CommandLine|contains: 'build'  # excluding CI build agents
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate calls to system binaries
    - Company specific internal usage
level: medium

title: SMB Create Remote File Admin Share
id: b210394c-ba12-4f89-9117-44a2464b9511
status: test
description: Look for non-system accounts SMB accessing a file with write (0x2) access mask via administrative share (i.e C$).
references:
    - https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook/blob/f7a58156dbfc9b019f17f638b8c62d22e557d350/playbooks/WIN-201012004336.yaml
    - https://securitydatasets.com/notebooks/atomic/windows/lateral_movement/SDWIN-200806015757.html?highlight=create%20file
author: Jose Rodriguez (@Cyb3rPandaH), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-08-06
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName|endswith: 'C$'
        AccessMask: '0x2'
    filter_main_subjectusername:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
    filter_optional_local_ip:
        IpAddress: '::1'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Special File Creation via Mknod Syscall
id: 710bdbce-495d-491d-9a8f-7d0d88d2b41e
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects usage of the `mknod` syscall to create special files (e.g., character or block devices).
    Attackers or malware might use `mknod` to create fake devices, interact with kernel interfaces,
    or establish covert channels in Linux systems.
    Monitoring the use of `mknod` is important because this syscall is rarely used by legitimate applications,
    and it can be abused to bypass file system restrictions or create backdoors.
references:
    - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/mknod.2.html
    - https://hopeness.medium.com/master-the-linux-mknod-command-a-comprehensive-guide-1c150a546aa8
author: Milad Cheraghi
date: 2025-05-31
modified: 2025-12-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection:
        type: 'SYSCALL'
        SYSCALL: 'mknod'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Device creation by legitimate scripts or init systems (udevadm, MAKEDEV)
    - Container runtimes or security tools during initialization
level: low

title: Suspicious GPO Discovery With Get-GPO
id: eb2fd349-ec67-4caa-9143-d79c7fb34441
status: test
description: Detect use of Get-GPO to get one GPO or all the GPOs in a domain.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1615/T1615.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/grouppolicy/get-gpo?view=windowsserver2022-ps
author: frack113
date: 2022-06-04
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1615
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: Get-GPO
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: low

title: Suspicious MsiExec Embedding Parent
id: 4a2a2c3e-209f-4d01-b513-4155a540b469
status: test
description: Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy the execution of malicious payloads
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md
author: frack113
date: 2022-04-16
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.007
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'MsiExec.exe'
            - '-Embedding '
    filter_splunk_ufw:
        Image|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'C:\Program Files\SplunkUniversalForwarder\bin\'
    filter_vs:
        - CommandLine|contains: '\DismFoDInstall.cmd'
        - ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
              - '\MsiExec.exe -Embedding '
              - 'Global\MSI0000'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msiexec_embedding/info.yml

title: Suspicious SPN enumeration previous to Kerberoasting attack (PowerShell)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to retrieve SPN using PowerShell and native tools.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0007-Discovery/T1087-Account%20discovery
- https://github.com/nidem/kerberoast
- https://github.com/cyberark/RiskySPN
- https://pentestlab.blog/2018/06/04/spn-discovery/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=3458
- https://redcanary.com/blog/marshmallows-and-kerberoasting/
- https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/us-china-espionage
tags:
- attack.account_discovery
- attack.t1087.002
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1558.003
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category:
    - ps_module
    - ps_classic_script
    - ps_script
detection:
  selection1_powershell_native:
    EventID: 800
    EventData|contains:
      - 'System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken'
      - 'Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel'

  selection2_powershell_modern:
    EventID: 4103
    Payload|contains:
      - 'System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken'
      - 'Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel'

  selection3_powershell_block:
    EventID: 4104
    ScriptBlockText|contains:
      - 'System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken'
      - 'Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel'

  condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Administrators
level: high