Sigma rules: 0y

title: Access to Browser Login Data
id: fc028194-969d-4122-8abe-0470d5b8f12f
related:
    - id: 98f4c75c-3089-44f3-b733-b327b9cd9c9d
      type: obsolete
    - id: 47147b5b-9e17-4d76-b8d2-7bac24c5ce1b
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.
    Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future.
    Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.md
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-30
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1555.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_cmd:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - Copy-Item
            - '-Destination'
    selection_path:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - '\Opera Software\Opera Stable\Login Data'
            - '\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles'
            - '\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default'
            - '\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data'
            - '\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data For Account'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Add Windows Capability Via PowerShell Script
id: 155c7fd5-47b4-49b2-bbeb-eb4fab335429
related:
    - id: b36d01a3-ddaf-4804-be18-18a6247adfcd
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the "Add-WindowsCapability" cmdlet to add Windows capabilities. Notable capabilities could be "OpenSSH" and others.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/openssh/openssh_install_firstuse?tabs=powershell
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/af1c82237b6e5a3a7cdbad82cc498d298c67845d92971bada450023d1335e267/content
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-22
modified: 2023-05-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_cmdlet:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Add-WindowsCapability '
    selection_capa:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: '-Name OpenSSH.' # For both "OpenSSH.Server" and "OpenSSH.Client"
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of the capabilities by administrators or users. Add additional filters accordingly.
level: medium

title: APT User Agent
id: 6ec820f2-e963-4801-9127-d8b2dce4d31b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious user agent strings used in APT malware in proxy logs
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis
date: 2019-11-12
modified: 2024-02-15
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-useragent:
         # APT Related
            - 'SJZJ (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Win32)' # APT Backspace
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/20.0' # APT GrizzlySteppe - ChopStick - US CERT https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2017/02/10/enhanced-analysis-grizzly-steppe
            - 'User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; SLCC' # Comment Crew Miniasp
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.4; Win32;32-bit)' # Comment Crew Miniasp
            - 'webclient' # Naikon APT
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; zh-EN; rv:1.7.12) Gecko/200' # Naikon APT
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI 6.0;' # SnowGlobe Babar - yes, it is cut
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:28.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/28.0' # Sofacy - Xtunnel
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/' # Sofacy - Xtunnel
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/2' # Sofacy - Xtunnel
            - 'Mozilla/4.0' # Derusbi backdoor ELF https://github.com/fideliscyber/indicators/tree/master/FTA-1021
            - 'Netscape' # Unit78020 Malware
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; zh-EN; rv:1.7.12) Gecko/20100719 Firefox/1.0.7' # Unit78020 Malware
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Firefox/3.6.13 GTB7.1' # Winnti related
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/5.0)' # Winnti related
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NETCLR 2.0.50727)' # APT17
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.0; SV1)' # Bronze Butler - Daserf
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 11.0; Windows NT 6.1; SV1)' # Bronze Butler - Daserf
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Win32)' # TSCookie https://app.any.run/tasks/0996b314-5133-491b-8d23-d431ffdec597
            - 'Mozilla v5.1 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:6.0.1) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/6.0.1' # Delphi downloader https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/04/24/sednit-update-analysis-zebrocy/
            - 'Mozilla/6.1 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 5.3; Trident/5.0)' # VPNFilter https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/05/VPNFilter.html
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; InfoPath.1)' # Sofacy User-Agent https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) WinHttp/1.6.3.8 (WinHTTP/5.1) like Gecko' # Sofacy User-Agent https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/
            - 'Mozilla v5.1 *' # Sofacy Zebrocy samples
            - 'MSIE 8.0' # Sofacy Azzy Backdoor  from https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/a80e29c0757bee05338fd5c22a542d852ad86c477068e3eb4aacc1c3e59e2eef?environmentId=100
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; InfoPath.2)' # https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/07/microsoft-office-vulnerabilities-used-to-distribute-felixroot-backdoor.html
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; RMS)' # Attacks on industrial enterprises using RMS and TeamViewer - https://securelist.com/attacks-on-industrial-enterprises-using-rms-and-teamviewer/87104/
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; DynGate)' # Attacks on industrial enterprises using RMS and TeamViewer - https://securelist.com/attacks-on-industrial-enterprises-using-rms-and-teamviewer/87104/
            - 'O/9.27 (W; U; Z)' # Cmstar https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/e4328011bb2b04abc856ccd04404c9f95d67167f6c291d343e8ffa8aa2aa2099/details
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.0; Trident/5.0;  Trident/5.0*' # KerrDown UA
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 9; *' # Suspicious 'Windows NT 9' user agent - used by APT33 malware in 2018
            - 'hots scot' # Unknown iOS zero-day implant https://twitter.com/craiu/status/1176437994288484352?s=20
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT)' # https://blog.telsy.com/meeting-powerband-the-apt33-net-powerton-variant/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) Chrome/28.0.1500.95 Safari/537.36' # Hidden Cobra malware
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; Win32; rv:47.0)' # Strong Pity loader https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1264185981118406657
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1;SV1;' # Mustang Panda https://insights.oem.avira.com/new-wave-of-plugx-targets-hong-kong/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:22.0) Firefox/22.0' # BackdoorDiplomacy https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/06/10/backdoordiplomacy-upgrading-quarian-turian/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 Chrome/72.0.3626.109 Safari/537.36' # SideWalk malware used by Sparkling Goblin
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:FTS_06) Gecko/22.36.35.06 Firefox/2.0' # LitePower stager used by WRITE https://securelist.com/wirtes-campaign-in-the-middle-east-living-off-the-land-since-at-least-2019/105044/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/102.0.5005.63 Safari/537.36 Edg/100.0.1185.39' # https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/29/zinc-weaponizing-open-source-software/
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; InfoPath.3; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)' # https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/29/zinc-weaponizing-open-source-software/
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 10.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; Tablet PC 2.0)' # PlugX backdoor https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/thor-plugx-variant/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/42.0.2311.135 Safari/537.36 Edge/12.246001'  # RedCurl Downloader APT https://www.facct.ru/blog/redcurl-2024
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Old browsers
level: high

title: AWL Bypass with Winrm.vbs and Malicious WsmPty.xsl/WsmTxt.xsl
id: 074e0ded-6ced-4ebd-8b4d-53f55908119d
status: test
description: Detects execution of attacker-controlled WsmPty.xsl or WsmTxt.xsl via winrm.vbs and copied cscript.exe (can be renamed)
references:
    - https://posts.specterops.io/application-whitelisting-bypass-and-arbitrary-unsigned-code-execution-technique-in-winrm-vbs-c8c24fb40404
author: Julia Fomina, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-06
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1216
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    contains_format_pretty_arg:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'format:pretty'
            - 'format:"pretty"'
            - 'format:"text"'
            - 'format:text'
    image_from_system_folder:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
    contains_winrm:
        CommandLine|contains: 'winrm'
    condition: contains_winrm and (contains_format_pretty_arg and not image_from_system_folder)
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: medium

title: Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service Initiated
id: 1d08ac94-400d-4469-a82f-daee9a908849
related:
    - id: 18249279-932f-45e2-b37a-8925f2597670
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" tunneling domains.
    Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware.
    While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/hakluke/status/1587733971814977537/photo/1
    - https://ngrok.com/docs/secure-tunnels/tunnels/ssh-reverse-tunnel-agent
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-03
modified: 2024-02-02
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1567
    - attack.t1568.002
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1102
    - attack.s0508
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|contains:
            - 'tunnel.us.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.eu.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.ap.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.au.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.sa.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.jp.ngrok.com'
            - 'tunnel.in.ngrok.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the ngrok service.
level: high

title: CVE-2023-40477 Potential Exploitation - WinRAR Application Crash
id: e5a29b54-6fe7-4258-8a23-82960e31231a
status: test
description: Detects a crash of "WinRAR.exe" where the version is lower than 6.23. This could indicate potential exploitation of CVE-2023-40477
references:
    - https://wildptr.io/winrar-cve-2023-40477-poc-new-vulnerability-winrar-security-research/
    - https://github.com/wildptr-io/Winrar-CVE-2023-40477-POC
    - https://www.rarlab.com/vuln_rev3_names.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-31
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - cve.2023-40477
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Application Error'
        EventID: 1000
        AppName: 'WinRAR.exe'
    filter_main_fixed_version:
        # TODO: fix this when the "lt" modifier is implemented for software versions
        AppVersion|startswith:
            - '6.23.'
            - '6.24.'
            - '6.25.'
            - '6.26.'
            - '7.'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate crash for reasons other than exploitation of the vulnerability
level: medium

title: Emotet Loader Execution Via .LNK File
id: 1f32d820-1d5c-43fe-8fe2-feef0c952eb7
status: test
description: |
    Detects the Emotet Epoch4 loader as reported by @malware_traffic back in 2022.
    The ".lnk" file was delivered via phishing campaign.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220422215221/https://twitter.com/malware_traffic/status/1517622327000846338
    - https://twitter.com/Cryptolaemus1/status/1517634855940632576
    - https://tria.ge/220422-1pw1pscfdl/
    - https://tria.ge/220422-1nnmyagdf2/
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2022-04-22
modified: 2024-08-15
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.006
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\explorer.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'findstr'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.lnk'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: End User Consent Blocked
id: 7091372f-623c-4293-bc37-20c32b3492be
status: test
description: Detects when end user consent is blocked due to risk-based consent.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#end-user-stopped-due-to-risk-based-consent
author: Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow'
date: 2022-07-10
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1528
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        failure_status_reason: 'Microsoft.online.Security.userConsentBlockedForRiskyAppsExceptions'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Firewall Disabled
id: 29e86bb3-3940-42e7-8da9-0ea4d47f20df
status: experimental
description: Detects disabling of the macOS firewall which exposes the system to network
  attacks
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004/
author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
date: 2025/10/29
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1562.004
logsource:
  product: macos
  service: unifiedlog
  category: firewall_events
detection:
  selection:
    subsystem: com.apple.alf
    message|contains:
    - firewall disabled
    - firewall stopped
    - global state disabled
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Network troubleshooting
level: high
modified: 2025/01/15

title: HTML Help HH.EXE Suspicious Child Process
id: 52cad028-0ff0-4854-8f67-d25dfcbc78b4
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious child process of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
references:
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/chm-badness-delivers-a-banking-trojan/
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-27939090904026cc396b0b629c8e4314acd6f5dac40a676edbc87f4567b47eb7
    - https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/unintentional-leak-glimpse-attack-vectors-apt37
author: Maxim Pavlunin, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-04-01
modified: 2023-04-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1218.001
    - attack.t1218.010
    - attack.t1218.011
    - attack.t1566
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\hh.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\CertReq.exe'
            - '\CertUtil.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\installutil.exe'
            - '\MSbuild.exe'
            - '\MSHTA.EXE'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Kapeka Backdoor Persistence Activity
id: 64a871dd-83f6-4e5f-80fc-5a7ca3a8a819
status: test
description: |
    Detects Kapeka backdoor persistence activity.
    Depending on the process privileges, the Kapeka dropper then sets persistence for the backdoor either as a scheduled task (if admin or SYSTEM) or autorun registry (if not).
    For the scheduled task, it creates a scheduled task called "Sens Api" via schtasks command, which is set to run upon system startup as SYSTEM.
    To establish persistence through the autorun utility, it adds an autorun entry called "Sens Api" under HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run via the "reg add" command.
    Both persistence mechanisms are set to launch the binary by calling rundll32 and passing the backdoor's first export ordinal (#1) without any additional argument.
references:
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/kapeka
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/1efb3ed4-cc0f-4690-a0ed-24516809bc72/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/bd07fb1e9b4768e7202de6cc454c78c6891270af02085c51fce5539db1386c3f/behavior
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2024-07-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_schtasks_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    selection_schtasks_flags:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'create'
            - 'ONSTART'
    selection_reg_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_reg_flags:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'add'
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
    selection_backdoor_command:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32'
            - '.wll'
            - '#1'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Sens Api'
            - 'OneDrive' # The scheduled task was called "OneDrive" instead of "Sens Api" in some cases
    condition: (all of selection_schtasks_* or all of selection_reg_*) and selection_backdoor_command
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Logon from a Risky IP Address
id: c191e2fa-f9d6-4ccf-82af-4f2aba08359f
status: test
description: Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when a user signs into your sanctioned apps from a risky IP address.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/anomaly-detection-policy
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/policy-template-reference
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    service: threat_management
    product: m365
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: SecurityComplianceCenter
        eventName: 'Log on from a risky IP address'
        status: success
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Microsoft Office Protected View Disabled
id: a5c7a43f-6009-4a8c-80c5-32abf1c53ecc
related:
    - id: 7c637634-c95d-4bbf-b26c-a82510874b34
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects changes to Microsoft Office protected view registry keys with which the attacker disables this feature.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-gorgon-group-slithering-nation-state-cybercrime/
    - https://yoroi.company/research/cyber-criminal-espionage-operation-insists-on-italian-manufacturing/
    - https://admx.help/HKCU/software/policies/microsoft/office/16.0/excel/security/protectedview
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-08
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection_path:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\Security\ProtectedView\'
    selection_values_1:
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\DisableAttachementsInPV' # Turn off Protected View for attachments opened from Outlook
            - '\DisableInternetFilesInPV' # Turn off Protected View for files downloaded from Internet zone
            - '\DisableIntranetCheck' # Turn off Protected View for file located in UNC paths
            - '\DisableUnsafeLocationsInPV' # Turn off Protected View for unsafe locations
    selection_values_0:
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\enabledatabasefileprotectedview'
            - '\enableforeigntextfileprotectedview'
    condition: selection_path and 1 of selection_values_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable Microsoft Office Security Features
      technique: T1685
      atomic_guid: 6f5fb61b-4e56-4a3d-a8c3-82e13686c6d7

title: Microsoft Sync Center Suspicious Network Connections
id: 9f2cc74d-78af-4eb2-bb64-9cd1d292b87b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious connections from Microsoft Sync Center to non-private IPs.
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-november-2021/
author: elhoim
date: 2022-04-28
modified: 2024-03-12
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: network_connection
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\mobsync.exe'
    filter_main_local_ranges:
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: New DLL Added to AppInit_DLLs Registry Key
id: 4f84b697-c9ed-4420-8ab5-e09af5b2345d
status: test
description: DLLs that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry key HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll
references:
    - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/822dc4c5-b355-4df8-bd37-29c458997b8f.html
author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community, Tim Shelton
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.010
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - TargetObject|endswith:
              - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\AppInit_Dlls'
              - '\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\AppInit_Dlls'
        # Key Rename
        - NewName|endswith:
              - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\AppInit_Dlls'
              - '\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\AppInit_Dlls'
    filter:
        Details: '(Empty)'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: New member added to a "OCS/Lync/Skype for Business" administration group (medium risk)
description: Detects scenarios where a new member is added to a sensitive administration group related to OCS/Lync/Skype for Business in order to scan topology, infiltrate servers and move laterally.
references:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/office/lync-server-2013/lync-server-2013-planning-for-role-based-access-control
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/skypeforbusiness/schema-reference/active-directory-schema-extensions-classes-and-attributes/changes-made-by-forest-preparation
- https://blog.insideo365.com/2012/11/a-lync-administrator-access-refresher/
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 4728 # security global group member added
      - 4756 # universal group member added
      - 4732 # local and domain local group member added
    TargetUserName:
      - CSArchivingAdministrator
      - CSUserAdministrator
      - RTCHSUniversalServices
      - RTCUniversalGlobalWriteGroup
      - RTCUniversalSBATechnicians
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- OCS/Lync/Skype administrator updating server configuration or topology
- OCS/Lync/Skype upgrade or migration
level: high

title: New ODBC Driver Registered
id: 3390fbef-c98d-4bdd-a863-d65ed7c610dd
status: test
description: Detects the registration of a new ODBC driver.
references:
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/odbcconf-lolbin-trifecta/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-23
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\ODBC\ODBCINST.INI\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Driver'
    filter_main_sqlserver:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SQL Server\'
        Details: '%WINDIR%\System32\SQLSRV32.dll'
    filter_optional_office_access:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft Access '
        Details|startswith: 'C:\Progra'
        Details|endswith: '\ACEODBC.DLL'
    filter_optional_office_excel:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft Excel Driver'
        Details|startswith: 'C:\Progra'
        Details|endswith: '\ACEODBC.DLL'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Likely
level: low

title: Possible Privilege Escalation via Weak Service Permissions
id: d937b75f-a665-4480-88a5-2f20e9f9b22a
status: test
description: Detection of sc.exe utility spawning by user with Medium integrity level to change service ImagePath or FailureCommand
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2017/03/30/weak-service-permissions/
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov
date: 2019-10-26
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    scbynonadmin:
        Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'Medium'
            - 'S-1-16-8192'
    selection_binpath:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'config'
            - 'binPath'
    selection_failure:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'failure'
            - 'command'
    condition: scbynonadmin and 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential CVE-2022-22954 Exploitation Attempt - VMware Workspace ONE Access Remote Code Execution
id: 5660d8db-6e25-411f-b92f-094420168a5d
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential exploitation attempt of CVE-2022-22954, a remote code execution vulnerability in VMware Workspace ONE Access and Identity Manager.
    As reported by Morphisec, part of the attack chain, threat actors used PowerShell commands that executed as a child processes of the legitimate Tomcat "prunsrv.exe" process application.
references:
    - https://blog.morphisec.com/vmware-identity-manager-attack-backdoor
    - https://github.com/DrorDvash/CVE-2022-22954_VMware_PoC
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2022-04-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1059.006
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2022-22954
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\prunsrv.exe'
    selection_payload_pwsh:
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
    selection_payload_cmd:
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '/c powershell'
    condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_payload_*
falsepositives:
    - Some false positives are possible as part of a custom script implementation from admins executed with cmd.exe as the child process.
level: medium

title: Potential Persistence Via DLLPathOverride
id: a1b1fd53-9c4a-444c-bae0-34a330fc7aa8
status: test
description: Detects when an attacker adds a new "DLLPathOverride" value to the "Natural Language" key in order to achieve persistence which will get invoked by "SearchIndexer.exe" process
references:
    - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/naturallanguage6.html
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/12/30/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-98/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-21
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_root:
        # The path can be for multiple languages
        # Example:  HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ContentIndex\Language\English_UK
        #           HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ContentIndex\Language\English_US
        #           HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ContentIndex\Language\Neutral
        TargetObject|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ContentIndex\Language\'
    selection_values:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\StemmerDLLPathOverride'
            - '\WBDLLPathOverride'
            - '\StemmerClass'
            - '\WBreakerClass'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell Get-Process LSASS in ScriptBlock
id: 84c174ab-d3ef-481f-9c86-a50d0b8e3edb
status: test
description: Detects a Get-Process command on lsass process, which is in almost all cases a sign of malicious activity
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220205033028/https://twitter.com/PythonResponder/status/1385064506049630211
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-04-23
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Get-Process lsass'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate certificate exports invoked by administrators or users (depends on processes in the environment - filter if unusable)
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_getprocess_lsass/info.yml

title: PUA - Memory Dump Mount Via MemProcFS
id: 8a1b2c3d-4e5f-6789-abcd-ef1234567890
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects execution of MemProcFS a memory forensics tool with the '-device' parameter.
    MemProcFS mounts physical memory as a virtual file system, allowing direct access to process memory and system structures.
    Threat actors were seen abusing this utility to mount memory dumps and then extract sensitive information from processes like LSASS or extract registry hives to obtain credentials, LSA secrets, SAM data, and cached domain credentials.
    MemProcFS usage that is not part of authorized forensic analysis should be treated as suspicious and warrants further investigation.
references:
    - https://github.com/ufrisk/MemProcFS
    - https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2024/10/05/htb-freelancer.html#
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/curling-for-data-a-dive-into-a-threat-actors-malicious-ttps
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\MemProcFS.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'MemProcFS.exe'
        - Description: 'MemProcFS'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '-device'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use during memory forensics; if not part of authorized analysis, warrants urgent investigation
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_memprocfs/info.yml

title: PUA - Nimgrab Execution
id: 74a12f18-505c-4114-8d0b-8448dd5485c6
status: test
description: Detects the usage of nimgrab, a tool bundled with the Nim programming framework and used for downloading files.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/28d190330fe44de6ff4767fc400cc10fa7cd6540/atomics/T1105/T1105.md
author: frack113
date: 2022-08-28
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_name:
        Image|endswith: '\nimgrab.exe'
    selection_hashes:
        Hashes|contains:
            - MD5=2DD44C3C29D667F5C0EF5F9D7C7FFB8B
            - SHA256=F266609E91985F0FE3E31C5E8FAEEEC4FFA5E0322D8B6F15FE69F4C5165B9559
            - IMPHASH=C07FDDD21D123EA9B3A08EEF44AAAC45
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of Nim on a developer systems
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_nimgrab/info.yml

title: Qakbot Rundll32 Exports Execution
id: 339ed3d6-5490-46d0-96a7-8abe33078f58
status: test
description: Detects specific process tree behavior of a "rundll32" execution with exports linked with Qakbot activity.
references:
    - https://github.com/pr0xylife/Qakbot/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-24
modified: 2023-05-30
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_paths:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            # Note: Only add processes seen used by Qakbot to avoid collision with other strains of malware
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\curl.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: Only add paths seen used by Qakbot to avoid collision with other strains of malware
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
    selection_exports:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            # Note: Only add additional exports seen used by Qakbot
            - 'aslr' # https://tria.ge/230524-scgq9add9v/behavioral1#report
            - 'bind'
            - 'DrawThemeIcon'
            - 'GG10'
            - 'GL70'
            - 'jhbvygftr'
            - 'kjhbhkjvydrt'
            - 'LS88'
            - 'Motd'
            - 'N115'
            - 'next' # https://tria.ge/230530-n3rxpahf9w/behavioral2
            - 'Nikn'
            - 'print'
            - 'qqqb'
            - 'qqqq'
            - 'RS32'
            - 'Test'
            - 'Time'
            - 'Updt'
            - 'vips'
            - 'Wind'
            - 'WW50'
            - 'X555'
            - 'XL55'
            - 'xlAutoOpen'
            - 'XS88'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: Script Interpreter Spawning Credential Scanner - Linux
id: f0025a69-e1b7-4dda-a53c-db21fa2d4071
related:
    - id: 0f60b28c-64dd-4e2c-9a63-5334d3e3a6e6
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog, gitleaks).
    This behavior is indicative of an attempt to find and steal secrets, as seen in the "Shai-Hulud: The Second Coming" campaign.
references:
    - https://github.com/asyncapi/cli/blob/2efa4dff59bc3d3cecdf897ccf178f99b115d63d/bun_environment.js
    - https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-zapier-ens-domains-and-other-prominent-npm-packages-compromised
    - https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/shai-hulud-2-malware-campaign-targets-github-and-cloud-credentials-using-bun-runtime
    - https://semgrep.dev/blog/2025/digging-for-secrets-sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-of-the-npm-worm/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552
    - attack.execution
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
    - attack.t1059.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
         # Add more script interpreters as needed
            - '/node'
            - '/bun'
    selection_child:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '/trufflehog'
              - '/gitleaks'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'trufflehog'
              - 'gitleaks'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate pre-commit hooks or CI/CD pipeline jobs that use a script to run a credential scanner as part of a security check.
level: high

title: Suspicious anonymous login (domain specified)
description: Detects scenarios where a suspicious anonymous login is performed during discovery phases.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0007-Discovery/T1046-Network%20Service%20Scanning
- https://github.com/login-securite/DonPAPI
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1046
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4624
    TargetUserSid: S-1-5-7 # ANONYMOUS LOGON
    LogonType: 3
    AuthenticationPackageName: NTLM
  filter:
    - IpAddress:
      - '%vulnerability_scanners%'
    - TargetDomainName:
      - 'NT AUTHORITY'  # English
      - 'AUTORITE NT'   # French
      - 'NT AUTHORITÄT' # German
      #- other localized language names for the NT AUTHORITY
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- None
level: high

title: Suspicious Schtasks Schedule Type With High Privileges
id: 7a02e22e-b885-4404-b38b-1ddc7e65258a
related:
    - id: 24c8392b-aa3c-46b7-a545-43f71657fe98
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects scheduled task creations or modification to be run with high privileges on a suspicious schedule type
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks-change
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks-create
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-31
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    selection_time:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' ONLOGON '
            - ' ONSTART '
            - ' ONCE '
            - ' ONIDLE '
    selection_privs:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'NT AUT' # This covers the usual NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
            - ' SYSTEM' # SYSTEM is a valid value for schtasks hence it gets it's own value with space
            - 'HIGHEST'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Some installers were seen using this method of creation unfortunately. Filter them in your environment
level: medium

title: Tamper Windows Defender Remove-MpPreference - ScriptBlockLogging
id: ae2bdd58-0681-48ac-be7f-58ab4e593458
related:
    - id: 07e3cb2c-0608-410d-be4b-1511cb1a0448
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender configuration using the 'MpPreference' cmdlet
references:
    - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/windows-10-controlled-folder-access-event-search/ba-p/2326088
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-05
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_remove:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Remove-MpPreference'
    selection_tamper:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - '-ControlledFolderAccessProtectedFolders '
            - '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids '
            - '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions '
            - '-CheckForSignaturesBeforeRunningScan '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: high