Sigma rules: 15

title: Account marked as sensitive and cannot be delegated had its protection removed (weakness introduction)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker removes security protection from a sensitive account to escalate privileges
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account%20manipulation
- https://www.sans.org/blog/protecting-privileged-domain-accounts-safeguarding-access-tokens/
- https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/weakness-within-kerberos-delegation
- https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows/stealing-credentials/credentials-protections#protected-users
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4738
    UserAccountControl: '%%2062' # Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated - FALSE
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- none
level: high

title: Added Credentials to Existing Application
id: cbb67ecc-fb70-4467-9350-c910bdf7c628
status: test
description: Detects when a new credential is added to an existing application. Any additional credentials added outside of expected processes could be a malicious actor using those credentials.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-credentials
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-05-26
modified: 2026-08-20
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1098.001
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - 'Update application - Certificates and secrets management' # See https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/pull/6247#issuecomment-5463002942
            - 'Update Service principal/Update Application'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - When credentials are added/removed as part of the normal working hours/workflows
level: high

title: Clipboard Access Via OSAScript
id: 7794fa3c-edea-4cff-bec7-267dd4770fd7
related:
    - id: 1bc2e6c5-0885-472b-bed6-be5ea8eace55
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects access to clipboard content via osascript, which may be used for data collection but also occurs in legitimate clipboard utilities and automation scripts
references:
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-offensive-actors-use-applescript-for-attacking-macos/
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-01-31
modified: 2026-05-22
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1115
    - attack.t1059.002
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/osascript'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -e '
            - 'clipboard'
    filter_optional_opencode:
        # OpenCode uses osascript to handle copying text from the TUI on MacOS devices. See https://github.com/anomalyco/opencode/blob/ca723f1cbc6fc4244ae57e61e9de8c4e37380ed4/packages/opencode/src/cli/cmd/tui/util/clipboard.ts#L65 for reference.
        ParentImage|endswith: 'opencode'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'osascript'
            - ' -e '
            - 'set imageData to the clipboard'
            - 'set fileRef'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate clipboard utilities and automation scripts that read or write clipboard content
    - Developer tools and IDEs that use osascript for clipboard integration
level: medium

title: CLR DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
id: d13c43f0-f66b-4279-8b2c-5912077c1780
status: test
description: Detects CLR DLL being loaded by an Office Product
references:
    - https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
author: Antonlovesdnb
date: 2020-02-19
modified: 2023-03-29
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\excel.exe'
            - '\mspub.exe'
            - '\outlook.exe'
            - '\onenote.exe'
            - '\onenoteim.exe' # Just in case
            - '\powerpnt.exe'
            - '\winword.exe'
        ImageLoaded|contains: '\clr.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Diskshadow Child Process Spawned
id: 56b1dde8-b274-435f-a73a-fb75eb81262a
related:
    - id: fa1a7e52-3d02-435b-81b8-00da14dd66c1 # Diskshadow Script Mode - Execution From Potential Suspicious Location
      type: similar
    - id: 1dde5376-a648-492e-9e54-4241dd9b0c7f # Diskshadow Script Mode - Uncommon Script Extension Execution
      type: similar
    - id: 9f546b25-5f12-4c8d-8532-5893dcb1e4b8 # Potentially Suspicious Child Process Of DiskShadow.EXE
      type: similar
    - id: 0c2f8629-7129-4a8a-9897-7e0768f13ff2 # Diskshadow Script Mode Execution
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects any child process spawning from "Diskshadow.exe". This could be due to executing Diskshadow in interpreter mode or script mode and using the "exec" flag to launch other applications.
references:
    - https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration
    - https://medium.com/@cyberjyot/lolbin-execution-via-diskshadow-f6ff681a27a4
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/diskshadow
author: Harjot Singh @cyb3rjy0t
date: 2023-09-15
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.execution
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\diskshadow.exe'
    filter_main_werfault:
        Image|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Likely from legitimate usage of Diskshadow in Interpreter mode.
level: medium

title: DLL Search Order Hijackig Via Additional Space in Path
id: b6f91281-20aa-446a-b986-38a92813a18f
status: test
description: |
    Detects when an attacker create a similar folder structure to windows system folders such as (Windows, Program Files...)
    but with a space in order to trick DLL load search order and perform a "DLL Search Order Hijacking" attack
references:
    - https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1552932770464292864
    - https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/hijacking-dlls-in-windows
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-30
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows \'
            - 'C:\Program Files \'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86) \'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: ESXi Network Configuration Discovery Via ESXCLI
id: 33e814e0-1f00-4e43-9c34-31fb7ae2b174
status: test
description: Detects execution of the "esxcli" command with the "network" flag in order to retrieve information about the network configuration.
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hypervisor-jackpotting-ecrime-actors-increase-targeting-of-esxi-servers/
    - https://developer.broadcom.com/xapis/esxcli-command-reference/7.0.0/namespace/esxcli_network.html
author: Cedric Maurugeon
date: 2023-09-04
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1033
    - attack.t1007
    - attack.t1059.012
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '/esxcli'
        CommandLine|contains: 'network'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' get'
            - ' list'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
# Note: level can be reduced to low in some envs
level: medium

title: File Creation Date Changed to Another Year
id: 558eebe5-f2ba-4104-b339-36f7902bcc1a
status: test
description: |
    Detects when the file creation time is changed to a year before 2020.
    Attackers may change the file creation time of a backdoor to make it look like it was installed with the operating system.
    Note that many processes legitimately change the creation time of a file; it does not necessarily indicate malicious activity.
    In order to use this rule in production, it is recommended first baseline normal behavior in your environment and then tune the rule accordingly.
    Hunting Recommendation: Focus on files with creation times set to years significantly before the current date, especially those in user-writable directories.
    Correlate with process execution logs to identify the source of the modification and investigate any unsigned or suspicious binaries involved.
references:
    - https://www.inversecos.com/2022/04/defence-evasion-technique-timestomping.html
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-12
modified: 2026-01-20
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070.006
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: file_change
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        PreviousCreationUtcTime|startswith: '202'
    filter_main_creation_time:
        CreationUtcTime|startswith: '202'
    filter_main_program_files:
        - TargetFilename|startswith:
              - 'C:\Program Files\'
              - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
        - Image|startswith:
              - 'C:\Program Files\'
              - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
    filter_optional_updates:
        - Image:
              - 'C:\Windows\system32\ProvTool.exe'
              - 'C:\Windows\System32\usocoreworker.exe'
              - 'C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettings.exe'
        - TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\ProgramData\USOPrivate\UpdateStore\'
        - TargetFilename|endswith:
              - '.tmp'
              - '.temp'
    filter_optional_cab:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\WINDOWS\System32\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\TiWorker.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
            - '\sihclient.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.cab'
    filter_optional_msiexec:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\msiexec.exe'
    filter_optional_vcredist:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
        Image|endswith: '\VCREDI~1.EXE'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Changes made to or by the local NTP service
    - Software installations and updates
level: low

title: HackTool - LocalPotato Execution
id: 6bd75993-9888-4f91-9404-e1e4e4e34b77
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the LocalPotato POC based on basic PE metadata information and default CLI examples
references:
    - https://www.localpotato.com/localpotato_html/LocalPotato.html
    - https://github.com/decoder-it/LocalPotato
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-14
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - cve.2023-21746
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\LocalPotato.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '.exe -i C:\'
            - '-o Windows\'
    selection_hash_plain:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'IMPHASH=E1742EE971D6549E8D4D81115F88F1FC'
            - 'IMPHASH=DD82066EFBA94D7556EF582F247C8BB5'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: High risk Active Directory group membership change
description: Detects scenarios where a suspicious group membership is changed.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account%20manipulation
- https://ss64.com/nt/syntax-groups.html
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-identifiers
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 4728 # security global group member added
      - 4756 # universal group member added
      #- 4732 # local and domain local group are covered in another rule
    TargetSid|startswith: 'S-1-5-21-'
    TargetSid|endswith:
      - '-512' # Domain Admins (global)
      - '-518' # Schema Admins (universal)
      - '-519' # Enterprise Admins (universal)
      - '-520' # Group Policy Creator Owners (global)
      #- '-525' # Protected users (global) > focus only on removal actions, not adding . See dedicated rule
      - '-526' # Key Admins (global)
      - '-527' # Enterprise Key Admins (universal)
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrator activity
level: high

title: IE Change Domain Zone
id: 45e112d0-7759-4c2a-aa36-9f8fb79d3393
related:
    - id: d88d0ab2-e696-4d40-a2ed-9790064e66b3
      type: derived
status: test
description: Hides the file extension through modification of the registry
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-4---add-domain-to-trusted-sites-zone
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/developer/browsers/security-privacy/ie-security-zones-registry-entries
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-22
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1137
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_domains:
        TargetObject|contains: \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\Domains\
    filter:
        Details:
            - DWORD (0x00000000) # My Computer
            - DWORD (0x00000001) # Local Intranet Zone
            - '(Empty)'
    condition: selection_domains and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Administrative scripts
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_change_security_zones/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Add Domain to Trusted Sites Zone
      technique: T1112
      atomic_guid: cf447677-5a4e-4937-a82c-e47d254afd57

title: Important Windows Service Terminated With Error
id: d6b5520d-3934-48b4-928c-2aa3f92d6963
related:
    - id: acfa2210-0d71-4eeb-b477-afab494d596c
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects important or interesting Windows services that got terminated for whatever reason
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-14
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_eid:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7023 # The X Service service terminated with the following error
    selection_name:
        - param1|contains:
              # Note that these names are "Display Names" and are language specific. If you're using a non-english system these can and will be different
              - ' Antivirus'
              - ' Firewall'
              - 'Application Guard'
              - 'BitLocker Drive Encryption Service'
              - 'Encrypting File System'
              - 'Microsoft Defender'
              - 'Threat Protection'
              - 'Windows Event Log'
        # Use this If you collect the binary value provided from this event, which is the wide hex encoded value of the service name.
        - Binary|contains:
              - '770069006e0064006500660065006e006400' # windefend (Microsoft Defender Antivirus Service)
              - '4500760065006e0074004c006f006700' # EventLog
              - '6d0070007300730076006300' # mpssvc (Windows Defender Firewall)
              - '530065006e0073006500' # Sense (Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection Service)
              - '450046005300' # EFS (Encrypting File System)
              - '420044004500530056004300' # BDESVC (BitLocker Drive Encryption Service)
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Rare false positives could occur since service termination could happen due to multiple reasons
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - PowerShell Module
id: 07ad2ea8-6a55-4ac6-bf3e-91b8e59676eb
related:
    - id: e55a5195-4724-480e-a77e-3ebe64bd3759
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task31)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-08
modified: 2023-01-04
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection:
        Payload|contains|all:
            - 'set'
            - '&&'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'vbscript:createobject'
            - '.run'
            - '(window.close)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: macOS Cloud Storage Access Tools
id: 4a0366e3-01e0-4345-bf41-487b54871df7
status: experimental
description: 'Detects execution of cloud storage CLI tools (aws, gsutil, rclone) which
  may

  indicate exfiltration to cloud storage services. Adversaries use cloud storage

  to exfiltrate data while blending in with legitimate traffic.

  '
author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
date: 2025/10/31
modified: 2025/10/31
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/
logsource:
  product: macos
  service: endpointsecurity
detection:
  selection_event:
    esf.event_type: 9
    event.action: exec
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - /aws
    - /gsutil
    - /rclone
    - /s3cmd
    - /azcopy
  selection_upload:
    CommandLine|contains:
    - s3 cp
    - s3 sync
    - gsutil cp
    - rclone copy
    - rclone sync
    - put
    - upload
  condition: selection_event and selection_process and selection_upload
falsepositives:
- Legitimate cloud backup operations
- DevOps and CI/CD pipelines
- Automated data synchronization
- System administration tasks
fields:
- Image
- CommandLine
- ProcessId
- ParentProcessId
- User
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1567.002
- attack.t1537
level: medium

title: New DLL Added to AppCertDlls Registry Key
id: 6aa1d992-5925-4e9f-a49b-845e51d1de01
status: test
description: |
  Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation
  by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer.
references:
    - http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/01/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-3/
    - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/14f90406-10a0-4d36-a672-31cabe149f2f.html
author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.009
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Sysmon gives us HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\.. if ControlSetXX is the selected one
        - TargetObject: 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\AppCertDlls'
        # key rename
        - NewName: 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\AppCertDlls'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: NTFS Vulnerability Exploitation
id: f14719ce-d3ab-4e25-9ce6-2899092260b0
status: test
description: This the exploitation of a NTFS vulnerability as reported without many details via Twitter
references:
    - https://twitter.com/jonasLyk/status/1347900440000811010
    - https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1347958161609809921
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/windows-10-bug-corrupts-your-hard-drive-on-seeing-this-files-icon/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-01-11
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1499.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: Ntfs
        EventID: 55
        Origin: 'File System Driver'
        Description|contains|all:
            - 'contains a corrupted file record'
            - 'The name of the file is "\"'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential COLDSTEEL RAT File Indicators
id: c708a93f-46b4-4674-a5b8-54aa6219c5fa
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a file named "dllhost.exe" in the "C:\users\public\Documents\" directory. Seen being used by the COLDSTEEL RAT in some of its variants.
references:
    - https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/cold-steel/NCSC-MAR-Cold-Steel.pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-30
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename: 'C:\users\public\Documents\dllhost.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Defense Evasion Via Binary Rename
id: 36480ae1-a1cb-4eaa-a0d6-29801d7e9142
related:
    - id: 0ba1da6d-b6ce-4366-828c-18826c9de23e
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName datapoint.
references:
    - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/12/BinaryRename.html
    - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/29/BinaryRename2.html
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.md#atomic-test-1---masquerading-as-windows-lsass-process
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/inno-setup-malware-redline-stealer-campaign.html
author: Matthew Green @mgreen27, Ecco, James Pemberton @4A616D6573, oscd.community, Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)
date: 2019-06-15
modified: 2026-06-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        OriginalFileName:
            - 'Cmd.Exe'
            - 'CONHOST.EXE'
            - '7z.exe'
            - '7za.exe'
            - '7zr.exe'
            - 'WinRAR.exe'
            - 'wevtutil.exe'
            - 'net.exe'
            - 'net1.exe'
            - 'netsh.exe'
            - 'InstallUtil.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\conhost.exe'
            - '\7z.exe'
            - '\7za.exe'
            - '\7zr.exe'
            - '\WinRAR.exe'
            - '\wevtutil.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\netsh.exe'
            - '\InstallUtil.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Custom applications use renamed binaries adding slight change to binary name. Typically this is easy to spot and add to whitelist
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary/info.yml

title: Potentially Suspicious DMP/HDMP File Creation
id: aba15bdd-657f-422a-bab3-ac2d2a0d6f1c
related:
    - id: 3a525307-d100-48ae-b3b9-0964699d7f97
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a file with the ".dmp"/".hdmp" extension by a shell or scripting application such as "cmd", "powershell", etc. Often created by software during a crash. Memory dumps can sometimes contain sensitive information such as credentials. It's best to determine the source of the crash.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wer/collecting-user-mode-dumps
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.dmp'
            - '.dump'
            - '.hdmp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Some administrative PowerShell or VB scripts might have the ability to collect dumps and move them to other folders which might trigger a false positive.
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_dump_file_susp_creation/info.yml

title: Potentially Suspicious Office Document Executed From Trusted Location
id: f99abdf0-6283-4e71-bd2b-b5c048a94743
status: test
description: Detects the execution of an Office application that points to a document that is located in a trusted location. Attackers often used this to avoid macro security and execute their malicious code.
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://twitter.com/Max_Mal_/status/1633863678909874176
    - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/new-security-hardening-policies-for-trusted-documents/ba-p/3023465
    - https://twitter.com/_JohnHammond/status/1588155401752788994
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-21
modified: 2023-10-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        # Note: we add a parent shell to reduce FP. Add additional 3rd party shells that you might use
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\explorer.exe'
            - '\dopus.exe'
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\EXCEL.EXE'
              - '\POWERPNT.EXE'
              - '\WINWORD.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'Excel.exe'
              - 'POWERPNT.EXE'
              - 'WinWord.exe'
    selection_trusted_location:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: these are the default locations. Admins/Users could add additional ones that you need to cover
            - '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Word\Startup\'
            - '\Microsoft Office\root\Templates\'
            - '\Microsoft Office\Templates\'
    filter_main_dotx:
        # Note: We add this filter to avoid curious people clicking on template files
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '.dotx'
            - '.xltx'
            - '.potx'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
id: 2c99737c-585d-4431-b61a-c911d86ff32f
status: test
description: Backdooring domain object to grant the rights associated with DCSync to a regular user or machine account using Powerview\Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync Extended Right cmdlet, will allow to re-obtain the pwd hashes of any user/computer
references:
    - https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1111556090137903104
    - https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/an_ace_up_the_sleeve.pdf
author: Samir Bousseaden, Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, Maxence Fossat
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2022-08-16
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: The "Audit Directory Service Changes" logging policy must be configured in order to receive events. Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs). Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs) and only when accessed in a manner that matches their SACL settings. This policy covers the following events ids - 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141. Note that the default policy does not cover User objects. For that a custom AuditRule need to be setup (See https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule)'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5136
        AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'ntSecurityDescriptor'
        AttributeValue|contains:
            - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
            - '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
            - '89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c'
    filter_main_dns_object_class:
        ObjectClass:
            - 'dnsNode'
            - 'dnsZoneScope'
            - 'dnsZone'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - New Domain Controller computer account, check user SIDs within the value attribute of event 5136 and verify if it's a regular user or DC computer account.
level: high

title: Remote Access Tool - ScreenConnect Remote Command Execution - Hunting
id: d1a401ab-8c47-4e86-a7d8-2460b6a53e4a
related:
    - id: b1f73849-6329-4069-bc8f-78a604bb8b23
      type: derived
    - id: 7b582f1a-b318-4c6a-bf4e-66fe49bf55a5
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects remote binary or command execution via the ScreenConnect Service.
    Use this rule in order to hunt for potentially anomalous executions originating from ScreenConnect
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/slashandgrab-screen-connect-post-exploitation-in-the-wild-cve-2024-1709-cve-2024-1708
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-02-23
modified: 2024-02-26
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate commands launched from ScreenConnect will also trigger this rule. Look for anomalies.
level: medium

title: Self Extracting Package Creation Via Iexpress.EXE From Potentially Suspicious Location
id: b2b048b0-7857-4380-b0fb-d3f0ab820b71
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of iexpress.exe to create binaries via Self Extraction Directive (SED) files located in potentially suspicious locations.
    This behavior has been observed in-the-wild by different threat actors.
references:
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/iexpress.exe-D594B2A33EFAFD0EABF09E3FDC05FCEA.html
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IExpress
    - https://decoded.avast.io/janvojtesek/raspberry-robins-roshtyak-a-little-lesson-in-trickery/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/602f4ae507fa8de57ada079adff25a6c2a899bd25cd092d0af7e62cdb619c93c/behavior
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-02-05
modified: 2024-06-04
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # VT Query: behavior_processes:"iexpress.exe" and behavior_processes:"/n /q /m" and behavior_processes:"*.sed*" and p:5+
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\iexpress.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'IEXPRESS.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' /n '
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: Add more uncommon paths that fit your organizational needs.
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrators building packages using iexpress.exe
level: high

title: Shell Execution via Git - Linux
id: 47b3bbd4-1bf7-48cc-84ab-995362aaa75a
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "git" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/git/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '/git'
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -p '
            - 'help'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'bash 0<&1'
            - 'dash 0<&1'
            - 'sh 0<&1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: SQL Injection Strings In URI
id: 5513deaf-f49a-46c2-a6c8-3f111b5cb453
status: test
description: Detects potential SQL injection attempts via GET requests in access logs.
references:
    - https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/exploiting-sql-injection-example/
    - https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/using-logs-to-investigate-a-web-application-attack/
    - https://brightsec.com/blog/sql-injection-payloads/
    - https://github.com/payloadbox/sql-injection-payload-list
    - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/sql-injection/mysql-injection
author: Saw Win Naung, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Thurein Oo (Yoma Bank)
date: 2020-02-22
modified: 2023-09-04
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'GET'
    keywords:
        - '@@version'
        - '%271%27%3D%271'
        - '=select '
        - '=select('
        - '=select%20'
        - 'concat_ws('
        - 'CONCAT(0x'
        - 'from mysql.innodb_table_stats'
        - 'from%20mysql.innodb_table_stats'
        - 'group_concat('
        - 'information_schema.tables'
        - 'json_arrayagg('
        - 'or 1=1#'
        - 'or%201=1#'
        - 'order by '
        - 'order%20by%20'
        - 'select * '
        - 'select database()'
        - 'select version()'
        - 'select%20*%20'
        - 'select%20database()'
        - 'select%20version()'
        - 'select%28sleep%2810%29'
        - 'SELECTCHAR('
        - 'table_schema'
        - 'UNION ALL SELECT'
        - 'UNION SELECT'
        - 'UNION%20ALL%20SELECT'
        - 'UNION%20SELECT'
        - "'1'='1"
    filter_main_status:
        sc-status: 404
    condition: selection and keywords and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Java scripts and CSS Files
    - User searches in search boxes of the respective website
    - Internal vulnerability scanners can cause some serious FPs when used, if you experience a lot of FPs due to this think of adding more filters such as "User Agent" strings and more response codes
level: high

title: SQL Server Dedicated Admin Connection (DAC) suspicious activity
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker enabled the DAC mode in order to bypass access controls, logon triggers, perform brute force attacks or run unauthorized queries.
references:
- https://josephpierini.blogspot.com/2012/07/microsoft-sql-dedicated-admin.html
- https://www.mssqltips.com/sqlservertip/1801/enable-sql-server-dedicated-administrator-connection/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/errors-events/database-engine-events-and-errors?view=sql-server-ver16
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1505.001
author: mdecrevoisier
status: stable
logsource:
  product: mssql
  service: application
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 17199 # DAC is disabled
      - 17200 # DAC settings changed
      - 17201 # DAC mode enabled to listen on
      - 17202 # DAC connection established
      - 17810 # DAC max connections reached
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Admin attempting to debug or recover a SQL Server
level: high

title: Suspicious Child Process of AspNetCompiler
id: 9ccba514-7cb6-4c5c-b377-700758f2f120 # SuspChild
related:
    - id: 4c7f49ee-2638-43bb-b85b-ce676c30b260 # TMP File
      type: similar
    - id: 9f50fe98-fe5c-4a2d-86c7-fad7f63ed622 # Susp Paths
      type: similar
    - id: a01b8329-5953-4f73-ae2d-aa01e1f35f00 # Exec
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious child processes of "aspnet_compiler.exe".
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Aspnet_Compiler/
    - https://ijustwannared.team/2020/08/01/the-curious-case-of-aspnet_compiler-exe/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1127
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\aspnet_compiler.exe'
    selection_child:
        # Note: add other potential suspicious child processes and paths
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\calc.exe'
              - '\notepad.exe'
        - Image|contains:
              - '\Users\Public\'
              - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
              - '\AppData\Local\Roaming\'
              - ':\Temp\'
              - ':\Windows\Temp\'
              - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
              - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Child Process Of BgInfo.EXE
id: 811f459f-9231-45d4-959a-0266c6311987
related:
    - id: aaf46cdc-934e-4284-b329-34aa701e3771
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of "BgInfo.exe" which could be a sign of potential abuse of the binary to proxy execution via external VBScript
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Bginfo/
    - https://oddvar.moe/2017/05/18/bypassing-application-whitelisting-with-bginfo/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-16
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\bginfo.exe'
            - '\bginfo64.exe'
    selection_child:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\calc.exe'
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\notepad.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        - Image|contains:
              - '\AppData\Local\'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\'
              - ':\Users\Public\'
              - ':\Temp\'
              - ':\Windows\Temp\'
              - ':\PerfLogs\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Cobalt Strike DNS Beaconing - Sysmon
id: f356a9c4-effd-4608-bbf8-408afd5cd006
related:
    - id: 0d18728b-f5bf-4381-9dcf-915539fff6c2
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects a program that invoked suspicious DNS queries known from Cobalt Strike beacons
references:
    - https://www.icebrg.io/blog/footprints-of-fin7-tracking-actor-patterns
    - https://www.sekoia.io/en/hunting-and-detecting-cobalt-strike/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-09
modified: 2023-01-16
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: dns_query
detection:
    selection1:
        QueryName|startswith:
            - 'aaa.stage.'
            - 'post.1'
    selection2:
        QueryName|contains: '.stage.123456.'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical