Sigma rules: 16

title: Application AppID Uri Configuration Changes
id: 1b45b0d1-773f-4f23-aedc-814b759563b1
status: test
description: Detects when a configuration change is made to an applications AppID URI.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#appid-uri-added-modified-or-removed
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-06-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1552
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Update Application
            - Update Service principal
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - When and administrator is making legitimate AppID URI configuration changes to an application. This should be a planned event.
level: high

title: Application Termination Attempt via Wmic.EXE
id: 49d9671b-0a0a-4c09-8280-d215bfd30662
related:
    - id: 847d5ff3-8a31-4737-a970-aeae8fe21765 # Uninstall Security Products
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects an attempt to terminate a process via "wmic" with the "call terminate" flag. Adversaries may
    use wmic to terminate security products or other applications on the compromised host. This event is
    triggered on on attempt and process creation can be either successful or unsuccessful.
references:
    - https://cyble.com/blog/lockfile-ransomware-using-proxyshell-attack-to-deploy-ransomware/
    - https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/377/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-WMI-creat4871-en-EN-GenericUse.pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-11
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\WMIC.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'call'
            - 'terminate'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_terminate_application/info.yml

title: Attack protection features manipulation - some attack protection features have been disabled.
id: 0325e11e-12ce-44e7-8d1f-3a64700a000a
status: experimental
description: |
    This detection alerts when attack protection features have been disabled in the tenant's settings.
    This detection covers Suspicious IP Throttling, Breached Password Detection, and Brute-force protection.
author: Okta
date: 2025-07-11
modified: 2025-09-01
logsource:
    product: auth0
detection:
    selection:
        data.type: sapi
        data.description:
            - Update Brute-force settings
            - Create or update the anomaly detection captcha
            - Update Suspicious IP Throttling settings
        data.details.request.body.enabled: 'false'
    filter:
        data.details.response.body.enabled:
            - false
    condition: selection and filter
explanation: >
    The query collects the events indicating modification of settings for the three listed features.
    When the response body contains 'enabled' set to 'false', this indicates that a corresponding feature has been turned off.
    The Splunk query below lists the attack protection features that has been turned off.
splunk: |
    index=auth0 data.tenant_name="{your-tenant-name}"
    data.type=sapi data.description IN ("Update Suspicious IP Throttling settings",
    "Update Breached Password Detection settings", "Update Brute-force settings")
    | eval feature_type = case(
      'data.description'="Update Suspicious IP Throttling settings", "Suspicious IP Throttling",
      'data.description'="Update Breached Password Detection settings", "Breached Password Detection",
      'data.description'="Update Brute-force settings", "Brute-force"
      )
    ```Take only the last modifications of settings for each feature```
    | sort -_time
    | dedup feature_type
    | eval status = case ('data.details.response.body.enabled' = "false", "disabled",
    'data.details.response.body.enabled' = "true", "enabled")
    | fields _time, status, feature_type, data.ip
    ``` for reporting purposes remove the "where" clause below and it will display the current
    status of all three protection features```
    | where status = "disabled"
    ``` Display the results printing out timestamp, modifying IP, feature reference, and its status```
    | stats by _time, data.ip, feature_type, status
comments:
    - The Splunk query above shall be tuned to reflect a valid tenant name.
    - Adjust the detection to monitor the attack feature in use.
    - Additionally, you can use this detection for reporting of all changes of the breached password
     detection settings by removing the "where", "sort", and "dedubp" clauses.
tenant_logs: |
    type: "sapi" AND (description: "Update Suspicious IP Throttling settings"
    OR description: "Update Breached Password Detection settings"
    OR description: "Update Brute-force settings")
prevention:
    - Control tenant admins, i.e. "Admin", as this role has permissions to modify attack protection settings.
    - Enforce MFA for tenant admins to reduce the risk of an adversary gaining access.
    - Control Management API scopes that allow modification of attack protection features - update:attack_protection.
    - Control usage of Management API from only trusted IPs by applying Network ACL scoped to "management".
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate updates by an administrator. This rule is designed for threat hunting and to be a starting point for further investigation.
level: medium
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1562
    - attack.t1562.007

title: AWS Config Disabling Channel/Recorder
id: 07330162-dba1-4746-8121-a9647d49d297
status: test
description: Detects AWS Config Service disabling
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/cloudtrail-log-files-for-aws-config.html
author: vitaliy0x1
date: 2020-01-21
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.002
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'config.amazonaws.com'
        eventName:
            - 'DeleteDeliveryChannel'
            - 'StopConfigurationRecorder'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Valid change in AWS Config Service
level: high

title: Azure Owner Removed From Application or Service Principal
id: 636e30d5-3736-42ea-96b1-e6e2f8429fd6
status: test
description: Identifies when a owner is was removed from a application or service principal in Azure.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities#core-directory
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-09-03
modified: 2026-04-30
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName:
            - 'Remove owner from service principal'
            - 'Remove owner from application'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Owner being removed may be performed by a system administrator.
    - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - Owner removed from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: Bitbucket User Login Failure
id: 70ed1d26-0050-4b38-a599-92c53d57d45a
status: test
description: |
    Detects user authentication failure events.
    Please note that this rule can be noisy and it is recommended to use with correlation based on "author.name" field.
references:
    - https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/audit-log-events-776640423.html
author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf)
date: 2024-02-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: bitbucket
    service: audit
    definition: 'Requirements: "Advance" log level is required to receive these audit events.'
detection:
    selection:
        auditType.category: 'Authentication'
        auditType.action: 'User login failed'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate user wrong password attempts.
level: medium

title: Breached Password Detection - critical settings manipulated
id: 2a26d75e-43fd-4bc9-afb6-d3465068d869
status: experimental
description: |
    Detect when Breached Password Detection has been disabled at all or set to a monitoring mode where no blocking occurs.
    This can allow malicious actors to conduct credential stuffing without being detected and blocked.
author: Okta
date: 2025-07-11
modified: 2025-09-01
logsource:
    product: auth0
detection:
    selection:
        data.type: sapi
        data.description:
            - Update Breached Password Detection settings
    filter_1:
        data.details.response.body.enabled: false
    filter_2:
        data.details.response.body.shields{}: 'block'
    filter_3:
        data.details.response.body.stage.pre-user-registration.shields{}: 'block'
    condition: (selection and filter_1) or (selection and not filter_2) or (selection and not filter_3)
explanation: >
    The query filters for modification of the Breached Password Detection.
    It returns a record when the feature is completely disabled, i.e. the "shields" attribute does not contain "block",
    or set into a monitoring mode by disabling all responses.
    The Splunk query below consideres only the last modification and displays a modifying IP, state of the protection for login and signup modes,
    and if user notifications are switched on.
splunk: |
    index=auth0 data.tenant_name="{your-tenant-name}"
    data.type=sapi data.description="Update Breached Password Detection settings"
    ``` Excluding white-listed IPs```
    ``` NOT data.ip IN ("{white-listed-IPs}")```
    | fields _time, data.ip, data.details.response.body.shields{}, data.details.response.body.enabled,
    data.details.response.body.stage.pre-user-registration.shields{}
    ```Take only the last change of configurations that reflects the current settings```
    | sort - _time
    | head 1
    | rename data.details.response.body.shields{} as login_shields
    | rename data.details.response.body.enabled as breached_protection_enabled
    | rename data.details.response.body.stage.pre-user-registration.shields{} as signup_shields
    ``` Encoding the logic to define what flows' protection have been disabled and enabled```
    | eval user_notifications_on = if(isnotnull(mvfind(login_shields, "user_notification")), "true", "false")
    | eval login_flow_is_protected = if(isnotnull(mvfind(login_shields, "block")), "true", "false")
    | eval signup_flow_is_protected = if(isnotnull(mvfind(signup_shields, "block")), "true", "false")
    ```Alert when breached password protection is completely disabled or all responses are disabled (login, signup). Note: pwd reset is masked by now.```
    | where breached_protection_enabled = "false" OR (login_flow_is_protected = "false" AND signup_flow_is_protected = "false")
    ```Display the information in a table```
    | table _time, data.ip, breached_protection_enabled, login_flow_is_protected, signup_flow_is_protected, user_notifications_on
comments:
    - The Splunk query above shall be tuned to reflect a valid tenant name.
    - Limit the detection to actions conducted from not white-listed IPs and/or a particular admin user.
    - If needed the "where" clause can be adjusted to alert when only one of the flows is unprotected.
    - Additionally, you can use this detection for reporting of all changes of the breached password
     detection settings by removing the "where" and "head" clauses.
tenant_logs: |
    type: "sapi" AND description: "Update Breached Password Detection settings"
prevention:
    - Control tenant admins, i.e. "Admin", as this role has permissions to modify any application.
    - Enforce MFA for tenant admins to reduce the risk of an adversary gaining access.
    - Control Management API scopes that allow modification of attack protection features - update:attack_protection.
    - Control usage of Management API from only trusted IPs by applying Network ACL scoped to "management".
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate updates by an administrator. This rule is designed for threat hunting and to be a starting point for further investigation.
level: medium
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1562
    - attack.t1562.007

title: Connection Proxy
id: 72f4ab3f-787d-495d-a55d-68c2ff46cf4c
status: test
description: Detects setting proxy configuration
author: Ömer Günal
date: 2020-06-17
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http_proxy='
            - 'https_proxy='
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: low

title: Conti Volume Shadow Listing
id: 7b30e0a7-c675-4b24-8a46-82fa67e2433d
status: test
description: Detects a command used by conti to find volume shadow backups
references:
    - https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1423336151860002816?s=20
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/03e9b8c2e86d6db450e5eceec057d7e369ee2389b9daecaf06331a95410aa5f8/detection
author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems), Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-09
tags:
    - attack.t1587.001
    - attack.resource-development
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'vssadmin list shadows'
            - 'log.txt'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: CVE-2020-0688 Exchange Exploitation via Web Log
id: fce2c2e2-0fb5-41ab-a14c-5391e1fd70a5
status: test
description: Detects the exploitation of Microsoft Exchange vulnerability as described in CVE-2020-0688
references:
    - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/detecting-cve-20200688-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-on-microsoft-exchange-server/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-02-29
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2020-0688
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection1:
        cs-method: 'GET'
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '/ecp/'
            - '/owa/'
    selection2:
        cs-uri-query|contains: '__VIEWSTATE='
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: CVE-2021-1675 Print Spooler Exploitation Filename Pattern
id: 2131cfb3-8c12-45e8-8fa0-31f5924e9f07
status: test
description: Detects the default filename used in PoC code against print spooler vulnerability CVE-2021-1675
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20210629055600/https://github.com/hhlxf/PrintNightmare/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20210701042336/https://github.com/afwu/PrintNightmare
    - https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-29
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1587
    - cve.2021-1675
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: 'C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\old\1\123'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: DPAPI Domain Backup Key Extraction
id: 4ac1f50b-3bd0-4968-902d-868b4647937e
status: test
description: Detects tools extracting LSA secret DPAPI domain backup key from Domain Controllers
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190620-DomainDPAPIBackupKeyExtraction/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2019-06-20
modified: 2022-02-24
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4662
        ObjectType: 'SecretObject'
        AccessMask: '0x2'
        ObjectName|contains: 'BCKUPKEY'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: ESXi System Information Discovery Via ESXCLI
id: e80273e1-9faf-40bc-bd85-dbaff104c4e9
status: test
description: Detects execution of the "esxcli" command with the "system" flag in order to retrieve information about the different component of the system. Such as accounts, modules, NTP, etc.
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hypervisor-jackpotting-ecrime-actors-increase-targeting-of-esxi-servers/
    - https://developer.broadcom.com/xapis/esxcli-command-reference/7.0.0/namespace/esxcli_system.html
author: Cedric Maurugeon
date: 2023-09-04
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1033
    - attack.t1007
    - attack.t1059.012
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '/esxcli'
        CommandLine|contains: 'system'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' get'
            - ' list'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: medium

title: ESXi VM List Discovery Via ESXCLI
id: 5f1573a7-363b-4114-9208-ad7a61de46eb
status: test
description: Detects execution of the "esxcli" command with the "vm" flag in order to retrieve information about the installed VMs.
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hypervisor-jackpotting-ecrime-actors-increase-targeting-of-esxi-servers/
    - https://developer.broadcom.com/xapis/esxcli-command-reference/7.0.0/namespace/esxcli_vm.html
    - https://www.secuinfra.com/en/techtalk/hide-your-hypervisor-analysis-of-esxiargs-ransomware/
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/e/new-linux-based-ransomware-cheerscrypt-targets-exsi-devices.html
author: Cedric Maurugeon
date: 2023-09-04
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1033
    - attack.t1007
    - attack.t1059.012
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/esxcli'
        CommandLine|contains: 'vm process'
        CommandLine|endswith: ' list'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: medium

title: Exchange transport agent installation artifacts (native)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to load an artifact in the Exchange transport agent.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1505-Server%20Software%20Component
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ESET-LightNeuron.pdf
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1505.002 # Server Software Component: Transport Agent 
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: msexchange-management
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 1 # success
      - 6 # failure
    EventData|contains:
      - Enable-TransportAgent
      - Install-TransportAgent
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- rare administrator change
level: high

title: Failed DNS server zone transfer for enumeration purposes
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to exploit DNS server missconfiguration to trigger a DNS zone transfer and enumerate list of valid IP and hostnames.
references:
- https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/291.html
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0007-Discovery/T1016-System%20Network%20Configuration%20Discovery
- http://intelligentsystemsmonitoring.com/knowledgebase/windows-operating-system/the-dns-server-received-a-zone-transfer-request-from-for-a-nonexistent-or-nonauthoritative-zone-8319/
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1016
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: dns-server
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 6004
    EventData Name: DNS_EVENT_BAD_ZONE_TRANSFER_REQUEST
  filter:
    param1: '%dns_servers%' # IP list of internal DNS servers
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknwown
level: medium

title: HackTool - EfsPotato Named Pipe Creation
id: 637f689e-b4a5-4a86-be0e-0100a0a33ba2
status: test
description: Detects the pattern of a pipe name as used by the hack tool EfsPotato
references:
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1429530155291193354?s=20
    - https://github.com/zcgonvh/EfsPotato
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2023-12-21
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: pipe_created
    definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
    selection:
        PipeName|contains:
            - '\pipe\'
            - '\pipe\srvsvc'  # more specific version (use only this one if the other causes too many false positives)
    filter_optional_ctx:
        PipeName|contains: '\CtxShare'
    filter_optional_default:
        PipeName|startswith: '\pipe\' # excludes pipes that start with \pipe\*
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - \pipe\LOCAL\Monitorian # https://github.com/emoacht/Monitorian
level: high

title: HackTool - Empire UserAgent URI Combo
id: b923f7d6-ac89-4a50-a71a-89fb846b4aa8
status: test
description: Detects user agent and URI paths used by empire agents
references:
    - https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-07-13
modified: 2024-02-26
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-useragent: 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko'
        cs-uri:
            - '/admin/get.php'
            - '/news.php'
            - '/login/process.php'
        cs-method: 'POST'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Valid requests with this exact user agent to server scripts of the defined names
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher
id: b222df08-0e07-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 26)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # CommandLine|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r).+clip(?:\.exe)?.{0,4}&&.+clipboard]::\(\s\\\"\{\d\}.+\-f.+\"'
        # Example 1: Cmd /c" echo/Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString |cLiP&& POWerSheLl -Nolog -sT . (\"{1}{2}{0}\"-f'pe','Ad',(\"{1}{0}\" -f'Ty','d-' ) ) -Assemb ( \"{5}{1}{3}{0}{2}{4}\" -f'ows','y','.F',(\"{0}{1}{2}\" -f'stem.W','i','nd'),( \"{0}{1}\"-f 'o','rms' ),'S' ) ; ([SySTEM.wiNDows.FoRmS.CLiPbOArd]::( \"{1}{0}\" -f (\"{1}{0}\" -f'T','TTeX' ),'gE' ).\"invO`Ke\"( ) ) ^| ^&( \"{5}{1}{2}{4}{3}{0}\" -f 'n',( \"{1}{0}\"-f'KE-','o' ),(\"{2}{1}{0}\"-f 'pRESS','x','e' ),'o','i','iNV') ; [System.Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::(\"{0}{1}\" -f( \"{1}{0}\"-f'e','SetT' ),'xt').\"InV`oKe\"( ' ')"
        # Example 2: CMD/c " ECho Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString|c:\WiNDowS\SySteM32\cLip && powershElL -noPRO -sTa ^& (\"{2}{0}{1}\" -f 'dd',(\"{1}{0}\"-f 'ype','-T' ),'A' ) -AssemblyN (\"{0}{3}{2}{1}{4}\"-f'Pr','nCo',(\"{0}{1}\"-f'e','ntatio'),'es','re' ) ; ^& ( ( [StRinG]${ve`RB`OSE`pr`e`FeReNCE} )[1,3] + 'x'-JoiN'') ( ( [sySTem.WInDOWs.ClipbOaRD]::( \"{1}{0}\" -f(\"{0}{1}\" -f'tTe','xt' ),'ge' ).\"IN`Vo`Ke\"( ) ) ) ; [System.Windows.Clipboard]::( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f't',( \"{0}{1}\" -f 'tT','ex' ),'Se' ).\"In`V`oKe\"( ' ' )"
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '&&'
            - 'clipboard]::'
            - '-f'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/c'
            - '/r'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Malicious DLL File Dropped in the Teams or OneDrive Folder
id: 1908fcc1-1b92-4272-8214-0fbaf2fa5163
status: test
description: |
    Detects creation of a malicious DLL file in the location where the OneDrive or Team applications
    Upon execution of the Teams or OneDrive application, the dropped malicious DLL file ("iphlpapi.dll") is sideloaded
references:
    - https://blog.cyble.com/2022/07/27/targeted-attacks-being-carried-out-via-dll-sideloading/
author: frack113
date: 2022-08-12
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'iphlpapi.dll'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: ManageEngine Endpoint Central Dctask64.EXE Potential Abuse
id: 6345b048-8441-43a7-9bed-541133633d7a
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of "dctask64.exe", a signed binary by ZOHO Corporation part of ManageEngine Endpoint Central.
    This binary can be abused for DLL injection, arbitrary command and process execution.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222088214581825540
    - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095963789111296
    - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095371175911424
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-01-28
modified: 2025-01-22
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\dctask64.exe'
        - Hashes|contains:
              - 'IMPHASH=6834B1B94E49701D77CCB3C0895E1AFD'
              - 'IMPHASH=1BB6F93B129F398C7C4A76BB97450BBA'
              - 'IMPHASH=FAA2AC19875FADE461C8D89DCF2710A3'
              - 'IMPHASH=F1039CED4B91572AB7847D26032E6BBF'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' executecmd64 '
            - ' invokeexe '
            - ' injectDll '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: MMC Executing Files with Reversed Extensions Using RTLO Abuse
id: 9cfe4b27-1e56-48b4-b7a8-d46851c91a44
status: experimental
description: Detects malicious behavior where the MMC utility (`mmc.exe`) executes files with reversed extensions caused by Right-to-Left Override (RLO) abuse, disguising them as document formats.
references:
    - https://www.unicode.org/versions/Unicode5.2.0/ch02.pdf
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right-to-left_override
    - https://tria.ge/241015-l98snsyeje/behavioral2
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-02-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1218.014
    - attack.t1036.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_image:
        - Image|endswith: '\mmc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'MMC.exe'
    selection_commandline:
        CommandLine|contains: # While looking at these files the prefix of their name will look something like csm.pdf, but in reality it is msc file
            - 'cod.msc'  # Reversed `.doc`
            - 'fdp.msc'  # Reversed `.pdf`
            - 'ftr.msc'  # Reversed `.rtf`
            - 'lmth.msc'  # Reversed `.html`
            - 'slx.msc'  # Reversed `.xls`
            - 'tdo.msc'  # Reversed `.odt`
            - 'xcod.msc'  # Reversed `.docx`
            - 'xslx.msc'  # Reversed `.xlsx`
            - 'xtpp.msc'  # Reversed `.pptx`
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative actions using MMC to execute misnamed `.msc` files.
    - Unconventional but non-malicious usage of RLO or reversed extensions.
level: high

title: Modify User Shell Folders Startup Value
id: 9c226817-8dc9-46c2-a58d-66655aafd7dc
related:
    - id: 8f3ab69a-aa22-4943-aa58-e0a52fdf6818
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detect modification of the User Shell Folders registry values for Startup or Common Startup which could indicate persistence attempts.
    Attackers may modify User Shell Folders registry keys to point to malicious executables or scripts that will be executed during startup.
    This technique is often used to maintain persistence on a compromised system by ensuring that the malicious payload is executed automatically.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/9e5b12c4912c07562aec7500447b11fa3e17e254/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md
    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/muddywater-snakes-riverbank/
author: frack113, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-01
modified: 2026-01-05
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1547.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders'
            - 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders'
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\Common Startup'
            - '\Startup'
    filter_main_details_null:
        Details: null
    filter_main_programdata_startup:
        Details|contains:
            - 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup'
            - '%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup'
    filter_main_userprofile_startup_1:
        Details|contains:
            - '%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup'
            - '%%USERPROFILE%%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup'
    filter_main_userprofile_startup_2:
        Details|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Users\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup'
    # Apply more filters if new legitimate paths are identified
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_susp_user_shell_folders/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Change Startup Folder - HKLM Modify User Shell Folders Common Startup Value
      technique: T1547.001
      atomic_guid: acfef903-7662-447e-a391-9c91c2f00f7b

title: OpenCanary - VNC Connection Attempt
id: 9db5446c-b44a-4291-8b89-fcab5609c3b3
status: test
description: Detects instances where a VNC service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 12001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Active Directory Enumeration Using AD Module - PsScript
id: 9e620995-f2d8-4630-8430-4afd89f77604
related:
    - id: 70bc5215-526f-4477-963c-a47a5c9ebd12
      type: similar
    - id: 74176142-4684-4d8a-8b0a-713257e7df8e
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the "Import-Module" cmdlet to load the "Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dl" DLL. Which is often used by attackers to perform AD enumeration.
references:
    - https://github.com/samratashok/ADModule
    - https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1617108657166061568?s=20
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/active-directory-enumeration-with-ad-module-without-rsat-or-admin-privileges
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2023-01-22
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enable'
detection:
    selection_generic:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Import-Module '
            - 'Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dll'
    selection_specific:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'ipmo Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dll'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the library for administrative activity
level: medium

title: Potential Arbitrary Code Execution Via Node.EXE
id: 6640f31c-01ad-49b5-beb5-83498a5cd8bd
status: test
description: Detects the execution node.exe which is shipped with multiple software such as VMware, Adobe...etc. In order to execute arbitrary code. For example to establish reverse shell as seen in Log4j attacks...etc
references:
    - http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html
    - https://www.sprocketsecurity.com/resources/crossing-the-log4j-horizon-a-vulnerability-with-no-return
    - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/01/18/active-exploitation-of-vmware-horizon-servers/
    - https://nodejs.org/api/cli.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-09
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1127
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_main:
        Image|endswith: '\node.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -e '
            - ' --eval '
    # Add more pattern of abuse as actions
    selection_action_reverse_shell:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '.exec('
            - 'net.socket'
            - '.connect'
            - 'child_process'
    condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_action_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential CVE-2023-21554 QueueJumper Exploitation
id: 53207cc2-0745-4c19-bc72-80be1cc16b3f
status: test
description: Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2023-21554 (dubbed QueueJumper)
references:
    - https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/queuejumper-critical-unauthorized-rce-vulnerability-in-msmq-service/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-12
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - cve.2023-21554
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\Windows\System32\mqsvc.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wsl.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Execution of Sysinternals Tools
id: 7cccd811-7ae9-4ebe-9afd-cb5c406b824b
related:
    - id: 25ffa65d-76d8-4da5-a832-3f2b0136e133
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects command lines that contain the 'accepteula' flag which could be a sign of execution of one of the Sysinternals tools
references:
    - https://twitter.com/Moti_B/status/1008587936735035392
author: Markus Neis
date: 2017-08-28
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1588.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -accepteula'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of SysInternals tools
    - Programs that use the same command line flag
level: low

title: Potential WizardUpdate Malware Infection
id: f68c4a4f-19ef-4817-952c-50dce331f4b0
status: test
description: Detects the execution traces of the WizardUpdate malware. WizardUpdate is a macOS trojan that attempts to infiltrate macOS machines to steal data and it is associated with other types of malicious payloads, increasing the chances of multiple infections on a device.
references:
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-c68a1fcbf7a3f80c87225d7fdc031f691e9f3b6a14a36754be00762bfe6eae97
    - https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/osx.xcsset
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/02/02/the-evolution-of-a-mac-trojan-updateagents-progression/
author: Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-10-17
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection_1:
        Image|endswith: '/sh'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '=$(curl '
            - 'eval'
    selection_2:
        Image|endswith: '/curl'
        CommandLine|contains: '_intermediate_agent_'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potentially Suspicious Usage Of Qemu
id: 5fc297ae-25b6-488a-8f25-cc12ac29b744
status: test
description: |
    Detects potentially suspicious execution of the Qemu utility in a Windows environment.
    Threat actors have leveraged this utility and this technique for achieving network access as reported by Kaspersky.
references:
    - https://securelist.com/network-tunneling-with-qemu/111803/
    - https://www.qemu.org/docs/master/system/invocation.html#hxtool-5
author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf), Hunter Juhan (@threatHNTR)
date: 2024-06-03
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1572
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-m 1M' # VM with just 1MB of ram is insufficient this is a suspicious flag
            - '-m 2M'
            - '-m 3M'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'restrict=off'
            - '-netdev '
            - 'connect='
            - '-nographic' # This is also a key detection no one invoke without UI from console usually its a flag.
    filter_main_normal_usecase:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -cdrom ' # Normal usage cases
            - ' type=virt '
            - ' -blockdev '
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Remote DLL Load Via Rundll32.EXE
id: f40017b3-cb2e-4335-ab5d-3babf679c1de
status: test
description: Detects a remote DLL load event via "rundll32.exe".
references:
    - https://github.com/gabe-k/themebleed
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        ImageLoaded|startswith: '\\\\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Remote Registry Lateral Movement
id: 35c55673-84ca-4e99-8d09-e334f3c29539
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls to modify the registry and possible execute code
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rrp/0fa3191d-bb79-490a-81bd-54c2601b7a78
    - https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-RRP.md
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:338cd001-2244-31f1-aaaa-900038001003"'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid: 338cd001-2244-31f1-aaaa-900038001003
        OpNum:
            - 6
            - 7
            - 8
            - 13
            - 18
            - 19
            - 21
            - 22
            - 23
            - 35
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Remote administration of registry values
level: high

title: Renamed NetSupport RAT Execution
id: 0afbd410-de03-4078-8491-f132303cb67d
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed "client32.exe" (NetSupport RAT) via Imphash, Product and OriginalFileName strings
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/misbehaving-rats/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-19
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Product|contains: 'NetSupport Remote Control'
        - OriginalFileName|contains: 'client32.exe'
        - Hashes|contains: IMPHASH=A9D50692E95B79723F3E76FCF70D023E
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\client32.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Sdclt Child Processes
id: da2738f2-fadb-4394-afa7-0a0674885afa
status: test
description: A General detection for sdclt spawning new processes. This could be an indicator of sdclt being used for bypass UAC techniques.
references:
    - https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/6
    - https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook/blob/2d4257f630f4c9770f78d0c1df059f891ffc3fec/docs/evals/apt29/detections/3.B.2_C36B49B5-DF58-4A34-9FE9-56189B9DEFEA.md
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-05-02
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\sdclt.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sdclt_child_process/info.yml