Sigma rules: 18

title: API Key Created
id: 3b07ff19-d7b8-44ba-afa5-d2d6fb8cb22f
status: test
description: |
    An attacker may have attemped to create an API key for persistence but it failed.
    Ex: aws appsync create-api-key --api-id ApiId
    I have seen this in the eventSource of `appsync.amazonaws.com` and `apigateway.amazonaws.com`.
    There are probably other services that can create API keys as well so I am leaving the eventSource open.
references:
    - https://medium.com/@adan.alvarez/distorting-the-sync-how-aws-appsync-can-be-turned-into-an-attackers-backdoor-8c015b8e52b8
    - https://traildiscover.cloud/#AppSync-CreateApiKey
author: Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
date: 2025-04-23
modified: 2025-04-23
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098.001 #Persistence: Additional Cloud Credentials
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventName: 'CreateApiKey'
    filter:
        errorCode: 'AccessDenied'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
level: high

title: Azure Kubernetes Admission Controller
id: a61a3c56-4ce2-4351-a079-88ae4cbd2b58
status: test
description: |
  Identifies when an admission controller is executed in Azure Kubernetes.
  A Kubernetes Admission controller intercepts, and possibly modifies, requests to the Kubernetes API server.
  The behavior of this admission controller is determined by an admission webhook (MutatingAdmissionWebhook or ValidatingAdmissionWebhook) that the user deploys in the cluster.
  An adversary can use such webhooks as the MutatingAdmissionWebhook for obtaining persistence in the cluster.
  For example, attackers can intercept and modify the pod creation operations in the cluster and add their malicious container to every created pod.
  An adversary can use the webhook ValidatingAdmissionWebhook, which could be used to obtain access credentials.
  An adversary could use the webhook to intercept the requests to the API server, record secrets, and other sensitive information.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-11-25
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552
    - attack.t1552.007
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName|startswith:
            - 'MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/ADMISSIONREGISTRATION.K8S.IO'
            - 'MICROSOFT.CONTAINERSERVICE/MANAGEDCLUSTERS/ADMISSIONREGISTRATION.K8S.IO'
        operationName|endswith:
            - '/MUTATINGWEBHOOKCONFIGURATIONS/WRITE'
            - '/VALIDATINGWEBHOOKCONFIGURATIONS/WRITE'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Azure Kubernetes Admissions Controller may be done by a system administrator.
    - If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: CloudTrail Logging Stopped
id: da90c11e-e3d4-411e-aaf7-06d02e0c5c23
status: test
description: |
    A user successfully disabled CloudTrail logging.
    Sample command line: aws cloudtrail stop-logging --name TrailName
references:
    - https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/cloud-security-atlas/attacks/stopping-cloudtrail-trail/
    - https://research.splunk.com/cloud/8a2f3ca2-4eb5-4389-a549-14063882e537/
    - https://logrhythm.com/blog/aws-defense-evasion-and-centralized-multi-account-logging/
    - https://medium.com/daniel-grzelak/disrupting-aws-logging-a42e437d6594
    - https://pages.awscloud.com/rs/112-TZM-766/images/Visibility_detect_respond_AWS_SANS_whitepaper.pdf
    - https://traildiscover.cloud/#CloudTrail-StopLogging
author: Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
date: 2025-04-23
modified: 2025-04-23
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1562.008 # Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Logs
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'cloudtrail.amazonaws.com'
        eventName: 'StopLogging'
    filter:
        errorCode: 'AccessDenied'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Admins turning off unneeded logging
level: high

title: Common Autorun Keys Modification
id: f59c3faf-50f3-464b-9f4c-1b67ab512d99
related:
    - id: 17f878b8-9968-4578-b814-c4217fc5768c
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
    - https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d # a list with registry keys
    - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/userinitmprlogonscript.html # UserInitMprLogonScript
author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split), wagga (name)
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows CE Services\AutoStart'
            - '\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Command Processor\Autorun'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows CE Services\AutoStartOnDisconnect'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows CE Services\AutoStartOnConnect'
            - '\SYSTEM\Setup\CmdLine'
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Ctf\LangBarAddin'
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Command Processor\Autorun'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Classes\Protocols\Handler'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Classes\Protocols\Filter'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Classes\Htmlfile\Shell\Open\Command\(Default)'
            - '\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Control Panel\Desktop\Scrnsave.exe'
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\UrlSearchHooks'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Desktop\Components'
            - '\Software\Classes\Clsid\{AB8902B4-09CA-4bb6-B78D-A8F59079A8D5}\Inprocserver32'
            - '\Control Panel\Desktop\Scrnsave.exe'
    filter_main_empty:
        Details: '(Empty)'
    filter_main_null:
        Details: null
    filter_main_poqexec:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe'
    filter_optional_msoffice:
        - TargetObject|contains:
              - '\Office\ClickToRun\REGISTRY\MACHINE\Software\Classes\PROTOCOLS\Handler\'
              - '\ClickToRunStore\HKMU\SOFTWARE\Classes\PROTOCOLS\Handler\'
        - Details:
              - '{314111c7-a502-11d2-bbca-00c04f8ec294}'
              - '{3459B272-CC19-4448-86C9-DDC3B4B2FAD3}'
              - '{42089D2D-912D-4018-9087-2B87803E93FB}'
              - '{5504BE45-A83B-4808-900A-3A5C36E7F77A}'
              - '{807583E5-5146-11D5-A672-00B0D022E945}'
    filter_optional_chrome:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{8A69D345-D564-463c-AFF1-A69D9E530F96}'
    filter_optional_edge:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{9459C573-B17A-45AE-9F64-1857B5D58CEE}'
    filter_optional_IE:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Software\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{89820200-ECBD-11cf-8B85-00AA005B4383}'
    filter_optional_integrator:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\integration\integrator.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\integration\integrator.exe'
    filter_optional_office:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\Updates\'
        Image|endswith: '\OfficeClickToRun.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason
    - Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason
level: medium

title: ComRAT Network Communication
id: 7857f021-007f-4928-8b2c-7aedbe64bb82
status: test
description: Detects Turla ComRAT network communication.
references:
    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-05-26
modified: 2024-02-26
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.g0010
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-uri|contains: '/index/index.php\?h='
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: CVE-2010-5278 Exploitation Attempt
id: a4a899e8-fd7a-49dd-b5a8-7044def72d61
status: test
description: |
  MODx manager - Local File Inclusion:Directory traversal vulnerability in manager/controllers/default/resource/tvs.php in MODx Revolution 2.0.2-pl, and possibly earlier,
  when magic_quotes_gpc is disabled, allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the class_key parameter.
references:
    - https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates
author: Subhash Popuri (@pbssubhash)
date: 2021-08-25
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2010-5278
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query|contains: /manager/controllers/default/resource/tvs.php?class_key=../../../../../../../../../../windows/win.ini%00
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Scanning from Nuclei
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: File Decoded From Base64/Hex Via Certutil.EXE
id: cc9cbe82-7bc0-4ef5-bc23-bbfb83947be7
status: test
description: Detects the execution of certutil with either the "decode" or "decodehex" flags to decode base64 or hex encoded files. This can be abused by attackers to decode an encoded payload before execution
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-babyshark-malware-targets-u-s-national-security-think-tanks/
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/04/13/compromised-exchange-server-hosting-cryptojacker-targeting-other-exchange-servers/
    - https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/835149808817991680
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/pki/basic-crl-checking-with-certutil
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certutil/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2023-02-15
modified: 2025-06-04
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - '-decode ' # Decode Base64
            - '-decodehex ' # Decode Hex
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_decode/info.yml

title: FoggyWeb Backdoor DLL Loading
id: 640dc51c-7713-4faa-8a0e-e7c0d9d4654c
status: test
description: Detects DLL hijacking technique used by NOBELIUM in their FoggyWeb backdoor. Which loads a malicious version of the expected "version.dll" dll
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/09/27/foggyweb-targeted-nobelium-malware-leads-to-persistent-backdoor/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-09-27
modified: 2022-12-09
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1587
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded: 'C:\Windows\ADFS\version.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: Greenbug Espionage Group Indicators
id: 3711eee4-a808-4849-8a14-faf733da3612
status: test
description: Detects tools and process executions used by Greenbug in their May 2020 campaign as reported by Symantec
references:
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/greenbug-espionage-telco-south-asia
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-05-20
modified: 2023-03-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.g0049
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1036.005
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - ':\ProgramData\adobe\Adobe.exe'
            - ':\ProgramData\oracle\local.exe'
            - '\revshell.exe'
            - '\infopagesbackup\ncat.exe'
            - ':\ProgramData\comms\comms.exe'
    selection_msf:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File'
            - '\msf.ps1'
    selection_ncat:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'infopagesbackup'
            - '\ncat'
            - '-e cmd.exe'
    selection_powershell:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'system.Data.SqlClient.SqlDataAdapter($cmd); [void]$da.fill'
            - '-nop -w hidden -c $k=new-object'
            - '[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;IEX '
            - ' -nop -w hidden -c $m=new-object net.webclient;$m'
            - '-noninteractive -executionpolicy bypass whoami'
            - '-noninteractive -executionpolicy bypass netstat -a'
    selection_other:
        CommandLine|contains: 'L3NlcnZlcj1'  # base64 encoded '/server='
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: Hidden Flag Set On File/Directory Via Chflags - MacOS
id: 3b2c1059-ae5f-40b6-b5d4-6106d3ac20fe
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of the "chflags" utility with the "hidden" flag, in order to hide files on MacOS.
    When a file or directory has this hidden flag set, it becomes invisible to the default file listing commands and in graphical file browsers.
references:
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/apt32-multi-stage-macos-trojan-innovates-on-crimeware-scripting-technique/
    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/04/09/oceanlotus-macos-malware-update/
    - https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf
    - https://ss64.com/mac/chflags.html
author: Omar Khaled (@beacon_exe)
date: 2024-08-21
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1564.004
    - attack.t1552.001
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/chflags'
        CommandLine|contains: 'hidden '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of chflags by administrators and users.
level: medium

title: Kapeka Backdoor Execution Via RunDLL32.EXE
id: e98f741c-6a5b-4c83-bc2a-1f4e58d07b12
status: test
description: |
    Detects Kapeka backdoor process execution pattern, where the dropper launch the backdoor binary by calling rundll32 and passing the backdoor's first export ordinal (#1) with a "-d" argument.
references:
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/kapeka
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/1efb3ed4-cc0f-4690-a0ed-24516809bc72/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-07-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.011
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
    selection_backdoor_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\ProgramData'
            - '\AppData\Local'
    selection_backdoor_exec_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '.wll'
            - '#1'
            - ' -d'
    selection_backdoor_exec_2:
        # This account for the in the wild variant
        CommandLine|contains: '.wll'
        CommandLine|endswith: '#1'
    condition: selection_img and selection_backdoor_path and 1 of selection_backdoor_exec_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Katz Stealer Suspicious User-Agent
id: 834c6d2f-5e98-4b2a-b453-0c4f234afedd
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects network connections with a suspicious user-agent string containing "katz-ontop", which may indicate Katz Stealer activity.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-05-22
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: http
detection:
    selection:
        user_agent|contains: 'katz-ontop'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ScriptBlock
id: 89819aa4-bbd6-46bc-88ec-c7f7fe30efa6
related:
    - id: 7d0d0329-0ef1-4e84-a9f5-49500f9d7c6c
      type: similar
    - id: 02030f2f-6199-49ec-b258-ea71b07e03dc
      type: similar
    - id: 6d3f1399-a81c-4409-aff3-1ecfe9330baf
      type: obsolete
    - id: 83083ac6-1816-4e76-97d7-59af9a9ae46e
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
references:
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=2921
    - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/tree/master/PowerSharpBinaries
    - https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Invoke-ZeroLogon/blob/111d17c7fec486d9bb23387e2e828b09a26075e4/Invoke-ZeroLogon.ps1
    - https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/848c919bfce4e2d67b626cbcf4404341cfe3d3b6/Get-DXWebcamVideo.ps1
    - https://github.com/rvrsh3ll/Misc-Powershell-Scripts/blob/6f23bb41f9675d7e2d32bacccff75e931ae00554/OfficeMemScraper.ps1
    - https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray/blob/b13d64a5834694aa73fd2aea9911a83027c465a7/DomainPasswordSpray.ps1
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-assessment-black-basta-ransomware/ # Invoke-TotalExec
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/06/06/shining-the-light-on-black-basta/ # Invoke-TotalExec
    - https://github.com/calebstewart/CVE-2021-1675 # Invoke-Nightmare
    - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/blob/0927441f67161cc6dc08a53c63ceb8e333f55874/Collectors/AzureHound.ps1
    - https://bloodhound.readthedocs.io/en/latest/data-collection/azurehound.html
    - https://github.com/HarmJ0y/DAMP
    - https://github.com/samratashok/nishang
    - https://github.com/DarkCoderSc/PowerRunAsSystem/
    - https://github.com/besimorhino/powercat
    - https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Powermad
    - https://github.com/adrecon/ADRecon
    - https://github.com/adrecon/AzureADRecon
    - https://github.com/The-Viper-One/Invoke-PowerDPAPI/
    - https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator/
author: Sean Metcalf, Florian Roth, Bartlomiej Czyz @bczyz1, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Tim Shelton, Mustafa Kaan Demir, Georg Lauenstein, Max Altgelt, Tobias Michalski, Austin Songer
date: 2017-03-05
modified: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.t1087.001
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1069.001
    - attack.t1069.002
    - attack.t1069
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            # Note: Please ensure alphabetical order when adding new entries
            - 'Add-Exfiltration'
            - 'Add-Persistence'
            - 'Add-RegBackdoor'
            - 'Add-RemoteRegBackdoor'
            - 'Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor'
            - 'ConvertTo-Rc4ByteStream'
            - 'Decrypt-Hash'
            - 'Disable-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Do-Exfiltration'
            - 'Enable-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Enabled-DuplicateToken'
            - 'Exploit-Jboss'
            - 'Export-ADRCSV'
            - 'Export-ADRExcel'
            - 'Export-ADRHTML'
            - 'Export-ADRJSON'
            - 'Export-ADRXML'
            - 'Find-Fruit'
            - 'Find-GPOLocation'
            - 'Find-TrustedDocuments'
            - 'Get-ADIDNSNodeAttribute'
            - 'Get-ADIDNSNodeOwner'
            - 'Get-ADIDNSNodeTombstoned'
            - 'Get-ADIDNSPermission'
            - 'Get-ADIDNSZone'
            - 'Get-ChromeDump'
            - 'Get-ClipboardContents'
            - 'Get-FoxDump'
            - 'Get-GPPPassword'
            - 'Get-IndexedItem'
            - 'Get-KerberosAESKey'
            - 'Get-Keystrokes'
            - 'Get-LSASecret'
            - 'Get-PassHashes'
            - 'Get-RegAlwaysInstallElevated'
            - 'Get-RegAutoLogon'
            - 'Get-RemoteBootKey'
            - 'Get-RemoteCachedCredential'
            - 'Get-RemoteLocalAccountHash'
            - 'Get-RemoteLSAKey'
            - 'Get-RemoteMachineAccountHash'
            - 'Get-RemoteNLKMKey'
            - 'Get-RickAstley'
            - 'Get-SecurityPackages'
            - 'Get-ServiceFilePermission'
            - 'Get-ServicePermission'
            - 'Get-ServiceUnquoted'
            - 'Get-SiteListPassword'
            - 'Get-System'
            - 'Get-TimedScreenshot'
            - 'Get-UnattendedInstallFile'
            - 'Get-Unconstrained'
            - 'Get-USBKeystrokes'
            - 'Get-VaultCredential'
            - 'Get-VulnAutoRun'
            - 'Get-VulnSchTask'
            - 'Grant-ADIDNSPermission'
            - 'Gupt-Backdoor'
            - 'Invoke-ACLScanner'
            - 'Invoke-ADRecon'
            - 'Invoke-ADSBackdoor'
            - 'Invoke-AgentSmith'
            - 'Invoke-AllChecks'
            - 'Invoke-ARPScan'
            - 'Invoke-AzureHound'
            - 'Invoke-BackdoorLNK'
            - 'Invoke-BadPotato'
            - 'Invoke-BetterSafetyKatz'
            - 'Invoke-BypassUAC'
            - 'Invoke-Carbuncle'
            - 'Invoke-Certify'
            - 'Invoke-ConPtyShell'
            - 'Invoke-CredentialInjection'
            - 'Invoke-DAFT'
            - 'Invoke-DCSync'
            - 'Invoke-DinvokeKatz'
            - 'Invoke-DllInjection'
            - 'Invoke-DNSUpdate'
            - 'Invoke-DNSExfiltrator'
            - 'Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray'
            - 'Invoke-DowngradeAccount'
            - 'Invoke-EgressCheck'
            - 'Invoke-Eyewitness'
            - 'Invoke-FakeLogonScreen'
            - 'Invoke-Farmer'
            - 'Invoke-Get-RBCD-Threaded'
            - 'Invoke-Gopher'
            - 'Invoke-Grouper' # Also Covers Invoke-GrouperX
            - 'Invoke-HandleKatz'
            - 'Invoke-ImpersonatedProcess'
            - 'Invoke-ImpersonateSystem'
            - 'Invoke-InteractiveSystemPowerShell'
            - 'Invoke-Internalmonologue'
            - 'Invoke-Inveigh'
            - 'Invoke-InveighRelay'
            - 'Invoke-KrbRelay'
            - 'Invoke-LdapSignCheck'
            - 'Invoke-Lockless'
            - 'Invoke-MalSCCM'
            - 'Invoke-Mimikatz'
            - 'Invoke-Mimikittenz'
            - 'Invoke-MITM6'
            - 'Invoke-NanoDump'
            - 'Invoke-NetRipper'
            - 'Invoke-Nightmare'
            - 'Invoke-NinjaCopy'
            - 'Invoke-OfficeScrape'
            - 'Invoke-OxidResolver'
            - 'Invoke-P0wnedshell'
            - 'Invoke-Paranoia'
            - 'Invoke-PortScan'
            - 'Invoke-PoshRatHttp' # Also Covers Invoke-PoshRatHttps
            - 'Invoke-PostExfil'
            - 'Invoke-PowerDump'
            - 'Invoke-PowerDPAPI'
            - 'Invoke-PowerShellTCP'
            - 'Invoke-PowerShellWMI'
            - 'Invoke-PPLDump'
            - 'Invoke-PsExec'
            - 'Invoke-PSInject'
            - 'Invoke-PsUaCme'
            - 'Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection'
            - 'Invoke-ReverseDNSLookup'
            - 'Invoke-Rubeus'
            - 'Invoke-RunAs'
            - 'Invoke-SafetyKatz'
            - 'Invoke-SauronEye'
            - 'Invoke-SCShell'
            - 'Invoke-Seatbelt'
            - 'Invoke-ServiceAbuse'
            - 'Invoke-ShadowSpray'
            - 'Invoke-Sharp' # Covers all "Invoke-Sharp" variants
            - 'Invoke-Shellcode'
            - 'Invoke-SMBScanner'
            - 'Invoke-Snaffler'
            - 'Invoke-Spoolsample'
            - 'Invoke-SpraySinglePassword'
            - 'Invoke-SSHCommand'
            - 'Invoke-StandIn'
            - 'Invoke-StickyNotesExtract'
            - 'Invoke-SystemCommand'
            - 'Invoke-Tasksbackdoor'
            - 'Invoke-Tater'
            - 'Invoke-Thunderfox'
            - 'Invoke-ThunderStruck'
            - 'Invoke-TokenManipulation'
            - 'Invoke-Tokenvator'
            - 'Invoke-TotalExec'
            - 'Invoke-UrbanBishop'
            - 'Invoke-UserHunter'
            - 'Invoke-VoiceTroll'
            - 'Invoke-Whisker'
            - 'Invoke-WinEnum'
            - 'Invoke-winPEAS'
            - 'Invoke-WireTap'
            - 'Invoke-WmiCommand'
            - 'Invoke-WMIExec'
            - 'Invoke-WScriptBypassUAC'
            - 'Invoke-Zerologon'
            - 'MailRaider'
            - 'New-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'New-HoneyHash'
            - 'New-InMemoryModule'
            - 'New-SOASerialNumberArray'
            - 'Out-Minidump'
            - 'PowerBreach'
            - 'powercat '
            - 'PowerUp'
            - 'PowerView'
            - 'Remove-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Remove-Update'
            - 'Rename-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Revoke-ADIDNSPermission'
            - 'Set-ADIDNSNode' # Covers: Set-ADIDNSNodeAttribute, Set-ADIDNSNodeOwner
            - 'Show-TargetScreen'
            - 'Start-CaptureServer'
            - 'Start-Dnscat2'
            - 'Start-WebcamRecorder'
            - 'VolumeShadowCopyTools'
            # - 'Check-VM'
            # - 'Disable-MachineAccount'
            # - 'Enable-MachineAccount'
            # - 'Get-ApplicationHost'
            # - 'Get-MachineAccountAttribute'
            # - 'Get-MachineAccountCreator'
            # - 'Get-Screenshot'
            # - 'HTTP-Login'
            # - 'Install-ServiceBinary'
            # - 'Install-SSP'
            # - 'New-DNSRecordArray'
            # - 'New-MachineAccount'
            # - 'Port-Scan'
            # - 'Remove-MachineAccount'
            # - 'Set-MacAttribute'
            # - 'Set-MachineAccountAttribute'
            # - 'Set-Wallpaper'
    filter_optional_amazon_ec2:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - Get-SystemDriveInfo  # http://bheltborg.dk/Windows/WinSxS/amd64_microsoft-windows-maintenancediagnostic_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.10240.16384_none_91ef7543a4514b5e/CL_Utility.ps1
            - C:\ProgramData\Amazon\EC2-Windows\Launch\Module\  # false positive form Amazon EC2
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_malicious_commandlets/info.yml

title: Malicious PowerShell Scripts - PoshModule
id: 41025fd7-0466-4650-a813-574aaacbe7f4
related:
    - id: f331aa1f-8c53-4fc3-b083-cc159bc971cb
      type: similar
    - id: bf7286e7-c0be-460b-a7e8-5b2e07ecc2f2
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the execution of known offensive powershell scripts used for exploitation or reconnaissance
references:
    - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
    - https://github.com/NetSPI/PowerUpSQL
    - https://github.com/CsEnox/EventViewer-UACBypass
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20210511204621/https://github.com/AlsidOfficial/WSUSpendu
    - https://github.com/nettitude/Invoke-PowerThIEf
    - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn
    - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/tree/master/PowerSharpBinaries
    - https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Invoke-ZeroLogon/blob/111d17c7fec486d9bb23387e2e828b09a26075e4/Invoke-ZeroLogon.ps1
    - https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/848c919bfce4e2d67b626cbcf4404341cfe3d3b6/Get-DXWebcamVideo.ps1
    - https://github.com/rvrsh3ll/Misc-Powershell-Scripts/blob/6f23bb41f9675d7e2d32bacccff75e931ae00554/OfficeMemScraper.ps1
    - https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray/blob/b13d64a5834694aa73fd2aea9911a83027c465a7/DomainPasswordSpray.ps1
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-assessment-black-basta-ransomware/ # Invoke-TotalExec
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/06/06/shining-the-light-on-black-basta/ # Invoke-TotalExec
    - https://github.com/HarmJ0y/DAMP
    - https://github.com/samratashok/nishang
    - https://github.com/DarkCoderSc/PowerRunAsSystem/
    - https://github.com/besimorhino/powercat
    - https://github.com/sadshade/veeam-creds/blob/6010eaf31ba41011b58d6af3950cffbf6f5cea32/Veeam-Get-Creds.ps1
    - https://github.com/The-Viper-One/Invoke-PowerDPAPI/
    - https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator/
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-23
modified: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_generic:
        ContextInfo|contains:
            - 'Add-ConstrainedDelegationBackdoor.ps1'
            - 'Add-Exfiltration.ps1'
            - 'Add-Persistence.ps1'
            - 'Add-RegBackdoor.ps1'
            - 'Add-RemoteRegBackdoor.ps1'
            - 'Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor.ps1'
            - 'BadSuccessor.ps1'
            - 'Check-VM.ps1'
            - 'ConvertTo-ROT13.ps1'
            - 'Copy-VSS.ps1'
            - 'Create-MultipleSessions.ps1'
            - 'DNS_TXT_Pwnage.ps1'
            - 'dnscat2.ps1'
            - 'Do-Exfiltration.ps1'
            - 'DomainPasswordSpray.ps1'
            - 'Download_Execute.ps1'
            - 'Download-Execute-PS.ps1'
            - 'Enabled-DuplicateToken.ps1'
            - 'Enable-DuplicateToken.ps1'
            - 'Execute-Command-MSSQL.ps1'
            - 'Execute-DNSTXT-Code.ps1'
            - 'Execute-OnTime.ps1'
            - 'ExetoText.ps1'
            - 'Exploit-Jboss.ps1'
            - 'Find-AVSignature.ps1'
            - 'Find-Fruit.ps1'
            - 'Find-GPOLocation.ps1'
            - 'Find-TrustedDocuments.ps1'
            - 'FireBuster.ps1'
            - 'FireListener.ps1'
            - 'Get-ApplicationHost.ps1'
            - 'Get-ChromeDump.ps1'
            - 'Get-ClipboardContents.ps1'
            - 'Get-ComputerDetail.ps1'
            - 'Get-FoxDump.ps1'
            - 'Get-GPPAutologon.ps1'
            - 'Get-GPPPassword.ps1'
            - 'Get-IndexedItem.ps1'
            - 'Get-Keystrokes.ps1'
            - 'Get-LSASecret.ps1'
            - 'Get-MicrophoneAudio.ps1'
            - 'Get-PassHashes.ps1'
            - 'Get-PassHints.ps1'
            - 'Get-RegAlwaysInstallElevated.ps1'
            - 'Get-RegAutoLogon.ps1'
            - 'Get-RickAstley.ps1'
            - 'Get-Screenshot.ps1'
            - 'Get-SecurityPackages.ps1'
            - 'Get-ServiceFilePermission.ps1'
            - 'Get-ServicePermission.ps1'
            - 'Get-ServiceUnquoted.ps1'
            - 'Get-SiteListPassword.ps1'
            - 'Get-System.ps1'
            - 'Get-TimedScreenshot.ps1'
            - 'Get-UnattendedInstallFile.ps1'
            - 'Get-Unconstrained.ps1'
            - 'Get-USBKeystrokes.ps1'
            - 'Get-VaultCredential.ps1'
            - 'Get-VulnAutoRun.ps1'
            - 'Get-VulnSchTask.ps1'
            - 'Get-WebConfig.ps1'
            - 'Get-WebCredentials.ps1'
            - 'Get-WLAN-Keys.ps1'
            - 'Gupt-Backdoor.ps1'
            - 'HTTP-Backdoor.ps1'
            - 'HTTP-Login.ps1'
            - 'Install-ServiceBinary.ps1'
            - 'Install-SSP.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-ACLScanner.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-ADSBackdoor.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-AmsiBypass.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-ARPScan.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-BackdoorLNK.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-BadPotato.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-BetterSafetyKatz.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-BruteForce.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-BypassUAC.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Carbuncle.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Certify.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-ConPtyShell.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-CredentialInjection.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-CredentialsPhish.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-DAFT.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-DCSync.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Decode.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-DinvokeKatz.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-DllInjection.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-DNSExfiltrator.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-DowngradeAccount.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-EgressCheck.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Encode.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-EventViewer.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Eyewitness.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-FakeLogonScreen.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Farmer.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Get-RBCD-Threaded.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Gopher.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Grouper2.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Grouper3.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-HandleKatz.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Interceptor.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Internalmonologue.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Inveigh.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-InveighRelay.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-JSRatRegsvr.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-JSRatRundll.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-KrbRelay.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-KrbRelayUp.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-LdapSignCheck.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Lockless.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-MalSCCM.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-MimikatzWDigestDowngrade.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Mimikittenz.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-MITM6.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-NanoDump.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-NetRipper.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-NetworkRelay.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-OxidResolver.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-P0wnedshell.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-P0wnedshellx86.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Paranoia.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PortScan.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PoshRatHttp.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PoshRatHttps.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PostExfil.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PowerDump.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PowerDPAPI.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PowerShellIcmp.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PowerShellTCP.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLineBind.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PowerShellUdp.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PowerShellUdpOneLine.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PowerShellWMI.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PowerThIEf.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PPLDump.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Prasadhak.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PsExec.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PsGcat.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PsGcatAgent.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PSInject.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-PsUaCme.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-ReverseDNSLookup.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Rubeus.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-RunAs.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-SafetyKatz.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-SauronEye.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-SCShell.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Seatbelt.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-ServiceAbuse.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-SessionGopher.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-ShellCode.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-SMBScanner.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Snaffler.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Spoolsample.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-SSHCommand.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-SSIDExfil.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-StandIn.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-StickyNotesExtract.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Tater.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Thunderfox.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-ThunderStruck.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-TokenManipulation.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Tokenvator.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-TotalExec.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-UrbanBishop.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-UserHunter.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-VoiceTroll.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Whisker.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-WinEnum.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-winPEAS.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-WireTap.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-WmiCommand.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-WScriptBypassUAC.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-Zerologon.ps1'
            - 'Keylogger.ps1'
            - 'MailRaider.ps1'
            - 'New-HoneyHash.ps1'
            - 'OfficeMemScraper.ps1'
            - 'Offline_Winpwn.ps1'
            - 'Out-CHM.ps1'
            - 'Out-DnsTxt.ps1'
            - 'Out-Excel.ps1'
            - 'Out-HTA.ps1'
            - 'Out-Java.ps1'
            - 'Out-JS.ps1'
            - 'Out-Minidump.ps1'
            - 'Out-RundllCommand.ps1'
            - 'Out-SCF.ps1'
            - 'Out-SCT.ps1'
            - 'Out-Shortcut.ps1'
            - 'Out-WebQuery.ps1'
            - 'Out-Word.ps1'
            - 'Parse_Keys.ps1'
            - 'Port-Scan.ps1'
            - 'PowerBreach.ps1'
            - 'powercat.ps1'
            - 'PowerRunAsSystem.psm1'
            - 'PowerSharpPack.ps1'
            - 'PowerUp.ps1'
            - 'PowerUpSQL.ps1'
            - 'PowerView.ps1'
            - 'PSAsyncShell.ps1'
            - 'RemoteHashRetrieval.ps1'
            - 'Remove-Persistence.ps1'
            - 'Remove-PoshRat.ps1'
            - 'Remove-Update.ps1'
            - 'Run-EXEonRemote.ps1'
            - 'Schtasks-Backdoor.ps1'
            - 'Set-DCShadowPermissions.ps1'
            - 'Set-MacAttribute.ps1'
            - 'Set-RemotePSRemoting.ps1'
            - 'Set-RemoteWMI.ps1'
            - 'Set-Wallpaper.ps1'
            - 'Show-TargetScreen.ps1'
            - 'Speak.ps1'
            - 'Start-CaptureServer.ps1'
            - 'Start-WebcamRecorder.ps1'
            - 'StringToBase64.ps1'
            - 'TexttoExe.ps1'
            - 'Veeam-Get-Creds.ps1'
            - 'VolumeShadowCopyTools.ps1'
            - 'WinPwn.ps1'
            - 'WSUSpendu.ps1'
    selection_invoke_sharp:
        ContextInfo|contains|all:
            - 'Invoke-Sharp' # Covers all "Invoke-Sharp" variants
            - '.ps1'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_exploit_scripts/info.yml

title: MFA attack - bombarding a user with SMS for MFA
id: 74a1ddea-7172-11f0-ace0-723487b9527c
status: experimental
description: |
    A threat actor can try to bombard a user with SMS messages for MFA in order to deplete the customer's SMS quota leading to Denial of Service.
author: Okta
date: 2025-07-11
modified: 2025-08-04
logsource:
    product: auth0
detection:
    selection:
        data.type: gd_send_sms
        data.description: "Guardian - Second factor sms sent"
    condition: selection
explanation: >
    The query collects events issued when a sms is sent.
    The Splunk detection is based on the number of SMS sent to a single user in a given chunk of time (1h by default).
    If a number of SMS sent to a user exceeds a threshold, it is likely that the user is bombarded with SMS messages.
    The threshold should be adjusted based on the customer's environment and the expected number of SMS messages sent to a user.
    The query prints the affected users.
splunk: |
    index=auth0 data.tenant_name="{your-tenant-name}"
    data.type = gd_send_sms data.description="Guardian - Second factor sms sent"
    | fields data.user_id
    ```The period of observations - adjust```
    | bin _time span=1h
    | stats count as sms_per_user by data.user_id
    | where sms_per_user > {threshold_for_max_sms}
comments:
    - The Splunk query above shall be tuned to reflect a valid tenant_name, threshold,
      e.g. 10, and the span of the considered time period, e.g. set to 1 hour by default.
tenant_logs: |
    type: "gd_send_sms" AND description: "Guardian - Second factor sms sent"
prevention:
    - Limit the number of SMS messages sent to a user in a given period of time.
    - Consider using alternative MFA methods, such as push notifications or authenticator apps, to reduce the reliance on SMS for MFA.
    - Deploy a send-phone-message action implementing a throttling logic to prevent excessive sms notifications, e.g. exceeding 10 SMS sent per hour.
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate users requesting multiple SMS messages in a short period of time, e.g. due to lost or delayed messages.
level: medium
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1499.002

title: Microsoft Excel Add-In Loaded From Uncommon Location
id: af4c4609-5755-42fe-8075-4effb49f5d44
related:
    - id: c5f4b5cb-4c25-4249-ba91-aa03626e3185
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Microsoft Excel loading an Add-In (.xll) file from an uncommon location
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/lnk-between-browsers
    - https://wazuh.com/blog/detecting-xll-files-used-for-dropping-fin7-jssloader-with-wazuh/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\excel.exe'
        ImageLoaded|contains:
            # Note: Add or remove locations from this list based on your internal policy
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Perflogs\'
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Tasks\'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '.xll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Some tuning might be required to allow or remove certain locations used by the rule if you consider them as safe locations
level: medium

title: NetNTLM Downgrade Attack
id: d3abac66-f11c-4ed0-8acb-50cc29c97eed
related:
    - id: d67572a0-e2ec-45d6-b8db-c100d14b8ef2
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects NetNTLM downgrade attack
references:
    - https://www.optiv.com/blog/post-exploitation-using-netntlm-downgrade-attacks
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), wagga
date: 2018-03-20
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Object Access > Audit Registry (Success)'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4657
        ObjectName|contains|all:
            - '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM'
            - 'ControlSet'
            - '\Control\Lsa'
        ObjectValueName:
            - 'LmCompatibilityLevel'
            - 'NtlmMinClientSec'
            - 'RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: NTFS symbolic link creation
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to create a symbolic link.
references:
- https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1630912251560329224
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1547.009 # Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification 
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection:
    NewProcessName|endswith: '\mklink.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '/h' # hard link
      - '/d' # directory symbolic link
      - '/j' # directory junction
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- admin activity on file server
level: medium

title: OpenCanary - SIP Request
id: e30de276-68ec-435c-ab99-ef3befec6c61
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SIP service on an OpenCanary node has had a SIP request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1123
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 15001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Binary Proxy Execution Via Cdb.EXE
id: b5c7395f-e501-4a08-94d4-57fe7a9da9d2
status: test
description: Detects usage of "cdb.exe" to launch arbitrary processes or commands from a debugger script file
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Cdb/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20170715043507/http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html
    - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1534957360032120833
author: Beyu Denis, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-26
modified: 2024-04-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1127
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\cdb.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CDB.Exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -c ' # Using a debugger script
            - ' -cf '
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of debugging tools
level: medium

title: Potential Compromised 3CXDesktopApp Beaconing Activity - Proxy
id: 3c4b3bbf-36b4-470c-b6cf-f07e8b1c7e26
related:
    - id: 76bc1601-9546-4b75-9419-06e0e8d10651 # Proxy GH
      type: similar
    - id: bd03a0dc-5d93-49eb-b2e8-2dfd268600f8 # DNS C2
      type: similar
    - id: 51eecf75-d069-43c7-9ea2-63f75499edd4 # net_connection C2
      type: similar
    - id: 93bbde78-dc86-4e73-9ffc-ff8a384ca89c # ProcCreation Exec
      type: similar
    - id: 63f3605b-979f-48c2-b7cc-7f90523fed88 # ProcCreation ChildProc
      type: similar
    - id: e7581747-1e44-4d4b-85a6-0db0b4a00f2a # ProcCreation Update
      type: similar
    - id: d0b65ad3-e945-435e-a7a9-438e62dd48e9 # ImageLoad
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential beaconing activity to domains related to 3CX 3CXDesktopApp compromise
references:
    - https://www.reddit.com/r/crowdstrike/comments/125r3uu/20230329_situational_awareness_crowdstrike/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-03-29
modified: 2023-05-18
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        cs-host|contains:
            - 'akamaicontainer.com'
            - 'akamaitechcloudservices.com'
            - 'azuredeploystore.com'
            - 'azureonlinecloud.com'
            - 'azureonlinestorage.com'
            - 'dunamistrd.com'
            - 'glcloudservice.com'
            - 'journalide.org'
            - 'msedgepackageinfo.com'
            - 'msstorageazure.com'
            - 'msstorageboxes.com'
            - 'officeaddons.com'
            - 'officestoragebox.com'
            - 'pbxcloudeservices.com'
            - 'pbxphonenetwork.com'
            - 'pbxsources.com'
            - 'qwepoi123098.com'
            - 'sbmsa.wiki'
            - 'sourceslabs.com'
            - 'visualstudiofactory.com'
            - 'zacharryblogs.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Data Stealing Via Chromium Headless Debugging
id: 3e8207c5-fcd2-4ea6-9418-15d45b4890e4
related:
    - id: b3d34dc5-2efd-4ae3-845f-8ec14921f449
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects chromium based browsers starting in headless and debugging mode and pointing to a user profile. This could be a sign of data stealing or remote control
references:
    - https://github.com/defaultnamehere/cookie_crimes/
    - https://mango.pdf.zone/stealing-chrome-cookies-without-a-password
    - https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/cookie-crimes-on-mirosoft-edge/
    - https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/chrome-spy-remote-control/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-23
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1185
    - attack.t1564.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '--remote-debugging-' # Covers: --remote-debugging-address, --remote-debugging-port, --remote-debugging-socket-name, --remote-debugging-pipe....etc
            - '--user-data-dir'
            - '--headless'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high