Sigma rules: 1a

title: Equation Group Indicators
id: 41e5c73d-9983-4b69-bd03-e13b67e9623c
status: test
description: Detects suspicious shell commands used in various Equation Group scripts and tools
references:
    - https://medium.com/@shadowbrokerss/dont-forget-your-base-867d304a94b1
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-04-09
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.g0020
    - attack.t1059.004
logsource:
    product: linux
detection:
    keywords:
        # evolvingstrategy, elgingamble, estesfox
        - 'chown root*chmod 4777 '
        - 'cp /bin/sh .;chown'
        # tmpwatch
        - 'chmod 4777 /tmp/.scsi/dev/bin/gsh'
        - 'chown root:root /tmp/.scsi/dev/bin/'
        # estesfox
        - 'chown root:root x;'
        # ratload
        - '/bin/telnet locip locport < /dev/console | /bin/sh'
        - '/tmp/ratload'
        # ewok
        - 'ewok -t '
        # xspy
        - 'xspy -display '
        # elatedmonkey
        - 'cat > /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/80 <<END'
        # ftshell
        - 'rm -f /current/tmp/ftshell.latest'
        # ghost
        - 'ghost_* -v '
        # morerats client
        - ' --wipe > /dev/null'
        # noclient
        - 'ping -c 2 *; grep * /proc/net/arp >/tmp/gx'
        - 'iptables * OUTPUT -p tcp -d 127.0.0.1 --tcp-flags RST RST -j DROP;'
        # auditcleaner
        - '> /var/log/audit/audit.log; rm -f .'
        - 'cp /var/log/audit/audit.log .tmp'
        # reverse shell
        - 'sh >/dev/tcp/* <&1 2>&1'
        # packrat
        - 'ncat -vv -l -p * <'
        - 'nc -vv -l -p * <'
        # empty bowl
        - '< /dev/console | uudecode && uncompress'
        - 'sendmail -osendmail;chmod +x sendmail'
        # echowrecker
        - '/usr/bin/wget -O /tmp/a http* && chmod 755 /tmp/cron'
        # dubmoat
        - 'chmod 666 /var/run/utmp~'
        # poptop
        - 'chmod 700 nscd crond'
        # abopscript
        - 'cp /etc/shadow /tmp/.'
        # ys
        - '</dev/console |uudecode > /dev/null 2>&1 && uncompress'
        # jacktelnet
        - 'chmod 700 jp&&netstat -an|grep'
        # others
        - 'uudecode > /dev/null 2>&1 && uncompress -f * && chmod 755'
        - 'chmod 700 crond'
        - 'wget http*; chmod +x /tmp/sendmail'
        - 'chmod 700 fp sendmail pt'
        - 'chmod 755 /usr/vmsys/bin/pipe'
        - 'chmod -R 755 /usr/vmsys'
        - 'chmod 755 $opbin/*tunnel'
        - 'chmod 700 sendmail'
        - 'chmod 0700 sendmail'
        - '/usr/bin/wget http*sendmail;chmod +x sendmail;'
        - '&& telnet * 2>&1 </dev/console'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: File Deletion Via Del
id: 379fa130-190e-4c3f-b7bc-6c8e834485f3
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of the builtin "del"/"erase" commands in order to delete files.
    Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity.
    Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how.
    Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.004/T1070.004.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/erase
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-15
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Cmd.Exe'
    selection_del:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'del '
            - 'erase '
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' -f' # Force deleting of read-only files.
            - ' -s' # Delete specified files from all subdirectories.
            - ' -q' # Quiet mode, do not ask if ok to delete on global wildcard
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - False positives levels will differ Depending on the environment. You can use a combination of ParentImage and other keywords from the CommandLine field to filter legitimate activity
level: low

title: HackTool - CrackMapExec PowerShell Obfuscation
id: 6f8b3439-a203-45dc-a88b-abf57ea15ccf
status: test
description: The CrachMapExec pentesting framework implements a PowerShell obfuscation with some static strings detected by this rule.
references:
    - https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec
    - https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/0a49f75347b625e81ee6aa8c33d3970b5515ea9e/cme/helpers/powershell.py#L242
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1027.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'join*split'
            # Line 343ff
            - '( $ShellId[1]+$ShellId[13]+''x'')'
            - '( $PSHome[*]+$PSHOME[*]+'
            - '( $env:Public[13]+$env:Public[5]+''x'')'
            - '( $env:ComSpec[4,*,25]-Join'''')'
            - '[1,3]+''x''-Join'''')'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - WSASS Execution
id: 589ac73f-8e12-409c-964e-31a2f5775ae2
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects execution of WSASS, a tool used to dump LSASS memory on Windows systems by leveraging WER's
    (Windows Error Reporting) WerFaultSecure.EXE to bypass PPL (Protected Process Light) protections.
references:
    - https://github.com/TwoSevenOneT/WSASS
    - https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/09/Dumping-LSASS-With-WER-On-Modern-Windows-11.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-23
modified: 2026-01-09
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\wsass.exe'
    selection_hash:
        Hashes|contains: 'IMPHASH=32F5095C9BBDCACF28FD4060EB4DFC42'
    selection_cli:
        # change to |re|i after Sigma v2.0 release
        # plain string without quotation marks as it has to match for both ' and "
        CommandLine|re: (?i)\.exe[\"\']?\s+[^\"]{0,64}werfaultsecure\.exe[\"\']?\s+\d{2,10} # wsass.exe "path to werfaultsecure" lsass_pid
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_wsass/info.yml

title: Malicious DLL Load By Compromised 3CXDesktopApp
id: d0b65ad3-e945-435e-a7a9-438e62dd48e9
related:
    - id: 3c4b3bbf-36b4-470c-b6cf-f07e8b1c7e26 # Proxy C2
      type: similar
    - id: 76bc1601-9546-4b75-9419-06e0e8d10651 # Proxy GH
      type: similar
    - id: bd03a0dc-5d93-49eb-b2e8-2dfd268600f8 # DNS C2
      type: similar
    - id: 51eecf75-d069-43c7-9ea2-63f75499edd4 # net_connection C2
      type: similar
    - id: 93bbde78-dc86-4e73-9ffc-ff8a384ca89c # ProcCreation Exec
      type: similar
    - id: 63f3605b-979f-48c2-b7cc-7f90523fed88 # ProcCreation ChildProc
      type: similar
    - id: e7581747-1e44-4d4b-85a6-0db0b4a00f2a # ProcCreation Update
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects DLL load activity of known compromised DLLs used in by the compromised 3CXDesktopApp
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/09/27/foggyweb-targeted-nobelium-malware-leads-to-persistent-backdoor/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-03-31
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Hashes|contains:
            # ffmpeg.dll
            - 'SHA256=7986BBAEE8940DA11CE089383521AB420C443AB7B15ED42AED91FD31CE833896'
            - 'SHA1=BF939C9C261D27EE7BB92325CC588624FCA75429'
            - 'MD5=74BC2D0B6680FAA1A5A76B27E5479CBC'
            # d3dcompiler_47.dll
            - 'SHA256=11BE1803E2E307B647A8A7E02D128335C448FF741BF06BF52B332E0BBF423B03'
            - 'SHA1=20D554A80D759C50D6537DD7097FED84DD258B3E'
            - 'MD5=82187AD3F0C6C225E2FBA0C867280CC9'
            # Inner object from ffmpeg.dll
            - 'SHA256=F79C3B0ADB6EC7BCC8BC9AE955A1571AAED6755A28C8B17B1D7595EE86840952'
            - 'SHA1=894E7D4FFD764BB458809C7F0643694B036EAD30'
            - 'MD5=11BC82A9BD8297BD0823BCE5D6202082'
            # ICONIC Stealer payload
            - 'SHA256=8AB3A5EAAF8C296080FADF56B265194681D7DA5DA7C02562953A4CB60E147423'
            - 'SHA1=3B3E778B647371262120A523EB873C20BB82BEAF'
            - 'MD5=7FAEA2B01796B80D180399040BB69835'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: MOVEit CVE-2023-34362 Exploitation Attempt - Potential Web Shell Request
id: 435e41f2-48eb-4c95-8a2b-ed24b50ec30b
status: test
description: Detects get requests to specific files used during the exploitation of MOVEit CVE-2023-34362
references:
    - https://community.progress.com/s/article/MOVEit-Transfer-Critical-Vulnerability-31May2023
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/zero-day-moveit-data-theft
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-03
modified: 2023-07-28
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
    - cve.2023-34362
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'GET'
        cs-uri-stem|contains:
            - '/human2.aspx'
            - '/_human2.aspx'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Network share manipulation via commandline
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to enumerate or to establish a connection to a network share.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0008-Lateral%20Movement/T1021.002%20-SMB%20Windows%20Admin%20Shares
- https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039/
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.002
author: mdecrevoisier
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection: # Full command example: 'net share'
    EventID: 4688
    NewProcessName|endswith:
      - \net1.exe
      - \net.exe
    CommandLine|contains: share
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Pentest
level: high

title: Office Macros Warning Disabled
id: 91239011-fe3c-4b54-9f24-15c86bb65913
related:
    - id: 9b894e57-033f-46cf-b7fa-a52804181973
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects registry changes to Microsoft Office "VBAWarning" to a value of "1" which enables the execution of all macros, whether signed or unsigned.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/inversecos/status/1494174785621819397
    - https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/zloader-with-a-new-infection-technique/
    - https://securelist.com/scarcruft-surveilling-north-korean-defectors-and-human-rights-activists/105074/
author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2024-03-19
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Security\VBAWarnings'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Commandline Obfuscation Using Escape Characters
id: f0cdd048-82dc-4f7a-8a7a-b87a52b6d0fd
status: test
description: Detects potential commandline obfuscation using known escape characters
references:
    - https://twitter.com/vysecurity/status/885545634958385153
    - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/885553465417756673 # Dead link
    - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/885570278637678592 # Dead link
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/obfuscation-wild-targeted-attackers-lead-way-evasion-techniques
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20190213114956/http://www.windowsinspired.com/understanding-the-command-line-string-and-arguments-received-by-a-windows-program/
author: juju4
date: 2018-12-11
modified: 2023-03-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1140
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # - <TAB>   # no TAB modifier in sigmac yet, so this matches <TAB> (or TAB in elasticsearch backends without DSL queries)
            - 'h^t^t^p'
            - 'h"t"t"p'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potential Persistence Via App Paths Default Property
id: 707e097c-e20f-4f67-8807-1f72ff4500d6
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the "Default" property for keys located in the \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\ registry. Which might be used as a method of persistence
    The entries found under App Paths are used primarily for the following purposes.
    First, to map an application's executable file name to that file's fully qualified path.
    Second, to prepend information to the PATH environment variable on a per-application, per-process basis.
references:
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/01/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-3/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/shell/app-registration
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-10
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.012
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths'
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '(Default)'
            - 'Path'
        Details|contains:
            # Add more suspicious paths or binaries as you see fit.
            - '\Users\Public'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '%temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - 'iex'
            - 'Invoke-'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'cscript'
            - 'wscript'
            - '.bat'
            - '.hta'
            - '.dll'
            - '.ps1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate applications registering their binary from on of the suspicious locations mentioned above (tune it)
level: high

title: Potential Remote Desktop Connection to Non-Domain Host
id: ce5678bb-b9aa-4fb5-be4b-e57f686256ad
status: test
description: Detects logons using NTLM to hosts that are potentially not part of the domain.
references:
    - n/a
author: James Pemberton
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: ntlm
    definition: Requires events from Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 8001
        TargetName|startswith: 'TERMSRV'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Host connections to valid domains, exclude these.
    - Host connections not using host FQDN.
    - Host connections to external legitimate domains.
level: medium

title: Potential Suspicious BPF Activity - Linux
id: 0fadd880-6af3-4610-b1e5-008dc3a11b8a
status: test
description: Detects the presence of "bpf_probe_write_user" BPF helper-generated warning messages. Which could be a sign of suspicious eBPF activity on the system.
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/ebpf-malware/
    - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/bpf-helpers.7.html
author: Red Canary (idea), Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2023-01-25
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        - 'bpf_probe_write_user'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Scheduled persistent task with SYSTEM privileges creation
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker creates a privileged task to establish persistence.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0002-Execution/T1053.005-Scheduled%20Task
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1053-schtask
- https://pentestlab.blog/2019/11/04/persistence-scheduled-tasks/
- http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html
- https://nasbench.medium.com/a-deep-dive-into-windows-scheduled-tasks-and-the-processes-running-them-218d1eed4cce
- https://posts.specterops.io/abstracting-scheduled-tasks-3b6451f6a1c5
- https://www.darkoperator.com/blog/2009/4/11/abusing-the-scheduler-with-meterpreter.html
- https://blog.menasec.net/2019/03/threat-hunting-25-scheduled-tasks-for.html
- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/schtasks.exe-5BD86A7193D38880F339D4AFB1F9B63A.html
- https://redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-exchange-attacks/
- https://nasbench.medium.com/behind-the-detection-schtasks-eb67a33a8710
- https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/lolbin-attacks-scheduled-tasks-t1503005-how-detect-them-v%C3%B6gele
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1053.005
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection: # Full command: "schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 1 /tn eviltask /tr C:\tools\shell.cmd /ru SYSTEM"
  selection:
    NewProcessName|endswith: \schtasks.exe
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - create
      #- ru      # Run with privileges from user X
      #- SYSTEM  # Run with SYSTEM privileges
      - tr      # Program, path or command to run
      - sc      # Run task every X minutes
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrator
level: high

# Extract ID 4698
# <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?> <Task version="1.2" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task"> <RegistrationInfo> <Date>2021-04-21T13:30:00</Date> <Author>demo\user1</Author> <URI>\eviltask</URI> </RegistrationInfo> <Triggers> <TimeTrigger> <Repetition> <Interval>PT1M</Interval> <StopAtDurationEnd>false</StopAtDurationEnd> </Repetition> <StartBoundary>2021-04-21T13:30:00</StartBoundary> <Enabled>true</Enabled> </TimeTrigger> </Triggers> <Settings> <MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy> <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>true</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries> <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries> <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate> <StartWhenAvailable>false</StartWhenAvailable> <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable> <IdleSettings> <Duration>PT10M</Duration> <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout> <StopOnIdleEnd>true</StopOnIdleEnd> <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle> </IdleSettings> <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand> <Enabled>true</Enabled> <Hidden>false</Hidden> <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle> <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun> <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT72H</ExecutionTimeLimit> <Priority>7</Priority> </Settings> <Actions Context="Author"> <Exec> <Command>C:\tools\shell.cmd</Command> </Exec> </Actions> <Principals> <Principal id="Author"> <UserId>S-1-5-18</UserId> <RunLevel>LeastPrivilege</RunLevel> </Principal> </Principals> </Task>

title: Suspicious Curl.EXE Download
id: e218595b-bbe7-4ee5-8a96-f32a24ad3468
related:
    - id: bbeaed61-1990-4773-bf57-b81dbad7db2d # Basic curl execution
      type: derived
    - id: 9a517fca-4ba3-4629-9278-a68694697b81 # Curl download
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious curl process start on Windows and outputs the requested document to a local file
references:
    - https://twitter.com/max_mal_/status/1542461200797163522
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200128160046/https://twitter.com/reegun21/status/1222093798009790464
    - https://github.com/pr0xylife/Qakbot/blob/4f0795d79dabee5bc9dd69f17a626b48852e7869/Qakbot_AA_23.06.2022.txt
    - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/07/28/sharptongue-deploys-clever-mail-stealing-browser-extension-sharpext/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-18---curl-download-file
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-07-03
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_curl:
        - Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
        - Product: 'The curl executable'
    selection_susp_locations:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '%AppData%'
            - '%Public%'
            - '%Temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\PerfLogs\'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    selection_susp_extensions:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '.dll'
            - '.gif'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.png'
            - '.temp'
            - '.tmp'
            - '.txt'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
    filter_optional_git_windows:
        # Example FP
        #   CommandLine: "C:\Program Files\Git\mingw64\bin\curl.exe" --silent --show-error --output C:/Users/test/AppData/Local/Temp/gfw-httpget-jVOEoxbS.txt --write-out %{http_code} https://gitforwindows.org/latest-tag.txt
        ParentImage: 'C:\Program Files\Git\usr\bin\sh.exe'
        Image: 'C:\Program Files\Git\mingw64\bin\curl.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '--silent --show-error --output '
            - 'gfw-httpget-'
            - 'AppData'
    condition: selection_curl and 1 of selection_susp_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_susp_download/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Curl Download File
      technique: T1105
      atomic_guid: 2b080b99-0deb-4d51-af0f-833d37c4ca6a

title: Suspicious Runscripthelper.exe
id: eca49c87-8a75-4f13-9c73-a5a29e845f03
status: test
description: Detects execution of powershell scripts via Runscripthelper.exe
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Runscripthelper/
author: Victor Sergeev, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-07-11
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\Runscripthelper.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'surfacecheck'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Trust Access Disable For VBApplications
id: 1a5c46e9-f32f-42f7-b2bc-6e9084db7fbf
related:
    - id: 9b894e57-033f-46cf-b7fa-a52804181973
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects registry changes to Microsoft Office "AccessVBOM" to a value of "1" which disables trust access for VBA on the victim machine and lets attackers execute malicious macros without any Microsoft Office warnings.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/inversecos/status/1494174785621819397
    - https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/zloader-with-a-new-infection-technique/
    - https://securelist.com/scarcruft-surveilling-north-korean-defectors-and-human-rights-activists/105074/
author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Security\AccessVBOM'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Turla Group Commands May 2020
id: 9e2e51c5-c699-4794-ba5a-29f5da40ac0c
status: test
description: Detects commands used by Turla group as reported by ESET in May 2020
references:
    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-05-26
modified: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.g0010
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1027
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'tracert -h 10 yahoo.com'
            - '.WSqmCons))|iex;'
            - 'Fr`omBa`se6`4Str`ing'
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|re: 'net\s+use\s+https://docs.live.net'
        CommandLine|contains: '@aol.co.uk'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical