Detection rules › Sigma

Sigma rules: 1c

Boot Configuration Tampering Via Bcdedit.EXE

#
Status
stable
Severity
high
Author
E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects the use of the bcdedit command to tamper with the boot configuration data. This technique is often times used by malware or attackers as a destructive way before launching ransomware.

Known False Positives

  • Unlikely

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Impact

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule Body

title: Boot Configuration Tampering Via Bcdedit.EXE
id: 1444443e-6757-43e4-9ea4-c8fc705f79a2
status: stable
description: Detects the use of the bcdedit command to tamper with the boot configuration data. This technique is often times used by malware or attackers as a destructive way before launching ransomware.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md
    - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/c4732632-9c1d-4980-9fa8-1d98c93f918e.html
author: E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2023-02-15
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\bcdedit.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'bcdedit.exe'
    selection_set:
        CommandLine|contains: 'set'
    selection_cli:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'bootstatuspolicy'
              - 'ignoreallfailures'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'recoveryenabled'
              - 'no'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Windows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair
      technique: T1490
      atomic_guid: cf21060a-80b3-4238-a595-22525de4ab81

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

all of selection_*

Stage 1: selection_img

selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: '\bcdedit.exe'
    - OriginalFileName: 'bcdedit.exe'

Stage 2: selection_set

selection_set:
    CommandLine|contains: 'set'

Stage 3: selection_cli

selection_cli:
    - CommandLine|contains|all:
          - 'bootstatuspolicy'
          - 'ignoreallfailures'
    - CommandLine|contains|all:
          - 'recoveryenabled'
          - 'no'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • bootstatuspolicy corpus 10 (elastic 8, sigma 1, splunk 1)
  • ignoreallfailures corpus 2 (sigma 1, splunk 1)
  • no
  • recoveryenabled corpus 10 (elastic 8, sigma 1, splunk 1)
  • set corpus 11 (sigma 10, splunk 1)
field:"CommandLine" kind:match
Imageends_with
  • \bcdedit.exe corpus 5 (sigma 5)
field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\bcdedit.exe"
OriginalFileNameeq
  • bcdedit.exe corpus 9 (elastic 7, sigma 2)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"bcdedit.exe"

Clear PowerShell History - PowerShell Module

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
Ilyas Ochkov, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects keywords that could indicate clearing PowerShell history

Known False Positives

  • Legitimate PowerShell scripts

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Clear PowerShell History - PowerShell Module
id: f99276ad-d122-4989-a09a-d00904a5f9d2
related:
    - id: dfba4ce1-e0ea-495f-986e-97140f31af2d
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects keywords that could indicate clearing PowerShell history
references:
    - https://gist.github.com/hook-s3c/7363a856c3cdbadeb71085147f042c1a
author: Ilyas Ochkov, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2022-12-02
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_1a_payload:
        Payload|contains:
            - 'del'
            - 'Remove-Item'
            - 'rm'
    selection_1b_payload:
        Payload|contains: '(Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath'
    selection_payload_2:
        Payload|contains|all:
            - 'Set-PSReadlineOption'
            - '–HistorySaveStyle'  # not sure if the homoglyph –/- is intended, just checking for both
            - 'SaveNothing'
    selection_payload_3:
        Payload|contains|all:
            - 'Set-PSReadlineOption'
            - '-HistorySaveStyle'
            - 'SaveNothing'
    condition: 1 of selection_payload_* or all of selection_1*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

1 of selection_payload_* or all of selection_1*

Stage 1: selection_payload_2

selection_payload_2:
    Payload|contains|all:
        - 'Set-PSReadlineOption'
        - '–HistorySaveStyle'
        - 'SaveNothing'

Stage 2: selection_payload_3

selection_payload_3:
    Payload|contains|all:
        - 'Set-PSReadlineOption'
        - '-HistorySaveStyle'
        - 'SaveNothing'

Stage 3: selection_1a_payload

selection_1a_payload:
    Payload|contains:
        - 'del'
        - 'Remove-Item'
        - 'rm'

Stage 4: selection_1b_payload

selection_1b_payload:
    Payload|contains: '(Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Payloadmatch
  • (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath
  • -HistorySaveStyle
  • Remove-Item
  • SaveNothing
  • Set-PSReadlineOption
  • del
  • rm
  • –HistorySaveStyle
field:"Payload" kind:match

CVE-2023-4966 Potential Exploitation Attempt - Citrix ADC Sensitive Information Disclosure - Proxy

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Michael Haag (STRT)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects potential exploitation attempt of CVE-2023-4966 a Citrix ADC and NetScaler Gateway sensitive information disclosure vulnerability via proxy logs.

Known False Positives

  • Vulnerability scanners

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Initial Access

Rule Body

title: CVE-2023-4966 Potential Exploitation Attempt - Citrix ADC Sensitive Information Disclosure - Proxy
id: ff349b81-617f-4af4-924f-dbe8ea9bab41
related:
    - id: 87c83d8e-5390-44ce-aa4a-d3b37e54d0a0 # Webserver Attempt
      type: similar
    - id: aee7681f-b53d-4594-a9de-ac51e6ad3362 # Proxy Exploit
      type: similar
    - id: a4e068b5-e27c-4f21-85b3-e69e5a4f7ce1 # Webserver Exploit
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential exploitation attempt of CVE-2023-4966 a Citrix ADC and NetScaler Gateway sensitive information disclosure vulnerability via proxy logs.
references:
    - https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX579459/netscaler-adc-and-netscaler-gateway-security-bulletin-for-cve20234966-and-cve20234967
    - https://attackerkb.com/topics/2faW2CxJgQ/cve-2023-4966
    - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/10/25/etr-cve-2023-4966-exploitation-of-citrix-netscaler-information-disclosure-vulnerability/
    - https://www.assetnote.io/resources/research/citrix-bleed-leaking-session-tokens-with-cve-2023-4966
    - https://github.com/assetnote/exploits/tree/main/citrix/CVE-2023-4966
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Michael Haag (STRT)
date: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2023-4966
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'GET'
        cs-uri|contains: '/oauth/idp/.well-known/openid-configuration'
        sc-status: 200
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Vulnerability scanners
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    cs-method: 'GET'
    cs-uri|contains: '/oauth/idp/.well-known/openid-configuration'
    sc-status: 200

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

Disabled Windows Defender Eventlog

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects the disabling of the Windows Defender eventlog as seen in relation to Lockbit 3.0 infections

Known False Positives

  • Other Antivirus software installations could cause Windows to disable that eventlog (unknown)

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Defense Impairment

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Disabled Windows Defender Eventlog
id: fcddca7c-b9c0-4ddf-98da-e1e2d18b0157
status: test
description: Detects the disabling of the Windows Defender eventlog as seen in relation to Lockbit 3.0 infections
references:
    - https://twitter.com/WhichbufferArda/status/1543900539280293889/photo/2
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-04
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational\Enabled'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Other Antivirus software installations could cause Windows to disable that eventlog (unknown)
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational\Enabled'
    Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Detailseq
  • DWORD (0x00000000) corpus 36 (sigma 36)
field:"Details" kind:eq value:"DWORD (0x00000000)"
TargetObjectmatch
  • \Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational\Enabled
field:"TargetObject" kind:match value:"\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational\Enabled"

Driver/DLL Installation Via Odbcconf.EXE

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects execution of "odbcconf" with "INSTALLDRIVER" which installs a new ODBC driver. Attackers abuse this to install and run malicious DLLs.

Known False Positives

  • Legitimate driver DLLs being registered via "odbcconf" will generate false positives. Investigate the path of the DLL and its contents to determine if the action is authorized.

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule Body

title: Driver/DLL Installation Via Odbcconf.EXE
id: 3f5491e2-8db8-496b-9e95-1029fce852d4
related:
    - id: cb0fe7c5-f3a3-484d-aa25-d350a7912729
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of "odbcconf" with "INSTALLDRIVER" which installs a new ODBC driver. Attackers abuse this to install and run malicious DLLs.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20191023232753/https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1187143326673330176
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/odbcconf-lolbin-trifecta/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-22
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.008
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\odbcconf.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'odbcconf.exe'
    selection_cli:
        # Note: The "/A" flag is not required to call a specific action
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'INSTALLDRIVER '
            - '.dll'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate driver DLLs being registered via "odbcconf" will generate false positives. Investigate the path of the DLL and its contents to determine if the action is authorized.
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

all of selection_*

Stage 1: selection_img

selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: '\odbcconf.exe'
    - OriginalFileName: 'odbcconf.exe'

Stage 2: selection_cli

selection_cli:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
        - 'INSTALLDRIVER '
        - '.dll'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • .dll corpus 16 (sigma 16)
  • INSTALLDRIVER corpus 2 (sigma 2)
field:"CommandLine" kind:match
Imageends_with
  • \odbcconf.exe corpus 11 (sigma 11)
field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\odbcconf.exe"
OriginalFileNameeq
  • odbcconf.exe corpus 11 (sigma 9, elastic 2)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"odbcconf.exe"

Dropping Of Password Filter DLL

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
Sreeman
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects dropping of dll files in system32 that may be used to retrieve user credentials from LSASS

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Dropping Of Password Filter DLL
id: b7966f4a-b333-455b-8370-8ca53c229762
status: test
description: Detects dropping of dll files in system32 that may be used to retrieve user credentials from LSASS
references:
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2020/02/10/credential-access-password-filter-dll/
    - https://github.com/3gstudent/PasswordFilter/tree/master/PasswordFilter
author: Sreeman
date: 2020-10-29
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1556.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cmdline:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa'
            - 'scecli\0*'
            - 'reg add'
    condition: selection_cmdline
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection_cmdline

Stage 1: selection_cmdline

selection_cmdline:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
        - 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa'
        - 'scecli\0*'
        - 'reg add'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa
  • reg add corpus 13 (sigma 13)
  • scecli\0*
field:"CommandLine" kind:match

Execute From Alternate Data Streams

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
frack113
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects execution from an Alternate Data Stream (ADS). Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Execute From Alternate Data Streams
id: 7f43c430-5001-4f8b-aaa9-c3b88f18fa5c
status: test
description: Detects execution from an Alternate Data Stream (ADS). Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-09-01
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_stream:
        CommandLine|contains: 'txt:'
    selection_tools_type:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'type '
            - ' > '
    selection_tools_makecab:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'makecab '
            - '.cab'
    selection_tools_reg:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'reg '
            - ' export '
    selection_tools_regedit:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'regedit '
            - ' /E '
    selection_tools_esentutl:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'esentutl '
            - ' /y '
            - ' /d '
            - ' /o '
    condition: selection_stream and (1 of selection_tools_*)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_alternate_data_streams/info.yml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection_stream and (1 of selection_tools_*)

Stage 1: selection_stream

selection_stream:
    CommandLine|contains: 'txt:'

Stage 2: selection_tools_type

selection_tools_type:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
        - 'type '
        - ' > '

Stage 3: selection_tools_makecab

selection_tools_makecab:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
        - 'makecab '
        - '.cab'

Stage 4: selection_tools_reg

selection_tools_reg:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
        - 'reg '
        - ' export '

Stage 5: selection_tools_regedit

selection_tools_regedit:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
        - 'regedit '
        - ' /E '

Stage 6: selection_tools_esentutl

selection_tools_esentutl:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
        - 'esentutl '
        - ' /y '
        - ' /d '
        - ' /o '

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • /E corpus 5 (sigma 5)
  • /d corpus 3 (sigma 3)
  • /o corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • /y corpus 3 (sigma 3)
  • > corpus 5 (sigma 5)
  • export corpus 3 (sigma 3)
  • .cab corpus 5 (sigma 5)
  • esentutl
  • makecab
  • reg corpus 5 (sigma 5)
  • regedit
  • txt:
  • type corpus 6 (sigma 6)
field:"CommandLine" kind:match

File Download Via Windows Defender MpCmpRun.EXE

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
Matthew Matchen
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects the use of Windows Defender MpCmdRun.EXE to download files

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule Body

title: File Download Via Windows Defender MpCmpRun.EXE
id: 46123129-1024-423e-9fae-43af4a0fa9a5
status: test
description: Detects the use of Windows Defender MpCmdRun.EXE to download files
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200903194959/https://twitter.com/djmtshepana/status/1301608169496612866
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/MpCmdRun/
author: Matthew Matchen
date: 2020-09-04
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
        - Description: 'Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'DownloadFile'
            - 'url'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

all of selection_*

Stage 1: selection_img

selection_img:
    - OriginalFileName: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
    - Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
    - CommandLine|contains: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
    - Description: 'Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility'

Stage 2: selection_cli

selection_cli:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
        - 'DownloadFile'
        - 'url'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • DownloadFile corpus 5 (sigma 4, elastic 1)
  • MpCmdRun.exe
  • url
field:"CommandLine" kind:match
Descriptioneq
  • Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility
field:"Description" kind:eq value:"Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility"
Imageends_with
  • \MpCmdRun.exe corpus 4 (sigma 4)
field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\MpCmdRun.exe"
OriginalFileNameeq
  • MpCmdRun.exe corpus 3 (sigma 2, splunk 1)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"MpCmdRun.exe"

First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
Samir Bousseaden
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using named pipes

Known False Positives

  • Update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe
id: 52d8b0c6-53d6-439a-9e41-52ad442ad9ad
status: test
description: This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using named pipes
references:
    - https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1104489274387451904
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2023-03-14
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$' # looking for the string \\*\IPC$
    false_positives:
        RelativeTargetName:
            - 'atsvc'
            - 'samr'
            - 'lsarpc'
            - 'lsass'
            - 'winreg'
            - 'netlogon'
            - 'srvsvc'
            - 'protected_storage'
            - 'wkssvc'
            - 'browser'
            - 'netdfs'
            - 'svcctl'
            - 'spoolss'
            - 'ntsvcs'
            - 'LSM_API_service'
            - 'HydraLsPipe'
            - 'TermSrv_API_service'
            - 'MsFteWds'
            - 'sql\query'
            - 'eventlog'
    condition: selection1 and not false_positives
falsepositives:
    - Update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection1 and not false_positives

Stage 1: selection1

selection1:
    EventID: 5145
    ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$'

Stage 2: not false_positives

false_positives:
    RelativeTargetName:
        - 'atsvc'
        - 'samr'
        - 'lsarpc'
        - 'lsass'
        - 'winreg'
        - 'netlogon'
        - 'srvsvc'
        - 'protected_storage'
        - 'wkssvc'
        - 'browser'
        - 'netdfs'
        - 'svcctl'
        - 'spoolss'
        - 'ntsvcs'
        - 'LSM_API_service'
        - 'HydraLsPipe'
        - 'TermSrv_API_service'
        - 'MsFteWds'
        - 'sql\query'
        - 'eventlog'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
ShareNameeq
  • \\\\\*\\IPC$ corpus 7 (sigma 7)
field:"ShareName" kind:eq value:"\\\\\*\\IPC$"

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
RelativeTargetNameeqHydraLsPipeexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"HydraLsPipe"
RelativeTargetNameeqLSM_API_serviceexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"LSM_API_service"
RelativeTargetNameeqMsFteWdsexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"MsFteWds"
RelativeTargetNameeqTermSrv_API_serviceexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"TermSrv_API_service"
RelativeTargetNameeqatsvcexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"atsvc"
RelativeTargetNameeqbrowserexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"browser"
RelativeTargetNameeqeventlogexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"eventlog"
RelativeTargetNameeqlsarpcexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"lsarpc"
RelativeTargetNameeqlsassexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"lsass"
RelativeTargetNameeqnetdfsexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"netdfs"
RelativeTargetNameeqnetlogonexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"netlogon"
RelativeTargetNameeqntsvcsexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"ntsvcs"
RelativeTargetNameeqprotected_storageexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"protected_storage"
RelativeTargetNameeqsamrexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"samr"
RelativeTargetNameeqspoolssexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"spoolss"
RelativeTargetNameeqsql\queryexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"sql\query"
RelativeTargetNameeqsrvsvcexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"srvsvc"
RelativeTargetNameeqsvcctlexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"svcctl"
RelativeTargetNameeqwinregexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"winreg"
RelativeTargetNameeqwkssvcexcludes:RelativeTargetName field:"RelativeTargetName" value:"wkssvc"

Invoke-Obfuscation RUNDLL LAUNCHER - Security

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via RUNDLL LAUNCHER

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Invoke-Obfuscation RUNDLL LAUNCHER - Security
id: f241cf1b-3a6b-4e1a-b4f9-133c00dd95ca
related:
    - id: 11b52f18-aaec-4d60-9143-5dd8cc4706b9
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via RUNDLL LAUNCHER
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 23)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-18
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32.exe'
            - 'shell32.dll'
            - 'shellexec_rundll'
            - 'powershell'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    EventID: 4697
    ServiceFileName|contains|all:
        - 'rundll32.exe'
        - 'shell32.dll'
        - 'shellexec_rundll'
        - 'powershell'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
ServiceFileNamematch
  • powershell corpus 4 (sigma 4)
  • rundll32.exe
  • shell32.dll corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • shellexec_rundll corpus 2 (sigma 2)
field:"ServiceFileName" kind:match

macOS ULS Gatekeeper Block (spctl)

#
Status
experimental
Severity
high
Author
Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
Source
github.com/Nebulock-Inc/macos-coresigma

Detect Gatekeeper blocks logged by spctl or related subsystems.

Known False Positives

  • unsigned internal tools during development

Rule Body

title: macOS ULS Gatekeeper Block (spctl)
id: 2f1b3c4d-5e6f-4a8b-9c0d-1e2f3a4b5c6d
status: experimental
description: Detect Gatekeeper blocks logged by spctl or related subsystems.
author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
date: 2025-10-29
logsource:
  product: macos
  service: unifiedlog
level: high
detection:
  selection:
    subsystem: com.apple.security.assessment
    message|contains:
    - rejected
    - assessment failed
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- unsigned internal tools during development
modified: 2025/01/15

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
  subsystem: com.apple.security.assessment
  message|contains:
  - rejected
  - assessment failed

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
messagematch
  • assessment failed
  • rejected
field:"message" kind:match
subsystemeq
  • com.apple.security.assessment
field:"subsystem" kind:eq value:"com.apple.security.assessment"

Moriya Rootkit - System

#
Status
test
Severity
critical
Author
Bhabesh Raj
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects the use of Moriya rootkit as described in the securelist's Operation TunnelSnake report

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Moriya Rootkit - System
id: 25b9c01c-350d-4b95-bed1-836d04a4f324
status: test
description: Detects the use of Moriya rootkit as described in the securelist's Operation TunnelSnake report
references:
    - https://securelist.com/operation-tunnelsnake-and-moriya-rootkit/101831
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-05-06
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ServiceName: ZzNetSvc
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
    EventID: 7045
    ServiceName: ZzNetSvc

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

OpenCanary - SMB File Open Request

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
Security Onion Solutions
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects instances where an SMB service on an OpenCanary node has had a file open request.

Known False Positives

  • Unlikely

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Lateral Movement
Collection

Rule Body

title: OpenCanary - SMB File Open Request
id: 22777c9e-873a-4b49-855f-6072ab861a52
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SMB service on an OpenCanary node has had a file open request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1021
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5000
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    logtype: 5000

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

OpenCanary - SSH Login Attempt

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
Security Onion Solutions
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects instances where an SSH service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.

Known False Positives

  • Unlikely

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Rule Body

title: OpenCanary - SSH Login Attempt
id: ff7139bc-fdb1-4437-92f2-6afefe8884cb
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SSH service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1021
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 4002
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    logtype: 4002

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

Potential Arbitrary File Download Using Office Application

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Beyu Denis, oscd.community
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects potential arbitrary file download using a Microsoft Office application

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Stealth

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule Body

title: Potential Arbitrary File Download Using Office Application
id: 4ae3e30b-b03f-43aa-87e3-b622f4048eed
related:
    - id: 0c79148b-118e-472b-bdb7-9b57b444cc19
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects potential arbitrary file download using a Microsoft Office application
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Winword/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Powerpnt/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Excel/
    - https://medium.com/@reegun/unsanitized-file-validation-leads-to-malicious-payload-download-via-office-binaries-202d02db7191
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Beyu Denis, oscd.community
date: 2022-05-17
modified: 2023-06-22
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\EXCEL.EXE'
              - '\POWERPNT.EXE'
              - '\WINWORD.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'Excel.exe'
              - 'POWERPNT.EXE'
              - 'WinWord.exe'
    selection_http:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

all of selection_*

Stage 1: selection_img

selection_img:
    - Image|endswith:
          - '\EXCEL.EXE'
          - '\POWERPNT.EXE'
          - '\WINWORD.exe'
    - OriginalFileName:
          - 'Excel.exe'
          - 'POWERPNT.EXE'
          - 'WinWord.exe'

Stage 2: selection_http

selection_http:
    CommandLine|contains:
        - 'http://'
        - 'https://'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • http:// corpus 20 (sigma 18, elastic 1, splunk 1)
  • https:// corpus 20 (sigma 18, elastic 1, splunk 1)
field:"CommandLine" kind:match
Imageends_with
  • \EXCEL.EXE corpus 16 (sigma 16)
  • \POWERPNT.EXE corpus 14 (sigma 14)
  • \WINWORD.exe corpus 17 (sigma 17)
field:"Image" kind:ends_with
OriginalFileNameeq
  • Excel.exe corpus 4 (sigma 3, elastic 1)
  • POWERPNT.EXE corpus 4 (sigma 3, elastic 1)
  • WinWord.exe corpus 6 (sigma 4, elastic 2)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq

Privileged Account Creation

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H', Tim Shelton
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects when a new admin is created.

Known False Positives

  • A legitimate new admin account being created

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

Rules Detecting the Same Action

These rules filter on the same operation.

Rule Body

title: Privileged Account Creation
id: f7b5b004-dece-46e4-a4a5-f6fd0e1c6947
status: test
description: Detects when a new admin is created.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H', Tim Shelton
date: 2022-08-11
modified: 2022-08-16
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message|contains|all:
            - Add user
            - Add member to role
        Status: Success
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - A legitimate new admin account being created
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    properties.message|contains|all:
        - Add user
        - Add member to role
    Status: Success

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Statuseq
  • Success corpus 6 (sigma 6)
field:"Status" kind:eq value:"Success"
properties.messagematch
  • Add member to role
  • Add user
field:"properties.message" kind:match

Rare Subscription-level Operations In Azure

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
sawwinnnaung
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Identifies IPs from which users grant access to other users on azure resources and alerts when a previously unseen source IP address is used.

Known False Positives

  • Valid change

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Credential Access

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Rare Subscription-level Operations In Azure
id: c1182e02-49a3-481c-b3de-0fadc4091488
status: test
description: Identifies IPs from which users grant access to other users on azure resources and alerts when a previously unseen source IP address is used.
references:
    - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/e534407884b1ec5371efc9f76ead282176c9e8bb/Detections/AzureActivity/RareOperations.yaml
author: sawwinnnaung
date: 2020-05-07
modified: 2023-10-11
tags:
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    keywords:
        - Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts/listKeys/action
        - Microsoft.Maps/accounts/listKeys/action
        - Microsoft.Media/mediaservices/listKeys/action
        - Microsoft.CognitiveServices/accounts/listKeys/action
        - Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listKeys/action
        - Microsoft.Compute/snapshots/write
        - Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/write
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Valid change
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

keywords

Stage 1: keywords

keywords:
    - Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts/listKeys/action
    - Microsoft.Maps/accounts/listKeys/action
    - Microsoft.Media/mediaservices/listKeys/action
    - Microsoft.CognitiveServices/accounts/listKeys/action
    - Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listKeys/action
    - Microsoft.Compute/snapshots/write
    - Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/write

Removal Of SD Value to Hide Schedule Task - Registry

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
Sittikorn S
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Remove SD (Security Descriptor) value in \Schedule\TaskCache\Tree registry hive to hide schedule task. This technique is used by Tarrask malware

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Defense Impairment

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Removal Of SD Value to Hide Schedule Task - Registry
id: acd74772-5f88-45c7-956b-6a7b36c294d2
related:
    - id: 526cc8bc-1cdc-48ad-8b26-f19bff969cec
      type: similar
status: test
description: Remove SD (Security Descriptor) value in \Schedule\TaskCache\Tree registry hive to hide schedule task. This technique is used by Tarrask malware
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/12/tarrask-malware-uses-scheduled-tasks-for-defense-evasion/
author: Sittikorn S
date: 2022-04-15
modified: 2025-10-25
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_delete
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\'
            - 'SD'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_schtasks_hide_task_via_sd_value_removal/info.yml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    TargetObject|contains|all:
        - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\'
        - 'SD'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
TargetObjectmatch
  • SD
  • \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\ corpus 4 (sigma 4)
field:"TargetObject" kind:match

Scheduled TaskCache Change by Uncommon Program

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
Syed Hasan (@syedhasan009)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Monitor the creation of a new key under 'TaskCache' when a new scheduled task is registered by a process that is not svchost.exe, which is suspicious

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Scheduled TaskCache Change by Uncommon Program
id: 4720b7df-40c3-48fd-bbdf-fd4b3c464f0d
status: test
description: Monitor the creation of a new key under 'TaskCache' when a new scheduled task is registered by a process that is not svchost.exe, which is suspicious
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
    - https://labs.f-secure.com/blog/scheduled-task-tampering/
author: Syed Hasan (@syedhasan009)
date: 2021-06-18
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\'
    filter_main_empty:
        Details: '(Empty)'
    filter_main_null:
        Details: null
    filter_main_other:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - 'Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator'
            - 'Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\SvcRestartTask\Index'
            - 'Microsoft\Windows\Flighting\OneSettings\RefreshCache\Index'
    filter_main_mousocoreworker:
        Image|endswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\MoUsoCoreWorker.exe'
    filter_main_services:
        Image|endswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\services.exe'
    filter_main_tiworker:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\'
        Image|endswith: '\TiWorker.exe'
    filter_main_svchost:
        Image: 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe'
    filter_main_ngen:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework' # \Framework\ and \Framework64\
        Image|endswith: '\ngen.exe'
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tasks\{B66B135D-DA06-4FC4-95F8-7458E1D10129}'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\Microsoft\Windows\.NET Framework\.NET Framework NGEN'
    filter_main_office:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Integration\Integrator.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Integration\Integrator.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe'
    filter_main_msiexec:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
    filter_main_explorer:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor\'
    filter_main_system:
        Image: 'System'
    filter_main_runtimebroker:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe'
    filter_optional_dropbox_updater:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\Update\DropboxUpdate.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Dropbox\Update\DropboxUpdate.exe'
    filter_optional_edge:
        Image|endswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe'
    filter_optional_onedrive:
        Image|endswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft OneDrive\OneDrive.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft OneDrive\OneDrive.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    TargetObject|contains: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\'

Stage 2: not filter_main_*

filter_main_empty:
    Details: '(Empty)'
filter_main_null:
    Details: null
filter_main_other:
    TargetObject|contains:
        - 'Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator'
        - 'Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\SvcRestartTask\Index'
        - 'Microsoft\Windows\Flighting\OneSettings\RefreshCache\Index'
filter_main_mousocoreworker:
    Image|endswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\MoUsoCoreWorker.exe'
filter_main_services:
    Image|endswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\services.exe'
filter_main_tiworker:
    Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\'
    Image|endswith: '\TiWorker.exe'
filter_main_svchost:
    Image: 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe'
filter_main_ngen:
    Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework'
    Image|endswith: '\ngen.exe'
    TargetObject|contains:
        - '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tasks\{B66B135D-DA06-4FC4-95F8-7458E1D10129}'
        - '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\Microsoft\Windows\.NET Framework\.NET Framework NGEN'
filter_main_office:
    Image:
        - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Integration\Integrator.exe'
        - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Integration\Integrator.exe'
        - 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe'
        - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe'
filter_main_msiexec:
    Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
filter_main_explorer:
    Image: 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
    TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor\'
filter_main_system:
    Image: 'System'
filter_main_runtimebroker:
    Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe'

Stage 3: not filter_optional_*

filter_optional_dropbox_updater:
    Image:
        - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\Update\DropboxUpdate.exe'
        - 'C:\Program Files\Dropbox\Update\DropboxUpdate.exe'
filter_optional_edge:
    Image|endswith:
        - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe'
        - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe'
filter_optional_onedrive:
    Image|endswith:
        - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft OneDrive\OneDrive.exe'
        - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft OneDrive\OneDrive.exe'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
TargetObjectmatch
  • SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\
field:"TargetObject" kind:match value:"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\"

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
TargetObjectmatch\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tasks\{B66B135D-DA06-4FC4-95F8-7458E1D10129}excludes:TargetObject field:"TargetObject" value:"\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tasks\{B66B135D-DA06-4FC4-95F8-7458E1D10129}"
TargetObjectmatch\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\Microsoft\Windows\.NET Framework\.NET Framework NGENexcludes:TargetObject field:"TargetObject" value:"\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\Microsoft\Windows\.NET Framework\.NET Framework NGEN"
Imageends_with\ngen.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\ngen.exe"
Imagestarts_withC:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Frameworkexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework"
Imageends_with\TiWorker.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\TiWorker.exe"
Imagestarts_withC:\Windows\excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\"
ImageeqC:\Windows\explorer.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\explorer.exe"
TargetObjectmatch\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor\excludes:TargetObject field:"TargetObject" value:"\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor\"
Detailseq(Empty)excludes:Details field:"Details" value:"(Empty)"
Detailsis_null(no value, null check)excludes:Details
Imageends_withC:\Windows\System32\MoUsoCoreWorker.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\System32\MoUsoCoreWorker.exe"
Imageends_withC:\Windows\System32\services.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\System32\services.exe"
ImageeqC:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe"
ImageeqC:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Integration\Integrator.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Integration\Integrator.exe"
ImageeqC:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe"
ImageeqC:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Integration\Integrator.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Integration\Integrator.exe"
ImageeqC:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe"
ImageeqC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe"
ImageeqC:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe"
ImageeqSystemexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"System"
TargetObjectmatchMicrosoft\Windows\Flighting\OneSettings\RefreshCache\Indexexcludes:TargetObject field:"TargetObject" value:"Microsoft\Windows\Flighting\OneSettings\RefreshCache\Index"
TargetObjectmatchMicrosoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\SvcRestartTask\Indexexcludes:TargetObject field:"TargetObject" value:"Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\SvcRestartTask\Index"
TargetObjectmatchMicrosoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestratorexcludes:TargetObject field:"TargetObject" value:"Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator"
Imageends_withC:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft OneDrive\OneDrive.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft OneDrive\OneDrive.exe"
Imageends_withC:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe"
Imageends_withC:\Program Files\Microsoft OneDrive\OneDrive.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Program Files\Microsoft OneDrive\OneDrive.exe"
Imageends_withC:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe"
ImageeqC:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\Update\DropboxUpdate.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\Update\DropboxUpdate.exe"
ImageeqC:\Program Files\Dropbox\Update\DropboxUpdate.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Program Files\Dropbox\Update\DropboxUpdate.exe"

Share And Session Enumeration Using Net.EXE

#
Status
stable
Severity
low
Author
Endgame, JHasenbusch (ported for oscd.community)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects attempts to enumerate file shares, printer shares and sessions using "net.exe" with the "view" flag.

Known False Positives

  • Legitimate use of net.exe utility by legitimate user

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Discovery

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule Body

title: Share And Session Enumeration Using Net.EXE
id: 62510e69-616b-4078-b371-847da438cc03
status: stable
description: Detects attempts to enumerate file shares, printer shares and sessions using "net.exe" with the "view" flag.
references:
    - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/b8a94d2f-dc75-4630-9d73-1edc6bd26fff.html
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1018/T1018.md
author: Endgame, JHasenbusch (ported for oscd.community)
date: 2018-10-30
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1018
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\net.exe'
              - '\net1.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'net.exe'
              - 'net1.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: 'view'
    filter:
        CommandLine|contains: '\\\\'
    condition: all of selection_* and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of net.exe utility by legitimate user
level: low

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

all of selection_* and not filter

Stage 1: selection_img

selection_img:
    - Image|endswith:
          - '\net.exe'
          - '\net1.exe'
    - OriginalFileName:
          - 'net.exe'
          - 'net1.exe'

Stage 2: selection_cli

selection_cli:
    CommandLine|contains: 'view'

Stage 3: not filter

filter:
    CommandLine|contains: '\\\\'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • view corpus 2 (sigma 1, splunk 1)
field:"CommandLine" kind:match value:"view"
Imageends_with
  • \net.exe corpus 49 (sigma 49)
  • \net1.exe corpus 47 (sigma 47)
field:"Image" kind:ends_with
OriginalFileNameeq
  • net.exe corpus 25 (sigma 19, elastic 4, splunk 2)
  • net1.exe corpus 39 (sigma 19, splunk 19, elastic 1)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
CommandLinematch\\\\excludes:CommandLine field:"CommandLine" value:"\\\\"

SSHD Error Message CVE-2018-15473

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects exploitation attempt using public exploit code for CVE-2018-15473

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Reconnaissance

Rule Body

title: SSHD Error Message CVE-2018-15473
id: 4c9d903d-4939-4094-ade0-3cb748f4d7da
status: test
description: Detects exploitation attempt using public exploit code for CVE-2018-15473
references:
    - https://github.com/Rhynorater/CVE-2018-15473-Exploit
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-08-24
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1589
    - cve.2018-15473
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: sshd
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'error: buffer_get_ret: trying to get more bytes 1907 than in buffer 308 [preauth]'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

keywords

Stage 1: keywords

keywords:
    - 'error: buffer_get_ret: trying to get more bytes 1907 than in buffer 308 [preauth]'

Windows Admin Share Mount Via Net.EXE

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
oscd.community, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, Zach Stanford @svch0st, wagga
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects when an admin share is mounted using net.exe

Known False Positives

  • Administrators

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule Body

title: Windows Admin Share Mount Via Net.EXE
id: 3abd6094-7027-475f-9630-8ab9be7b9725
related:
    - id: f117933c-980c-4f78-b384-e3d838111165
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when an admin share is mounted using net.exe
references:
    - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view
author: oscd.community, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, Zach Stanford @svch0st, wagga
date: 2020-10-05
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\net.exe'
              - '\net1.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'net.exe'
              - 'net1.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' use '
            - ' \\\\*\\*$'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrators
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

all of selection_*

Stage 1: selection_img

selection_img:
    - Image|endswith:
          - '\net.exe'
          - '\net1.exe'
    - OriginalFileName:
          - 'net.exe'
          - 'net1.exe'

Stage 2: selection_cli

selection_cli:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
        - ' use '
        - ' \\\\*\\*$'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • \\\\*\\*$
  • use corpus 6 (sigma 6)
field:"CommandLine" kind:match
Imageends_with
  • \net.exe corpus 49 (sigma 49)
  • \net1.exe corpus 47 (sigma 47)
field:"Image" kind:ends_with
OriginalFileNameeq
  • net.exe corpus 25 (sigma 19, elastic 4, splunk 2)
  • net1.exe corpus 39 (sigma 19, splunk 19, elastic 1)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq

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