Detection rules › Sigma
Sigma rules: 1c
Boot Configuration Tampering Via Bcdedit.EXE
#Detects the use of the bcdedit command to tamper with the boot configuration data. This technique is often times used by malware or attackers as a destructive way before launching ransomware.
Known False Positives
- Unlikely
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Impact |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule Body
title: Boot Configuration Tampering Via Bcdedit.EXE
id: 1444443e-6757-43e4-9ea4-c8fc705f79a2
status: stable
description: Detects the use of the bcdedit command to tamper with the boot configuration data. This technique is often times used by malware or attackers as a destructive way before launching ransomware.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md
- https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/c4732632-9c1d-4980-9fa8-1d98c93f918e.html
author: E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2023-02-15
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1490
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\bcdedit.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'bcdedit.exe'
selection_set:
CommandLine|contains: 'set'
selection_cli:
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'bootstatuspolicy'
- 'ignoreallfailures'
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'recoveryenabled'
- 'no'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
simulation:
- type: atomic-red-team
name: Windows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair
technique: T1490
atomic_guid: cf21060a-80b3-4238-a595-22525de4ab81
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
all of selection_*Stage 1: selection_img
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\bcdedit.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'bcdedit.exe'
Stage 2: selection_set
selection_set:
CommandLine|contains: 'set'
Stage 3: selection_cli
selection_cli:
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'bootstatuspolicy'
- 'ignoreallfailures'
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'recoveryenabled'
- 'no'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\bcdedit.exe" |
OriginalFileName | eq |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"bcdedit.exe" |
Clear PowerShell History - PowerShell Module
#Detects keywords that could indicate clearing PowerShell history
Known False Positives
- Legitimate PowerShell scripts
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| PowerShell | Event ID 4103: Payload Context: ContextInfo User Data: UserData. |
Rule Body
title: Clear PowerShell History - PowerShell Module
id: f99276ad-d122-4989-a09a-d00904a5f9d2
related:
- id: dfba4ce1-e0ea-495f-986e-97140f31af2d
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects keywords that could indicate clearing PowerShell history
references:
- https://gist.github.com/hook-s3c/7363a856c3cdbadeb71085147f042c1a
author: Ilyas Ochkov, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2022-12-02
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1070.003
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_module
definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
selection_1a_payload:
Payload|contains:
- 'del'
- 'Remove-Item'
- 'rm'
selection_1b_payload:
Payload|contains: '(Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath'
selection_payload_2:
Payload|contains|all:
- 'Set-PSReadlineOption'
- '–HistorySaveStyle' # not sure if the homoglyph –/- is intended, just checking for both
- 'SaveNothing'
selection_payload_3:
Payload|contains|all:
- 'Set-PSReadlineOption'
- '-HistorySaveStyle'
- 'SaveNothing'
condition: 1 of selection_payload_* or all of selection_1*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
1 of selection_payload_* or all of selection_1*Stage 1: selection_payload_2
selection_payload_2:
Payload|contains|all:
- 'Set-PSReadlineOption'
- '–HistorySaveStyle'
- 'SaveNothing'
Stage 2: selection_payload_3
selection_payload_3:
Payload|contains|all:
- 'Set-PSReadlineOption'
- '-HistorySaveStyle'
- 'SaveNothing'
Stage 3: selection_1a_payload
selection_1a_payload:
Payload|contains:
- 'del'
- 'Remove-Item'
- 'rm'
Stage 4: selection_1b_payload
selection_1b_payload:
Payload|contains: '(Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Payload | match |
| field:"Payload" kind:match |
CVE-2023-4966 Potential Exploitation Attempt - Citrix ADC Sensitive Information Disclosure - Proxy
#Detects potential exploitation attempt of CVE-2023-4966 a Citrix ADC and NetScaler Gateway sensitive information disclosure vulnerability via proxy logs.
Known False Positives
- Vulnerability scanners
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access |
Rule Body
title: CVE-2023-4966 Potential Exploitation Attempt - Citrix ADC Sensitive Information Disclosure - Proxy
id: ff349b81-617f-4af4-924f-dbe8ea9bab41
related:
- id: 87c83d8e-5390-44ce-aa4a-d3b37e54d0a0 # Webserver Attempt
type: similar
- id: aee7681f-b53d-4594-a9de-ac51e6ad3362 # Proxy Exploit
type: similar
- id: a4e068b5-e27c-4f21-85b3-e69e5a4f7ce1 # Webserver Exploit
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential exploitation attempt of CVE-2023-4966 a Citrix ADC and NetScaler Gateway sensitive information disclosure vulnerability via proxy logs.
references:
- https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX579459/netscaler-adc-and-netscaler-gateway-security-bulletin-for-cve20234966-and-cve20234967
- https://attackerkb.com/topics/2faW2CxJgQ/cve-2023-4966
- https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/10/25/etr-cve-2023-4966-exploitation-of-citrix-netscaler-information-disclosure-vulnerability/
- https://www.assetnote.io/resources/research/citrix-bleed-leaking-session-tokens-with-cve-2023-4966
- https://github.com/assetnote/exploits/tree/main/citrix/CVE-2023-4966
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Michael Haag (STRT)
date: 2023-11-28
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1190
- cve.2023-4966
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
cs-method: 'GET'
cs-uri|contains: '/oauth/idp/.well-known/openid-configuration'
sc-status: 200
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Vulnerability scanners
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
cs-method: 'GET'
cs-uri|contains: '/oauth/idp/.well-known/openid-configuration'
sc-status: 200
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
cs-method | eq |
| field:"cs-method" kind:eq value:"GET" |
cs-uri | match |
| field:"cs-uri" kind:match value:"/oauth/idp/.well-known/openid-configuration" |
sc-status | eq |
| field:"sc-status" kind:eq value:"200" |
Disabled Windows Defender Eventlog
#Detects the disabling of the Windows Defender eventlog as seen in relation to Lockbit 3.0 infections
Known False Positives
- Other Antivirus software installations could cause Windows to disable that eventlog (unknown)
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Impairment |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 13: RegistryEvent (Value Set) |
Rule Body
title: Disabled Windows Defender Eventlog
id: fcddca7c-b9c0-4ddf-98da-e1e2d18b0157
status: test
description: Detects the disabling of the Windows Defender eventlog as seen in relation to Lockbit 3.0 infections
references:
- https://twitter.com/WhichbufferArda/status/1543900539280293889/photo/2
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-04
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational\Enabled'
Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Other Antivirus software installations could cause Windows to disable that eventlog (unknown)
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational\Enabled'
Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Details | eq |
| field:"Details" kind:eq value:"DWORD (0x00000000)" |
TargetObject | match |
| field:"TargetObject" kind:match value:"\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational\Enabled" |
Driver/DLL Installation Via Odbcconf.EXE
#Detects execution of "odbcconf" with "INSTALLDRIVER" which installs a new ODBC driver. Attackers abuse this to install and run malicious DLLs.
Known False Positives
- Legitimate driver DLLs being registered via "odbcconf" will generate false positives. Investigate the path of the DLL and its contents to determine if the action is authorized.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule Body
title: Driver/DLL Installation Via Odbcconf.EXE
id: 3f5491e2-8db8-496b-9e95-1029fce852d4
related:
- id: cb0fe7c5-f3a3-484d-aa25-d350a7912729
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of "odbcconf" with "INSTALLDRIVER" which installs a new ODBC driver. Attackers abuse this to install and run malicious DLLs.
references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20191023232753/https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1187143326673330176
- https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/odbcconf-lolbin-trifecta/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-22
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218.008
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\odbcconf.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'odbcconf.exe'
selection_cli:
# Note: The "/A" flag is not required to call a specific action
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'INSTALLDRIVER '
- '.dll'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate driver DLLs being registered via "odbcconf" will generate false positives. Investigate the path of the DLL and its contents to determine if the action is authorized.
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
all of selection_*Stage 1: selection_img
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\odbcconf.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'odbcconf.exe'
Stage 2: selection_cli
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'INSTALLDRIVER '
- '.dll'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\odbcconf.exe" |
OriginalFileName | eq |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"odbcconf.exe" |
Dropping Of Password Filter DLL
#Detects dropping of dll files in system32 that may be used to retrieve user credentials from LSASS
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Defense Impairment | |
| Credential Access |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule Body
title: Dropping Of Password Filter DLL
id: b7966f4a-b333-455b-8370-8ca53c229762
status: test
description: Detects dropping of dll files in system32 that may be used to retrieve user credentials from LSASS
references:
- https://pentestlab.blog/2020/02/10/credential-access-password-filter-dll/
- https://github.com/3gstudent/PasswordFilter/tree/master/PasswordFilter
author: Sreeman
date: 2020-10-29
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.credential-access
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1556.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_cmdline:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa'
- 'scecli\0*'
- 'reg add'
condition: selection_cmdline
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection_cmdlineStage 1: selection_cmdline
selection_cmdline:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa'
- 'scecli\0*'
- 'reg add'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Execute From Alternate Data Streams
#Detects execution from an Alternate Data Stream (ADS). Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule Body
title: Execute From Alternate Data Streams
id: 7f43c430-5001-4f8b-aaa9-c3b88f18fa5c
status: test
description: Detects execution from an Alternate Data Stream (ADS). Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-09-01
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1564.004
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_stream:
CommandLine|contains: 'txt:'
selection_tools_type:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'type '
- ' > '
selection_tools_makecab:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'makecab '
- '.cab'
selection_tools_reg:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'reg '
- ' export '
selection_tools_regedit:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'regedit '
- ' /E '
selection_tools_esentutl:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'esentutl '
- ' /y '
- ' /d '
- ' /o '
condition: selection_stream and (1 of selection_tools_*)
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_alternate_data_streams/info.yml
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection_stream and (1 of selection_tools_*)Stage 1: selection_stream
selection_stream:
CommandLine|contains: 'txt:'
Stage 2: selection_tools_type
selection_tools_type:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'type '
- ' > '
Stage 3: selection_tools_makecab
selection_tools_makecab:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'makecab '
- '.cab'
Stage 4: selection_tools_reg
selection_tools_reg:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'reg '
- ' export '
Stage 5: selection_tools_regedit
selection_tools_regedit:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'regedit '
- ' /E '
Stage 6: selection_tools_esentutl
selection_tools_esentutl:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'esentutl '
- ' /y '
- ' /d '
- ' /o '
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
File Download Via Windows Defender MpCmpRun.EXE
#Detects the use of Windows Defender MpCmdRun.EXE to download files
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth | |
| Command & Control |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule Body
title: File Download Via Windows Defender MpCmpRun.EXE
id: 46123129-1024-423e-9fae-43af4a0fa9a5
status: test
description: Detects the use of Windows Defender MpCmdRun.EXE to download files
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20200903194959/https://twitter.com/djmtshepana/status/1301608169496612866
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/MpCmdRun/
author: Matthew Matchen
date: 2020-09-04
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1105
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- OriginalFileName: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
- Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
- CommandLine|contains: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
- Description: 'Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'DownloadFile'
- 'url'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
all of selection_*Stage 1: selection_img
selection_img:
- OriginalFileName: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
- Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
- CommandLine|contains: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
- Description: 'Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility'
Stage 2: selection_cli
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'DownloadFile'
- 'url'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Description | eq |
| field:"Description" kind:eq value:"Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility" |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\MpCmdRun.exe" |
OriginalFileName | eq |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"MpCmdRun.exe" |
First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe
#This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using named pipes
Known False Positives
- Update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Lateral Movement |
Telemetry Coverage
Rule Body
title: First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe
id: 52d8b0c6-53d6-439a-9e41-52ad442ad9ad
status: test
description: This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using named pipes
references:
- https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1104489274387451904
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2023-03-14
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.002
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
selection1:
EventID: 5145
ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$' # looking for the string \\*\IPC$
false_positives:
RelativeTargetName:
- 'atsvc'
- 'samr'
- 'lsarpc'
- 'lsass'
- 'winreg'
- 'netlogon'
- 'srvsvc'
- 'protected_storage'
- 'wkssvc'
- 'browser'
- 'netdfs'
- 'svcctl'
- 'spoolss'
- 'ntsvcs'
- 'LSM_API_service'
- 'HydraLsPipe'
- 'TermSrv_API_service'
- 'MsFteWds'
- 'sql\query'
- 'eventlog'
condition: selection1 and not false_positives
falsepositives:
- Update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection1 and not false_positivesStage 1: selection1
selection1:
EventID: 5145
ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$'
Stage 2: not false_positives
false_positives:
RelativeTargetName:
- 'atsvc'
- 'samr'
- 'lsarpc'
- 'lsass'
- 'winreg'
- 'netlogon'
- 'srvsvc'
- 'protected_storage'
- 'wkssvc'
- 'browser'
- 'netdfs'
- 'svcctl'
- 'spoolss'
- 'ntsvcs'
- 'LSM_API_service'
- 'HydraLsPipe'
- 'TermSrv_API_service'
- 'MsFteWds'
- 'sql\query'
- 'eventlog'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
ShareName | eq |
| field:"ShareName" kind:eq value:"\\\\\*\\IPC$" |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
Invoke-Obfuscation RUNDLL LAUNCHER - Security
#Detects Obfuscated Powershell via RUNDLL LAUNCHER
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4697: A service was installed in the system. |
Rule Body
title: Invoke-Obfuscation RUNDLL LAUNCHER - Security
id: f241cf1b-3a6b-4e1a-b4f9-133c00dd95ca
related:
- id: 11b52f18-aaec-4d60-9143-5dd8cc4706b9
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via RUNDLL LAUNCHER
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 23)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-18
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- 'rundll32.exe'
- 'shell32.dll'
- 'shellexec_rundll'
- 'powershell'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
EventID: 4697
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- 'rundll32.exe'
- 'shell32.dll'
- 'shellexec_rundll'
- 'powershell'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
ServiceFileName | match |
| field:"ServiceFileName" kind:match |
macOS ULS Gatekeeper Block (spctl)
#Detect Gatekeeper blocks logged by spctl or related subsystems.
Known False Positives
- unsigned internal tools during development
Rule Body
title: macOS ULS Gatekeeper Block (spctl)
id: 2f1b3c4d-5e6f-4a8b-9c0d-1e2f3a4b5c6d
status: experimental
description: Detect Gatekeeper blocks logged by spctl or related subsystems.
author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
date: 2025-10-29
logsource:
product: macos
service: unifiedlog
level: high
detection:
selection:
subsystem: com.apple.security.assessment
message|contains:
- rejected
- assessment failed
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- unsigned internal tools during development
modified: 2025/01/15
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
subsystem: com.apple.security.assessment
message|contains:
- rejected
- assessment failed
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
message | match |
| field:"message" kind:match |
subsystem | eq |
| field:"subsystem" kind:eq value:"com.apple.security.assessment" |
Moriya Rootkit - System
#Detects the use of Moriya rootkit as described in the securelist's Operation TunnelSnake report
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Service-Control-Manager | Event ID 7045: A service was installed in the system. |
Rule Body
title: Moriya Rootkit - System
id: 25b9c01c-350d-4b95-bed1-836d04a4f324
status: test
description: Detects the use of Moriya rootkit as described in the securelist's Operation TunnelSnake report
references:
- https://securelist.com/operation-tunnelsnake-and-moriya-rootkit/101831
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-05-06
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1543.003
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
ServiceName: ZzNetSvc
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
ServiceName: ZzNetSvc
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Provider_Name | eq |
| field:"Provider_Name" kind:eq value:"Service Control Manager" |
ServiceName | eq |
| field:"ServiceName" kind:eq value:"ZzNetSvc" |
OpenCanary - SMB File Open Request
#Detects instances where an SMB service on an OpenCanary node has had a file open request.
Known False Positives
- Unlikely
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Lateral Movement | |
| Collection |
Rule Body
title: OpenCanary - SMB File Open Request
id: 22777c9e-873a-4b49-855f-6072ab861a52
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SMB service on an OpenCanary node has had a file open request.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.collection
- attack.t1021
- attack.t1005
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 5000
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
logtype: 5000
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
logtype | eq |
| field:"logtype" kind:eq value:"5000" |
OpenCanary - SSH Login Attempt
#Detects instances where an SSH service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
Known False Positives
- Unlikely
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | |
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Stealth | |
| Lateral Movement |
Rule Body
title: OpenCanary - SSH Login Attempt
id: ff7139bc-fdb1-4437-92f2-6afefe8884cb
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SSH service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
- https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.persistence
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1133
- attack.t1021
- attack.t1078
logsource:
category: application
product: opencanary
detection:
selection:
logtype: 4002
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
logtype: 4002
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
logtype | eq |
| field:"logtype" kind:eq value:"4002" |
Potential Arbitrary File Download Using Office Application
#Detects potential arbitrary file download using a Microsoft Office application
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule Body
title: Potential Arbitrary File Download Using Office Application
id: 4ae3e30b-b03f-43aa-87e3-b622f4048eed
related:
- id: 0c79148b-118e-472b-bdb7-9b57b444cc19
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects potential arbitrary file download using a Microsoft Office application
references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Winword/
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Powerpnt/
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Excel/
- https://medium.com/@reegun/unsanitized-file-validation-leads-to-malicious-payload-download-via-office-binaries-202d02db7191
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Beyu Denis, oscd.community
date: 2022-05-17
modified: 2023-06-22
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1202
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\EXCEL.EXE'
- '\POWERPNT.EXE'
- '\WINWORD.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'Excel.exe'
- 'POWERPNT.EXE'
- 'WinWord.exe'
selection_http:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'http://'
- 'https://'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
all of selection_*Stage 1: selection_img
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\EXCEL.EXE'
- '\POWERPNT.EXE'
- '\WINWORD.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'Excel.exe'
- 'POWERPNT.EXE'
- 'WinWord.exe'
Stage 2: selection_http
selection_http:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'http://'
- 'https://'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with |
OriginalFileName | eq |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq |
Privileged Account Creation
#Detects when a new admin is created.
Known False Positives
- A legitimate new admin account being created
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | |
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Azure | any: Entra ID audit event (any operation) |
Rules Detecting the Same Action
These rules filter on the same operation.
- [Entra ID] Application Assigned Administrator Permissions Immediately After Obtaining Role Management Permissions (Kusto)
- [Entra ID] Authentication Method Changed for Privileged Account (Kusto)
- [Entra ID] Mass Privileged Role Change Activity Detected (Kusto)
- [Entra ID] Privilege Elevation Request Denied (Kusto)
- [Entra ID] Privileged Role Assigned to a New User (Kusto)
- [Entra ID] Privileged Role Assigned to User (Kusto)
- Account Created and Deleted in Short Timeframe (Kusto)
- Account Created And Deleted Within A Close Time Frame (Sigma)
Rule Body
title: Privileged Account Creation
id: f7b5b004-dece-46e4-a4a5-f6fd0e1c6947
status: test
description: Detects when a new admin is created.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H', Tim Shelton
date: 2022-08-11
modified: 2022-08-16
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078.004
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
properties.message|contains|all:
- Add user
- Add member to role
Status: Success
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A legitimate new admin account being created
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
properties.message|contains|all:
- Add user
- Add member to role
Status: Success
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Status | eq |
| field:"Status" kind:eq value:"Success" |
properties.message | match |
| field:"properties.message" kind:match |
Rare Subscription-level Operations In Azure
#Identifies IPs from which users grant access to other users on azure resources and alerts when a previously unseen source IP address is used.
Known False Positives
- Valid change
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access |
Telemetry Coverage
Rule Body
title: Rare Subscription-level Operations In Azure
id: c1182e02-49a3-481c-b3de-0fadc4091488
status: test
description: Identifies IPs from which users grant access to other users on azure resources and alerts when a previously unseen source IP address is used.
references:
- https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/e534407884b1ec5371efc9f76ead282176c9e8bb/Detections/AzureActivity/RareOperations.yaml
author: sawwinnnaung
date: 2020-05-07
modified: 2023-10-11
tags:
- attack.t1003
- attack.credential-access
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
keywords:
- Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts/listKeys/action
- Microsoft.Maps/accounts/listKeys/action
- Microsoft.Media/mediaservices/listKeys/action
- Microsoft.CognitiveServices/accounts/listKeys/action
- Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listKeys/action
- Microsoft.Compute/snapshots/write
- Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/write
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Valid change
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
keywordsStage 1: keywords
keywords:
- Microsoft.DocumentDB/databaseAccounts/listKeys/action
- Microsoft.Maps/accounts/listKeys/action
- Microsoft.Media/mediaservices/listKeys/action
- Microsoft.CognitiveServices/accounts/listKeys/action
- Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listKeys/action
- Microsoft.Compute/snapshots/write
- Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/write
Removal Of SD Value to Hide Schedule Task - Registry
#Remove SD (Security Descriptor) value in \Schedule\TaskCache\Tree registry hive to hide schedule task. This technique is used by Tarrask malware
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Impairment |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 12: RegistryEvent (Object create and delete) |
Rule Body
title: Removal Of SD Value to Hide Schedule Task - Registry
id: acd74772-5f88-45c7-956b-6a7b36c294d2
related:
- id: 526cc8bc-1cdc-48ad-8b26-f19bff969cec
type: similar
status: test
description: Remove SD (Security Descriptor) value in \Schedule\TaskCache\Tree registry hive to hide schedule task. This technique is used by Tarrask malware
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/12/tarrask-malware-uses-scheduled-tasks-for-defense-evasion/
author: Sittikorn S
date: 2022-04-15
modified: 2025-10-25
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
category: registry_delete
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains|all:
- '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\'
- 'SD'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_schtasks_hide_task_via_sd_value_removal/info.yml
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
TargetObject|contains|all:
- '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\'
- 'SD'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
TargetObject | match |
| field:"TargetObject" kind:match |
Scheduled TaskCache Change by Uncommon Program
#Monitor the creation of a new key under 'TaskCache' when a new scheduled task is registered by a process that is not svchost.exe, which is suspicious
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 13: RegistryEvent (Value Set) |
Rule Body
title: Scheduled TaskCache Change by Uncommon Program
id: 4720b7df-40c3-48fd-bbdf-fd4b3c464f0d
status: test
description: Monitor the creation of a new key under 'TaskCache' when a new scheduled task is registered by a process that is not svchost.exe, which is suspicious
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
- https://labs.f-secure.com/blog/scheduled-task-tampering/
author: Syed Hasan (@syedhasan009)
date: 2021-06-18
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1053
- attack.t1053.005
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\'
filter_main_empty:
Details: '(Empty)'
filter_main_null:
Details: null
filter_main_other:
TargetObject|contains:
- 'Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator'
- 'Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\SvcRestartTask\Index'
- 'Microsoft\Windows\Flighting\OneSettings\RefreshCache\Index'
filter_main_mousocoreworker:
Image|endswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\MoUsoCoreWorker.exe'
filter_main_services:
Image|endswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\services.exe'
filter_main_tiworker:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\'
Image|endswith: '\TiWorker.exe'
filter_main_svchost:
Image: 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe'
filter_main_ngen:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework' # \Framework\ and \Framework64\
Image|endswith: '\ngen.exe'
TargetObject|contains:
- '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tasks\{B66B135D-DA06-4FC4-95F8-7458E1D10129}'
- '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\Microsoft\Windows\.NET Framework\.NET Framework NGEN'
filter_main_office:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Integration\Integrator.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Integration\Integrator.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe'
filter_main_msiexec:
Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
filter_main_explorer:
Image: 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor\'
filter_main_system:
Image: 'System'
filter_main_runtimebroker:
Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe'
filter_optional_dropbox_updater:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\Update\DropboxUpdate.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Dropbox\Update\DropboxUpdate.exe'
filter_optional_edge:
Image|endswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe'
filter_optional_onedrive:
Image|endswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft OneDrive\OneDrive.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft OneDrive\OneDrive.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*Stage 1: selection
selection:
TargetObject|contains: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\'
Stage 2: not filter_main_*
filter_main_empty:
Details: '(Empty)'
filter_main_null:
Details: null
filter_main_other:
TargetObject|contains:
- 'Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator'
- 'Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\SvcRestartTask\Index'
- 'Microsoft\Windows\Flighting\OneSettings\RefreshCache\Index'
filter_main_mousocoreworker:
Image|endswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\MoUsoCoreWorker.exe'
filter_main_services:
Image|endswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\services.exe'
filter_main_tiworker:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\'
Image|endswith: '\TiWorker.exe'
filter_main_svchost:
Image: 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe'
filter_main_ngen:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework'
Image|endswith: '\ngen.exe'
TargetObject|contains:
- '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tasks\{B66B135D-DA06-4FC4-95F8-7458E1D10129}'
- '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\Microsoft\Windows\.NET Framework\.NET Framework NGEN'
filter_main_office:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Integration\Integrator.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Integration\Integrator.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe'
filter_main_msiexec:
Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
filter_main_explorer:
Image: 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor\'
filter_main_system:
Image: 'System'
filter_main_runtimebroker:
Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe'
Stage 3: not filter_optional_*
filter_optional_dropbox_updater:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\Update\DropboxUpdate.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Dropbox\Update\DropboxUpdate.exe'
filter_optional_edge:
Image|endswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe'
filter_optional_onedrive:
Image|endswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft OneDrive\OneDrive.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft OneDrive\OneDrive.exe'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
TargetObject | match |
| field:"TargetObject" kind:match value:"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\" |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
SSHD Error Message CVE-2018-15473
#Detects exploitation attempt using public exploit code for CVE-2018-15473
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Reconnaissance |
Rule Body
title: SSHD Error Message CVE-2018-15473
id: 4c9d903d-4939-4094-ade0-3cb748f4d7da
status: test
description: Detects exploitation attempt using public exploit code for CVE-2018-15473
references:
- https://github.com/Rhynorater/CVE-2018-15473-Exploit
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-08-24
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.reconnaissance
- attack.t1589
- cve.2018-15473
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
product: linux
service: sshd
detection:
keywords:
- 'error: buffer_get_ret: trying to get more bytes 1907 than in buffer 308 [preauth]'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
keywordsStage 1: keywords
keywords:
- 'error: buffer_get_ret: trying to get more bytes 1907 than in buffer 308 [preauth]'