Sigma rules: 1j

title: Anydesk Remote Access Software Service Installation
id: 530a6faa-ff3d-4022-b315-50828e77eef5
status: test
description: Detects the installation of the anydesk software service. Which could be an indication of anydesk abuse if you the software isn't already used.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/08/08/bumblebee-roasts-its-way-to-domain-admin/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/02/24/confluence-exploit-leads-to-lockbit-ransomware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-11
modified: 2025-02-24
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_provider:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
    selection_service:
        - ServiceName|contains|all:
              - 'AnyDesk' # Covers both AnyDesk Service and AnyDesk MSI Service
              - 'Service'
        - ImagePath|contains: 'AnyDesk'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of the anydesk tool
level: medium

title: AppLocker Prevented Application or Script from Running
id: 401e5d00-b944-11ea-8f9a-00163ecd60ae
status: test
description: |
    Detects when AppLocker prevents the execution of an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App from running.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/what-is-applocker
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-event-viewer-with-applocker
    - https://nxlog.co/documentation/nxlog-user-guide/applocker.html
author: Pushkarev Dmitry
date: 2020-06-28
modified: 2025-12-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.006
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: applocker
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 8004 # EXE and DLL
            - 8007 # MSI and Script
            - 8022 # Packaged app execution
            - 8025 # Packaged app deployment
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely, since this event notifies about blocked application execution. Tune your applocker rules to avoid blocking legitimate applications.
level: medium

title: Attempt To Get Credentials For Identity
id: 535c3745-3883-4cc8-a635-1a56cc3d6384
status: experimental
description: |
    Returns credentials for the provided identity ID. Any provided logins will be validated against supported login providers.
references:
    - https://hackingthe.cloud/aws/exploitation/cognito_identity_pool_excessive_privileges/#exploitation
    - https://traildiscover.cloud/#CognitoIdentity-GetCredentialsForIdentity
author: Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
date: 2025-04-23
modified: 2025-04-23
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1078.004 # Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventName: 'GetCredentialsForIdentity'
        errorCode: 'AccessDenied'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
level: medium

title: Bypass UAC Using SilentCleanup Task
id: 724ea201-6514-4f38-9739-e5973c34f49a
status: test
description: |
    Detects the setting of the environement variable "windir" to a non default value.
    Attackers often abuse this variable in order to trigger a UAC bypass via the "SilentCleanup" task.
    The SilentCleanup task located in %windir%\system32\cleanmgr.exe is an auto-elevated task that can be abused to elevate any file with administrator privileges without prompting UAC.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md#atomic-test-9---bypass-uac-using-silentcleanup-task
    - https://www.reddit.com/r/hacking/comments/ajtrws/bypassing_highest_uac_level_windows_810/
    - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/enter-the-darkgate-new-cryptocurrency-mining-and-ransomware-campaign
author: frack113, Nextron Systems
date: 2022-01-06
modified: 2024-01-30
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Environment\windir'
    filter_main_default:
        Details: '%SystemRoot%'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_bypass_uac_using_silentcleanup_task/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Bypass UAC using SilentCleanup Task
      technique: T1548.002
      atomic_guid: 28104f8a-4ff1-4582-bcf6-699dce156608

title: Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution - Security
id: f0d1feba-4344-4ca9-8121-a6c97bd6df52
related:
    - id: 4976aa50-8f41-45c6-8b15-ab3fc10e79ed
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution events
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2017-03-05
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.005
    - attack.t1003.006
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.s0005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - 'cachedump'
            - 'dumpsvc'
            - 'fgexec'
            - 'gsecdump'
            - 'mimidrv'
            - 'pwdump'
            - 'servpw'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Administrator using credential dumping tool for password recovery
level: high

title: DiagTrackEoP Default Login Username
id: 2111118f-7e46-4fc8-974a-59fd8ec95196
status: test
description: Detects the default "UserName" used by the DiagTrackEoP POC
references:
    - https://github.com/Wh04m1001/DiagTrackEoP/blob/3a2fc99c9700623eb7dc7d4b5f314fd9ce5ef51f/main.cpp#L46
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 9
        TargetOutboundUserName: 'thisisnotvaliduser'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: Disable Tamper Protection on Windows Defender
id: 93d298a1-d28f-47f1-a468-d971e7796679
status: test
description: Detects disabling Windows Defender Tamper Protection
references:
    - https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/123792-turn-off-tamper-protection-microsoft-defender-antivirus.html
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-08-04
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Features\TamperProtection'
        Details: DWORD (0x00000000)
    filter_msmpeng_client: # only disabled temporarily during updates
        Image|startswith: 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
        Image|endswith: '\MsMpEng.exe'
    filter_msmpeng_domain_controller: # only disabled temporarily during updates
        Image: 'C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\MsMpEng.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: DPAPI Domain Master Key Backup Attempt
id: 39a94fd1-8c9a-4ff6-bf22-c058762f8014
status: test
description: Detects anyone attempting a backup for the DPAPI Master Key. This events gets generated at the source and not the Domain Controller.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190620-DomainDPAPIBackupKeyExtraction/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2019-08-10
modified: 2023-03-15
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4692
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - If a computer is a member of a domain, DPAPI has a backup mechanism to allow unprotection of the data. Which will trigger this event.
level: medium

title: Event log cleared (native)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker cleared the event logs.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0005-Defense%20Evasion/T1070.001-Clear%20Windows%20event%20logs
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1070.001 # Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs 
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security, system
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 1102 # Security event log cleared (reported in Security channel). Attention, this Event ID is also produced by ADFS in the same Channel
      - 104  # Other event log cleared (reported in System channel).
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Exchange Servers
level: high

title: Execute Code with Pester.bat as Parent
id: 18988e1b-9087-4f8a-82fe-0414dce49878
related:
    - id: 59e938ff-0d6d-4dc3-b13f-36cc28734d4e
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects code execution via Pester.bat (Pester - Powershell Modulte for testing)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/Oddvarmoe/status/993383596244258816
    - https://twitter.com/_st0pp3r_/status/1560072680887525378
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2022-08-20
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1216
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_module:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: '\WindowsPowerShell\Modules\Pester\'
    selection_cli:
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            - '{ Invoke-Pester -EnableExit ;'
            - '{ Get-Help "'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of Pester for writing tests for Powershell scripts and modules
level: medium

title: Greedy File Deletion Using Del
id: 204b17ae-4007-471b-917b-b917b315c5db
status: test
description: Detects execution of the "del" builtin command to remove files using greedy/wildcard expression. This is often used by malware to delete content of folders that perhaps contains the initial malware infection or to delete evidence.
references:
    - https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/509330/0/html#1044F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/erase
author: frack113 , X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-02
modified: 2023-09-11
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # Example:
    #   del C:\ProgramData\*.dll & exit
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Cmd.Exe'
    selection_del:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'del '
            - 'erase '
    selection_extensions:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\\\*.au3'
            - '\\\*.dll'
            - '\\\*.exe'
            - '\\\*.js'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: HackTool - SOAPHound Execution
id: e92a4287-e072-4a40-9739-370c106bb750
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of SOAPHound, a .NET tool for collecting Active Directory data, using specific command-line arguments that may indicate an attempt to extract sensitive AD information.
references:
    - https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
    - https://medium.com/falconforce/soaphound-tool-to-collect-active-directory-data-via-adws-165aca78288c
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2024-01-26
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' --buildcache '
            - ' --bhdump '
            - ' --certdump '
            - ' --dnsdump '
    selection_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -c '
            - ' --cachefilename '
            - ' -o '
            - ' --outputdirectory'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_soaphound_execution/info.yml

title: HackTool - WinPwn Execution - ScriptBlock
id: 851fd622-b675-4d26-b803-14bc7baa517a
related:
    - id: d557dc06-62e8-4468-a8e8-7984124908ce
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects scriptblock text keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-12-04
references:
    - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn
    - https://www.publicnow.com/view/EB87DB49C654D9B63995FAD4C9DE3D3CC4F6C3ED?1671634841
    - https://reconshell.com/winpwn-tool-for-internal-windows-pentesting-and-ad-security/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/4d6c4e8e23d465af7a2388620cfe3f8c76e16cf0/atomics/T1082/T1082.md
    - https://grep.app/search?q=winpwn&filter[repo][0]=redcanaryco/atomic-red-team
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1046
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1518
    - attack.t1548.002
    - attack.t1552.001
    - attack.t1555
    - attack.t1555.003
logsource:
    category: ps_script
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'Offline_Winpwn'
            - 'WinPwn '
            - 'WinPwn.exe'
            - 'WinPwn.ps1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - As the script block is a blob of text. False positive may occur with scripts that contain the keyword as a reference or simply use it for detection.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_hktl_winpwn/info.yml

title: HH.EXE Initiated HTTP Network Connection
id: 468a8cea-2920-4909-a593-0cbe1d96674a
related:
    - id: f57c58b3-ee69-4ef5-9041-455bf39aaa89
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects a network connection initiated by the "hh.exe" process to HTTP destination ports, which could indicate the execution/download of remotely hosted .chm files.
references:
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/follina-for-protocol-handlers.html
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/1cf4dd51f83dcb0ebe6ade902d6157ad2dbc6ac8/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.001
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\hh.exe'
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationPort:
            - 80
            - 443
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positive is expected from launching "hh.exe" for the first time on a machine in a while or simply from help files containing reference to external sources. Best correlate this with process creation and file events.
level: medium

title: Impacket WMIexec execution via SMB admin share
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to remotely execute WMIexec via SMB admin share in order to escalate privileges. 
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0008-Lateral%20Movement/T1021.002%20-SMB%20Windows%20Admin%20Shares
- https://riccardoancarani.github.io/2020-05-10-hunting-for-impacket/#wmiexecpy
- https://www.darkoperator.com/blog/2017/10/14/basics-of-tracking-wmi-activity
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-to-detect-and-prevent-impackets-wmiexec/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/18/defenders-beware-a-case-for-post-ransomware-investigations/
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.002
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5145
    ShareName: '\\*\ADMIN$'
    RelativeTargetName|re: '__\d*\.\d*' # example: '__1619091076.1269338'. Can be changed in source code
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - System
id: 641a4bfb-c017-44f7-800c-2aee0184ce9b
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task30)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - '&&'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'shell32.dll'
            - 'shellexec_rundll'
        ImagePath|contains:
            - 'value'
            - 'invoke'
            - 'comspec'
            - 'iex'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Linux Crypto Mining Indicators
id: 9069ea3c-b213-4c52-be13-86506a227ab1
status: test
description: Detects command line parameters or strings often used by crypto miners
references:
    - https://www.poolwatch.io/coin/monero
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-10-26
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1496
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' --cpu-priority='
            - '--donate-level=0'
            - ' -o pool.'
            - ' --nicehash'
            - ' --algo=rx/0 '
            - 'stratum+tcp://'
            - 'stratum+udp://'
            # Sub process started by xmrig - the most popular Monero crypto miner - unknown if this causes any false positives
            - 'sh -c /sbin/modprobe msr allow_writes=on'
            # base64 encoded: --donate-level=
            - 'LS1kb25hdGUtbGV2ZWw9'
            - '0tZG9uYXRlLWxldmVsP'
            - 'tLWRvbmF0ZS1sZXZlbD'
            # base64 encoded: stratum+tcp:// and stratum+udp://
            - 'c3RyYXR1bSt0Y3A6Ly'
            - 'N0cmF0dW0rdGNwOi8v'
            - 'zdHJhdHVtK3RjcDovL'
            - 'c3RyYXR1bSt1ZHA6Ly'
            - 'N0cmF0dW0rdWRwOi8v'
            - 'zdHJhdHVtK3VkcDovL'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of crypto miners
level: high

title: Local Groups Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE
id: 164eda96-11b2-430b-85ff-6a265c15bf32
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of "wmic" with the "group" flag.
    Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings.
    The knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group.
    Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-12
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1069.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: ' group'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_recon_group/info.yml

title: LPE InstallerFileTakeOver PoC CVE-2021-41379
id: 7dbb86de-a0cc-494c-8aa8-b2996c9ef3c8
status: test
description: Detects PoC tool used to exploit LPE vulnerability CVE-2021-41379
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220421061949/https://github.com/klinix5/InstallerFileTakeOver
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-22
modified: 2022-07-12
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
    # warning: The 'data' field used in the detection section is the container for the event data as a whole. You may have to adapt the rule for your backend accordingly
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 1033
        Provider_Name: 'MsiInstaller'
        Data|contains: 'test pkg'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Other MSI packages for which your admins have used that name
level: high

title: MSSQL XPCmdshell Option Change
id: d08dd86f-681e-4a00-a92c-1db218754417
status: test
description: |
    Detects when the MSSQL "xp_cmdshell" stored procedure setting is changed.
references:
    - https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-12
modified: 2024-06-26
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
    # warning: The 'data' field used in the detection section is the container for the event data as a whole. You may have to adapt the rule for your backend accordingly
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name|contains: 'MSSQL' # Note: We use contains to account for other third party providers - See https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/4876
        EventID: 15457
        Data|contains: 'xp_cmdshell'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate enable/disable of the setting
    - Note that since the event contain the change for both values. This means that this will trigger on both enable and disable
level: high

title: Office Macro File Download
id: 0e29e3a7-1ad8-40aa-b691-9f82ecd33d66
related:
    - id: 91174a41-dc8f-401b-be89-7bfc140612a0
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation of a new office macro files on the system via an application (browser, mail client).
    This can help identify potential malicious activity, such as the download of macro-enabled documents that could be used for exploitation.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1566.001/T1566.001.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployoffice/compat/office-file-format-reference
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-23
modified: 2025-10-29
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_processes:
        Image|endswith:
            # Email clients
            - '\RuntimeBroker.exe' # Windows Email clients uses RuntimeBroker to create the files
            - '\outlook.exe'
            - '\thunderbird.exe'
            # Browsers
            - '\brave.exe'
            - '\chrome.exe'
            - '\firefox.exe'
            - '\iexplore.exe'
            - '\maxthon.exe'
            - '\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\msedgewebview2.exe'
            - '\opera.exe'
            - '\safari.exe'
            - '\seamonkey.exe'
            - '\vivaldi.exe'
            - '\whale.exe'
    selection_ext:
        - TargetFilename|endswith:
              - '.docm'
              - '.dotm'
              - '.xlsm'
              - '.xltm'
              - '.potm'
              - '.pptm'
        - TargetFilename|contains:
              - '.docm:Zone'
              - '.dotm:Zone'
              - '.xlsm:Zone'
              - '.xltm:Zone'
              - '.potm:Zone'
              - '.pptm:Zone'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate macro files downloaded from the internet
    - Legitimate macro files sent as attachments via emails
level: low

title: Okta Policy Modified or Deleted
id: 1667a172-ed4c-463c-9969-efd92195319a
status: test
description: Detects when an Okta policy is modified or deleted.
references:
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-09-12
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: okta
    service: okta
detection:
    selection:
        eventType:
            - policy.lifecycle.update
            - policy.lifecycle.delete
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Okta Policies being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.
    - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - Okta Policies modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: low

title: Possible DC Shadow Attack
id: 32e19d25-4aed-4860-a55a-be99cb0bf7ed
related:
    - id: 611eab06-a145-4dfa-a295-3ccc5c20f59a
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects DCShadow via create new SPN
references:
    - https://twitter.com/gentilkiwi/status/1003236624925413376
    - https://gist.github.com/gentilkiwi/dcc132457408cf11ad2061340dcb53c2
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20180203014709/https://blog.alsid.eu/dcshadow-explained-4510f52fc19d?gi=c426ac876c48
author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community, Chakib Gzenayi (@Chak092), Hosni Mribah
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2022-10-17
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1207
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The "Audit Directory Service Changes" logging policy must be configured in order to receive events. Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs). Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs) and only when accessed in a manner that matches their SACL settings. This policy covers the following events ids - 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141. Note that the default policy does not cover User objects. For that a custom AuditRule need to be setup (See https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule)
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID: 4742
        ServicePrincipalNames|contains: 'GC/'
    selection2:
        EventID: 5136
        AttributeLDAPDisplayName: servicePrincipalName
        AttributeValue|startswith: 'GC/'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Valid on domain controllers; exclude known DCs
level: medium

title: Potential Credential Dumping Attempt Using New NetworkProvider - REG
id: 0442defa-b4a2-41c9-ae2c-ea7042fc4701
related:
    - id: baef1ec6-2ca9-47a3-97cc-4cf2bda10b77
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when an attacker tries to add a new network provider in order to dump clear text credentials, similar to how the NPPSpy tool does it
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/setup-upgrade-and-drivers/network-provider-settings-removed-in-place-upgrade
    - https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/PasswordStealing/NPPSpy
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-23
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\'
            - '\NetworkProvider'
    filter:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\WebClient\NetworkProvider'
            - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanWorkstation\NetworkProvider'
            - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RDPNP\NetworkProvider'
            # - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\P9NP\NetworkProvider' # Related to WSL remove the comment if you use WSL in your ENV
    filter_valid_procs:
        Image: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter*
falsepositives:
    - Other legitimate network providers used and not filtred in this rule
level: medium

title: Potential Iviewers.DLL Sideloading
id: 4c21b805-4dd7-469f-b47d-7383a8fcb437
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "iviewers.dll" (OLE/COM Object Interface Viewer)
references:
    - https://www.secureworks.com/research/shadowpad-malware-analysis
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-03-21
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\iviewers.dll'
    filter:
        ImageLoaded|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Windows Kits\'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potentially Suspicious WebDAV LNK Execution
id: 1412aa78-a24c-4abd-83df-767dfb2c5bbe
related:
    - id: f0507c0f-a3a2-40f5-acc6-7f543c334993
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects possible execution via LNK file accessed on a WebDAV server.
references:
    - https://www.trellix.com/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/research/beyond-file-search-a-novel-method.html
    - https://micahbabinski.medium.com/search-ms-webdav-and-chill-99c5b23ac462
author: Micah Babinski
date: 2023-08-21
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1204
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '\DavWWWRoot\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: PowerShell Base64 Encoded WMI Classes
id: 1816994b-42e1-4fb1-afd2-134d88184f71
related:
    - id: 47688f1b-9f51-4656-b013-3cc49a166a36
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects calls to base64 encoded WMI class such as "Win32_ShadowCopy", "Win32_ScheduledJob", etc.
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine/blob/20a569fa21625086433dcce8bb2765d0ea08dcb6/yara/mal_revil.yar
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-30
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli_shadowcopy:
        # Win32_ShadowCopy
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8AUwBoAGEAZABvAHcAYwBvAHAAeQ'
            - 'cAaQBuADMAMgBfAFMAaABhAGQAbwB3AGMAbwBwAHkA'
            - 'XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBTAGgAYQBkAG8AdwBjAG8AcAB5A'
            - 'V2luMzJfU2hhZG93Y29we'
            - 'dpbjMyX1NoYWRvd2NvcH'
            - 'XaW4zMl9TaGFkb3djb3B5'
    selection_cli_scheduledJob:
        # Win32_ScheduledJob
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8AUwBjAGgAZQBkAHUAbABlAGQASgBvAGIA'
            - 'cAaQBuADMAMgBfAFMAYwBoAGUAZAB1AGwAZQBkAEoAbwBiA'
            - 'XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBTAGMAaABlAGQAdQBsAGUAZABKAG8AYg'
            - 'V2luMzJfU2NoZWR1bGVkSm9i'
            - 'dpbjMyX1NjaGVkdWxlZEpvY'
            - 'XaW4zMl9TY2hlZHVsZWRKb2'
    selection_cli_process:
        # Win32_Process
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8AUAByAG8AYwBlAHMAcw'
            - 'cAaQBuADMAMgBfAFAAcgBvAGMAZQBzAHMA'
            - 'XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBQAHIAbwBjAGUAcwBzA'
            - 'V2luMzJfUHJvY2Vzc'
            - 'dpbjMyX1Byb2Nlc3'
            - 'XaW4zMl9Qcm9jZXNz'
    selection_cli_useraccount:
        # Win32_UserAccount
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8AVQBzAGUAcgBBAGMAYwBvAHUAbgB0A'
            - 'cAaQBuADMAMgBfAFUAcwBlAHIAQQBjAGMAbwB1AG4AdA'
            - 'XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBVAHMAZQByAEEAYwBjAG8AdQBuAHQA'
            - 'V2luMzJfVXNlckFjY291bn'
            - 'dpbjMyX1VzZXJBY2NvdW50'
            - 'XaW4zMl9Vc2VyQWNjb3Vud'
    selection_cli_loggedonuser:
        # Win32_LoggedOnUser
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8ATABvAGcAZwBlAGQATwBuAFUAcwBlAHIA'
            - 'cAaQBuADMAMgBfAEwAbwBnAGcAZQBkAE8AbgBVAHMAZQByA'
            - 'XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBMAG8AZwBnAGUAZABPAG4AVQBzAGUAcg'
            - 'V2luMzJfTG9nZ2VkT25Vc2Vy'
            - 'dpbjMyX0xvZ2dlZE9uVXNlc'
            - 'XaW4zMl9Mb2dnZWRPblVzZX'
    condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PUA - Adidnsdump Execution
id: 26d3f0a2-f514-4a3f-a8a7-e7e48a8d9160
status: test
description: |
    This tool enables enumeration and exporting of all DNS records in the zone for recon purposes of internal networks Python 3 and python.exe must be installed,
    Usee to Query/modify DNS records for Active Directory integrated DNS via LDAP
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1018/T1018.md#atomic-test-9---remote-system-discovery---adidnsdump
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-01
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1018
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\python.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'adidnsdump'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low

title: Small Sieve Malware File Indicator Creation
id: 39466c42-c189-476a-989f-8cdb135c163a
status: test
description: Detects filename indicators that contain a specific typo seen used by the Small Sieve malware.
references:
    - https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/small-sieve/NCSC-MAR-Small-Sieve.pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_typo_path:
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - ':\Users\'
            - '\AppData\'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\Roaming\'
            - '\Local\'
    selection_typo_keyword:
        TargetFilename|contains: 'Microsift'
    selection_ioc:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\AppData\Local\MicrosoftWindowsOutlookDataPlus.txt'
    condition: all of selection_typo_* or selection_ioc
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious Reg Add BitLocker
id: 0e0255bf-2548-47b8-9582-c0955c9283f5
status: test
description: Detects suspicious addition to BitLocker related registry keys via the reg.exe utility
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
author: frack113
date: 2021-11-15
modified: 2022-09-09
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1486
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'REG'
            - 'ADD'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE'
            - '/v'
            - '/f'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'EnableBDEWithNoTPM'
            - 'UseAdvancedStartup'
            - 'UseTPM'
            - 'UseTPMKey'
            - 'UseTPMKeyPIN'
            - 'RecoveryKeyMessageSource'
            - 'UseTPMPIN'
            - 'RecoveryKeyMessage'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_bitlocker/info.yml

title: Suspicious Serv-U Process Pattern
id: 58f4ea09-0fc2-4520-ba18-b85c540b0eaf
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process pattern which could be a sign of an exploited Serv-U service
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/13/microsoft-discovers-threat-actor-targeting-solarwinds-serv-u-software-with-0-day-exploit/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-14
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1555
    - cve.2021-35211
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\Serv-U.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'  # https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\forfiles.exe'
            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate uses in which users or programs use the SSH service of Serv-U for remote command execution
level: high

title: Suspicious TSCON Start as SYSTEM
id: 9847f263-4a81-424f-970c-875dab15b79b
status: test
description: Detects a tscon.exe start as LOCAL SYSTEM
references:
    - http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html
    - https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/lateral-movement/t1076-rdp-hijacking-for-lateral-movement
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-03-17
modified: 2022-05-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
        Image|endswith: '\tscon.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high