Sigma rules: 1k

title: Anonymous IP Address
id: 53acd925-2003-440d-a1f3-71a5253fe237
status: test
description: Indicates sign-ins from an anonymous IP address, for example, using an anonymous browser or VPN.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/riskdetection?view=graph-rest-1.0
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#anonymous-ip-address
author: Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-08-22
tags:
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'anonymizedIPAddress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins
level: high

title: Atomic MacOS Stealer - FileGrabber Activity
id: e710a880-1f18-4417-b6a0-b5afdf7e33da
related:
    - id: e710a880-1f18-4417-b6a0-b5afdf7e305a
      type: obsolete
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious activity associated with Atomic MacOS Stealer (Amos) campaigns, including execution of FileGrabber and curl-based POST requests used for data exfiltration. The rule identifies either the execution of FileGrabber targeting /tmp or the use of curl to POST sensitive user data (including files such as /tmp/out.zip) to remote servers, which are key indicators of Amos infostealer activity.
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/i/an-mdr-analysis-of-the-amos-stealer-campaign.html
    - https://hunt.io/blog/macos-clickfix-applescript-terminal-phishing
    - https://github.com/bobby-tablez/TTP-Threat-Feeds/blob/45398914e631f8372c3a9fbcd339ff65ffff1b17/results/2025/10/20251001-161956-trendmicro-atomic-macos-stealer-(amos).yml#L36
    - https://www.jamf.com/blog/infostealers-pose-threat-to-macos/
author: Jason Phang Vern - Onn, Robbin Ooi Zhen Heng (Gen Digital)
date: 2025-11-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.002
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection_curl_post:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'curl'
            - 'POST'
            - 'user:'
            - '-H '
            - 'BuildID'
            - 'file=@/tmp/out.zip'
            - 'cl: 0'
    selection_filegrabber_exec:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'FileGrabber'
            - '/tmp'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Azure Application Security Group Modified or Deleted
id: 835747f1-9329-40b5-9cc3-97d465754ce6
status: test
description: Identifies when a application security group is modified or deleted.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations
author: Austin Songer
date: 2021-08-16
modified: 2022-08-23
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName:
            - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/APPLICATIONSECURITYGROUPS/WRITE
            - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/APPLICATIONSECURITYGROUPS/DELETE
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Application security group being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.
    - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - Application security group modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: Brute Force Protection - critical settings manipulated
id: 8281291e-51b4-46a9-8012-955e20406efd
status: experimental
description: |
    Detect when Brute Force Protection has been disabled at all or set to a monitoring mode where no blocking occurs.
    This can allow malicious actors to continue brute force attacks without being detected and blocked.
author: Okta
date: 2025-07-11
modified: 2025-08-04
logsource:
    product: auth0
detection:
    selection:
        data.type: sapi
        data.description:
            - Update Brute-force settings
    filter_1:
        data.details.response.body.enabled: false
    filter_2:
        data.details.response.body.shields{}: 'block'
    condition: (selection and filter_1) or (selection and not filter_2)
explanation: >
    The query filters for modifications of the Brute Force Protection feature.
    It returns records when the feature is completely disabled, i.e. the "shields" attribute does not contain "block"
    or set into a monitoring mode by disabling all responses.
    The Splunk query below considers only the last modification and summarises a modifying IP, what mode is enabled,
    i.e. blocking an account just this IP or regardless, the state of user notifications.
splunk: |
    index=auth0 data.tenant_name="{your-tenant-name}"
    data.type=sapi data.description = "Update Brute-force settings"
    ``` Excluding white-listed IPs```
    ``` NOT data.ip IN ("{white-listed-IPs}")```
    | fields _time, data.ip, data.details.response.body.shields{}, data.details.response.body.enabled,
    data.details.response.body.mode
    ```Take only the last change of configurations that reflects the current settings```
    | sort - _time
    | head 1
    | rename data.details.response.body.shields{} as shields
    | rename data.details.response.body.enabled as brute_force_enabled
    | rename data.details.response.body.mode as brute_force_blocking_mode
    ``` Encoding the logic to define what flows' protection have been disabled and enabled```
    | eval brute_force_blocking = if(isnotnull(mvfind(shields, "block")), "true", "false")
    | eval brute_force_user_notifications_on = if(isnotnull(mvfind(shields, "user_notification")), "true", "false")
    ```Both responses are on```
    | eval brute_force_both_responses_on = if(match(brute_force_blocking_mode,"^count_per_identifier$") AND match(brute_force_blocking, "true"), "true", "false")
    ```Only "Block brute force login" is on, i.e. account is blocked from a concrete IP only```
    | eval brute_force_only_ip_specific_blocking = if(match(brute_force_blocking_mode,"count_per_identifier_and_ip") AND match(brute_force_blocking, "true"), "true", "false")
    ```"Lockout account" regardless IP is on, i.e. account is blocked from all IPs```
    | eval brute_force_regardless_ip_blocking = if(match(brute_force_blocking, "false") AND match(brute_force_blocking_mode,"^count_per_identifier$"), "true", "false")
    | eval brute_force_all_responses_disabled = if ((brute_force_only_ip_specific_blocking = "false" AND brute_force_regardless_ip_blocking = "false"), "true", "false")
    ```Alert when brute force is completely disabled or both responses are disabled```
    | where brute_force_enabled = "false" OR (brute_force_enabled="true" AND brute_force_all_responses_disabled="true")
    ```Display the information in a table```
    | table _time, data.ip, brute_force_enabled, brute_force_only_ip_specific_blocking, brute_force_regardless_ip_blocking,
     brute_force_user_notifications_on, brute_force_all_responses_disabled
comments:
    - The Splunk query above shall be tuned to reflect a valid tenant name.
    - Limit the detection to actions conducted from not white-listed IPs and/or particular users.
    - Additionally, you can also alert when user notifications are turned off indicated by 'brute_force_user_notifications_on = "false"''
      by modifying a respective "where" clause.
    - This detection can be used for reporting of all changes of the brute force protection settings by removing the "where" and "head" clauses.
tenant_logs: |
    type: "sapi" AND description: "Update Brute-force settings"
prevention:
    - Control tenant admins, i.e. "Admin", as this role has permissions to modify any application.
    - Enforce MFA for tenant admins to reduce the risk of an adversary gaining access.
    - Control Management API scopes that allow modification of attack protection features - update:attack_protection.
    - Control usage of Management API from only trusted IPs by applying Network ACL scoped to "management".
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate updates by an administrator. This rule is designed for threat hunting and to be a starting point for further investigation.
level: medium
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1562
    - attack.t1562.007

title: ChromeLoader Malware Execution
id: 0a74c5a9-1b71-4475-9af2-7829d320d5c2
status: test
description: Detects execution of ChromeLoader malware via a registered scheduled task
references:
    - https://github.com/xephora/Threat-Remediation-Scripts/tree/main/Threat-Track/CS_INSTALLER
    - https://twitter.com/th3_protoCOL/status/1480621526764322817
    - https://twitter.com/Kostastsale/status/1480716528421011458
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/ded20df574b843aaa3c8e977c2040e1498ae17c12924a19868df5b12dee6dfdd
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2022-01-10
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1176
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -E JAB'
        CommandLine|contains: '--load-extension="*\Appdata\local\chrome"'
        Image|endswith: '\chrome.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: CodeIntegrity - Unmet WHQL Requirements For Loaded Kernel Module
id: 2f8cd7a0-9d5a-4f62-9f8b-2c951aa0dd1f
status: test
description: Detects loaded kernel modules that did not meet the WHQL signing requirements.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-tag-explanations
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-06
modified: 2023-06-14
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: codeintegrity-operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 3082 # Code Integrity determined kernel module %2 that did not meet the WHQL requirements is loaded into the system. However, due to code integrity auditing policy, the image was allowed to load
            - 3083 # Code Integrity determined kernel module %2 that did not meet the WHQL requirements is loaded into the system. Check with the publisher to see if a WHQL compliant kernel module is available
    filter_optional_vmware:
        FileNameBuffer:
            - 'system32\drivers\vsock.sys'
            - 'System32\drivers\vmci.sys'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: COLDSTEEL RAT Service Persistence Execution
id: 9f9cd389-cea0-4142-bf1a-a3fd424abedd
status: test
description: Detects the creation of an "svchost" process with specific command line flags, that were seen present and used by ColdSteel RAT
references:
    - https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/cold-steel/NCSC-MAR-Cold-Steel.pdf
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-30
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - ' -k msupdate'
            - ' -k msupdate2'
            - ' -k alg'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: Console Login With MFA
id: dd9381d0-bde9-464d-ba68-dba31fe177e1
status: test
description: Detects a console login with MFA
references:
    - https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/cloud-security-atlas/attacks/compromising-aws-console-credentials/
    - https://hackingthe.cloud/aws/post_exploitation/create_a_console_session_from_iam_credentials/
    - https://pages.awscloud.com/rs/112-TZM-766/images/Visibility_detect_respond_AWS_SANS_whitepaper.pdf
author: Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
date: 2025-04-13
modified: 2025-04-13
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1078 # Valid Accounts
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: signin.amazonaws.com
        eventName: 'ConsoleLogin'
        additionalEventData.MFAUsed: 'Yes'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
level: informational

title: File Access Of Signal Desktop Sensitive Data
id: 5d6c375a-18ae-4952-b4f6-8b803f6c8555
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects access to Signal Desktop's sensitive data files: db.sqlite and config.json.
    The db.sqlite file in Signal Desktop stores all locally saved messages in an encrypted SQLite database, while the config.json contains the decryption key needed to access that data.
    Since the key is stored in plain text, a threat actor who gains access to both files can decrypt and read sensitive messages without needing the users credentials.
    Currently the rule only covers the default Signal installation path in AppData\Roaming. Signal Portable installations may use different paths based on user configuration. Additional paths can be added to the selection as needed.
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/russia-targeting-signal-messenger/
    - https://vmois.dev/query-signal-desktop-messages-sqlite/
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: System Access Control List (SACL) policy with attributes List folder/read data on Objects'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4663
        ObjectType: 'File'
        ObjectName|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Signal\'
        ObjectName|endswith:
            - '\config.json'
            - '\db.sqlite'
    filter_main_signal:
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - '\signal-portable.exe'
            - '\signal.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely, but possible from AV or backup software accessing the files.
level: medium

title: Hidden Files and Directories
id: d08722cd-3d09-449a-80b4-83ea2d9d4616
status: test
description: Detects adversary creating hidden file or directory, by detecting directories or files with . as the first character
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.md
author: 'Pawel Mazur'
date: 2021-09-06
modified: 2025-06-16
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564.001
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection_commands:
        type: 'EXECVE'
        a0:
            - 'mkdir'
            - 'nano'
            - 'touch'
            - 'vi'
            - 'vim'
    selection_arguments:
        - a1|re: '(^|\/)\.[^.\/]'
        - a2|re: '(^|\/)\.[^.\/]'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low

title: IAM Access Key Creation Attempt
id: 2c4d6e8f-0a1b-3c5d-7e9f-1a2b3c4d5e70
status: test
description: |
    Detects a failed attempt to create an IAM access key (AccessDenied).
    Even though the attempt failed, it indicates the attacker has valid
    credentials and is attempting persistence via access key creation.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001/
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_CreateAccessKey.html
author: nishikawaakira (@nishikawaakira)
date: 2026-05-03
modified: 2026-05-29
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098.001
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
        eventName: CreateAccessKey
        errorCode: AccessDenied
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
level: medium

title: Important Windows Event Auditing Disabled
id: ab4561b1-6c7e-48a7-ad08-087cfb9ce8f1
related:
    - id: 69aeb277-f15f-4d2d-b32a-55e883609563
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects scenarios where system auditing for important events such as "Process Creation" or "Logon" events is disabled.
references:
    - https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1dkrldTTlN3La-OjWtkWJBb4hVk6vfsSMBFBERs6R8zA/edit
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ad1bfd3d28aa0ccc9656240f845022518ef65a2e/documentation/logsource-guides/windows/service/security.md
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-20
modified: 2023-11-17
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: dfd8c0f4-e6ad-4e07-b91b-f2fca0ddef64
detection:
    selection_state_success_and_failure:
        EventID: 4719
        SubcategoryGuid:
            # Note: Add or remove GUID as you see fit in your env
            - '{0CCE9210-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Security State Change
            - '{0CCE9211-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Security System Extension
            - '{0CCE9212-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit System Integrity
            - '{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Logon
            - '{0CCE921B-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Special Logon
            - '{0CCE922B-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Process Creation
            - '{0CCE922F-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Audit Policy Change
            - '{0CCE9230-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Authentication Policy Change
            - '{0CCE9235-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit User Account Management
            - '{0CCE9236-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Computer Account Management
            - '{0CCE9237-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Security Group Management
            - '{0CCE923F-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Credential Validation
            - '{0CCE9240-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations
            - '{0CCE9242-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Kerberos Authentication Service
        AuditPolicyChanges|contains:
            - '%%8448' # This is "Success removed"
            - '%%8450' # This is "Failure removed"
    selection_state_success_only:
        EventID: 4719
        SubcategoryGuid: '{0CCE9217-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' # Audit Account Lockout
        AuditPolicyChanges|contains: '%%8448'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Linux Setuid Capability Set on a Binary via Setcap Utility
id: ed447910-bc30-4575-a598-3a2e49516a7a
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of the 'setcap' utility to set the 'setuid' capability (cap_setuid) on a binary file.
    This capability allows a non privileged process to make arbitrary manipulations of user IDs (UIDs), including setting its current UID to a value that would otherwise be restricted (i.e. UID 0, the root user).
    This behavior can be used by adversaries to backdoor a binary in order to escalate privileges again in the future if needed.
references:
    - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/setcap.8.html
    - https://dfir.ch/posts/linux_capabilities/
    - https://juggernaut-sec.com/capabilities/#cap_setuid
author: Luc Génaux
date: 2026-01-24
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1548
    - attack.t1554
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/setcap'
        CommandLine|contains: 'cap_setuid'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low

title: Network Connection Initiated via Finger.EXE
id: 2fdaf50b-9fd5-449f-ba69-f17248119af6
related:
    - id: c082c2b0-525b-4dbc-9a26-a57dc4692074
      type: similar
    - id: af491bca-e752-4b44-9c86-df5680533dbc
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects network connections via finger.exe, which can be abused by threat actors to retrieve remote commands for execution on Windows devices.
    In one ClickFix malware campaign, adversaries leveraged the finger protocol to fetch commands from a remote server.
    Since the finger utility is not commonly used in modern Windows environments, its presence already raises suspicion.
    Investigating such network connections can also help identify potential malicious infrastructure used by threat actors
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/decades-old-finger-protocol-abused-in-clickfix-malware-attacks/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-19
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        Image|endswith: '\finger.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: New PowerShell Instance Created
id: ac7102b4-9e1e-4802-9b4f-17c5524c015c
related:
    - id: 58cb02d5-78ce-4692-b3e1-dce850aae41a
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the execution of PowerShell via the creation of a named pipe starting with PSHost
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190610-PwshAlternateHosts/notebook.html
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190410-LocalPwshExecution/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2019-09-12
modified: 2023-11-30
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: pipe_created
    definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
    selection:
        PipeName|startswith: '\PSHost'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Likely
level: informational

title: Odbcconf.EXE Suspicious DLL Location
id: 6b65c28e-11f3-46cb-902a-68f2cafaf474
status: test
description: Detects execution of "odbcconf" where the path of the DLL being registered is located in a potentially suspicious location.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-ver16
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/h/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses.html
    - https://securityintelligence.com/posts/raspberry-robin-worm-dridex-malware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-22
modified: 2023-05-26
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.008
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\odbcconf.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'odbcconf.exe'
    selection_cli:
        # Note: Add more suspicious locations
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\PerfLogs\'
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Registration\CRMLog'
            - ':\Windows\System32\com\dmp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\FxsTmp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\spool\SERVERS\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks_Migrated\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\SyncCenter\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\com\dmp\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\FxsTmp\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\System\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\SyncCenter\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - ':\Windows\Tracing\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Pass the Hash Activity 2
id: 8eef149c-bd26-49f2-9e5a-9b00e3af499b
status: stable
description: Detects the attack technique pass the hash which is used to move laterally inside the network
references:
    - https://github.com/iadgov/Event-Forwarding-Guidance/tree/master/Events
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20170909091934/https://blog.binarydefense.com/reliably-detecting-pass-the-hash-through-event-log-analysis
    - https://blog.stealthbits.com/how-to-detect-pass-the-hash-attacks/
author: Dave Kennedy, Jeff Warren (method) / David Vassallo (rule)
date: 2019-06-14
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1550.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The successful use of PtH for lateral movement between workstations would trigger event ID 4624
detection:
    selection_logon3:
        EventID: 4624
        SubjectUserSid: 'S-1-0-0'
        LogonType: 3
        LogonProcessName: 'NtLmSsp'
        KeyLength: 0
    selection_logon9:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 9
        LogonProcessName: 'seclogo'
    filter:
        TargetUserName: 'ANONYMOUS LOGON'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Administrator activity
level: medium

title: Phishing Pattern ISO in Archive
id: fcdf69e5-a3d3-452a-9724-26f2308bf2b1
status: test
description: Detects cases in which an ISO files is opend within an archiver like 7Zip or Winrar, which is a sign of phishing as threat actors put small ISO files in archives as email attachments to bypass certain filters and protective measures (mark of web)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/1ZRR4H/status/1534259727059787783
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/e1fe6a62-bce8-4323-a49a-63795d9afd5d/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-07
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\Winrar.exe'
            - '\7zFM.exe'
            - '\peazip.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\isoburn.exe'
            - '\PowerISO.exe'
            - '\ImgBurn.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate cases in which archives contain ISO or IMG files and the user opens the archive and the image via clicking and not extraction
level: high

title: Potential Reconnaissance For Cached Credentials Via Cmdkey.EXE
id: 07f8bdc2-c9b3-472a-9817-5a670b872f53
status: test
description: Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials on the system
references:
    - https://www.peew.pw/blog/2017/11/26/exploring-cmdkey-an-edge-case-for-privilege-escalation
    - https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754243(v=ws.11).aspx
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/b27a3cb25025161d49ac861cb216db68c46a3537/atomics/T1003.005/T1003.005.md#atomic-test-1---cached-credential-dump-via-cmdkey
author: jmallette, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\cmdkey.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'cmdkey.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -l'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative tasks
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmdkey_recon/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Cached Credential Dump via Cmdkey
      technique: T1003.005
      atomic_guid: 56506854-89d6-46a3-9804-b7fde90791f9

title: Potentially Suspicious Command Targeting Teams Sensitive Files
id: d2eb17db-1d39-41dc-b57f-301f6512fa75
status: test
description: |
    Detects a commandline containing references to the Microsoft Teams database or cookies files from a process other than Teams.
    The database might contain authentication tokens and other sensitive information about the logged in accounts.
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-teams-stores-auth-tokens-as-cleartext-in-windows-linux-macs/
    - https://www.vectra.ai/blogpost/undermining-microsoft-teams-security-by-mining-tokens
author: '@SerkinValery'
date: 2022-09-16
modified: 2023-12-18
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1528
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Microsoft\Teams\Cookies'
            - '\Microsoft\Teams\Local Storage\leveldb'
    filter_main_legit_locations:
        Image|endswith: '\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: PsExec Service File Creation
id: 259e5a6a-b8d2-4c38-86e2-26c5e651361d
related:
    - id: 42c575ea-e41e-41f1-b248-8093c3e82a28
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects default PsExec service filename which indicates PsExec service installation and execution
references:
    - https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html
    - https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-06-12
modified: 2022-10-26
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.s0029
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\PSEXESVC.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low

title: PUA - PingCastle Execution
id: b1cb4ab6-ac31-43f4-adf1-d9d08957419c
related:
    - id: b37998de-a70b-4f33-b219-ec36bf433dc0
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the execution of PingCastle, a tool designed to quickly assess the Active Directory security level.
references:
    - https://github.com/vletoux/pingcastle
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/
    - https://github.com/fengjixuchui/Start-ADEnum/blob/e237a739db98b6104427d833004836507da36a58/Functions/Start-ADEnum.ps1#L450
    - https://github.com/lkys37en/Start-ADEnum/blob/5b42c54215fe5f57fc59abc52c20487d15764005/Functions/Start-ADEnum.ps1#L680
    - https://github.com/projectHULK/AD_Recon/blob/dde2daba9b3393a9388cbebda87068972cc0bd3b/SecurityAssessment.ps1#L2699
    - https://github.com/802-1x/Compliance/blob/2e53df8b6e89686a0b91116b3f42c8f717dca820/Ping%20Castle/Get-PingCastle-HTMLComplianceReport.ps1#L8
    - https://github.com/EvotecIT/TheDashboard/blob/481a9ce8f82f2fd55fe65220ee6486bae6df0c9d/Examples/RunReports/PingCastle.ps1
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2024-01-11
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1595
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Hashes|contains:
              # PingCastle.exe
              - 'MD5=f741f25ac909ee434e50812d436c73ff'
              - 'MD5=d40acbfc29ee24388262e3d8be16f622'
              - 'MD5=01bb2c16fadb992fa66228cd02d45c60'
              - 'MD5=9e1b18e62e42b5444fc55b51e640355b'
              - 'MD5=b7f8fe33ac471b074ca9e630ba0c7e79'
              - 'MD5=324579d717c9b9b8e71d0269d13f811f'
              - 'MD5=63257a1ddaf83cfa43fe24a3bc06c207'
              - 'MD5=049e85963826b059c9bac273bb9c82ab'
              - 'MD5=ecb98b7b4d4427eb8221381154ff4cb2'
              - 'MD5=faf87749ac790ec3a10dd069d10f9d63'
              - 'MD5=f296dba5d21ad18e6990b1992aea8f83'
              - 'MD5=93ba94355e794b6c6f98204cf39f7a11'
              - 'MD5=a258ef593ac63155523a461ecc73bdba'
              - 'MD5=97000eb5d1653f1140ee3f47186463c4'
              - 'MD5=95eb317fbbe14a82bd9fdf31c48b8d93'
              - 'MD5=32fe9f0d2630ac40ea29023920f20f49'
              - 'MD5=a05930dde939cfd02677fc18bb2b7df5'
              - 'MD5=124283924e86933ff9054a549d3a268b'
              - 'MD5=ceda6909b8573fdeb0351c6920225686'
              - 'MD5=60ce120040f2cd311c810ae6f6bbc182'
              - 'MD5=2f10cdc5b09100a260703a28eadd0ceb'
              - 'MD5=011d967028e797a4c16d547f7ba1463f'
              - 'MD5=2da9152c0970500c697c1c9b4a9e0360'
              - 'MD5=b5ba72034b8f44d431f55275bace9f8b'
              - 'MD5=d6ed9101df0f24e27ff92ddab42dacca'
              - 'MD5=3ed3cdb6d12aa1ac562ad185cdbf2d1d'
              - 'MD5=5e083cd0143ae95a6cb79b68c07ca573'
              - 'MD5=28caff93748cb84be70486e79f04c2df'
              - 'MD5=9d4f12c30f9b500f896efd1800e4dd11'
              - 'MD5=4586f7dd14271ad65a5fb696b393f4c0'
              - 'MD5=86ba9dddbdf49215145b5bcd081d4011'
              - 'MD5=9dce0a481343874ef9a36c9a825ef991'
              - 'MD5=85890f62e231ad964b1fda7a674747ec'
              - 'MD5=599be548da6441d7fe3e9a1bb8cb0833'
              - 'MD5=9b0c7fd5763f66e9b8c7b457fce53f96'
              - 'MD5=32d45718164205aec3e98e0223717d1d'
              - 'MD5=6ff5f373ee7f794cd17db50704d00ddb'
              - 'MD5=88efbdf41f0650f8f58a3053b0ca0459'
              - 'MD5=ef915f61f861d1fb7cbde9afd2e7bd93'
              - 'MD5=781fa16511a595757154b4304d2dd350'
              - 'MD5=5018ec39be0e296f4fc8c8575bfa8486'
              - 'MD5=f4a84d6f1caf0875b50135423d04139f'
              - 'SHA1=9c1431801fa6342ed68f047842b9a11778fc669b'
              - 'SHA1=c36c862f40dad78cb065197aad15fef690c262f2'
              - 'SHA1=bc8e23faea8b3c537f268b3e81d05b937012272d'
              - 'SHA1=12e0357658614ff60d480d1a6709be68a2e40c5f'
              - 'SHA1=18b33ab5719966393d424a3edbfa8dec225d98fa'
              - 'SHA1=f14c9633040897d375e3069fddc71e859f283778'
              - 'SHA1=08041b426c9f112ad2061bf3c8c718e34739d4fc'
              - 'SHA1=7be77c885d0c9a4af4cecc64d512987cf93ba937'
              - 'SHA1=72dbb719b05f89d9d2dbdf186714caf7639daa36'
              - 'SHA1=5b1498beb2cfb4d971e377801e7abce62c0e315b'
              - 'SHA1=292629c6ab33bddf123d26328025e2d157d9e8fc'
              - 'SHA1=be59e621e83a2d4c87b0e6c69a2d22f175408b11'
              - 'SHA1=0250ce9a716ab8cca1c70a9de4cbc49a51934995'
              - 'SHA1=607e1fa810c799735221a609af3bfc405728c02d'
              - 'SHA1=ab1c547f6d1c07a9e0a01e46adea3aae1cac12e3'
              - 'SHA1=044cf5698a8e6b0aeba5acb56567f06366a9a70a'
              - 'SHA1=ef2dea8c736d49607832986c6c2d6fdd68ba6491'
              - 'SHA1=efffc2bfb8af2e3242233db9a7109b903fc3f178'
              - 'SHA1=5a05d4320de9afbc84de8469dd02b3a109efb2d4'
              - 'SHA1=a785d88cf8b862a420b9be793ee6a9616aa94c84'
              - 'SHA1=5688d56cbaf0d934c4e37b112ba257e8fb63f4ea'
              - 'SHA1=5cd2ada1c26815fbfd6a0cd746d5d429c0d83a17'
              - 'SHA1=81d67b3d70c4e855cb11a453cc32997517708362'
              - 'SHA1=9cffce9de95e0109f4dfecce0ab2cb0a59cc58ad'
              - 'SHA1=09c6930d057f49c1c1e11cf9241fffc8c12df3a2'
              - 'SHA1=e27bf7db8d96db9d4c8a06ee5e9b8e9fcb86ac92'
              - 'SHA1=9e3c992415e390f9ada4d15c693b687f38a492d1'
              - 'SHA1=3f34a5ee303d37916584c888c4928e1c1164f92a'
              - 'SHA1=ea4c8c56a8f5c90a4c08366933e5fb2de611d0db'
              - 'SHA1=3150f14508ee4cae19cf09083499d1cda8426540'
              - 'SHA1=036ad9876fa552b1298c040e233d620ea44689c6'
              - 'SHA1=3a3c1dcb146bb4616904157344ce1a82cd173bf5'
              - 'SHA1=6230d6fca973fa26188dfbadede57afb4c15f75c'
              - 'SHA1=8f7b2a9b8842f339b1e33602b7f926ab65de1a4d'
              - 'SHA1=a586bb06b59a4736a47abff8423a54fe8e2c05c4'
              - 'SHA1=c82152cddf9e5df49094686531872ecd545976db'
              - 'SHA1=04c39ffc18533100aaa4f9c06baf2c719ac94a61'
              - 'SHA1=e082affa5cdb2d46452c6601a9e85acb8446b836'
              - 'SHA1=a075bfb6cf5c6451ce682197a87277c8bc188719'
              - 'SHA1=34c0c5839af1c92bce7562b91418443a2044c90d'
              - 'SHA1=74e10a9989e0ec8fe075537ac802bd3031ae7e08'
              - 'SHA1=3a515551814775df0ccbe09f219bc972eae45a10'
              - 'SHA256=90fd5b855b5107e7abaaefb6e658f50d5d6e08ac28e35f31d8b03dcabf77872b'
              - 'SHA256=5836c24f233f77342fee825f3cad73caab7ab4fb65ec2aec309fd12bc1317e85'
              - 'SHA256=e850e54b12331249c357a20604281b9abf8a91e6f3d957463fc625e6b126ef03'
              - 'SHA256=9e752f29edcd0db9931c20b173eee8d4d8196f87382c68a6e7eb4c8a44d58795'
              - 'SHA256=7a8c127d6c41f80d178d2315ed2f751ac91b1cd54d008af13680e04f068f426f'
              - 'SHA256=9f65e1c142c4f814e056a197a2241fd09e09acf245c62897109871137321a72a'
              - 'SHA256=c9b52d03c66d54d6391c643b3559184b1425c84a372081ec2bfed07ebf6af275'
              - 'SHA256=1b96f6218498aa6baf6f6c15b8f99e542077e33feb1ab5472bbbf7d4de43eb6b'
              - 'SHA256=768021fc242054decc280675750dec0a9e74e764b8646864c58756fa2386d2a2'
              - 'SHA256=1e1b32bef31be040f0f038fcb5a2d68fb192daaef23c6167f91793d21e06ebae'
              - 'SHA256=606bd75ed9d2d6107ea7ee67063d1761a99f2fb5e932c8344d11395d24587dd6'
              - 'SHA256=b489d3cdd158f040322ae5c8d0139ad28eff743c738a10f2d0255c7e149bd92a'
              - 'SHA256=ca7ecf04a8ad63aff330492c15270d56760cb223a607cdb1431fb00e1b9985d1'
              - 'SHA256=9dc4fca72463078b70f6516559a179c78400b06534e63ee12fb38adbe2632559'
              - 'SHA256=c00d2aee59bac087d769e09b5b7f832176f7714fefdc6af2502e6031e3eb37c2'
              - 'SHA256=a8e96d564687064190eaf865774f773def05fdbf651aa5bbf66216c077b863ef'
              - 'SHA256=84ed328cee2a0505e87662faf6fc57915e3a831c97ee88ad691f5c63522e139d'
              - 'SHA256=c143de99c57965d3a44c1fce6a97c2773b050609c1ea7f45688a4ca2422a5524'
              - 'SHA256=01d1efd5e552c59baa70c0778902233c05fde7de6e5cc156c62607df0804d36b'
              - 'SHA256=9a8dfeb7e3174f3510691e2b32d0f9088e0ed67d9ed1b2afbe450d70dec2016b'
              - 'SHA256=63b92a114075d855f706979d50ed3460fe39f8a2f5498b7657f0d14865117629'
              - 'SHA256=2eb014130ff837b6481c26f0d0152f84de22ca7370b15a4f51921e0054a2a358'
              - 'SHA256=7d5bb4271bf8ca2b63a59e731f3ec831dbda53adb8e28665e956afb4941f32ca'
              - 'SHA256=e57098a75bf32e127c214b61bfba492d6b209e211f065fcc84ff10637a2143ea'
              - 'SHA256=dd14dbcdbcfcf4bc108a926b9667af4944a3b6faf808cf1bb9a3a2554722e172'
              - 'SHA256=dca2b1b824cb28bd15577eace45bde7ff8f8f44705b17085524659de31761de4'
              - 'SHA256=8b95f339a07d59a8c8d8580283dffb9e8dfabdeb9171e42c948ab68c71afe7f2'
              - 'SHA256=5428a840fab6ac4a0ecb2fc20dbc5f928432b00b9297dd1cb6e69336f44eba66'
              - 'SHA256=e2517ae0fccaa4aefe039026a4fc855964f0c2a5f84177140200b0e58ddbfd27'
              - 'SHA256=75d05880de2593480254181215dd9a0075373876f2f4a2a4a9a654b2e0729a41'
              - 'SHA256=56490e14ce3817c3a1ddc0d97b96e90d6351bcd29914e7c9282f6a998cca84b1'
              - 'SHA256=f25d0a5e77e4ed9e7c4204a33cfc8e46281b43adbee550b15701dd00f41bdbe0'
              - 'SHA256=845a5fdcbb08e7efa7e0eabfcd881c9eebc0eec0a3a2f8689194e6b91b6eeaf8'
              - 'SHA256=9a89e6652e563d26a3f328ba23d91f464c9549da734557c5a02559df24b2700d'
              - 'SHA256=5614f2bc9b2ed414aab2c5c7997bdcbe8236e67ced8f91a63d1b6cfbe6e08726'
              - 'SHA256=37bf92dcedb47a90d8d38ebda8d8dd168ef5803dcb01161f8cf6d68b70d49d90'
              - 'SHA256=ec8590f91f5cc21e931c57345425f0625a6e37dfba026b222260450de40459f5'
              - 'SHA256=3994eb72b1c227c593e14b8cad7001de11d1c247d4fbf84d0714bb8a17853140'
              - 'SHA256=d654f870436d63c9d8e4390d9d4d898abdf0456736c7654d71cdf81a299c3f87'
              - 'SHA256=63fbfabd4d8afb497dee47d112eb9d683671b75a8bf6407c4bd5027fd211b892'
              - 'SHA256=47028053f05188e6a366fff19bedbcad2bc4daba8ff9e4df724b77d0181b7054'
              - 'SHA256=7c1b1e8c880a30c43b3a52ee245f963a977e1f40284f4b83f4b9afe3821753dd'
        - Image|endswith: '\PingCastle.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: PingCastle.exe
        - Product: 'Ping Castle'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '--scanner aclcheck'
              - '--scanner antivirus'
              - '--scanner computerversion'
              - '--scanner foreignusers'
              - '--scanner laps_bitlocker'
              - '--scanner localadmin'
              - '--scanner nullsession'
              - '--scanner nullsession-trust'
              - '--scanner oxidbindings'
              - '--scanner remote'
              - '--scanner share'
              - '--scanner smb'
              - '--scanner smb3querynetwork'
              - '--scanner spooler'
              - '--scanner startup'
              - '--scanner zerologon'
        - CommandLine|contains: '--no-enum-limit'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '--healthcheck'
              - '--level Full'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '--healthcheck'
              - '--server '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
# Note: As this is a PUA the level may vary depending on your environment. Reduce or increase the level as you see fit
level: medium

title: Registry Explorer Policy Modification
id: 1c3121ed-041b-4d97-a075-07f54f20fb4a
status: test
description: Detects registry modifications that disable internal tools or functions in explorer (malware like Agent Tesla uses this technique)
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md
author: frack113
date: 2022-03-18
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_set_1:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\NoLogOff'
            - 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\NoDesktop'
            - 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\NoRun'
            - 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\NoFind'
            - 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\NoControlPanel'
            - 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\NoFileMenu'
            - 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\NoClose'
            - 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\NoSetTaskbar'
            - 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\NoPropertiesMyDocuments'
            - 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\NoTrayContextMenu'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection_set_1
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin script
level: medium
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Activate Windows NoDesktop Group Policy Feature
      technique: T1112
      atomic_guid: 93386d41-525c-4a1b-8235-134a628dee17
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Activate Windows NoRun Group Policy Feature
      technique: T1112
      atomic_guid: d49ff3cc-8168-4123-b5b3-f057d9abbd55
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Activate Windows NoFind Group Policy Feature
      technique: T1112
      atomic_guid: ffbb407e-7f1d-4c95-b22e-548169db1fbd
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Activate Windows NoControlPanel Group Policy Feature
      technique: T1112
      atomic_guid: a450e469-ba54-4de1-9deb-9023a6111690
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Activate Windows NoFileMenu Group Policy Feature
      technique: T1112
      atomic_guid: 5e27bdb4-7fd9-455d-a2b5-4b4b22c9dea4
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Activate Windows NoClose Group Policy Feature
      technique: T1112
      atomic_guid: 12f50e15-dbc6-478b-a801-a746e8ba1723
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Activate Windows NoSetTaskbar Group Policy Feature
      technique: T1112
      atomic_guid: d29b7faf-7355-4036-9ed3-719bd17951ed
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Activate Windows NoPropertiesMyDocuments Group Policy Feature
      technique: T1112
      atomic_guid: 20fc9daa-bd48-4325-9aff-81b967a84b1d
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Activate Windows NoTrayContextMenu Group Policy Feature
      technique: T1112
      atomic_guid: 4d72d4b1-fa7b-4374-b423-0fe326da49d2
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Activate Windows NoLogOff Group Policy Feature
      technique: T1112
      atomic_guid: c375558d-7c25-45e9-bd64-7b23a97c1db0

title: Remote Access Tool - AnyDesk Silent Installation
id: 114e7f1c-f137-48c8-8f54-3088c24ce4b9
status: test
description: Detects AnyDesk Remote Desktop silent installation. Which can be used by attackers to gain remote access.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1423361119926816776?s=20
    - https://support.anydesk.com/Automatic_Deployment
author: Ján Trenčanský
date: 2021-08-06
modified: 2023-03-05
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '--install'
            - '--start-with-win'
            - '--silent'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate deployment of AnyDesk
level: high

title: Replace.exe Usage
id: 9292293b-8496-4715-9db6-37028dcda4b3
status: test
description: Detects the use of Replace.exe which can be used to replace file with another file
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Replace/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/replace
author: frack113
date: 2022-03-06
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\replace.exe'
    argument:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-a'
    condition: selection and argument
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_replace/info.yml

title: Standard User In High Privileged Group
id: 7ac407cc-0f48-4328-aede-de1d2e6fef41
status: test
description: Detect standard users login that are part of high privileged groups such as the Administrator group
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-identifiers
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/configuring-additional-lsa-protection
    - https://github.com/nasbench/EVTX-ETW-Resources/blob/7a806a148b3d9d381193d4a80356016e6e8b1ee8/ETWProvidersManifests/Windows11/22H2/W11_22H2_Pro_20221220_22621.963/WEPExplorer/LsaSrv.xml
author: frack113
date: 2023-01-13
modified: 2023-05-05
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: lsa-server
    definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-LSA/Operational (199FE037-2B82-40A9-82AC-E1D46C792B99) Event Log must be enabled and collected in order to use this rule.'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 300
        TargetUserSid|startswith: 'S-1-5-21-' # Standard user
        SidList|contains:
            - 'S-1-5-32-544'    # Local admin
            - '-500}'           # Domain admin
            - '-518}'           # Schema admin
            - '-519}'           # Enterprise admin
    filter_main_admin:
        TargetUserSid|endswith:
            - '-500'           # Domain admin
            - '-518'           # Schema admin
            - '-519'           # Enterprise admin
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Standard domain users who are part of the administrator group.
      These users shouldn't have these right. But in the case where it's necessary. They should be filtered out using the "TargetUserName" field
level: medium

title: Suspicious Outlook Child Process
id: 208748f7-881d-47ac-a29c-07ea84bf691d
related:
    - id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50 # Office Child Processes
      type: derived
    - id: e212d415-0e93-435f-9e1a-f29005bb4723 # Outlook Remote Child Process
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process spawning from an Outlook process.
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/465aabe132ccb949e75b8ab9c5bda36d80cf2fd503d52b8bad54e295f28bbc21?environmentId=100
    - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html
author: Michael Haag, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Elastic, FPT.EagleEye Team
date: 2022-02-28
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\AppVLP.exe'
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\forfiles.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\mftrace.exe'
            - '\msbuild.exe'        # https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_msbuild_started_by_office_app.toml
            - '\msdt.exe'           # CVE-2022-30190
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\scrcons.exe'
            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'        # https://www.vmray.com/analyses/2d2fa29185ad/report/overview.html
            - '\wmic.exe'           # https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
            - '\wscript.exe'
            # Several FPs with rundll32.exe
            # We started excluding specific use cases and ended up commenting out the rundll32.exe sub processes completely
            # - '\rundll32.exe'
            # filter_outlook_photoviewer:  # https://twitter.com/Luke_Hamp/status/1495919717760237568
            #   ParentImage|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
            #   Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
            #   CommandLine|contains: '\PhotoViewer.dll'
            # filter_outlook_printattachments:  # https://twitter.com/KickaKamil/status/1496238278659485696
            #   ParentImage|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
            #   Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
            #   CommandLine|contains|all:
            #     - 'shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL'
            #     - '\SYSTEM32\SPOOL\DRIVERS\'
    condition: selection # and not 1 of filter*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Sysinternals Tools AppX Versions Execution
id: d29a20b2-be4b-4827-81f2-3d8a59eab5fc
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of Sysinternals tools via an AppX package.
    Attackers could install the Sysinternals Suite to get access to tools such as psexec and procdump to avoid detection based on System paths.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/microsoft-store
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-16
modified: 2023-09-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: appmodel-runtime
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 201
        ImageName:
            - 'procdump.exe'
            - 'psloglist.exe'
            - 'psexec.exe'
            - 'livekd.exe'
            - 'ADExplorer.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of sysinternals applications from the Windows Store will trigger this. Apply exclusions as needed.
level: low