Detection rules › Sigma
Sigma rules: 1o
Access To Crypto Currency Wallets By Uncommon Applications
#Detects file access requests to crypto currency files by uncommon processes. Could indicate potential attempt of crypto currency wallet stealing.
Known False Positives
- Antivirus, Anti-Spyware, Anti-Malware Software
- Backup software
- Legitimate software installed on partitions other than "C:\"
- Searching software such as "everything.exe"
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access |
Rule Body
title: Access To Crypto Currency Wallets By Uncommon Applications
id: f41b0311-44f9-44f0-816d-dd45e39d4bc8
status: test
description: |
Detects file access requests to crypto currency files by uncommon processes.
Could indicate potential attempt of crypto currency wallet stealing.
references:
- Internal Research
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-07-29
tags:
- attack.t1003
- attack.credential-access
logsource:
category: file_access
product: windows
definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File ETW provider'
detection:
selection:
- FileName|contains:
- '\AppData\Roaming\Ethereum\keystore\'
- '\AppData\Roaming\EthereumClassic\keystore\'
- '\AppData\Roaming\monero\wallets\'
- FileName|endswith:
- '\AppData\Roaming\Bitcoin\wallet.dat'
- '\AppData\Roaming\BitcoinABC\wallet.dat'
- '\AppData\Roaming\BitcoinSV\wallet.dat'
- '\AppData\Roaming\DashCore\wallet.dat'
- '\AppData\Roaming\DogeCoin\wallet.dat'
- '\AppData\Roaming\Litecoin\wallet.dat'
- '\AppData\Roaming\Ripple\wallet.dat'
- '\AppData\Roaming\Zcash\wallet.dat'
filter_main_system:
Image: System
filter_main_generic:
# This filter is added to avoid large amount of FP with 3rd party software. You should remove this in favour of specific filter per-application
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
- 'C:\Program Files\'
- 'C:\Windows\system32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
filter_optional_defender:
Image|startswith: 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
Image|endswith:
- '\MpCopyAccelerator.exe'
- '\MsMpEng.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Antivirus, Anti-Spyware, Anti-Malware Software
- Backup software
- Legitimate software installed on partitions other than "C:\"
- Searching software such as "everything.exe"
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*Stage 1: selection
selection:
- FileName|contains:
- '\AppData\Roaming\Ethereum\keystore\'
- '\AppData\Roaming\EthereumClassic\keystore\'
- '\AppData\Roaming\monero\wallets\'
- FileName|endswith:
- '\AppData\Roaming\Bitcoin\wallet.dat'
- '\AppData\Roaming\BitcoinABC\wallet.dat'
- '\AppData\Roaming\BitcoinSV\wallet.dat'
- '\AppData\Roaming\DashCore\wallet.dat'
- '\AppData\Roaming\DogeCoin\wallet.dat'
- '\AppData\Roaming\Litecoin\wallet.dat'
- '\AppData\Roaming\Ripple\wallet.dat'
- '\AppData\Roaming\Zcash\wallet.dat'
Stage 2: not filter_main_*
filter_main_system:
Image: System
filter_main_generic:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
- 'C:\Program Files\'
- 'C:\Windows\system32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
Stage 3: not filter_optional_defender
filter_optional_defender:
Image|startswith: 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
Image|endswith:
- '\MpCopyAccelerator.exe'
- '\MsMpEng.exe'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
FileName | ends_with |
| field:"file_name" kind:ends_with |
FileName | match |
| field:"file_name" kind:match |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | eq | System | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"System" |
Image | starts_with | C:\Program Files (x86)\ | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Program Files (x86)\" |
Image | starts_with | C:\Program Files\ | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Program Files\" |
Image | starts_with | C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\" |
Image | starts_with | C:\Windows\system32\ | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\system32\" |
Image | ends_with | \MpCopyAccelerator.exe | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\MpCopyAccelerator.exe" |
Image | ends_with | \MsMpEng.exe | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\MsMpEng.exe" |
Image | starts_with | C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\ | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\" |
Antivirus - APT Malware Signature
#Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports APT malware. This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
Known False Positives
- Unlikely
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Command & Control |
Rule Body
title: Antivirus - APT Malware Signature
id: 101a1877-2cf4-474d-abfd-7f6ac4788d1a
status: experimental
description: |
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports APT malware.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
author: Arnim Rupp (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-06-15
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1203
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1219.002
logsource:
category: antivirus
detection:
selection:
- Signature|re:
- 'APT\d'
- 'ATK\d'
- 'UNC\d'
- 'UAC\d'
- Signature|contains:
- "[APT]"
- 'APT_'
- 'APT-'
- 'BackOrder'
- 'BlindingCan'
- 'Blizzard'
- 'Chollima'
- 'Cleaver'
- 'Cobra'
- 'DarkHotel'
- 'Dragon'
- 'DTrack'
- 'Equation'
- 'GiftedCrook'
- 'GraphSteel'
- 'GreyEnergy'
- 'GEnergy'
- 'GrimPlant'
- 'Hydra'
- 'Jackal'
- 'Kitten'
- 'Kimsuky'
- 'Lazar' # Lazarus
- 'LightRail'
- 'Lotus'
- 'Luminous'
- 'LumiMoth'
- 'Nimbus'
- 'Manticore'
- 'MiniBike'
- 'MiniBrowse'
- 'MiniBus'
- 'MiniFast'
- 'MiniJuke'
- 'MiniUpdate'
- 'MuddyWater'
- 'NukeSped'
- 'OilRig'
- 'Panda'
- 'Sandstorm'
- 'SandWorm'
- 'Seamonkey'
- 'Sleet'
- 'SlugResin'
- 'SnailResin'
- 'Snake'
- 'Tempest'
- 'Tsunami'
- 'Turla'
- 'Typhoon'
- 'UAC_'
- 'UAC-'
- 'UNC_'
- 'UNC-'
- 'VinoSiren'
- 'Winnti'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
- Signature|re:
- 'APT\d'
- 'ATK\d'
- 'UNC\d'
- 'UAC\d'
- Signature|contains:
- "[APT]"
- 'APT_'
- 'APT-'
- 'BackOrder'
- 'BlindingCan'
- 'Blizzard'
- 'Chollima'
- 'Cleaver'
- 'Cobra'
- 'DarkHotel'
- 'Dragon'
- 'DTrack'
- 'Equation'
- 'GiftedCrook'
- 'GraphSteel'
- 'GreyEnergy'
- 'GEnergy'
- 'GrimPlant'
- 'Hydra'
- 'Jackal'
- 'Kitten'
- 'Kimsuky'
- 'Lazar'
- 'LightRail'
- 'Lotus'
- 'Luminous'
- 'LumiMoth'
- 'Nimbus'
- 'Manticore'
- 'MiniBike'
- 'MiniBrowse'
- 'MiniBus'
- 'MiniFast'
- 'MiniJuke'
- 'MiniUpdate'
- 'MuddyWater'
- 'NukeSped'
- 'OilRig'
- 'Panda'
- 'Sandstorm'
- 'SandWorm'
- 'Seamonkey'
- 'Sleet'
- 'SlugResin'
- 'SnailResin'
- 'Snake'
- 'Tempest'
- 'Tsunami'
- 'Turla'
- 'Typhoon'
- 'UAC_'
- 'UAC-'
- 'UNC_'
- 'UNC-'
- 'VinoSiren'
- 'Winnti'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Signature | match |
| field:"Signature" kind:match |
Signature | regex_match |
| field:"Signature" kind:regex_match |
APT PRIVATELOG Image Load Pattern
#Detects an image load pattern as seen when a tool named PRIVATELOG is used and rarely observed under legitimate circumstances
Known False Positives
- Rarely observed
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 7: Image loaded |
Rule Body
title: APT PRIVATELOG Image Load Pattern
id: 33a2d1dd-f3b0-40bd-8baf-7974468927cc
status: test
description: Detects an image load pattern as seen when a tool named PRIVATELOG is used and rarely observed under legitimate circumstances
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20210901184449/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/09/unknown-actor-using-clfs-log-files-for-stealth.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-09-07
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1055
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\clfsw32.dll'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Rarely observed
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\clfsw32.dll'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\svchost.exe" |
ImageLoaded | ends_with |
| field:"ImageLoaded" kind:ends_with value:"\clfsw32.dll" |
BITS Transfer Job Download To Potential Suspicious Folder
#Detects new BITS transfer job where the LocalName/Saved file is stored in a potentially suspicious location
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Persistence | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Bits-Client | Event ID 16403: task_016403 |
Rule Body
title: BITS Transfer Job Download To Potential Suspicious Folder
id: f8a56cb7-a363-44ed-a82f-5926bb44cd05
status: test
description: Detects new BITS transfer job where the LocalName/Saved file is stored in a potentially suspicious location
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-28
modified: 2023-03-27
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1197
logsource:
product: windows
service: bits-client
detection:
selection:
EventID: 16403
LocalName|contains:
# TODO: Add more interesting suspicious paths
- '\Desktop\'
- 'C:\Users\Public\'
- 'C:\PerfLogs\'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
EventID: 16403
LocalName|contains:
- '\Desktop\'
- 'C:\Users\Public\'
- 'C:\PerfLogs\'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
LocalName | match |
| field:"LocalName" kind:match |
CMSTP App Paths Registry Key Modification
#Detects modifications to the CMSTP App Paths registry key. This may indicate abuse of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP) for arbitrary code execution or UAC bypass.
Known False Positives
- Legitimate CMSTP use (unlikely in modern enterprise environments)
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
Rule Body
title: CMSTP App Paths Registry Key Modification
id: b6d235fc-1d38-4b12-adbe-325f06728f37
status: stable
description: |
Detects modifications to the CMSTP App Paths registry key. This may indicate abuse of
Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP) for arbitrary code execution or UAC bypass.
references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Cmstp/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20190720093911/http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20190722224110/https://oddvar.moe/2017/08/15/research-on-cmstp-exe/
author: Nik Seetharaman
date: 2018-07-16
modified: 2026-08-27
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218.003
- attack.g0069
- car.2019-04-001
logsource:
category: registry_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\cmmgr32.exe\'
filter_main_cmcfg32:
TargetObject|endswith: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\cmmgr32.exe\CmstpExtensionDll'
Details:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\cmcfg32.dll'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmcfg32.dll'
filter_main_empty:
Details: '(Empty)'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate CMSTP use (unlikely in modern enterprise environments)
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not 1 of filter_main_*Stage 1: selection
selection:
TargetObject|contains: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\cmmgr32.exe\'
Stage 2: not filter_main_*
filter_main_cmcfg32:
TargetObject|endswith: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\cmmgr32.exe\CmstpExtensionDll'
Details:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\cmcfg32.dll'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmcfg32.dll'
filter_main_empty:
Details: '(Empty)'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
TargetObject | match |
| field:"TargetObject" kind:match value:"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\cmmgr32.exe\" |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Details | eq | C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmcfg32.dll | excludes:Details field:"Details" value:"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmcfg32.dll" |
Details | eq | C:\Windows\System32\cmcfg32.dll | excludes:Details field:"Details" value:"C:\Windows\System32\cmcfg32.dll" |
TargetObject | ends_with | SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\cmmgr32.exe\CmstpExtensionDll | excludes:TargetObject field:"TargetObject" value:"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\cmmgr32.exe\CmstpExtensionDll" |
Details | eq | (Empty) | excludes:Details field:"Details" value:"(Empty)" |
Creation of WerFault.exe/Wer.dll in Unusual Folder
#Detects the creation of a file named "WerFault.exe" or "wer.dll" in an uncommon folder, which could be a sign of WerFault DLL hijacking.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 11: FileCreate |
Rule Body
title: Creation of WerFault.exe/Wer.dll in Unusual Folder
id: 28a452f3-786c-4fd8-b8f2-bddbe9d616d1
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a file named "WerFault.exe" or "wer.dll" in an uncommon folder, which could be a sign of WerFault DLL hijacking.
references:
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-are-now-hiding-malware-in-windows-event-logs/
author: frack113
date: 2022-05-09
modified: 2026-05-18
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1574.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '\WerFault.exe'
- '\wer.dll'
filter_main_known_locations:
TargetFilename|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
- 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
- 'C:\Windows\UUS\' # covers both C:\Windows\UUS\arm64\ and C:\Windows\UUS\packages\
filter_main_process:
Image|endswith: '\wuaucltcore.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not 1 of filter_main_*Stage 1: selection
selection:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '\WerFault.exe'
- '\wer.dll'
Stage 2: not filter_main_*
filter_main_known_locations:
TargetFilename|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
- 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
- 'C:\Windows\UUS\'
filter_main_process:
Image|endswith: '\wuaucltcore.exe'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
TargetFilename | ends_with |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:ends_with |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | ends_with | \wuaucltcore.exe | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\wuaucltcore.exe" |
TargetFilename | starts_with | C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\ | excludes:TargetFilename field:"TargetFilename" value:"C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\" |
TargetFilename | starts_with | C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ | excludes:TargetFilename field:"TargetFilename" value:"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\" |
TargetFilename | starts_with | C:\Windows\System32\ | excludes:TargetFilename field:"TargetFilename" value:"C:\Windows\System32\" |
TargetFilename | starts_with | C:\Windows\UUS\ | excludes:TargetFilename field:"TargetFilename" value:"C:\Windows\UUS\" |
TargetFilename | starts_with | C:\Windows\WinSxS\ | excludes:TargetFilename field:"TargetFilename" value:"C:\Windows\WinSxS\" |
Cred Dump Tools Dropped Files
#Files with well-known filenames (parts of credential dump software or files produced by them) creation
Known False Positives
- Legitimate Administrator using tool for password recovery
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 11: FileCreate |
Rule Body
title: Cred Dump Tools Dropped Files
id: 8fbf3271-1ef6-4e94-8210-03c2317947f6
status: test
description: Files with well-known filenames (parts of credential dump software or files produced by them) creation
references:
- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
date: 2019-11-01
modified: 2025-10-25
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.t1003.002
- attack.t1003.003
- attack.t1003.004
- attack.t1003.005
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- TargetFilename|contains:
- '\fgdump-log'
- '\kirbi'
- '\pwdump'
- '\pwhashes'
- '\wce_ccache'
- '\wce_krbtkts'
- TargetFilename|endswith:
- '\cachedump.exe'
- '\cachedump64.exe'
- '\DumpExt.dll'
- '\DumpSvc.exe'
- '\Dumpy.exe'
- '\fgexec.exe'
- '\lsremora.dll'
- '\lsremora64.dll'
- '\NTDS.out'
- '\procdump.exe'
- '\procdump64.exe'
- '\procdump64a.exe'
- '\pstgdump.exe'
- '\pwdump.exe'
- '\SAM.out'
- '\SECURITY.out'
- '\servpw.exe'
- '\servpw64.exe'
- '\SYSTEM.out'
- '\test.pwd'
- '\wceaux.dll'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Administrator using tool for password recovery
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_cred_dump_tools_dropped_files/info.yml
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
- TargetFilename|contains:
- '\fgdump-log'
- '\kirbi'
- '\pwdump'
- '\pwhashes'
- '\wce_ccache'
- '\wce_krbtkts'
- TargetFilename|endswith:
- '\cachedump.exe'
- '\cachedump64.exe'
- '\DumpExt.dll'
- '\DumpSvc.exe'
- '\Dumpy.exe'
- '\fgexec.exe'
- '\lsremora.dll'
- '\lsremora64.dll'
- '\NTDS.out'
- '\procdump.exe'
- '\procdump64.exe'
- '\procdump64a.exe'
- '\pstgdump.exe'
- '\pwdump.exe'
- '\SAM.out'
- '\SECURITY.out'
- '\servpw.exe'
- '\servpw64.exe'
- '\SYSTEM.out'
- '\test.pwd'
- '\wceaux.dll'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
TargetFilename | ends_with |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:ends_with |
TargetFilename | match |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:match |
CVE-2022-24527 Microsoft Connected Cache LPE
#Detects files created during the local privilege exploitation of CVE-2022-24527 Microsoft Connected Cache
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 11: FileCreate |
Rule Body
title: CVE-2022-24527 Microsoft Connected Cache LPE
id: e0a41412-c69a-446f-8e6e-0e6d7483dad7
status: test
description: Detects files created during the local privilege exploitation of CVE-2022-24527 Microsoft Connected Cache
references:
- https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/04/12/cve-2022-24527-microsoft-connected-cache-local-privilege-escalation-fixed/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-13
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1059.001
- cve.2022-24527
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|endswith: 'WindowsPowerShell\Modules\webAdministration\webAdministration.psm1'
filter:
User|contains: # covers many language settings
- 'AUTHORI'
- 'AUTORI'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not filterStage 1: selection
selection:
TargetFilename|endswith: 'WindowsPowerShell\Modules\webAdministration\webAdministration.psm1'
Stage 2: not filter
filter:
User|contains:
- 'AUTHORI'
- 'AUTORI'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
TargetFilename | ends_with |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:ends_with value:"WindowsPowerShell\Modules\webAdministration\webAdministration.psm1" |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
User | match | AUTHORI | excludes:User field:"User" value:"AUTHORI" |
User | match | AUTORI | excludes:User field:"User" value:"AUTORI" |
Disable Important Scheduled Task
#Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by disabling their respective scheduled tasks in order to conduct data destructive activities
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Impact |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule Body
title: Disable Important Scheduled Task
id: 9ac94dc8-9042-493c-ba45-3b5e7c86b980
related:
- id: 7595ba94-cf3b-4471-aa03-4f6baa9e5fad # Security-Audting Eventlog
type: similar
- id: 9e3cb244-bdb8-4632-8c90-6079c8f4f16d # TaskScheduler EventLog
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by disabling their respective scheduled tasks in order to conduct data destructive activities
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-8---windows---disable-the-sr-scheduled-task
- https://twitter.com/MichalKoczwara/status/1553634816016498688
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior
date: 2021-12-26
modified: 2026-03-11
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1489
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
selection_cli_disable:
CommandLine|contains|windash: '/disable'
selection_cli_task:
CommandLine|contains:
# Add more important tasks
- '\Windows\BitLocker'
- '\Windows\ExploitGuard'
- '\Windows\ExploitGuard\ExploitGuard MDM policy Refresh'
- '\Windows\SystemRestore\SR'
- '\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\'
- '\Windows\Windows Defender\'
- '\Windows\WindowsBackup\'
- '\Windows\WindowsUpdate\'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_disable/info.yml
simulation:
- type: atomic-red-team
name: Windows - Disable the SR scheduled task
technique: T1490
atomic_guid: 1c68c68d-83a4-4981-974e-8993055fa034
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
all of selection_*Stage 1: selection_img
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
Stage 2: selection_cli_disable
selection_cli_disable:
CommandLine|contains|windash: '/disable'
Stage 3: selection_cli_task
selection_cli_task:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\Windows\BitLocker'
- '\Windows\ExploitGuard'
- '\Windows\ExploitGuard\ExploitGuard MDM policy Refresh'
- '\Windows\SystemRestore\SR'
- '\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\'
- '\Windows\Windows Defender\'
- '\Windows\WindowsBackup\'
- '\Windows\WindowsUpdate\'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\schtasks.exe" |
OriginalFileName | eq |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"schtasks.exe" |
Disable Privacy Settings Experience in Registry
#Detects registry modifications that disable Privacy Settings Experience
Known False Positives
- Legitimate admin script
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Impairment |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 13: RegistryEvent (Value Set) |
Rule Body
title: Disable Privacy Settings Experience in Registry
id: 0372e1f9-0fd2-40f7-be1b-a7b2b848fa7b
status: test
description: Detects registry modifications that disable Privacy Settings Experience
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/9e5b12c4912c07562aec7500447b11fa3e17e254/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
author: frack113
date: 2022-10-02
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|endswith: '\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE\DisablePrivacyExperience'
Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate admin script
level: medium
simulation:
- type: atomic-red-team
name: LockBit Black - Disable Privacy Settings Experience Using Registry -cmd
technique: T1685
atomic_guid: d6d22332-d07d-498f-aea0-6139ecb7850e
- type: atomic-red-team
name: LockBit Black - Disable Privacy Settings Experience Using Registry -Powershell
technique: T1685
atomic_guid: d8c57eaa-497a-4a08-961e-bd5efd7c9374
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
TargetObject|endswith: '\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE\DisablePrivacyExperience'
Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Details | eq |
| field:"Details" kind:eq value:"DWORD (0x00000000)" |
TargetObject | ends_with |
| field:"TargetObject" kind:ends_with value:"\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE\DisablePrivacyExperience" |
DllUnregisterServer Function Call Via Msiexec.EXE
#Detects MsiExec loading a DLL and calling its DllUnregisterServer function
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule Body
title: DllUnregisterServer Function Call Via Msiexec.EXE
id: 84f52741-8834-4a8c-a413-2eb2269aa6c8
status: test
description: Detects MsiExec loading a DLL and calling its DllUnregisterServer function
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msiexec/
- https://twitter.com/_st0pp3r_/status/1583914515996897281
author: frack113
date: 2022-04-24
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218.007
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
- OriginalFileName: '\msiexec.exe'
selection_flag:
CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -z '
selection_dll:
CommandLine|contains: '.dll'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msiexec_dll/info.yml
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
all of selection_*Stage 1: selection_img
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
- OriginalFileName: '\msiexec.exe'
Stage 2: selection_flag
selection_flag:
CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -z '
Stage 3: selection_dll
selection_dll:
CommandLine|contains: '.dll'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\msiexec.exe" |
OriginalFileName | eq |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"\msiexec.exe" |
Exchange transport agent injection via configuration file
#Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to load an artifact in the Exchange transport agent.
Known False Positives
- rare administrator change
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 11: FileCreate |
Rule Body
title: Exchange transport agent injection via configuration file
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to load an artifact in the Exchange transport agent.
requirements: |
requires to update SYSMON configuration to include the transport agent path (eg: '<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Exchange2016\TransportRoles\Shared</TargetFilename>')
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1505-Server%20Software%20Component
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ESET-LightNeuron.pdf
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1505.002 # Server Software Component: Transport Agent
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event # Event ID 11
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|endswith: '\TransportRoles\Shared\agents.config'
filter:
Image: '\ExchangeSetup\ExSetupUI.exe' # Exchange installer / updater
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- rare administrator change
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not filterStage 1: selection
selection:
TargetFilename|endswith: '\TransportRoles\Shared\agents.config'
Stage 2: not filter
filter:
Image: '\ExchangeSetup\ExSetupUI.exe'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
TargetFilename | ends_with |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:ends_with value:"\TransportRoles\Shared\agents.config" |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | eq | \ExchangeSetup\ExSetupUI.exe | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\ExchangeSetup\ExSetupUI.exe" |
Exploiting SetupComplete.cmd CVE-2019-1378
#Detects exploitation attempt of privilege escalation vulnerability via SetupComplete.cmd and PartnerSetupComplete.cmd described in CVE-2019-1378
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule Body
title: Exploiting SetupComplete.cmd CVE-2019-1378
id: 1c373b6d-76ce-4553-997d-8c1da9a6b5f5
status: test
description: Detects exploitation attempt of privilege escalation vulnerability via SetupComplete.cmd and PartnerSetupComplete.cmd described in CVE-2019-1378
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20200530031708/https://www.embercybersecurity.com/blog/cve-2019-1378-exploiting-an-access-control-privilege-escalation-vulnerability-in-windows-10-update-assistant-wua
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro
date: 2019-11-15
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1068
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.003
- attack.t1574
- cve.2019-1378
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '/c'
- 'C:\Windows\Setup\Scripts\'
ParentCommandLine|endswith:
- 'SetupComplete.cmd'
- 'PartnerSetupComplete.cmd'
filter:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
- 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
- 'C:\Windows\Setup\'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not filterStage 1: selection
selection:
ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '/c'
- 'C:\Windows\Setup\Scripts\'
ParentCommandLine|endswith:
- 'SetupComplete.cmd'
- 'PartnerSetupComplete.cmd'
Stage 2: not filter
filter:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
- 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
- 'C:\Windows\Setup\'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
ParentCommandLine | ends_with |
| field:"ParentCommandLine" kind:ends_with |
ParentCommandLine | match |
| field:"ParentCommandLine" kind:match |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | starts_with | C:\Windows\Setup\ | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\Setup\" |
Image | starts_with | C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\" |
Image | starts_with | C:\Windows\System32\ | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\System32\" |
Image | starts_with | C:\Windows\WinSxS\ | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\WinSxS\" |
F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API Command Execution - Proxy
#Detects POST requests to the F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API "bash" endpoint, which allows the execution of commands on the BIG-IP
Known False Positives
- Legitimate usage of the BIG IP REST API to execute command for administration purposes
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access |
Rule Body
title: F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API Command Execution - Proxy
id: b59c98c6-95e8-4d65-93ee-f594dfb96b17
related:
- id: 85254a62-22be-4239-b79c-2ec17e566c37
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects POST requests to the F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API "bash" endpoint, which allows the execution of commands on the BIG-IP
references:
- https://f5-sdk.readthedocs.io/en/latest/apidoc/f5.bigip.tm.util.html#module-f5.bigip.tm.util.bash
- https://community.f5.com/t5/technical-forum/icontrolrest-11-5-execute-bash-command/td-p/203029
- https://community.f5.com/t5/technical-forum/running-bash-commands-via-rest-api/td-p/272516
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Thurein Oo
date: 2023-11-08
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1190
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
cs-method: 'POST'
c-uri|endswith: '/mgmt/tm/util/bash'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate usage of the BIG IP REST API to execute command for administration purposes
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
cs-method: 'POST'
c-uri|endswith: '/mgmt/tm/util/bash'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
c-uri | ends_with |
| field:"c-uri" kind:ends_with value:"/mgmt/tm/util/bash" |
cs-method | eq |
| field:"cs-method" kind:eq value:"POST" |
Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - Powershell
#Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| PowerShell | Event ID 4104: Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
Rule Body
title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - Powershell
id: db92dd33-a3ad-49cf-8c2c-608c3e30ace0
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task29)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2024-04-15
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection_4104:
ScriptBlockText|re: '(?i)echo.*clip.*&&.*(Clipboard|i`?n`?v`?o`?k`?e`?)'
condition: selection_4104
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection_4104Stage 1: selection_4104
selection_4104:
ScriptBlockText|re: '(?i)echo.*clip.*&&.*(Clipboard|i`?n`?v`?o`?k`?e`?)'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
ScriptBlockText | regex_match |
| field:"ScriptBlockText" kind:regex_match value:"(?i)echo.*clip.*&&.*(Clipboard|i`?n`?v`?o`?k`?e`?)" |
Java Payload Strings
#Detects possible Java payloads in web access logs
Known False Positives
- Legitimate apps
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access |
Rule Body
title: Java Payload Strings
id: 583aa0a2-30b1-4d62-8bf3-ab73689efe6c
status: test
description: Detects possible Java payloads in web access logs
references:
- https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/06/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-cve-2022-26134/
- https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/09/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-server-cve-2021-26084/
- https://github.com/httpvoid/writeups/blob/62d3751945289d088ccfdf4d0ffbf61598a2cd7d/Confluence-RCE.md
- https://twitter.com/httpvoid0x2f/status/1532924261035384832
- https://medium.com/geekculture/text4shell-exploit-walkthrough-ebc02a01f035
author: frack113, Harjot Singh, "@cyb3rjy0t" (update)
date: 2022-06-04
modified: 2023-01-19
tags:
- cve.2022-26134
- cve.2021-26084
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1190
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
keywords:
- '%24%7B%28%23a%3D%40'
- '${(#a=@'
- '%24%7B%40java'
- '${@java'
- 'u0022java'
- '%2F%24%7B%23'
- '/${#'
- 'new+java.'
- 'getRuntime().exec('
- 'getRuntime%28%29.exec%28'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Legitimate apps
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
keywordsStage 1: keywords
keywords:
- '%24%7B%28%23a%3D%40'
- '${(#a=@'
- '%24%7B%40java'
- '${@java'
- 'u0022java'
- '%2F%24%7B%23'
- '/${#'
- 'new+java.'
- 'getRuntime().exec('
- 'getRuntime%28%29.exec%28'
Local group enumeration triggered by Azure Virtual machine recovery tool
#Detects scenarios where an attacker having compromised a virtual machine via serial cable attempts to enumerate local groups.
Known False Positives
- Virtual machine recovery by administrator
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Discovery |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4799: A security-enabled local group membership was enumerated. |
Rule Body
title: Local group enumeration triggered by Azure Virtual machine recovery tool
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker having compromised a virtual machine via serial cable attempts to enumerate local groups.
references:
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/sim-swapping-abuse-azure-serial
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1069.001 # Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups
author: mdecrevoisier
status: stable
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection: # C:\Packages\Plugins\Microsoft.Compute.VMAccessAgent\2.4.8\bin\JsonVMAccessExtension.exe
EventID: 4799
CallerProcessName|contains: 'Microsoft.Compute.VMAccessAgent'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Virtual machine recovery by administrator
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
EventID: 4799
CallerProcessName|contains: 'Microsoft.Compute.VMAccessAgent'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CallerProcessName | match |
| field:"CallerProcessName" kind:match value:"Microsoft.Compute.VMAccessAgent" |
Network Connection Initiated To Cloudflared Tunnels Domains
#Detects network connections to Cloudflared tunnels domains initiated by a process on the system. Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
Known False Positives
- Legitimate use of cloudflare tunnels will also trigger this.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Command & Control | |
| Exfiltration |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 3: Network connection |
Rule Body
title: Network Connection Initiated To Cloudflared Tunnels Domains
id: 7cd1dcdc-6edf-4896-86dc-d1f19ad64903
related:
- id: a1d9eec5-33b2-4177-8d24-27fe754d0812
type: derived
status: test
description: |
Detects network connections to Cloudflared tunnels domains initiated by a process on the system.
Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
references:
- https://defr0ggy.github.io/research/Abusing-Cloudflared-A-Proxy-Service-To-Host-Share-Applications/
- https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/tunnel-vision-cloudflared-abused-in-the-wild/
- Internal Research
author: Kamran Saifullah, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-05-27
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1567
- attack.t1572
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Initiated: 'true'
DestinationHostname|endswith:
- '.v2.argotunnel.com'
- 'protocol-v2.argotunnel.com'
- 'trycloudflare.com'
- 'update.argotunnel.com'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of cloudflare tunnels will also trigger this.
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
Initiated: 'true'
DestinationHostname|endswith:
- '.v2.argotunnel.com'
- 'protocol-v2.argotunnel.com'
- 'trycloudflare.com'
- 'update.argotunnel.com'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
DestinationHostname | ends_with |
| field:"DestinationHostname" kind:ends_with |
Initiated | eq |
| field:"Initiated" kind:eq value:"true" |
Number Of Resource Creation Or Deployment Activities
#Number of VM creations or deployment activities occur in Azure via the azureactivity log.
Known False Positives
- Valid change
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry Coverage
Rule Body
title: Number Of Resource Creation Or Deployment Activities
id: d2d901db-7a75-45a1-bc39-0cbf00812192
status: test
description: Number of VM creations or deployment activities occur in Azure via the azureactivity log.
references:
- https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/e534407884b1ec5371efc9f76ead282176c9e8bb/Detections/AzureActivity/Creating_Anomalous_Number_Of_Resources_detection.yaml
author: sawwinnnaung
date: 2020-05-07
modified: 2023-10-11
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
keywords:
- Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/write
- Microsoft.Resources/deployments/write
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Valid change
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
keywordsStage 1: keywords
keywords:
- Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/write
- Microsoft.Resources/deployments/write
Potential Active Directory Enumeration Using AD Module - PsModule
#Detects usage of the "Import-Module" cmdlet to load the "Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dl" DLL. Which is often used by attackers to perform AD enumeration.
Known False Positives
- Legitimate use of the library for administrative activity
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Reconnaissance | No specific technique |
| Discovery | No specific technique |
| Impact | No specific technique |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| PowerShell | Event ID 4103: Payload Context: ContextInfo User Data: UserData. |
Rule Body
title: Potential Active Directory Enumeration Using AD Module - PsModule
id: 74176142-4684-4d8a-8b0a-713257e7df8e
related:
- id: 70bc5215-526f-4477-963c-a47a5c9ebd12
type: similar
- id: 9e620995-f2d8-4630-8430-4afd89f77604
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the "Import-Module" cmdlet to load the "Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dl" DLL. Which is often used by attackers to perform AD enumeration.
references:
- https://github.com/samratashok/ADModule
- https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1617108657166061568?s=20
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/active-directory-enumeration-with-ad-module-without-rsat-or-admin-privileges
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2023-01-22
tags:
- attack.reconnaissance
- attack.discovery
- attack.impact
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_module
definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
selection_cmdlet:
Payload|contains:
- 'Import-Module '
- 'ipmo '
selection_dll:
Payload|contains: 'Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dll'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of the library for administrative activity
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
all of selection_*Stage 1: selection_cmdlet
selection_cmdlet:
Payload|contains:
- 'Import-Module '
- 'ipmo '
Stage 2: selection_dll
selection_dll:
Payload|contains: 'Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dll'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Payload | match |
| field:"Payload" kind:match |
Potential COM Object Hijacking Via TreatAs Subkey - Registry
#Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey
Known False Positives
- Maybe some system utilities in rare cases use linking keys for backward compatibility
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 13: RegistryEvent (Value Set) |
Rule Body
title: Potential COM Object Hijacking Via TreatAs Subkey - Registry
id: 9b0f8a61-91b2-464f-aceb-0527e0a45020
status: test
description: Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey
references:
- https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/
author: Kutepov Anton, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-23
modified: 2025-10-26
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1546.015
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains|all:
- 'HKU\'
- 'Classes\CLSID\'
- '\TreatAs'
filter_main_svchost:
# Example of target object by svchost
# TargetObject: HKU\S-1-5-21-1098798288-3663759343-897484398-1001_Classes\CLSID\{0003000A-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}\TreatAs
Image: 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Maybe some system utilities in rare cases use linking keys for backward compatibility
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_persistence_com_key_linking/info.yml
simulation:
- type: atomic-red-team
name: COM hijacking via TreatAs
technique: T1546.015
atomic_guid: 33eacead-f117-4863-8eb0-5c6304fbfaa9
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not 1 of filter_main_*Stage 1: selection
selection:
TargetObject|contains|all:
- 'HKU\'
- 'Classes\CLSID\'
- '\TreatAs'
Stage 2: not filter_main_svchost
filter_main_svchost:
Image: 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
TargetObject | match |
| field:"TargetObject" kind:match |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | eq | C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe" |
Potential Defense Evasion Activity Via Emoji Usage In CommandLine - 1
#Detects the usage of emojis in the command line, this could be a sign of potential defense evasion activity.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth | No specific technique |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule Body
title: Potential Defense Evasion Activity Via Emoji Usage In CommandLine - 1
id: 4a30ac0c-b9d6-4e01-b71a-5f851bbf4259
status: test
description: Detects the usage of emojis in the command line, this could be a sign of potential defense evasion activity.
author: '@Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport'
references:
- Internal Research
tags:
- attack.stealth
date: 2022-12-05
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- '😀'
- '😃'
- '😄'
- '😁'
- '😆'
- '😅'
- '😂'
- '🤣'
- '🥲'
- '🥹'
- '☺️'
- '😊'
- '😇'
- '🙂'
- '🙃'
- '😉'
- '😌'
- '😍'
- '🥰'
- '😘'
- '😗'
- '😙'
- '😚'
- '😋'
- '😛'
- '😝'
- '😜'
- '🤪'
- '🤨'
- '🧐'
- '🤓'
- '😎'
- '🥸'
- '🤩'
- '🥳'
- '😏'
- '😒'
- '😞'
- '😔'
- '😟'
- '😕'
- '🙁'
- '☹️'
- '😣'
- '😖'
- '😫'
- '😩'
- '🥺'
- '😢'
- '😭'
- '😮💨'
- '😤'
- '😠'
- '😡'
- '🤬'
- '🤯'
- '😳'
- '🥵'
- '🥶'
- '😱'
- '😨'
- '😰'
- '😥'
- '😓'
- '🫣'
- '🤗'
- '🫡'
- '🤔'
- '🫢'
- '🤭'
- '🤫'
- '🤥'
- '😶'
- '😶🌫️'
- '😐'
- '😑'
- '😬'
- '🫠'
- '🙄'
- '😯'
- '😦'
- '😧'
- '😮'
- '😲'
- '🥱'
- '😴'
- '🤤'
- '😪'
- '😵'
- '😵💫'
- '🫥'
- '🤐'
- '🥴'
- '🤢'
- '🤮'
- '🤧'
- '😷'
- '🤒'
- '🤕'
- '🤑'
- '🤠'
- '😈'
- '👿'
- '👹'
- '👺'
- '🤡'
- '💩'
- '👻'
- '💀'
- '☠️'
- '👽'
- '👾'
- '🤖'
- '🎃'
- '😺'
- '😸'
- '😹'
- '😻'
- '😼'
- '😽'
- '🙀'
- '😿'
- '😾'
- '👋'
- '🤚'
- '🖐'
- '✋'
- '🖖'
- '👌'
- '🤌'
- '🤏'
- '✌️'
- '🤞'
- '🫰'
- '🤟'
- '🤘'
- '🤙'
- '🫵'
- '🫱'
- '🫲'
- '🫳'
- '🫴'
- '👈'
- '👉'
- '👆'
- '🖕'
- '👇'
- '☝️'
- '👍'
- '👎'
- '✊'
- '👊'
- '🤛'
- '🤜'
- '👏'
- '🫶'
- '🙌'
- '👐'
- '🤲'
- '🤝'
- '🙏'
- '✍️'
- '💪'
- '🦾'
- '🦵'
- '🦿'
- '🦶'
- '👣'
- '👂'
- '🦻'
- '👃'
- '🫀'
- '🫁'
- '🧠'
- '🦷'
- '🦴'
- '👀'
- '👁'
- '👅'
- '👄'
- '🫦'
- '💋'
- '🩸'
- '👶'
- '👧'
- '🧒'
- '👦'
- '👩'
- '🧑'
- '👨'
- '👩🦱'
- '🧑🦱'
- '👨🦱'
- '👩🦰'
- '🧑🦰'
- '👨🦰'
- '👱♀️'
- '👱'
- '👱♂️'
- '👩🦳'
- '🧑🦳'
- '👨🦳'
- '👩🦲'
- '🧑🦲'
- '👨🦲'
- '🧔♀️'
- '🧔'
- '🧔♂️'
- '👵'
- '🧓'
- '👴'
- '👲'
- '👳♀️'
- '👳'
- '👳♂️'
- '🧕'
- '👮♀️'
- '👮'
- '👮♂️'
- '👷♀️'
- '👷'
- '👷♂️'
- '💂♀️'
- '💂'
- '💂♂️'
- '🕵️♀️'
- '🕵️'
- '🕵️♂️'
- '👩⚕️'
- '🧑⚕️'
- '👨⚕️'
- '👩🌾'
- '🧑🌾'
- '👨🌾'
- '👩🍳'
- '🧑🍳'
- '👨🍳'
- '👩🎓'
- '🧑🎓'
- '👨🎓'
- '👩🎤'
- '🧑🎤'
- '👨🎤'
- '👩🏫'
- '🧑🏫'
- '👨🏫'
- '👩🏭'
- '🧑🏭'
- '👨🏭'
- '👩💻'
- '🧑💻'
- '👨💻'
- '👩💼'
- '🧑💼'
- '👨💼'
- '👩🔧'
- '🧑🔧'
- '👨🔧'
- '👩🔬'
- '🧑🔬'
- '👨🔬'
- '👩🎨'
- '🧑🎨'
- '👨🎨'
- '👩🚒'
- '🧑🚒'
- '👨🚒'
- '👩✈️'
- '🧑✈️'
- '👨✈️'
- '👩🚀'
- '🧑🚀'
- '👨🚀'
- '👩⚖️'
- '🧑⚖️'
- '👨⚖️'
- '👰♀️'
- '👰'
- '👰♂️'
- '🤵♀️'
- '🤵'
- '🤵♂️'
- '👸'
- '🫅'
- '🤴'
- '🥷'
- '🦸♀️'
- '🦸'
- '🦸♂️'
- '🦹♀️'
- '🦹'
- '🦹♂️'
- '🤶'
- '🧑🎄'
- '🎅'
- '🧙♀️'
- '🧙'
- '🧙♂️'
- '🧝♀️'
- '🧝'
- '🧝♂️'
- '🧛♀️'
- '🧛'
- '🧛♂️'
- '🧟♀️'
- '🧟'
- '🧟♂️'
- '🧞♀️'
- '🧞'
- '🧞♂️'
- '🧜♀️'
- '🧜'
- '🧜♂️'
- '🧚♀️'
- '🧚'
- '🧚♂️'
- '🧌'
- '👼'
- '🤰'
- '🫄'
- '🫃'
- '🤱'
- '👩🍼'
- '🧑🍼'
- '👨🍼'
- '🙇♀️'
- '🙇'
- '🙇♂️'
- '💁♀️'
- '💁'
- '💁♂️'
- '🙅♀️'
- '🙅'
- '🙅♂️'
- '🙆♀️'
- '🙆'
- '🙆♂️'
- '🙋♀️'
- '🙋'
- '🙋♂️'
- '🧏♀️'
- '🧏'
- '🧏♂️'
- '🤦♀️'
- '🤦'
- '🤦♂️'
- '🤷♀️'
- '🤷'
- '🤷♂️'
- '🙎♀️'
- '🙎'
- '🙎♂️'
- '🙍♀️'
- '🙍'
- '🙍♂️'
- '💇♀️'
- '💇'
- '💇♂️'
- '💆♀️'
- '💆'
- '💆♂️'
- '🧖♀️'
- '🧖'
- '🧖♂️'
- '💅'
- '💃'
- '🕺'
- '👯♀️'
- '👯'
- '👯♂️'
- '🕴'
- '👩🦽'
- '🧑🦽'
- '👨🦽'
- '👩🦼'
- '🧑🦼'
- '👨🦼'
- '🚶♀️'
- '🚶'
- '🚶♂️'
- '👩🦯'
- '🧑🦯'
- '👨🦯'
- '🧎♀️'
- '🧎'
- '🧎♂️'
- '🏃♀️'
- '🏃'
- '🏃♂️'
- '🧍♀️'
- '🧍'
- '🧍♂️'
- '👭'
- '🧑🤝🧑'
- '👬'
- '👫'
- '👩❤️👩'
- '💑'
- '👨❤️👨'
- '👩❤️👨'
- '👩❤️💋👩'
- '💏'
- '👨❤️💋👨'
- '👩❤️💋👨'
- '👪'
- '👨👩👦'
- '👨👩👧'
- '👨👩👧👦'
- '👨👩👦👦'
- '👨👩👧👧'
- '👨👨👦'
- '👨👨👧'
- '👨👨👧👦'
- '👨👨👦👦'
- '👨👨👧👧'
- '👩👩👦'
- '👩👩👧'
- '👩👩👧👦'
- '👩👩👦👦'
- '👩👩👧👧'
- '👨👦'
- '👨👦👦'
- '👨👧'
- '👨👧👦'
- '👨👧👧'
- '👩👦'
- '👩👦👦'
- '👩👧'
- '👩👧👦'
- '👩👧👧'
- '🗣'
- '👤'
- '👥'
- '🫂'
- '🧳'
- '🌂'
- '☂️'
- '🧵'
- '🪡'
- '🪢'
- '🧶'
- '👓'
- '🕶'
- '🥽'
- '🥼'
- '🦺'
- '👔'
- '👕'
- '👖'
- '🧣'
- '🧤'
- '🧥'
- '🧦'
- '👗'
- '👘'
- '🥻'
- '🩴'
- '🩱'
- '🩲'
- '🩳'
- '👙'
- '👚'
- '👛'
- '👜'
- '👝'
- '🎒'
- '👞'
- '👟'
- '🥾'
- '🥿'
- '👠'
- '👡'
- '🩰'
- '👢'
- '👑'
- '👒'
- '🎩'
- '🎓'
- '🧢'
- '⛑'
- '🪖'
- '💄'
- '💍'
- '💼'
- '👋🏻'
- '🤚🏻'
- '🖐🏻'
- '✋🏻'
- '🖖🏻'
- '👌🏻'
- '🤌🏻'
- '🤏🏻'
- '✌🏻'
- '🤞🏻'
- '🫰🏻'
- '🤟🏻'
- '🤘🏻'
- '🤙🏻'
- '🫵🏻'
- '🫱🏻'
- '🫲🏻'
- '🫳🏻'
- '🫴🏻'
- '👈🏻'
- '👉🏻'
- '👆🏻'
- '🖕🏻'
- '👇🏻'
- '☝🏻'
- '👍🏻'
- '👎🏻'
- '✊🏻'
- '👊🏻'
- '🤛🏻'
- '🤜🏻'
- '👏🏻'
- '🫶🏻'
- '🙌🏻'
- '👐🏻'
- '🤲🏻'
- '🙏🏻'
- '✍🏻'
- '💪🏻'
- '🦵🏻'
- '🦶🏻'
- '👂🏻'
- '🦻🏻'
- '👃🏻'
- '👶🏻'
- '👧🏻'
- '🧒🏻'
- '👦🏻'
- '👩🏻'
- '🧑🏻'
- '👨🏻'
- '👩🏻🦱'
- '🧑🏻🦱'
- '👨🏻🦱'
- '👩🏻🦰'
- '🧑🏻🦰'
- '👨🏻🦰'
- '👱🏻♀️'
- '👱🏻'
- '👱🏻♂️'
- '👩🏻🦳'
- '🧑🏻🦳'
- '👨🏻🦳'
- '👩🏻🦲'
- '🧑🏻🦲'
- '👨🏻🦲'
- '🧔🏻♀️'
- '🧔🏻'
- '🧔🏻♂️'
- '👵🏻'
- '🧓🏻'
- '👴🏻'
- '👲🏻'
- '👳🏻♀️'
- '👳🏻'
- '👳🏻♂️'
- '🧕🏻'
- '👮🏻♀️'
- '👮🏻'
- '👮🏻♂️'
- '👷🏻♀️'
- '👷🏻'
- '👷🏻♂️'
- '💂🏻♀️'
- '💂🏻'
- '💂🏻♂️'
- '🕵🏻♀️'
- '🕵🏻'
- '🕵🏻♂️'
- '👩🏻⚕️'
- '🧑🏻⚕️'
- '👨🏻⚕️'
- '👩🏻🌾'
- '🧑🏻🌾'
- '👨🏻🌾'
- '👩🏻🍳'
- '🧑🏻🍳'
- '👨🏻🍳'
- '👩🏻🎓'
- '🧑🏻🎓'
- '👨🏻🎓'
- '👩🏻🎤'
- '🧑🏻🎤'
- '👨🏻🎤'
- '👩🏻🏫'
- '🧑🏻🏫'
- '👨🏻🏫'
- '👩🏻🏭'
- '🧑🏻🏭'
- '👨🏻🏭'
- '👩🏻💻'
- '🧑🏻💻'
- '👨🏻💻'
- '👩🏻💼'
- '🧑🏻💼'
- '👨🏻💼'
- '👩🏻🔧'
- '🧑🏻🔧'
- '👨🏻🔧'
- '👩🏻🔬'
- '🧑🏻🔬'
- '👨🏻🔬'
- '👩🏻🎨'
- '🧑🏻🎨'
- '👨🏻🎨'
- '👩🏻🚒'
- '🧑🏻🚒'
- '👨🏻🚒'
- '👩🏻✈️'
- '🧑🏻✈️'
- '👨🏻✈️'
- '👩🏻🚀'
- '🧑🏻🚀'
- '👨🏻🚀'
- '👩🏻⚖️'
- '🧑🏻⚖️'
- '👨🏻⚖️'
- '👰🏻♀️'
- '👰🏻'
- '👰🏻♂️'
- '🤵🏻♀️'
- '🤵🏻'
- '🤵🏻♂️'
- '👸🏻'
- '🫅🏻'
- '🤴🏻'
- '🥷🏻'
- '🦸🏻♀️'
- '🦸🏻'
- '🦸🏻♂️'
- '🦹🏻♀️'
- '🦹🏻'
- '🦹🏻♂️'
- '🤶🏻'
- '🧑🏻🎄'
- '🎅🏻'
- '🧙🏻♀️'
- '🧙🏻'
- '🧙🏻♂️'
- '🧝🏻♀️'
- '🧝🏻'
- '🧝🏻♂️'
- '🧛🏻♀️'
- '🧛🏻'
- '🧛🏻♂️'
- '🧜🏻♀️'
- '🧜🏻'
- '🧜🏻♂️'
- '🧚🏻♀️'
- '🧚🏻'
- '🧚🏻♂️'
- '👼🏻'
- '🤰🏻'
- '🫄🏻'
- '🫃🏻'
- '🤱🏻'
- '👩🏻🍼'
- '🧑🏻🍼'
- '👨🏻🍼'
- '🙇🏻♀️'
- '🙇🏻'
- '🙇🏻♂️'
- '💁🏻♀️'
- '💁🏻'
- '💁🏻♂️'
- '🙅🏻♀️'
- '🙅🏻'
- '🙅🏻♂️'
- '🙆🏻♀️'
- '🙆🏻'
- '🙆🏻♂️'
- '🙋🏻♀️'
- '🙋🏻'
- '🙋🏻♂️'
- '🧏🏻♀️'
- '🧏🏻'
- '🧏🏻♂️'
- '🤦🏻♀️'
- '🤦🏻'
- '🤦🏻♂️'
- '🤷🏻♀️'
- '🤷🏻'
- '🤷🏻♂️'
- '🙎🏻♀️'
- '🙎🏻'
- '🙎🏻♂️'
- '🙍🏻♀️'
- '🙍🏻'
- '🙍🏻♂️'
- '💇🏻♀️'
- '💇🏻'
- '💇🏻♂️'
- '💆🏻♀️'
- '💆🏻'
- '💆🏻♂️'
- '🧖🏻♀️'
- '🧖🏻'
- '🧖🏻♂️'
- '💃🏻'
- '🕺🏻'
- '🕴🏻'
- '👩🏻🦽'
- '🧑🏻🦽'
- '👨🏻🦽'
- '👩🏻🦼'
- '🧑🏻🦼'
- '👨🏻🦼'
- '🚶🏻♀️'
- '🚶🏻'
- '🚶🏻♂️'
- '👩🏻🦯'
- '🧑🏻🦯'
- '👨🏻🦯'
- '🧎🏻♀️'
- '🧎🏻'
- '🧎🏻♂️'
- '🏃🏻♀️'
- '🏃🏻'
- '🏃🏻♂️'
- '🧍🏻♀️'
- '🧍🏻'
- '🧍🏻♂️'
- '👭🏻'
- '🧑🏻🤝🧑🏻'
- '👬🏻'
- '👫🏻'
- '🧗🏻♀️'
- '🧗🏻'
- '🧗🏻♂️'
- '🏇🏻'
- '🏂🏻'
- '🏌🏻♀️'
- '🏌🏻'
- '🏌🏻♂️'
- '🏄🏻♀️'
- '🏄🏻'
- '🏄🏻♂️'
- '🚣🏻♀️'
- '🚣🏻'
- '🚣🏻♂️'
- '🏊🏻♀️'
- '🏊🏻'
- '🏊🏻♂️'
- '⛹🏻♀️'
- '⛹🏻'
- '⛹🏻♂️'
- '🏋🏻♀️'
- '🏋🏻'
- '🏋🏻♂️'
- '🚴🏻♀️'
- '🚴🏻'
- '🚴🏻♂️'
- '🚵🏻♀️'
- '🚵🏻'
- '🚵🏻♂️'
- '🤸🏻♀️'
- '🤸🏻'
- '🤸🏻♂️'
- '🤽🏻♀️'
- '🤽🏻'
- '🤽🏻♂️'
- '🤾🏻♀️'
- '🤾🏻'
- '🤾🏻♂️'
- '🤹🏻♀️'
- '🤹🏻'
- '🤹🏻♂️'
- '🧘🏻♀️'
- '🧘🏻'
- '🧘🏻♂️'
- '🛀🏻'
- '🛌🏻'
- '👋🏼'
- '🤚🏼'
- '🖐🏼'
- '✋🏼'
- '🖖🏼'
- '👌🏼'
- '🤌🏼'
- '🤏🏼'
- '✌🏼'
- '🤞🏼'
- '🫰🏼'
- '🤟🏼'
- '🤘🏼'
- '🤙🏼'
- '🫵🏼'
- '🫱🏼'
- '🫲🏼'
- '🫳🏼'
- '🫴🏼'
- '👈🏼'
- '👉🏼'
- '👆🏼'
- '🖕🏼'
- '👇🏼'
- '☝🏼'
- '👍🏼'
- '👎🏼'
- '✊🏼'
- '👊🏼'
- '🤛🏼'
- '🤜🏼'
- '👏🏼'
- '🫶🏼'
- '🙌🏼'
- '👐🏼'
- '🤲🏼'
- '🙏🏼'
- '✍🏼'
- '💪🏼'
- '🦵🏼'
- '🦶🏼'
- '👂🏼'
- '🦻🏼'
- '👃🏼'
- '👶🏼'
- '👧🏼'
- '🧒🏼'
- '👦🏼'
- '👩🏼'
- '🧑🏼'
- '👨🏼'
- '👩🏼🦱'
- '🧑🏼🦱'
- '👨🏼🦱'
- '👩🏼🦰'
- '🧑🏼🦰'
- '👨🏼🦰'
- '👱🏼♀️'
- '👱🏼'
- '👱🏼♂️'
- '👩🏼🦳'
- '🧑🏼🦳'
- '👨🏼🦳'
- '👩🏼🦲'
- '🧑🏼🦲'
- '👨🏼🦲'
- '🧔🏼♀️'
- '🧔🏼'
- '🧔🏼♂️'
- '👵🏼'
- '🧓🏼'
- '👴🏼'
- '👲🏼'
- '👳🏼♀️'
- '👳🏼'
- '👳🏼♂️'
- '🧕🏼'
- '👮🏼♀️'
- '👮🏼'
- '👮🏼♂️'
- '👷🏼♀️'
- '👷🏼'
- '👷🏼♂️'
- '💂🏼♀️'
- '💂🏼'
- '💂🏼♂️'
- '🕵🏼♀️'
- '🕵🏼'
- '🕵🏼♂️'
- '👩🏼⚕️'
- '🧑🏼⚕️'
- '👨🏼⚕️'
- '👩🏼🌾'
- '🧑🏼🌾'
- '👨🏼🌾'
- '👩🏼🍳'
- '🧑🏼🍳'
- '👨🏼🍳'
- '👩🏼🎓'
- '🧑🏼🎓'
- '👨🏼🎓'
- '👩🏼🎤'
- '🧑🏼🎤'
- '👨🏼🎤'
- '👩🏼🏫'
- '🧑🏼🏫'
- '👨🏼🏫'
- '👩🏼🏭'
- '🧑🏼🏭'
- '👨🏼🏭'
- '👩🏼💻'
- '🧑🏼💻'
- '👨🏼💻'
- '👩🏼💼'
- '🧑🏼💼'
- '👨🏼💼'
- '👩🏼🔧'
- '🧑🏼🔧'
- '👨🏼🔧'
- '👩🏼🔬'
- '🧑🏼🔬'
- '👨🏼🔬'
- '👩🏼🎨'
- '🧑🏼🎨'
- '👨🏼🎨'
- '👩🏼🚒'
- '🧑🏼🚒'
- '👨🏼🚒'
- '👩🏼✈️'
- '🧑🏼✈️'
- '👨🏼✈️'
- '👩🏼🚀'
- '🧑🏼🚀'
- '👨🏼🚀'
- '👩🏼⚖️'
- '🧑🏼⚖️'
- '👨🏼⚖️'
- '👰🏼♀️'
- '👰🏼'
- '👰🏼♂️'
- '🤵🏼♀️'
- '🤵🏼'
- '🤵🏼♂️'
- '👸🏼'
- '🫅🏼'
- '🤴🏼'
- '🥷🏼'
- '🦸🏼♀️'
- '🦸🏼'
- '🦸🏼♂️'
- '🦹🏼♀️'
- '🦹🏼'
- '🦹🏼♂️'
- '🤶🏼'
- '🧑🏼🎄'
- '🎅🏼'
- '🧙🏼♀️'
- '🧙🏼'
- '🧙🏼♂️'
- '🧝🏼♀️'
- '🧝🏼'
- '🧝🏼♂️'
- '🧛🏼♀️'
- '🧛🏼'
- '🧛🏼♂️'
- '🧜🏼♀️'
- '🧜🏼'
- '🧜🏼♂️'
- '🧚🏼♀️'
- '🧚🏼'
- '🧚🏼♂️'
- '👼🏼'
- '🤰🏼'
- '🫄🏼'
- '🫃🏼'
- '🤱🏼'
- '👩🏼🍼'
- '🧑🏼🍼'
- '👨🏼🍼'
- '🙇🏼♀️'
- '🙇🏼'
- '🙇🏼♂️'
- '💁🏼♀️'
- '💁🏼'
- '💁🏼♂️'
- '🙅🏼♀️'
- '🙅🏼'
- '🙅🏼♂️'
- '🙆🏼♀️'
- '🙆🏼'
- '🙆🏼♂️'
- '🙋🏼♀️'
- '🙋🏼'
- '🙋🏼♂️'
- '🧏🏼♀️'
- '🧏🏼'
- '🧏🏼♂️'
- '🤦🏼♀️'
- '🤦🏼'
- '🤦🏼♂️'
- '🤷🏼♀️'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- '😀'
- '😃'
- '😄'
- '😁'
- '😆'
- '😅'
- '😂'
- '🤣'
- '🥲'
- '🥹'
- '☺️'
- '😊'
- '😇'
- '🙂'
- '🙃'
- '😉'
- '😌'
- '😍'
- '🥰'
- '😘'
- '😗'
- '😙'
- '😚'
- '😋'
- '😛'
- '😝'
- '😜'
- '🤪'
- '🤨'
- '🧐'
- '🤓'
- '😎'
- '🥸'
- '🤩'
- '🥳'
- '😏'
- '😒'
- '😞'
- '😔'
- '😟'
- '😕'
- '🙁'
- '☹️'
- '😣'
- '😖'
- '😫'
- '😩'
- '🥺'
- '😢'
- '😭'
- '😮💨'
- '😤'
- '😠'
- '😡'
- '🤬'
- '🤯'
- '😳'
- '🥵'
- '🥶'
- '😱'
- '😨'
- '😰'
- '😥'
- '😓'
- '🫣'
- '🤗'
- '🫡'
- '🤔'
- '🫢'
- '🤭'
- '🤫'
- '🤥'
- '😶'
- '😶🌫️'
- '😐'
- '😑'
- '😬'
- '🫠'
- '🙄'
- '😯'
- '😦'
- '😧'
- '😮'
- '😲'
- '🥱'
- '😴'
- '🤤'
- '😪'
- '😵'
- '😵💫'
- '🫥'
- '🤐'
- '🥴'
- '🤢'
- '🤮'
- '🤧'
- '😷'
- '🤒'
- '🤕'
- '🤑'
- '🤠'
- '😈'
- '👿'
- '👹'
- '👺'
- '🤡'
- '💩'
- '👻'
- '💀'
- '☠️'
- '👽'
- '👾'
- '🤖'
- '🎃'
- '😺'
- '😸'
- '😹'
- '😻'
- '😼'
- '😽'
- '🙀'
- '😿'
- '😾'
- '👋'
- '🤚'
- '🖐'
- '✋'
- '🖖'
- '👌'
- '🤌'
- '🤏'
- '✌️'
- '🤞'
- '🫰'
- '🤟'
- '🤘'
- '🤙'
- '🫵'
- '🫱'
- '🫲'
- '🫳'
- '🫴'
- '👈'
- '👉'
- '👆'
- '🖕'
- '👇'
- '☝️'
- '👍'
- '👎'
- '✊'
- '👊'
- '🤛'
- '🤜'
- '👏'
- '🫶'
- '🙌'
- '👐'
- '🤲'
- '🤝'
- '🙏'
- '✍️'
- '💪'
- '🦾'
- '🦵'
- '🦿'
- '🦶'
- '👣'
- '👂'
- '🦻'
- '👃'
- '🫀'
- '🫁'
- '🧠'
- '🦷'
- '🦴'
- '👀'
- '👁'
- '👅'
- '👄'
- '🫦'
- '💋'
- '🩸'
- '👶'
- '👧'
- '🧒'
- '👦'
- '👩'
- '🧑'
- '👨'
- '👩🦱'
- '🧑🦱'
- '👨🦱'
- '👩🦰'
- '🧑🦰'
- '👨🦰'
- '👱♀️'
- '👱'
- '👱♂️'
- '👩🦳'
- '🧑🦳'
- '👨🦳'
- '👩🦲'
- '🧑🦲'
- '👨🦲'
- '🧔♀️'
- '🧔'
- '🧔♂️'
- '👵'
- '🧓'
- '👴'
- '👲'
- '👳♀️'
- '👳'
- '👳♂️'
- '🧕'
- '👮♀️'
- '👮'
- '👮♂️'
- '👷♀️'
- '👷'
- '👷♂️'
- '💂♀️'
- '💂'
- '💂♂️'
- '🕵️♀️'
- '🕵️'
- '🕵️♂️'
- '👩⚕️'
- '🧑⚕️'
- '👨⚕️'
- '👩🌾'
- '🧑🌾'
- '👨🌾'
- '👩🍳'
- '🧑🍳'
- '👨🍳'
- '👩🎓'
- '🧑🎓'
- '👨🎓'
- '👩🎤'
- '🧑🎤'
- '👨🎤'
- '👩🏫'
- '🧑🏫'
- '👨🏫'
- '👩🏭'
- '🧑🏭'
- '👨🏭'
- '👩💻'
- '🧑💻'
- '👨💻'
- '👩💼'
- '🧑💼'
- '👨💼'
- '👩🔧'
- '🧑🔧'
- '👨🔧'
- '👩🔬'
- '🧑🔬'
- '👨🔬'
- '👩🎨'
- '🧑🎨'
- '👨🎨'
- '👩🚒'
- '🧑🚒'
- '👨🚒'
- '👩✈️'
- '🧑✈️'
- '👨✈️'
- '👩🚀'
- '🧑🚀'
- '👨🚀'
- '👩⚖️'
- '🧑⚖️'
- '👨⚖️'
- '👰♀️'
- '👰'
- '👰♂️'
- '🤵♀️'
- '🤵'
- '🤵♂️'
- '👸'
- '🫅'
- '🤴'
- '🥷'
- '🦸♀️'
- '🦸'
- '🦸♂️'
- '🦹♀️'
- '🦹'
- '🦹♂️'
- '🤶'
- '🧑🎄'
- '🎅'
- '🧙♀️'
- '🧙'
- '🧙♂️'
- '🧝♀️'
- '🧝'
- '🧝♂️'
- '🧛♀️'
- '🧛'
- '🧛♂️'
- '🧟♀️'
- '🧟'
- '🧟♂️'
- '🧞♀️'
- '🧞'
- '🧞♂️'
- '🧜♀️'
- '🧜'
- '🧜♂️'
- '🧚♀️'
- '🧚'
- '🧚♂️'
- '🧌'
- '👼'
- '🤰'
- '🫄'
- '🫃'
- '🤱'
- '👩🍼'
- '🧑🍼'
- '👨🍼'
- '🙇♀️'
- '🙇'
- '🙇♂️'
- '💁♀️'
- '💁'
- '💁♂️'
- '🙅♀️'
- '🙅'
- '🙅♂️'
- '🙆♀️'
- '🙆'
- '🙆♂️'
- '🙋♀️'
- '🙋'
- '🙋♂️'
- '🧏♀️'
- '🧏'
- '🧏♂️'
- '🤦♀️'
- '🤦'
- '🤦♂️'
- '🤷♀️'
- '🤷'
- '🤷♂️'
- '🙎♀️'
- '🙎'
- '🙎♂️'
- '🙍♀️'
- '🙍'
- '🙍♂️'
- '💇♀️'
- '💇'
- '💇♂️'
- '💆♀️'
- '💆'
- '💆♂️'
- '🧖♀️'
- '🧖'
- '🧖♂️'
- '💅'
- '💃'
- '🕺'
- '👯♀️'
- '👯'
- '👯♂️'
- '🕴'
- '👩🦽'
- '🧑🦽'
- '👨🦽'
- '👩🦼'
- '🧑🦼'
- '👨🦼'
- '🚶♀️'
- '🚶'
- '🚶♂️'
- '👩🦯'
- '🧑🦯'
- '👨🦯'
- '🧎♀️'
- '🧎'
- '🧎♂️'
- '🏃♀️'
- '🏃'
- '🏃♂️'
- '🧍♀️'
- '🧍'
- '🧍♂️'
- '👭'
- '🧑🤝🧑'
- '👬'
- '👫'
- '👩❤️👩'
- '💑'
- '👨❤️👨'
- '👩❤️👨'
- '👩❤️💋👩'
- '💏'
- '👨❤️💋👨'
- '👩❤️💋👨'
- '👪'
- '👨👩👦'
- '👨👩👧'
- '👨👩👧👦'
- '👨👩👦👦'
- '👨👩👧👧'
- '👨👨👦'
- '👨👨👧'
- '👨👨👧👦'
- '👨👨👦👦'
- '👨👨👧👧'
- '👩👩👦'
- '👩👩👧'
- '👩👩👧👦'
- '👩👩👦👦'
- '👩👩👧👧'
- '👨👦'
- '👨👦👦'
- '👨👧'
- '👨👧👦'
- '👨👧👧'
- '👩👦'
- '👩👦👦'
- '👩👧'
- '👩👧👦'
- '👩👧👧'
- '🗣'
- '👤'
- '👥'
- '🫂'
- '🧳'
- '🌂'
- '☂️'
- '🧵'
- '🪡'
- '🪢'
- '🧶'
- '👓'
- '🕶'
- '🥽'
- '🥼'
- '🦺'
- '👔'
- '👕'
- '👖'
- '🧣'
- '🧤'
- '🧥'
- '🧦'
- '👗'
- '👘'
- '🥻'
- '🩴'
- '🩱'
- '🩲'
- '🩳'
- '👙'
- '👚'
- '👛'
- '👜'
- '👝'
- '🎒'
- '👞'
- '👟'
- '🥾'
- '🥿'
- '👠'
- '👡'
- '🩰'
- '👢'
- '👑'
- '👒'
- '🎩'
- '🎓'
- '🧢'
- '⛑'
- '🪖'
- '💄'
- '💍'
- '💼'
- '👋🏻'
- '🤚🏻'
- '🖐🏻'
- '✋🏻'
- '🖖🏻'
- '👌🏻'
- '🤌🏻'
- '🤏🏻'
- '✌🏻'
- '🤞🏻'
- '🫰🏻'
- '🤟🏻'
- '🤘🏻'
- '🤙🏻'
- '🫵🏻'
- '🫱🏻'
- '🫲🏻'
- '🫳🏻'
- '🫴🏻'
- '👈🏻'
- '👉🏻'
- '👆🏻'
- '🖕🏻'
- '👇🏻'
- '☝🏻'
- '👍🏻'
- '👎🏻'
- '✊🏻'
- '👊🏻'
- '🤛🏻'
- '🤜🏻'
- '👏🏻'
- '🫶🏻'
- '🙌🏻'
- '👐🏻'
- '🤲🏻'
- '🙏🏻'
- '✍🏻'
- '💪🏻'
- '🦵🏻'
- '🦶🏻'
- '👂🏻'
- '🦻🏻'
- '👃🏻'
- '👶🏻'
- '👧🏻'
- '🧒🏻'
- '👦🏻'
- '👩🏻'
- '🧑🏻'
- '👨🏻'
- '👩🏻🦱'
- '🧑🏻🦱'
- '👨🏻🦱'
- '👩🏻🦰'
- '🧑🏻🦰'
- '👨🏻🦰'
- '👱🏻♀️'
- '👱🏻'
- '👱🏻♂️'
- '👩🏻🦳'
- '🧑🏻🦳'
- '👨🏻🦳'
- '👩🏻🦲'
- '🧑🏻🦲'
- '👨🏻🦲'
- '🧔🏻♀️'
- '🧔🏻'
- '🧔🏻♂️'
- '👵🏻'
- '🧓🏻'
- '👴🏻'
- '👲🏻'
- '👳🏻♀️'
- '👳🏻'
- '👳🏻♂️'
- '🧕🏻'
- '👮🏻♀️'
- '👮🏻'
- '👮🏻♂️'
- '👷🏻♀️'
- '👷🏻'
- '👷🏻♂️'
- '💂🏻♀️'
- '💂🏻'
- '💂🏻♂️'
- '🕵🏻♀️'
- '🕵🏻'
- '🕵🏻♂️'
- '👩🏻⚕️'
- '🧑🏻⚕️'
- '👨🏻⚕️'
- '👩🏻🌾'
- '🧑🏻🌾'
- '👨🏻🌾'
- '👩🏻🍳'
- '🧑🏻🍳'
- '👨🏻🍳'
- '👩🏻🎓'
- '🧑🏻🎓'
- '👨🏻🎓'
- '👩🏻🎤'
- '🧑🏻🎤'
- '👨🏻🎤'
- '👩🏻🏫'
- '🧑🏻🏫'
- '👨🏻🏫'
- '👩🏻🏭'
- '🧑🏻🏭'
- '👨🏻🏭'
- '👩🏻💻'
- '🧑🏻💻'
- '👨🏻💻'
- '👩🏻💼'
- '🧑🏻💼'
- '👨🏻💼'
- '👩🏻🔧'
- '🧑🏻🔧'
- '👨🏻🔧'
- '👩🏻🔬'
- '🧑🏻🔬'
- '👨🏻🔬'
- '👩🏻🎨'
- '🧑🏻🎨'
- '👨🏻🎨'
- '👩🏻🚒'
- '🧑🏻🚒'
- '👨🏻🚒'
- '👩🏻✈️'
- '🧑🏻✈️'
- '👨🏻✈️'
- '👩🏻🚀'
- '🧑🏻🚀'
- '👨🏻🚀'
- '👩🏻⚖️'
- '🧑🏻⚖️'
- '👨🏻⚖️'
- '👰🏻♀️'
- '👰🏻'
- '👰🏻♂️'
- '🤵🏻♀️'
- '🤵🏻'
- '🤵🏻♂️'
- '👸🏻'
- '🫅🏻'
- '🤴🏻'
- '🥷🏻'
- '🦸🏻♀️'
- '🦸🏻'
- '🦸🏻♂️'
- '🦹🏻♀️'
- '🦹🏻'
- '🦹🏻♂️'
- '🤶🏻'
- '🧑🏻🎄'
- '🎅🏻'
- '🧙🏻♀️'
- '🧙🏻'
- '🧙🏻♂️'
- '🧝🏻♀️'
- '🧝🏻'
- '🧝🏻♂️'
- '🧛🏻♀️'
- '🧛🏻'
- '🧛🏻♂️'
- '🧜🏻♀️'
- '🧜🏻'
- '🧜🏻♂️'
- '🧚🏻♀️'
- '🧚🏻'
- '🧚🏻♂️'
- '👼🏻'
- '🤰🏻'
- '🫄🏻'
- '🫃🏻'
- '🤱🏻'
- '👩🏻🍼'
- '🧑🏻🍼'
- '👨🏻🍼'
- '🙇🏻♀️'
- '🙇🏻'
- '🙇🏻♂️'
- '💁🏻♀️'
- '💁🏻'
- '💁🏻♂️'
- '🙅🏻♀️'
- '🙅🏻'
- '🙅🏻♂️'
- '🙆🏻♀️'
- '🙆🏻'
- '🙆🏻♂️'
- '🙋🏻♀️'
- '🙋🏻'
- '🙋🏻♂️'
- '🧏🏻♀️'
- '🧏🏻'
- '🧏🏻♂️'
- '🤦🏻♀️'
- '🤦🏻'
- '🤦🏻♂️'
- '🤷🏻♀️'
- '🤷🏻'
- '🤷🏻♂️'
- '🙎🏻♀️'
- '🙎🏻'
- '🙎🏻♂️'
- '🙍🏻♀️'
- '🙍🏻'
- '🙍🏻♂️'
- '💇🏻♀️'
- '💇🏻'
- '💇🏻♂️'
- '💆🏻♀️'
- '💆🏻'
- '💆🏻♂️'
- '🧖🏻♀️'
- '🧖🏻'
- '🧖🏻♂️'
- '💃🏻'
- '🕺🏻'
- '🕴🏻'
- '👩🏻🦽'
- '🧑🏻🦽'
- '👨🏻🦽'
- '👩🏻🦼'
- '🧑🏻🦼'
- '👨🏻🦼'
- '🚶🏻♀️'
- '🚶🏻'
- '🚶🏻♂️'
- '👩🏻🦯'
- '🧑🏻🦯'
- '👨🏻🦯'
- '🧎🏻♀️'
- '🧎🏻'
- '🧎🏻♂️'
- '🏃🏻♀️'
- '🏃🏻'
- '🏃🏻♂️'
- '🧍🏻♀️'
- '🧍🏻'
- '🧍🏻♂️'
- '👭🏻'
- '🧑🏻🤝🧑🏻'
- '👬🏻'
- '👫🏻'
- '🧗🏻♀️'
- '🧗🏻'
- '🧗🏻♂️'
- '🏇🏻'
- '🏂🏻'
- '🏌🏻♀️'
- '🏌🏻'
- '🏌🏻♂️'
- '🏄🏻♀️'
- '🏄🏻'
- '🏄🏻♂️'
- '🚣🏻♀️'
- '🚣🏻'
- '🚣🏻♂️'
- '🏊🏻♀️'
- '🏊🏻'
- '🏊🏻♂️'
- '⛹🏻♀️'
- '⛹🏻'
- '⛹🏻♂️'
- '🏋🏻♀️'
- '🏋🏻'
- '🏋🏻♂️'
- '🚴🏻♀️'
- '🚴🏻'
- '🚴🏻♂️'
- '🚵🏻♀️'
- '🚵🏻'
- '🚵🏻♂️'
- '🤸🏻♀️'
- '🤸🏻'
- '🤸🏻♂️'
- '🤽🏻♀️'
- '🤽🏻'
- '🤽🏻♂️'
- '🤾🏻♀️'
- '🤾🏻'
- '🤾🏻♂️'
- '🤹🏻♀️'
- '🤹🏻'
- '🤹🏻♂️'
- '🧘🏻♀️'
- '🧘🏻'
- '🧘🏻♂️'
- '🛀🏻'
- '🛌🏻'
- '👋🏼'
- '🤚🏼'
- '🖐🏼'
- '✋🏼'
- '🖖🏼'
- '👌🏼'
- '🤌🏼'
- '🤏🏼'
- '✌🏼'
- '🤞🏼'
- '🫰🏼'
- '🤟🏼'
- '🤘🏼'
- '🤙🏼'
- '🫵🏼'
- '🫱🏼'
- '🫲🏼'
- '🫳🏼'
- '🫴🏼'
- '👈🏼'
- '👉🏼'
- '👆🏼'
- '🖕🏼'
- '👇🏼'
- '☝🏼'
- '👍🏼'
- '👎🏼'
- '✊🏼'
- '👊🏼'
- '🤛🏼'
- '🤜🏼'
- '👏🏼'
- '🫶🏼'
- '🙌🏼'
- '👐🏼'
- '🤲🏼'
- '🙏🏼'
- '✍🏼'
- '💪🏼'
- '🦵🏼'
- '🦶🏼'
- '👂🏼'
- '🦻🏼'
- '👃🏼'
- '👶🏼'
- '👧🏼'
- '🧒🏼'
- '👦🏼'
- '👩🏼'
- '🧑🏼'
- '👨🏼'
- '👩🏼🦱'
- '🧑🏼🦱'
- '👨🏼🦱'
- '👩🏼🦰'
- '🧑🏼🦰'
- '👨🏼🦰'
- '👱🏼♀️'
- '👱🏼'
- '👱🏼♂️'
- '👩🏼🦳'
- '🧑🏼🦳'
- '👨🏼🦳'
- '👩🏼🦲'
- '🧑🏼🦲'
- '👨🏼🦲'
- '🧔🏼♀️'
- '🧔🏼'
- '🧔🏼♂️'
- '👵🏼'
- '🧓🏼'
- '👴🏼'
- '👲🏼'
- '👳🏼♀️'
- '👳🏼'
- '👳🏼♂️'
- '🧕🏼'
- '👮🏼♀️'
- '👮🏼'
- '👮🏼♂️'
- '👷🏼♀️'
- '👷🏼'
- '👷🏼♂️'
- '💂🏼♀️'
- '💂🏼'
- '💂🏼♂️'
- '🕵🏼♀️'
- '🕵🏼'
- '🕵🏼♂️'
- '👩🏼⚕️'
- '🧑🏼⚕️'
- '👨🏼⚕️'
- '👩🏼🌾'
- '🧑🏼🌾'
- '👨🏼🌾'
- '👩🏼🍳'
- '🧑🏼🍳'
- '👨🏼🍳'
- '👩🏼🎓'
- '🧑🏼🎓'
- '👨🏼🎓'
- '👩🏼🎤'
- '🧑🏼🎤'
- '👨🏼🎤'
- '👩🏼🏫'
- '🧑🏼🏫'
- '👨🏼🏫'
- '👩🏼🏭'
- '🧑🏼🏭'
- '👨🏼🏭'
- '👩🏼💻'
- '🧑🏼💻'
- '👨🏼💻'
- '👩🏼💼'
- '🧑🏼💼'
- '👨🏼💼'
- '👩🏼🔧'
- '🧑🏼🔧'
- '👨🏼🔧'
- '👩🏼🔬'
- '🧑🏼🔬'
- '👨🏼🔬'
- '👩🏼🎨'
- '🧑🏼🎨'
- '👨🏼🎨'
- '👩🏼🚒'
- '🧑🏼🚒'
- '👨🏼🚒'
- '👩🏼✈️'
- '🧑🏼✈️'
- '👨🏼✈️'
- '👩🏼🚀'
- '🧑🏼🚀'
- '👨🏼🚀'
- '👩🏼⚖️'
- '🧑🏼⚖️'
- '👨🏼⚖️'
- '👰🏼♀️'
- '👰🏼'
- '👰🏼♂️'
- '🤵🏼♀️'
- '🤵🏼'
- '🤵🏼♂️'
- '👸🏼'
- '🫅🏼'
- '🤴🏼'
- '🥷🏼'
- '🦸🏼♀️'
- '🦸🏼'
- '🦸🏼♂️'
- '🦹🏼♀️'
- '🦹🏼'
- '🦹🏼♂️'
- '🤶🏼'
- '🧑🏼🎄'
- '🎅🏼'
- '🧙🏼♀️'
- '🧙🏼'
- '🧙🏼♂️'
- '🧝🏼♀️'
- '🧝🏼'
- '🧝🏼♂️'
- '🧛🏼♀️'
- '🧛🏼'
- '🧛🏼♂️'
- '🧜🏼♀️'
- '🧜🏼'
- '🧜🏼♂️'
- '🧚🏼♀️'
- '🧚🏼'
- '🧚🏼♂️'
- '👼🏼'
- '🤰🏼'
- '🫄🏼'
- '🫃🏼'
- '🤱🏼'
- '👩🏼🍼'
- '🧑🏼🍼'
- '👨🏼🍼'
- '🙇🏼♀️'
- '🙇🏼'
- '🙇🏼♂️'
- '💁🏼♀️'
- '💁🏼'
- '💁🏼♂️'
- '🙅🏼♀️'
- '🙅🏼'
- '🙅🏼♂️'
- '🙆🏼♀️'
- '🙆🏼'
- '🙆🏼♂️'
- '🙋🏼♀️'
- '🙋🏼'
- '🙋🏼♂️'
- '🧏🏼♀️'
- '🧏🏼'
- '🧏🏼♂️'
- '🤦🏼♀️'
- '🤦🏼'
- '🤦🏼♂️'
- '🤷🏼♀️'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
PwnDrp Access
#Detects downloads from PwnDrp web servers developed for red team testing and most likely also used for criminal activity
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
Rule Body
title: PwnDrp Access
id: 2b1ee7e4-89b6-4739-b7bb-b811b6607e5e
status: test
description: Detects downloads from PwnDrp web servers developed for red team testing and most likely also used for criminal activity
references:
- https://breakdev.org/pwndrop/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-04-15
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1102.001
- attack.t1102.003
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-uri|contains: '/pwndrop/'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
c-uri|contains: '/pwndrop/'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
c-uri | match |
| field:"c-uri" kind:match value:"/pwndrop/" |
Rare Remote Thread Creation By Uncommon Source Image
#Detects uncommon processes creating remote threads.
Known False Positives
- This rule is best put in testing first in order to create a baseline that reflects the data in your environment.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 8: CreateRemoteThread |
Rule Body
title: Rare Remote Thread Creation By Uncommon Source Image
id: 02d1d718-dd13-41af-989d-ea85c7fab93f
related:
- id: 66d31e5f-52d6-40a4-9615-002d3789a119
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects uncommon processes creating remote threads.
references:
- Personal research, statistical analysis
- https://lolbas-project.github.io
author: Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community
date: 2019-10-27
modified: 2025-12-08
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1055
logsource:
product: windows
category: create_remote_thread
detection:
selection:
SourceImage|endswith:
- '\bash.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\cvtres.exe'
- '\defrag.exe'
- '\dialer.exe'
- '\dnx.exe'
- '\esentutl.exe'
- '\excel.exe'
- '\expand.exe'
- '\find.exe'
- '\findstr.exe'
- '\forfiles.exe'
- '\gpupdate.exe'
- '\hh.exe'
- '\installutil.exe'
- '\lync.exe'
- '\makecab.exe'
- '\mDNSResponder.exe'
- '\monitoringhost.exe' # Loads .NET CLR by default and thus a favorite for process injection for .NET in-memory offensive tools.
- '\msbuild.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\mspaint.exe'
- '\outlook.exe'
- '\ping.exe'
- '\provtool.exe'
- '\python.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\robocopy.exe'
- '\runonce.exe'
- '\sapcimc.exe'
- '\smartscreen.exe'
- '\spoolsv.exe'
- '\tstheme.exe'
- '\userinit.exe'
- '\vssadmin.exe'
- '\vssvc.exe'
- '\w3wp.exe'
- '\winscp.exe'
- '\winword.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
filter_main_conhost:
SourceImage:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\Defrag.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\makecab.exe'
TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe'
filter_main_provtol_svchost:
SourceImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\provtool.exe'
TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
filter_main_provtool_system:
SourceImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\provtool.exe'
TargetImage: 'System'
filter_main_userinit:
SourceImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\userinit.exe'
TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
filter_main_winword:
SourceImage|endswith: '\WINWORD.EXE'
TargetImage|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\' # C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe
- 'C:\Program Files\' # C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\vfs\ProgramFilesCommonX64\Microsoft Shared\Office16\AI\ai.exe
filter_main_ms_office:
# Raised by following issue: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/5529
SourceImage|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\'
TargetImage: 'System'
filter_optional_explorer_vmtools:
SourceImage|endswith: '\SysWOW64\explorer.exe'
TargetImage:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- This rule is best put in testing first in order to create a baseline that reflects the data in your environment.
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*Stage 1: selection
selection:
SourceImage|endswith:
- '\bash.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\cvtres.exe'
- '\defrag.exe'
- '\dialer.exe'
- '\dnx.exe'
- '\esentutl.exe'
- '\excel.exe'
- '\expand.exe'
- '\find.exe'
- '\findstr.exe'
- '\forfiles.exe'
- '\gpupdate.exe'
- '\hh.exe'
- '\installutil.exe'
- '\lync.exe'
- '\makecab.exe'
- '\mDNSResponder.exe'
- '\monitoringhost.exe'
- '\msbuild.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\mspaint.exe'
- '\outlook.exe'
- '\ping.exe'
- '\provtool.exe'
- '\python.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\robocopy.exe'
- '\runonce.exe'
- '\sapcimc.exe'
- '\smartscreen.exe'
- '\spoolsv.exe'
- '\tstheme.exe'
- '\userinit.exe'
- '\vssadmin.exe'
- '\vssvc.exe'
- '\w3wp.exe'
- '\winscp.exe'
- '\winword.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
Stage 2: not filter_main_*
filter_main_conhost:
SourceImage:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\Defrag.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\makecab.exe'
TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe'
filter_main_provtol_svchost:
SourceImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\provtool.exe'
TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
filter_main_provtool_system:
SourceImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\provtool.exe'
TargetImage: 'System'
filter_main_userinit:
SourceImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\userinit.exe'
TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
filter_main_winword:
SourceImage|endswith: '\WINWORD.EXE'
TargetImage|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
- 'C:\Program Files\'
filter_main_ms_office:
SourceImage|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\'
TargetImage: 'System'
Stage 3: not filter_optional_explorer_vmtools
filter_optional_explorer_vmtools:
SourceImage|endswith: '\SysWOW64\explorer.exe'
TargetImage:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
SourceImage | ends_with |
| field:"SourceImage" kind:ends_with |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
Remote Event Log Recon
#Detects remote RPC calls to get event log information via EVEN or EVEN6
Known False Positives
- Remote administrative tasks on Windows Events
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Discovery | No specific technique |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| RPCFW | Event ID 3: An RPC server function was called. |
Rule Body
title: Remote Event Log Recon
id: 2053961f-44c7-4a64-b62d-f6e72800af0d
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls to get event log information via EVEN or EVEN6
references:
- https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
- https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
- attack.discovery
logsource:
product: rpc_firewall
category: application
definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:82273fdc-e32a-18c3-3f78-827929dc23ea and uuid:f6beaff7-1e19-4fbb-9f8f-b89e2018337c"'
detection:
selection:
EventLog: RPCFW
EventID: 3
InterfaceUuid:
- 82273fdc-e32a-18c3-3f78-827929dc23ea
- f6beaff7-1e19-4fbb-9f8f-b89e2018337c
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Remote administrative tasks on Windows Events
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
EventLog: RPCFW
EventID: 3
InterfaceUuid:
- 82273fdc-e32a-18c3-3f78-827929dc23ea
- f6beaff7-1e19-4fbb-9f8f-b89e2018337c
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventLog | eq |
| field:"EventLog" kind:eq value:"RPCFW" |
InterfaceUuid | eq |
| field:"InterfaceUuid" kind:eq |
Roles Assigned Outside PIM
#Identifies when a privilege role assignment has taken place outside of PIM and may indicate an attack.
Known False Positives
- Investigate where users are being assigned privileged roles outside of Privileged Identity Management and prohibit future assignments from there.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | |
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Stealth |
Rule Body
title: Roles Assigned Outside PIM
id: b1bc08d1-8224-4758-a0e6-fbcfc98c73bb
status: test
description: Identifies when a privilege role assignment has taken place outside of PIM and may indicate an attack.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#roles-are-being-assigned-outside-of-privileged-identity-management
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
product: azure
service: pim
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'rolesAssignedOutsidePrivilegedIdentityManagementAlertConfiguration'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Investigate where users are being assigned privileged roles outside of Privileged Identity Management and prohibit future assignments from there.
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
riskEventType: 'rolesAssignedOutsidePrivilegedIdentityManagementAlertConfiguration'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
riskEventType | eq |
| field:"azure_ad::risk_event_types" kind:eq value:"rolesAssignedOutsidePrivilegedIdentityManagementAlertConfiguration" |
Rundll32.EXE Calling DllRegisterServer Export Function Explicitly
#Detects when the DLL export function 'DllRegisterServer' is called in the commandline by Rundll32 explicitly where the DLL is located in a non-standard path.
Known False Positives
- Legitimate usage as part of application installation, but less likely from e.g. temporary paths.
- Not every instance is considered malicious, but this rule will capture the malicious usages.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule Body
title: Rundll32.EXE Calling DllRegisterServer Export Function Explicitly
id: d81a9fc6-55db-4461-b962-0e78fea5b0ad
related:
- id: 2569ed8c-1147-498a-9b8c-2ad3656b10ed # Renamed rundll32
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects when the DLL export function 'DllRegisterServer' is called in the commandline by Rundll32 explicitly where the DLL is located in a non-standard path.
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/08/28/html-smuggling-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/94816439312563db982cd038cf77cbc5ef4c7003e3edee86e2b0f99e675ed4ed/behavior
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/olectl/nf-olectl-dllregisterserver
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2023-10-17
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
- detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_image:
- Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
selection_cmdline:
CommandLine|contains: 'DllRegisterServer'
filter_main_legit_paths:
CommandLine|contains:
- ':\Program Files (x86)'
- ':\Program Files\'
- ':\Windows\System32\'
- ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate usage as part of application installation, but less likely from e.g. temporary paths.
- Not every instance is considered malicious, but this rule will capture the malicious usages.
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*Stage 1: selection_image
selection_image:
- Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
Stage 2: selection_cmdline
selection_cmdline:
CommandLine|contains: 'DllRegisterServer'
Stage 3: not filter_main_legit_paths
filter_main_legit_paths:
CommandLine|contains:
- ':\Program Files (x86)'
- ':\Program Files\'
- ':\Windows\System32\'
- ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match value:"DllRegisterServer" |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\rundll32.exe" |
OriginalFileName | eq |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"RUNDLL32.EXE" |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match | :\Program Files (x86) | excludes:CommandLine field:"CommandLine" value:":\Program Files (x86)" |
CommandLine | match | :\Program Files\ | excludes:CommandLine field:"CommandLine" value:":\Program Files\" |
CommandLine | match | :\Windows\SysWOW64\ | excludes:CommandLine field:"CommandLine" value:":\Windows\SysWOW64\" |
CommandLine | match | :\Windows\System32\ | excludes:CommandLine field:"CommandLine" value:":\Windows\System32\" |
Scheduled Task Executing Payload from Registry
#Detects the creation of a schtasks that potentially executes a payload stored in the Windows Registry using PowerShell.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule Body
title: Scheduled Task Executing Payload from Registry
id: 86588b36-c6d3-465f-9cee-8f9093e07798
related:
- id: c4eeeeae-89f4-43a7-8b48-8d1bdfa66c78
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a schtasks that potentially executes a payload stored in the Windows Registry using PowerShell.
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-18
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1053.005
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_img:
# schtasks.exe /Create /F /TN "{97F2F70B-10D1-4447-A2F3-9B070C86E261}" /TR "cmd /c start /min \"\" powershell.exe -Command IEX([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String((Get-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Pvoeooxf).yzbbvhhdypa))) " /SC MINUTE /MO 30
- Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
selection_cli_create:
CommandLine|contains: '/Create'
selection_cli_get:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Get-ItemProperty'
- ' gp ' # Alias
selection_cli_hive:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'HKCU:'
- 'HKLM:'
- 'registry::'
- 'HKEY_'
filter_main_encoding:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'FromBase64String'
- 'encodedcommand'
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*Stage 1: selection_img
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
Stage 2: selection_cli_create
selection_cli_create:
CommandLine|contains: '/Create'
Stage 3: selection_cli_get
selection_cli_get:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Get-ItemProperty'
- ' gp '
Stage 4: selection_cli_hive
selection_cli_hive:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'HKCU:'
- 'HKLM:'
- 'registry::'
- 'HKEY_'
Stage 5: not filter_main_encoding
filter_main_encoding:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'FromBase64String'
- 'encodedcommand'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\schtasks.exe" |
OriginalFileName | eq |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"schtasks.exe" |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match | FromBase64String | excludes:CommandLine field:"CommandLine" value:"FromBase64String" |
CommandLine | match | encodedcommand | excludes:CommandLine field:"CommandLine" value:"encodedcommand" |
Service abuse with malicious ImagePath (service)
#Detects scenarios where an attacker modify the original service executable path with a malicious one.
Known False Positives
- administrator reconfiguring service
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule Body
title: Service abuse with malicious ImagePath (service)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker modify the original service executable path with a malicious one.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1543.003-Create%20or%20Modify%20System%20Process-Windows%20Service
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc742019(v=ws.11)
- https://pentestlab.blog/2020/01/22/persistence-modify-existing-service/
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1543.003
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection: # sc config <service_name> binPath="C:\windows\system32\pentestlab.exe"
selection_process:
NewProcessName|endswith: \sc.exe
CommandLine|contains|all:
- sc
- config
- binpath
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- administrator reconfiguring service
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection_process
selection_process:
NewProcessName|endswith: \sc.exe
CommandLine|contains|all:
- sc
- config
- binpath
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
NewProcessName | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\sc.exe" |
Suspicious FromBase64String Usage On Gzip Archive - Process Creation
#Detects attempts of decoding a base64 Gzip archive via PowerShell. This technique is often used as a method to load malicious content into memory afterward.
Known False Positives
- Legitimate administrative script
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Command & Control |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule Body
title: Suspicious FromBase64String Usage On Gzip Archive - Process Creation
id: d75d6b6b-adb9-48f7-824b-ac2e786efe1f
related:
- id: df69cb1d-b891-4cd9-90c7-d617d90100ce
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects attempts of decoding a base64 Gzip archive via PowerShell. This technique is often used as a method to load malicious content into memory afterward.
references:
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=43
author: frack113
date: 2022-12-23
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1132.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'FromBase64String'
- 'MemoryStream'
- 'H4sI'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative script
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'FromBase64String'
- 'MemoryStream'
- 'H4sI'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Suspicious Inbox Manipulation Rules
#Detects suspicious rules that delete or move messages or folders are set on a user's inbox.
Known False Positives
- Actual mailbox rules that are moving items based on their workflow.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Rule Body
title: Suspicious Inbox Manipulation Rules
id: ceb55fd0-726e-4656-bf4e-b585b7f7d572
status: test
description: Detects suspicious rules that delete or move messages or folders are set on a user's inbox.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#suspicious-inbox-manipulation-rules
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1140
logsource:
product: azure
service: riskdetection
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'mcasSuspiciousInboxManipulationRules'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Actual mailbox rules that are moving items based on their workflow.
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
riskEventType: 'mcasSuspiciousInboxManipulationRules'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
riskEventType | eq |
| field:"azure_ad::risk_event_types" kind:eq value:"mcasSuspiciousInboxManipulationRules" |
Suspicious Nohup Execution
#Detects execution of binaries located in potentially suspicious locations via "nohup"
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | No specific technique |
Telemetry Coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Linux | Event ID 1: Process Create |
Rule Body
title: Suspicious Nohup Execution
id: 457df417-8b9d-4912-85f3-9dbda39c3645
related:
- id: e4ffe466-6ff8-48d4-94bd-e32d1a6061e2
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects execution of binaries located in potentially suspicious locations via "nohup"
references:
- https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2023/05/gobrat.html
- https://jstnk9.github.io/jstnk9/research/GobRAT-Malware/
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/60bcd645450e4c846238cf0e7226dc40c84c96eba99f6b2cffcd0ab4a391c8b3/detection
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3e44c807a25a56f4068b5b8186eee5002eed6f26d665a8b791c472ad154585d1/detection
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-06-02
tags:
- attack.execution
logsource:
product: linux
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/nohup'
CommandLine|contains: '/tmp/'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
Image|endswith: '/nohup'
CommandLine|contains: '/tmp/'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match value:"/tmp/" |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"/nohup" |
Suspicious Process Discovery With Get-Process
#Get the processes that are running on the local computer.
Known False Positives
- Legitimate PowerShell scripts
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Discovery |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| PowerShell | Event ID 4104: Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
Rule Body
title: Suspicious Process Discovery With Get-Process
id: af4c87ce-bdda-4215-b998-15220772e993
status: test
description: Get the processes that are running on the local computer.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1057/T1057.md#atomic-test-3---process-discovery---get-process
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-process?view=powershell-7.4
author: frack113
date: 2022-03-17
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1057
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection:
ScriptBlockText|contains: Get-Process
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: low
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
ScriptBlockText|contains: Get-Process
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
ScriptBlockText | match |
| field:"ScriptBlockText" kind:match value:"Get-Process" |
System Information Discovery Using System_Profiler
#Detects the execution of "system_profiler" with specific "Data Types" that have been seen being used by threat actors and malware. It provides system hardware and software configuration information. This process is primarily used for system information discovery. However, "system_profiler" can also be used to determine if virtualization software is being run for defense evasion purposes.
Known False Positives
- Legitimate administrative activities
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
Telemetry Coverage
Rule Body
title: System Information Discovery Using System_Profiler
id: 4809c683-059b-4935-879d-36835986f8cf
status: test
description: |
Detects the execution of "system_profiler" with specific "Data Types" that have been seen being used by threat actors and malware. It provides system hardware and software configuration information.
This process is primarily used for system information discovery. However, "system_profiler" can also be used to determine if virtualization software is being run for defense evasion purposes.
references:
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_za/research/20/k/new-macos-backdoor-connected-to-oceanlotus-surfaces.html
- https://www.sentinelone.com/wp-content/uploads/pdf-gen/1630910064/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware.pdf
- https://ss64.com/mac/system_profiler.html
- https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x62.html
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/04/09/oceanlotus-macos-malware-update/
- https://gist.github.com/nasbench/9a1ba4bc7094ea1b47bc42bf172961af
author: Stephen Lincoln `@slincoln_aiq` (AttackIQ)
date: 2024-01-02
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1497.001
logsource:
product: macos
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '/system_profiler'
- CommandLine|contains: 'system_profiler'
selection_cmd:
# Note: This list is based on CTI reporting. Threat actors might use other data types. Please refere to https://gist.github.com/nasbench/9a1ba4bc7094ea1b47bc42bf172961af for a full list
CommandLine|contains:
- 'SPApplicationsDataType'
- 'SPHardwareDataType'
- 'SPNetworkDataType'
- 'SPUSBDataType'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative activities
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
all of selection_*Stage 1: selection_img
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '/system_profiler'
- CommandLine|contains: 'system_profiler'
Stage 2: selection_cmd
selection_cmd:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'SPApplicationsDataType'
- 'SPHardwareDataType'
- 'SPNetworkDataType'
- 'SPUSBDataType'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"/system_profiler" |
System Network Connections Discovery - Linux
#Detects usage of system utilities to discover system network connections
Known False Positives
- Legitimate activities
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Discovery |
Telemetry Coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Linux | Event ID 1: Process Create |
Rule Body
title: System Network Connections Discovery - Linux
id: 4c519226-f0cd-4471-bd2f-6fbb2bb68a79
status: test
description: Detects usage of system utilities to discover system network connections
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1049/T1049.md
author: Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-19
modified: 2023-01-17
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1049
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '/who'
- '/w'
- '/last'
- '/lsof'
- '/netstat'
filter_landscape_sysinfo:
ParentCommandLine|contains: '/usr/bin/landscape-sysinfo'
Image|endswith: '/who'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate activities
level: low
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not 1 of filter_*Stage 1: selection
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '/who'
- '/w'
- '/last'
- '/lsof'
- '/netstat'
Stage 2: not filter_landscape_sysinfo
filter_landscape_sysinfo:
ParentCommandLine|contains: '/usr/bin/landscape-sysinfo'
Image|endswith: '/who'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | ends_with | /who | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"/who" |
ParentCommandLine | match | /usr/bin/landscape-sysinfo | excludes:ParentCommandLine field:"ParentCommandLine" value:"/usr/bin/landscape-sysinfo" |
Uncommon Child Process Of Appvlp.EXE
#Detects uncommon child processes of Appvlp.EXE Appvlp or the Application Virtualization Utility is included with Microsoft Office. Attackers are able to abuse "AppVLP" to execute shell commands. Normally, this binary is used for Application Virtualization, but it can also be abused to circumvent the ASR file path rule folder or to mark a file as a system file.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule Body
title: Uncommon Child Process Of Appvlp.EXE
id: 9c7e131a-0f2c-4ae0-9d43-b04f4e266d43
status: test
description: |
Detects uncommon child processes of Appvlp.EXE
Appvlp or the Application Virtualization Utility is included with Microsoft Office. Attackers are able to abuse "AppVLP" to execute shell commands.
Normally, this binary is used for Application Virtualization, but it can also be abused to circumvent the ASR file path rule folder
or to mark a file as a system file.
references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Appvlp/
author: Sreeman
date: 2020-03-13
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
- attack.execution
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\appvlp.exe'
# Note: Filters based on data from EchoTrail: https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/appvlp.exe/
filter_main_generic:
Image|endswith:
- ':\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe'
- ':\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe'
filter_optional_office_msoasb:
Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office'
Image|endswith: '\msoasb.exe'
filter_optional_office_skype:
Image|contains|all:
- ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office'
- '\SkypeSrv\'
Image|endswith: '\SKYPESERVER.EXE'
filter_optional_office_msouc:
Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office'
Image|endswith: '\MSOUC.EXE'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*Stage 1: selection
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\appvlp.exe'
Stage 2: not filter_main_generic
filter_main_generic:
Image|endswith:
- ':\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe'
- ':\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe'
Stage 3: not filter_optional_*
filter_optional_office_msoasb:
Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office'
Image|endswith: '\msoasb.exe'
filter_optional_office_skype:
Image|contains|all:
- ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office'
- '\SkypeSrv\'
Image|endswith: '\SKYPESERVER.EXE'
filter_optional_office_msouc:
Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office'
Image|endswith: '\MSOUC.EXE'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
ParentImage | ends_with |
| field:"ParentImage" kind:ends_with value:"\appvlp.exe" |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | ends_with | :\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:":\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe" |
Image | ends_with | :\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:":\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe" |
Image | ends_with | \MSOUC.EXE | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\MSOUC.EXE" |
Image | match | :\Program Files\Microsoft Office | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:":\Program Files\Microsoft Office" |
Image | ends_with | \SKYPESERVER.EXE | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\SKYPESERVER.EXE" |
Image | match | \SkypeSrv\ | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\SkypeSrv\" |
Image | ends_with | \msoasb.exe | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\msoasb.exe" |