Detection rules › Sigma

Sigma rules: 1o

RuleSeverity
Access To Crypto Currency Wallets By Uncommon Applicationsmedium
Antivirus - APT Malware Signaturecritical
APT PRIVATELOG Image Load Patternhigh
BITS Transfer Job Download To Potential Suspicious Folderhigh
CMSTP App Paths Registry Key Modificationhigh
Creation of WerFault.exe/Wer.dll in Unusual Foldermedium
Cred Dump Tools Dropped Fileshigh
CVE-2022-24527 Microsoft Connected Cache LPEhigh
Disable Important Scheduled Taskhigh
Disable Privacy Settings Experience in Registrymedium
DllUnregisterServer Function Call Via Msiexec.EXEmedium
Exchange transport agent injection via configuration filehigh
Exploiting SetupComplete.cmd CVE-2019-1378high
F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API Command Execution - Proxymedium
Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - Powershellhigh
Java Payload Stringshigh
Kerberos TGS ticket request related to a potential Golden tickethigh
Local group enumeration triggered by Azure Virtual machine recovery toolhigh
Malicious Base64 Encoded PowerShell Keywords in Command Lineshigh
Network Connection Initiated To Cloudflared Tunnels Domainsmedium
Number Of Resource Creation Or Deployment Activitiesmedium
Potential Active Directory Enumeration Using AD Module - PsModulemedium
Potential COM Object Hijacking Via TreatAs Subkey - Registrymedium
Potential Defense Evasion Activity Via Emoji Usage In CommandLine - 1high
PwnDrp Accesscritical
Rare Remote Thread Creation By Uncommon Source Imagehigh
Remote Event Log Reconhigh
Roles Assigned Outside PIMhigh
Rundll32.EXE Calling DllRegisterServer Export Function Explicitlymedium
Scheduled Task Executing Payload from Registrymedium
Service abuse with malicious ImagePath (service)high
Suspicious FromBase64String Usage On Gzip Archive - Process Creationmedium
Suspicious Inbox Manipulation Ruleshigh
Suspicious Nohup Executionhigh
Suspicious Process Discovery With Get-Processlow
System Information Discovery Using System_Profilermedium
System Network Connections Discovery - Linuxlow
Uncommon Child Process Of Appvlp.EXEmedium

Access To Crypto Currency Wallets By Uncommon Applications

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects file access requests to crypto currency files by uncommon processes. Could indicate potential attempt of crypto currency wallet stealing.

Known False Positives

  • Antivirus, Anti-Spyware, Anti-Malware Software
  • Backup software
  • Legitimate software installed on partitions other than "C:\"
  • Searching software such as "everything.exe"

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Credential Access

Rule Body

title: Access To Crypto Currency Wallets By Uncommon Applications
id: f41b0311-44f9-44f0-816d-dd45e39d4bc8
status: test
description: |
    Detects file access requests to crypto currency files by uncommon processes.
    Could indicate potential attempt of crypto currency wallet stealing.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-07-29
tags:
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: file_access
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File ETW provider'
detection:
    selection:
        - FileName|contains:
              - '\AppData\Roaming\Ethereum\keystore\'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\EthereumClassic\keystore\'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\monero\wallets\'
        - FileName|endswith:
              - '\AppData\Roaming\Bitcoin\wallet.dat'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\BitcoinABC\wallet.dat'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\BitcoinSV\wallet.dat'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\DashCore\wallet.dat'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\DogeCoin\wallet.dat'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\Litecoin\wallet.dat'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\Ripple\wallet.dat'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\Zcash\wallet.dat'
    filter_main_system:
        Image: System
    filter_main_generic:
        # This filter is added to avoid large amount of FP with 3rd party software. You should remove this in favour of specific filter per-application
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
            - 'C:\Windows\system32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
    filter_optional_defender:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\MpCopyAccelerator.exe'
            - '\MsMpEng.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Antivirus, Anti-Spyware, Anti-Malware Software
    - Backup software
    - Legitimate software installed on partitions other than "C:\"
    - Searching software such as "everything.exe"
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    - FileName|contains:
          - '\AppData\Roaming\Ethereum\keystore\'
          - '\AppData\Roaming\EthereumClassic\keystore\'
          - '\AppData\Roaming\monero\wallets\'
    - FileName|endswith:
          - '\AppData\Roaming\Bitcoin\wallet.dat'
          - '\AppData\Roaming\BitcoinABC\wallet.dat'
          - '\AppData\Roaming\BitcoinSV\wallet.dat'
          - '\AppData\Roaming\DashCore\wallet.dat'
          - '\AppData\Roaming\DogeCoin\wallet.dat'
          - '\AppData\Roaming\Litecoin\wallet.dat'
          - '\AppData\Roaming\Ripple\wallet.dat'
          - '\AppData\Roaming\Zcash\wallet.dat'

Stage 2: not filter_main_*

filter_main_system:
    Image: System
filter_main_generic:
    Image|startswith:
        - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
        - 'C:\Program Files\'
        - 'C:\Windows\system32\'
        - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'

Stage 3: not filter_optional_defender

filter_optional_defender:
    Image|startswith: 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
    Image|endswith:
        - '\MpCopyAccelerator.exe'
        - '\MsMpEng.exe'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
FileNameends_with
  • \AppData\Roaming\BitcoinABC\wallet.dat
  • \AppData\Roaming\BitcoinSV\wallet.dat
  • \AppData\Roaming\Bitcoin\wallet.dat
  • \AppData\Roaming\DashCore\wallet.dat
  • \AppData\Roaming\DogeCoin\wallet.dat
  • \AppData\Roaming\Litecoin\wallet.dat
  • \AppData\Roaming\Ripple\wallet.dat
  • \AppData\Roaming\Zcash\wallet.dat
field:"file_name" kind:ends_with
FileNamematch
  • \AppData\Roaming\EthereumClassic\keystore\
  • \AppData\Roaming\Ethereum\keystore\
  • \AppData\Roaming\monero\wallets\
field:"file_name" kind:match

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
ImageeqSystemexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"System"
Imagestarts_withC:\Program Files (x86)\excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Program Files (x86)\"
Imagestarts_withC:\Program Files\excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Program Files\"
Imagestarts_withC:\Windows\SysWOW64\excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\"
Imagestarts_withC:\Windows\system32\excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\system32\"
Imageends_with\MpCopyAccelerator.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\MpCopyAccelerator.exe"
Imageends_with\MsMpEng.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\MsMpEng.exe"
Imagestarts_withC:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\"

Antivirus - APT Malware Signature

#
Status
experimental
Severity
critical
Author
Arnim Rupp (Nextron Systems)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports APT malware. This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.

Known False Positives

  • Unlikely

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Rule Body

title: Antivirus - APT Malware Signature
id: 101a1877-2cf4-474d-abfd-7f6ac4788d1a
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports APT malware.
    This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
author: Arnim Rupp (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-06-15
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    category: antivirus
detection:
    selection:
        - Signature|re:
              - 'APT\d'
              - 'ATK\d'
              - 'UNC\d'
              - 'UAC\d'
        - Signature|contains:
              - "[APT]"
              - 'APT_'
              - 'APT-'
              - 'BackOrder'
              - 'BlindingCan'
              - 'Blizzard'
              - 'Chollima'
              - 'Cleaver'
              - 'Cobra'
              - 'DarkHotel'
              - 'Dragon'
              - 'DTrack'
              - 'Equation'
              - 'GiftedCrook'
              - 'GraphSteel'
              - 'GreyEnergy'
              - 'GEnergy'
              - 'GrimPlant'
              - 'Hydra'
              - 'Jackal'
              - 'Kitten'
              - 'Kimsuky'
              - 'Lazar'  # Lazarus
              - 'LightRail'
              - 'Lotus'
              - 'Luminous'
              - 'LumiMoth'
              - 'Nimbus'
              - 'Manticore'
              - 'MiniBike'
              - 'MiniBrowse'
              - 'MiniBus'
              - 'MiniFast'
              - 'MiniJuke'
              - 'MiniUpdate'
              - 'MuddyWater'
              - 'NukeSped'
              - 'OilRig'
              - 'Panda'
              - 'Sandstorm'
              - 'SandWorm'
              - 'Seamonkey'
              - 'Sleet'
              - 'SlugResin'
              - 'SnailResin'
              - 'Snake'
              - 'Tempest'
              - 'Tsunami'
              - 'Turla'
              - 'Typhoon'
              - 'UAC_'
              - 'UAC-'
              - 'UNC_'
              - 'UNC-'
              - 'VinoSiren'
              - 'Winnti'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    - Signature|re:
          - 'APT\d'
          - 'ATK\d'
          - 'UNC\d'
          - 'UAC\d'
    - Signature|contains:
          - "[APT]"
          - 'APT_'
          - 'APT-'
          - 'BackOrder'
          - 'BlindingCan'
          - 'Blizzard'
          - 'Chollima'
          - 'Cleaver'
          - 'Cobra'
          - 'DarkHotel'
          - 'Dragon'
          - 'DTrack'
          - 'Equation'
          - 'GiftedCrook'
          - 'GraphSteel'
          - 'GreyEnergy'
          - 'GEnergy'
          - 'GrimPlant'
          - 'Hydra'
          - 'Jackal'
          - 'Kitten'
          - 'Kimsuky'
          - 'Lazar'
          - 'LightRail'
          - 'Lotus'
          - 'Luminous'
          - 'LumiMoth'
          - 'Nimbus'
          - 'Manticore'
          - 'MiniBike'
          - 'MiniBrowse'
          - 'MiniBus'
          - 'MiniFast'
          - 'MiniJuke'
          - 'MiniUpdate'
          - 'MuddyWater'
          - 'NukeSped'
          - 'OilRig'
          - 'Panda'
          - 'Sandstorm'
          - 'SandWorm'
          - 'Seamonkey'
          - 'Sleet'
          - 'SlugResin'
          - 'SnailResin'
          - 'Snake'
          - 'Tempest'
          - 'Tsunami'
          - 'Turla'
          - 'Typhoon'
          - 'UAC_'
          - 'UAC-'
          - 'UNC_'
          - 'UNC-'
          - 'VinoSiren'
          - 'Winnti'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Signaturematch
  • APT-
  • APT_
  • BackOrder
  • BlindingCan
  • Blizzard
  • Chollima
  • Cleaver
  • Cobra corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • DTrack
  • DarkHotel
  • Dragon
  • Equation
  • GEnergy
  • GiftedCrook
  • GraphSteel
  • GreyEnergy
  • GrimPlant
  • Hydra
  • Jackal
  • Kimsuky
  • Kitten
  • Lazar
  • LightRail
  • Lotus
  • LumiMoth
  • Luminous
  • Manticore
  • MiniBike
  • MiniBrowse
  • MiniBus
  • MiniFast
  • MiniJuke
  • MiniUpdate
  • MuddyWater
  • Nimbus
  • NukeSped
  • OilRig
  • Panda
  • SandWorm
  • Sandstorm
  • Seamonkey
  • Sleet
  • SlugResin
  • SnailResin
  • Snake
  • Tempest
  • Tsunami
  • Turla
  • Typhoon
  • UAC-
  • UAC_
  • UNC-
  • UNC_
  • VinoSiren
  • Winnti
  • [APT]
field:"Signature" kind:match
Signatureregex_match
  • APT\d
  • ATK\d
  • UAC\d
  • UNC\d
field:"Signature" kind:regex_match

APT PRIVATELOG Image Load Pattern

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects an image load pattern as seen when a tool named PRIVATELOG is used and rarely observed under legitimate circumstances

Known False Positives

  • Rarely observed

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Privilege Escalation
Stealth

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 7: Image loaded

Rule Body

title: APT PRIVATELOG Image Load Pattern
id: 33a2d1dd-f3b0-40bd-8baf-7974468927cc
status: test
description: Detects an image load pattern as seen when a tool named PRIVATELOG is used and rarely observed under legitimate circumstances
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20210901184449/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/09/unknown-actor-using-clfs-log-files-for-stealth.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-09-07
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\clfsw32.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rarely observed
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
    ImageLoaded|endswith: '\clfsw32.dll'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Imageends_with
  • \svchost.exe corpus 22 (sigma 22)
field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\svchost.exe"
ImageLoadedends_with
  • \clfsw32.dll
field:"ImageLoaded" kind:ends_with value:"\clfsw32.dll"

BITS Transfer Job Download To Potential Suspicious Folder

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects new BITS transfer job where the LocalName/Saved file is stored in a potentially suspicious location

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Execution
Persistence
Stealth

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
Bits-ClientEvent ID 16403: task_016403

Rule Body

title: BITS Transfer Job Download To Potential Suspicious Folder
id: f8a56cb7-a363-44ed-a82f-5926bb44cd05
status: test
description: Detects new BITS transfer job where the LocalName/Saved file is stored in a potentially suspicious location
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-28
modified: 2023-03-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1197
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: bits-client
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 16403
        LocalName|contains:
            # TODO: Add more interesting suspicious paths
            - '\Desktop\'
            - 'C:\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\PerfLogs\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    EventID: 16403
    LocalName|contains:
        - '\Desktop\'
        - 'C:\Users\Public\'
        - 'C:\PerfLogs\'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
LocalNamematch
  • C:\PerfLogs\
  • C:\Users\Public\
  • \Desktop\
field:"LocalName" kind:match

CMSTP App Paths Registry Key Modification

#
Status
stable
Severity
high
Author
Nik Seetharaman
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects modifications to the CMSTP App Paths registry key. This may indicate abuse of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP) for arbitrary code execution or UAC bypass.

Known False Positives

  • Legitimate CMSTP use (unlikely in modern enterprise environments)

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: CMSTP App Paths Registry Key Modification
id: b6d235fc-1d38-4b12-adbe-325f06728f37
status: stable
description: |
    Detects modifications to the CMSTP App Paths registry key. This may indicate abuse of
    Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP) for arbitrary code execution or UAC bypass.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Cmstp/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20190720093911/http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20190722224110/https://oddvar.moe/2017/08/15/research-on-cmstp-exe/
author: Nik Seetharaman
date: 2018-07-16
modified: 2026-08-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.003
    - attack.g0069
    - car.2019-04-001
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\cmmgr32.exe\'
    filter_main_cmcfg32:
        TargetObject|endswith: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\cmmgr32.exe\CmstpExtensionDll'
        Details:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\cmcfg32.dll'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmcfg32.dll'
    filter_main_empty:
        Details: '(Empty)'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate CMSTP use (unlikely in modern enterprise environments)
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection and not 1 of filter_main_*

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    TargetObject|contains: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\cmmgr32.exe\'

Stage 2: not filter_main_*

filter_main_cmcfg32:
    TargetObject|endswith: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\cmmgr32.exe\CmstpExtensionDll'
    Details:
        - 'C:\Windows\System32\cmcfg32.dll'
        - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmcfg32.dll'
filter_main_empty:
    Details: '(Empty)'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
TargetObjectmatch
  • SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\cmmgr32.exe\
field:"TargetObject" kind:match value:"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\cmmgr32.exe\"

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
DetailseqC:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmcfg32.dllexcludes:Details field:"Details" value:"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmcfg32.dll"
DetailseqC:\Windows\System32\cmcfg32.dllexcludes:Details field:"Details" value:"C:\Windows\System32\cmcfg32.dll"
TargetObjectends_withSOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\cmmgr32.exe\CmstpExtensionDllexcludes:TargetObject field:"TargetObject" value:"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\cmmgr32.exe\CmstpExtensionDll"
Detailseq(Empty)excludes:Details field:"Details" value:"(Empty)"

Creation of WerFault.exe/Wer.dll in Unusual Folder

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
frack113
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects the creation of a file named "WerFault.exe" or "wer.dll" in an uncommon folder, which could be a sign of WerFault DLL hijacking.

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 11: FileCreate

Rule Body

title: Creation of WerFault.exe/Wer.dll in Unusual Folder
id: 28a452f3-786c-4fd8-b8f2-bddbe9d616d1
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a file named "WerFault.exe" or "wer.dll" in an uncommon folder, which could be a sign of WerFault DLL hijacking.
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-are-now-hiding-malware-in-windows-event-logs/
author: frack113
date: 2022-05-09
modified: 2026-05-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\WerFault.exe'
            - '\wer.dll'
    filter_main_known_locations:
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
            - 'C:\Windows\UUS\' # covers both C:\Windows\UUS\arm64\ and C:\Windows\UUS\packages\
    filter_main_process:
        Image|endswith: '\wuaucltcore.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection and not 1 of filter_main_*

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    TargetFilename|endswith:
        - '\WerFault.exe'
        - '\wer.dll'

Stage 2: not filter_main_*

filter_main_known_locations:
    TargetFilename|startswith:
        - 'C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\'
        - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
        - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
        - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
        - 'C:\Windows\UUS\'
filter_main_process:
    Image|endswith: '\wuaucltcore.exe'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
TargetFilenameends_with
  • \WerFault.exe corpus 3 (sigma 3)
  • \wer.dll
field:"TargetFilename" kind:ends_with

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
Imageends_with\wuaucltcore.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\wuaucltcore.exe"
TargetFilenamestarts_withC:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\excludes:TargetFilename field:"TargetFilename" value:"C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\"
TargetFilenamestarts_withC:\Windows\SysWOW64\excludes:TargetFilename field:"TargetFilename" value:"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\"
TargetFilenamestarts_withC:\Windows\System32\excludes:TargetFilename field:"TargetFilename" value:"C:\Windows\System32\"
TargetFilenamestarts_withC:\Windows\UUS\excludes:TargetFilename field:"TargetFilename" value:"C:\Windows\UUS\"
TargetFilenamestarts_withC:\Windows\WinSxS\excludes:TargetFilename field:"TargetFilename" value:"C:\Windows\WinSxS\"

Cred Dump Tools Dropped Files

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Files with well-known filenames (parts of credential dump software or files produced by them) creation

Known False Positives

  • Legitimate Administrator using tool for password recovery

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 11: FileCreate

Rule Body

title: Cred Dump Tools Dropped Files
id: 8fbf3271-1ef6-4e94-8210-03c2317947f6
status: test
description: Files with well-known filenames (parts of credential dump software or files produced by them) creation
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
date: 2019-11-01
modified: 2025-10-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.003
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.005
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - TargetFilename|contains:
              - '\fgdump-log'
              - '\kirbi'
              - '\pwdump'
              - '\pwhashes'
              - '\wce_ccache'
              - '\wce_krbtkts'
        - TargetFilename|endswith:
              - '\cachedump.exe'
              - '\cachedump64.exe'
              - '\DumpExt.dll'
              - '\DumpSvc.exe'
              - '\Dumpy.exe'
              - '\fgexec.exe'
              - '\lsremora.dll'
              - '\lsremora64.dll'
              - '\NTDS.out'
              - '\procdump.exe'
              - '\procdump64.exe'
              - '\procdump64a.exe'
              - '\pstgdump.exe'
              - '\pwdump.exe'
              - '\SAM.out'
              - '\SECURITY.out'
              - '\servpw.exe'
              - '\servpw64.exe'
              - '\SYSTEM.out'
              - '\test.pwd'
              - '\wceaux.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Administrator using tool for password recovery
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_cred_dump_tools_dropped_files/info.yml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    - TargetFilename|contains:
          - '\fgdump-log'
          - '\kirbi'
          - '\pwdump'
          - '\pwhashes'
          - '\wce_ccache'
          - '\wce_krbtkts'
    - TargetFilename|endswith:
          - '\cachedump.exe'
          - '\cachedump64.exe'
          - '\DumpExt.dll'
          - '\DumpSvc.exe'
          - '\Dumpy.exe'
          - '\fgexec.exe'
          - '\lsremora.dll'
          - '\lsremora64.dll'
          - '\NTDS.out'
          - '\procdump.exe'
          - '\procdump64.exe'
          - '\procdump64a.exe'
          - '\pstgdump.exe'
          - '\pwdump.exe'
          - '\SAM.out'
          - '\SECURITY.out'
          - '\servpw.exe'
          - '\servpw64.exe'
          - '\SYSTEM.out'
          - '\test.pwd'
          - '\wceaux.dll'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
TargetFilenameends_with
  • \DumpExt.dll
  • \DumpSvc.exe
  • \Dumpy.exe
  • \NTDS.out
  • \SAM.out
  • \SECURITY.out
  • \SYSTEM.out
  • \cachedump.exe
  • \cachedump64.exe
  • \fgexec.exe
  • \lsremora.dll
  • \lsremora64.dll
  • \procdump.exe
  • \procdump64.exe
  • \procdump64a.exe
  • \pstgdump.exe
  • \pwdump.exe
  • \servpw.exe
  • \servpw64.exe
  • \test.pwd
  • \wceaux.dll
field:"TargetFilename" kind:ends_with
TargetFilenamematch
  • \fgdump-log
  • \kirbi
  • \pwdump
  • \pwhashes
  • \wce_ccache
  • \wce_krbtkts
field:"TargetFilename" kind:match

CVE-2022-24527 Microsoft Connected Cache LPE

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects files created during the local privilege exploitation of CVE-2022-24527 Microsoft Connected Cache

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 11: FileCreate

Rule Body

title: CVE-2022-24527 Microsoft Connected Cache LPE
id: e0a41412-c69a-446f-8e6e-0e6d7483dad7
status: test
description: Detects files created during the local privilege exploitation of CVE-2022-24527 Microsoft Connected Cache
references:
    - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/04/12/cve-2022-24527-microsoft-connected-cache-local-privilege-escalation-fixed/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-13
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1059.001
    - cve.2022-24527
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: 'WindowsPowerShell\Modules\webAdministration\webAdministration.psm1'
    filter:
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection and not filter

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    TargetFilename|endswith: 'WindowsPowerShell\Modules\webAdministration\webAdministration.psm1'

Stage 2: not filter

filter:
    User|contains:
        - 'AUTHORI'
        - 'AUTORI'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
TargetFilenameends_with
  • WindowsPowerShell\Modules\webAdministration\webAdministration.psm1
field:"TargetFilename" kind:ends_with value:"WindowsPowerShell\Modules\webAdministration\webAdministration.psm1"

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
UsermatchAUTHORIexcludes:User field:"User" value:"AUTHORI"
UsermatchAUTORIexcludes:User field:"User" value:"AUTORI"

Disable Important Scheduled Task

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by disabling their respective scheduled tasks in order to conduct data destructive activities

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Impact

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule Body

title: Disable Important Scheduled Task
id: 9ac94dc8-9042-493c-ba45-3b5e7c86b980
related:
    - id: 7595ba94-cf3b-4471-aa03-4f6baa9e5fad # Security-Audting Eventlog
      type: similar
    - id: 9e3cb244-bdb8-4632-8c90-6079c8f4f16d # TaskScheduler EventLog
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by disabling their respective scheduled tasks in order to conduct data destructive activities
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-8---windows---disable-the-sr-scheduled-task
    - https://twitter.com/MichalKoczwara/status/1553634816016498688
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior
date: 2021-12-26
modified: 2026-03-11
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1489
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    selection_cli_disable:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '/disable'
    selection_cli_task:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more important tasks
            - '\Windows\BitLocker'
            - '\Windows\ExploitGuard'
            - '\Windows\ExploitGuard\ExploitGuard MDM policy Refresh'
            - '\Windows\SystemRestore\SR'
            - '\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\'
            - '\Windows\Windows Defender\'
            - '\Windows\WindowsBackup\'
            - '\Windows\WindowsUpdate\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_disable/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Windows - Disable the SR scheduled task
      technique: T1490
      atomic_guid: 1c68c68d-83a4-4981-974e-8993055fa034

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

all of selection_*

Stage 1: selection_img

selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
    - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'

Stage 2: selection_cli_disable

selection_cli_disable:
    CommandLine|contains|windash: '/disable'

Stage 3: selection_cli_task

selection_cli_task:
    CommandLine|contains:
        - '\Windows\BitLocker'
        - '\Windows\ExploitGuard'
        - '\Windows\ExploitGuard\ExploitGuard MDM policy Refresh'
        - '\Windows\SystemRestore\SR'
        - '\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\'
        - '\Windows\Windows Defender\'
        - '\Windows\WindowsBackup\'
        - '\Windows\WindowsUpdate\'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • -disable corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • /disable corpus 3 (sigma 2, splunk 1)
  • \Windows\BitLocker corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • \Windows\ExploitGuard corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • \Windows\ExploitGuard\ExploitGuard MDM policy Refresh
  • \Windows\SystemRestore\SR corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • \Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\ corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • \Windows\Windows Defender\ corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • \Windows\WindowsBackup\ corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • \Windows\WindowsUpdate\ corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • –disable corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • —disable corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • ―disable corpus 2 (sigma 2)
field:"CommandLine" kind:match
Imageends_with
  • \schtasks.exe corpus 55 (sigma 55)
field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\schtasks.exe"
OriginalFileNameeq
  • schtasks.exe corpus 29 (sigma 18, elastic 7, splunk 4)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"schtasks.exe"

Disable Privacy Settings Experience in Registry

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
frack113
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects registry modifications that disable Privacy Settings Experience

Known False Positives

  • Legitimate admin script

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Defense Impairment

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Disable Privacy Settings Experience in Registry
id: 0372e1f9-0fd2-40f7-be1b-a7b2b848fa7b
status: test
description: Detects registry modifications that disable Privacy Settings Experience
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/9e5b12c4912c07562aec7500447b11fa3e17e254/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
author: frack113
date: 2022-10-02
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE\DisablePrivacyExperience'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin script
level: medium
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: LockBit Black - Disable Privacy Settings Experience Using Registry -cmd
      technique: T1685
      atomic_guid: d6d22332-d07d-498f-aea0-6139ecb7850e
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: LockBit Black - Disable Privacy Settings Experience Using Registry -Powershell
      technique: T1685
      atomic_guid: d8c57eaa-497a-4a08-961e-bd5efd7c9374

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    TargetObject|endswith: '\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE\DisablePrivacyExperience'
    Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Detailseq
  • DWORD (0x00000000) corpus 36 (sigma 36)
field:"Details" kind:eq value:"DWORD (0x00000000)"
TargetObjectends_with
  • \SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE\DisablePrivacyExperience
field:"TargetObject" kind:ends_with value:"\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE\DisablePrivacyExperience"

DllUnregisterServer Function Call Via Msiexec.EXE

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
frack113
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects MsiExec loading a DLL and calling its DllUnregisterServer function

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule Body

title: DllUnregisterServer Function Call Via Msiexec.EXE
id: 84f52741-8834-4a8c-a413-2eb2269aa6c8
status: test
description: Detects MsiExec loading a DLL and calling its DllUnregisterServer function
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msiexec/
    - https://twitter.com/_st0pp3r_/status/1583914515996897281
author: frack113
date: 2022-04-24
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.007
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: '\msiexec.exe'
    selection_flag:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -z '
    selection_dll:
        CommandLine|contains: '.dll'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msiexec_dll/info.yml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

all of selection_*

Stage 1: selection_img

selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
    - OriginalFileName: '\msiexec.exe'

Stage 2: selection_flag

selection_flag:
    CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -z '

Stage 3: selection_dll

selection_dll:
    CommandLine|contains: '.dll'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • -z
  • /z
  • –z
  • —z
  • ―z
  • .dll corpus 16 (sigma 16)
field:"CommandLine" kind:match
Imageends_with
  • \msiexec.exe corpus 20 (sigma 20)
field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\msiexec.exe"
OriginalFileNameeq
  • \msiexec.exe corpus 2 (sigma 2)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"\msiexec.exe"

Exchange transport agent injection via configuration file

#
Status
experimental
Severity
high
Author
mdecrevoisier
Source
github.com/mdecrevoisier/SIGMA-detection-rules

Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to load an artifact in the Exchange transport agent.

Known False Positives

  • rare administrator change

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 11: FileCreate

Rule Body

title: Exchange transport agent injection via configuration file
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to load an artifact in the Exchange transport agent.
requirements: |
 requires to update SYSMON configuration to include the transport agent path (eg: '<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Exchange2016\TransportRoles\Shared</TargetFilename>')
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1505-Server%20Software%20Component
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ESET-LightNeuron.pdf
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1505.002 # Server Software Component: Transport Agent 
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: file_event # Event ID 11
detection:
  selection:
    TargetFilename|endswith: '\TransportRoles\Shared\agents.config'
  filter:
    Image: '\ExchangeSetup\ExSetupUI.exe' # Exchange installer / updater
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- rare administrator change
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection and not filter

Stage 1: selection

selection:
  TargetFilename|endswith: '\TransportRoles\Shared\agents.config'

Stage 2: not filter

filter:
  Image: '\ExchangeSetup\ExSetupUI.exe'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
TargetFilenameends_with
  • \TransportRoles\Shared\agents.config
field:"TargetFilename" kind:ends_with value:"\TransportRoles\Shared\agents.config"

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
Imageeq\ExchangeSetup\ExSetupUI.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\ExchangeSetup\ExSetupUI.exe"

Exploiting SetupComplete.cmd CVE-2019-1378

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects exploitation attempt of privilege escalation vulnerability via SetupComplete.cmd and PartnerSetupComplete.cmd described in CVE-2019-1378

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule Body

title: Exploiting SetupComplete.cmd CVE-2019-1378
id: 1c373b6d-76ce-4553-997d-8c1da9a6b5f5
status: test
description: Detects exploitation attempt of privilege escalation vulnerability via SetupComplete.cmd and PartnerSetupComplete.cmd described in CVE-2019-1378
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200530031708/https://www.embercybersecurity.com/blog/cve-2019-1378-exploiting-an-access-control-privilege-escalation-vulnerability-in-windows-10-update-assistant-wua
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro
date: 2019-11-15
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1574
    - cve.2019-1378
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '/c'
            - 'C:\Windows\Setup\Scripts\'
        ParentCommandLine|endswith:
            - 'SetupComplete.cmd'
            - 'PartnerSetupComplete.cmd'
    filter:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Setup\'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection and not filter

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
        - '\cmd.exe'
        - '/c'
        - 'C:\Windows\Setup\Scripts\'
    ParentCommandLine|endswith:
        - 'SetupComplete.cmd'
        - 'PartnerSetupComplete.cmd'

Stage 2: not filter

filter:
    Image|startswith:
        - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
        - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
        - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
        - 'C:\Windows\Setup\'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
ParentCommandLineends_with
  • PartnerSetupComplete.cmd
  • SetupComplete.cmd
field:"ParentCommandLine" kind:ends_with
ParentCommandLinematch
  • /c corpus 3 (sigma 3)
  • C:\Windows\Setup\Scripts\
  • \cmd.exe
field:"ParentCommandLine" kind:match

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
Imagestarts_withC:\Windows\Setup\excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\Setup\"
Imagestarts_withC:\Windows\SysWOW64\excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\"
Imagestarts_withC:\Windows\System32\excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\System32\"
Imagestarts_withC:\Windows\WinSxS\excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\Windows\WinSxS\"

F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API Command Execution - Proxy

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Thurein Oo
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects POST requests to the F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API "bash" endpoint, which allows the execution of commands on the BIG-IP

Known False Positives

  • Legitimate usage of the BIG IP REST API to execute command for administration purposes

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Initial Access

Rule Body

title: F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API Command Execution - Proxy
id: b59c98c6-95e8-4d65-93ee-f594dfb96b17
related:
    - id: 85254a62-22be-4239-b79c-2ec17e566c37
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects POST requests to the F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API "bash" endpoint, which allows the execution of commands on the BIG-IP
references:
    - https://f5-sdk.readthedocs.io/en/latest/apidoc/f5.bigip.tm.util.html#module-f5.bigip.tm.util.bash
    - https://community.f5.com/t5/technical-forum/icontrolrest-11-5-execute-bash-command/td-p/203029
    - https://community.f5.com/t5/technical-forum/running-bash-commands-via-rest-api/td-p/272516
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Thurein Oo
date: 2023-11-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        c-uri|endswith: '/mgmt/tm/util/bash'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of the BIG IP REST API to execute command for administration purposes
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    cs-method: 'POST'
    c-uri|endswith: '/mgmt/tm/util/bash'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - Powershell

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - Powershell
id: db92dd33-a3ad-49cf-8c2c-608c3e30ace0
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task29)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2024-04-15
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_4104:
        ScriptBlockText|re: '(?i)echo.*clip.*&&.*(Clipboard|i`?n`?v`?o`?k`?e`?)'
    condition: selection_4104
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection_4104

Stage 1: selection_4104

selection_4104:
    ScriptBlockText|re: '(?i)echo.*clip.*&&.*(Clipboard|i`?n`?v`?o`?k`?e`?)'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
ScriptBlockTextregex_match
  • (?i)echo.*clip.*&&.*(Clipboard|i`?n`?v`?o`?k`?e`?)
field:"ScriptBlockText" kind:regex_match value:"(?i)echo.*clip.*&&.*(Clipboard|i`?n`?v`?o`?k`?e`?)"

Java Payload Strings

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
frack113, Harjot Singh, "@cyb3rjy0t" (update)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects possible Java payloads in web access logs

Known False Positives

  • Legitimate apps

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Initial Access

Rule Body

title: Java Payload Strings
id: 583aa0a2-30b1-4d62-8bf3-ab73689efe6c
status: test
description: Detects possible Java payloads in web access logs
references:
    - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/06/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-cve-2022-26134/
    - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/09/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-server-cve-2021-26084/
    - https://github.com/httpvoid/writeups/blob/62d3751945289d088ccfdf4d0ffbf61598a2cd7d/Confluence-RCE.md
    - https://twitter.com/httpvoid0x2f/status/1532924261035384832
    - https://medium.com/geekculture/text4shell-exploit-walkthrough-ebc02a01f035
author: frack113, Harjot Singh, "@cyb3rjy0t" (update)
date: 2022-06-04
modified: 2023-01-19
tags:
    - cve.2022-26134
    - cve.2021-26084
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    keywords:
        - '%24%7B%28%23a%3D%40'
        - '${(#a=@'
        - '%24%7B%40java'
        - '${@java'
        - 'u0022java'
        - '%2F%24%7B%23'
        - '/${#'
        - 'new+java.'
        - 'getRuntime().exec('
        - 'getRuntime%28%29.exec%28'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate apps
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

keywords

Stage 1: keywords

keywords:
    - '%24%7B%28%23a%3D%40'
    - '${(#a=@'
    - '%24%7B%40java'
    - '${@java'
    - 'u0022java'
    - '%2F%24%7B%23'
    - '/${#'
    - 'new+java.'
    - 'getRuntime().exec('
    - 'getRuntime%28%29.exec%28'

Kerberos TGS ticket request related to a potential Golden ticket

#

Local group enumeration triggered by Azure Virtual machine recovery tool

#
Status
stable
Severity
high
Author
mdecrevoisier
Source
github.com/mdecrevoisier/SIGMA-detection-rules

Detects scenarios where an attacker having compromised a virtual machine via serial cable attempts to enumerate local groups.

Known False Positives

  • Virtual machine recovery by administrator

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Local group enumeration triggered by Azure Virtual machine recovery tool
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker having compromised a virtual machine via serial cable attempts to enumerate local groups.
references:
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/sim-swapping-abuse-azure-serial
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1069.001 # Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups 
author: mdecrevoisier
status: stable
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection: # C:\Packages\Plugins\Microsoft.Compute.VMAccessAgent\2.4.8\bin\JsonVMAccessExtension.exe
    EventID: 4799
    CallerProcessName|contains: 'Microsoft.Compute.VMAccessAgent'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Virtual machine recovery by administrator 
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
  EventID: 4799
  CallerProcessName|contains: 'Microsoft.Compute.VMAccessAgent'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

Malicious Base64 Encoded PowerShell Keywords in Command Lines

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
John Lambert (rule)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects base64 encoded strings used in hidden malicious PowerShell command lines

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule Body

title: Malicious Base64 Encoded PowerShell Keywords in Command Lines
id: f26c6093-6f14-4b12-800f-0fcb46f5ffd0
status: test
description: Detects base64 encoded strings used in hidden malicious PowerShell command lines
references:
    - http://www.leeholmes.com/blog/2017/09/21/searching-for-content-in-base-64-strings/
author: John Lambert (rule)
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2023-01-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_hidden:
        CommandLine|contains: ' hidden '
    selection_encoded:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'AGkAdABzAGEAZABtAGkAbgAgAC8AdAByAGEAbgBzAGYAZQByA'
            - 'aXRzYWRtaW4gL3RyYW5zZmVy'
            - 'IAaQB0AHMAYQBkAG0AaQBuACAALwB0AHIAYQBuAHMAZgBlAHIA'
            - 'JpdHNhZG1pbiAvdHJhbnNmZX'
            - 'YgBpAHQAcwBhAGQAbQBpAG4AIAAvAHQAcgBhAG4AcwBmAGUAcg'
            - 'Yml0c2FkbWluIC90cmFuc2Zlc'
            - 'AGMAaAB1AG4AawBfAHMAaQB6AGUA'
            - 'JABjAGgAdQBuAGsAXwBzAGkAegBlA'
            - 'JGNodW5rX3Npem'
            - 'QAYwBoAHUAbgBrAF8AcwBpAHoAZQ'
            - 'RjaHVua19zaXpl'
            - 'Y2h1bmtfc2l6Z'
            - 'AE8ALgBDAG8AbQBwAHIAZQBzAHMAaQBvAG4A'
            - 'kATwAuAEMAbwBtAHAAcgBlAHMAcwBpAG8Abg'
            - 'lPLkNvbXByZXNzaW9u'
            - 'SQBPAC4AQwBvAG0AcAByAGUAcwBzAGkAbwBuA'
            - 'SU8uQ29tcHJlc3Npb2'
            - 'Ty5Db21wcmVzc2lvb'
            - 'AE8ALgBNAGUAbQBvAHIAeQBTAHQAcgBlAGEAbQ'
            - 'kATwAuAE0AZQBtAG8AcgB5AFMAdAByAGUAYQBtA'
            - 'lPLk1lbW9yeVN0cmVhb'
            - 'SQBPAC4ATQBlAG0AbwByAHkAUwB0AHIAZQBhAG0A'
            - 'SU8uTWVtb3J5U3RyZWFt'
            - 'Ty5NZW1vcnlTdHJlYW'
            - '4ARwBlAHQAQwBoAHUAbgBrA'
            - '5HZXRDaHVua'
            - 'AEcAZQB0AEMAaAB1AG4Aaw'
            - 'LgBHAGUAdABDAGgAdQBuAGsA'
            - 'LkdldENodW5r'
            - 'R2V0Q2h1bm'
            - 'AEgAUgBFAEEARABfAEkATgBGAE8ANgA0A'
            - 'QASABSAEUAQQBEAF8ASQBOAEYATwA2ADQA'
            - 'RIUkVBRF9JTkZPNj'
            - 'SFJFQURfSU5GTzY0'
            - 'VABIAFIARQBBAEQAXwBJAE4ARgBPADYANA'
            - 'VEhSRUFEX0lORk82N'
            - 'AHIAZQBhAHQAZQBSAGUAbQBvAHQAZQBUAGgAcgBlAGEAZA'
            - 'cmVhdGVSZW1vdGVUaHJlYW'
            - 'MAcgBlAGEAdABlAFIAZQBtAG8AdABlAFQAaAByAGUAYQBkA'
            - 'NyZWF0ZVJlbW90ZVRocmVhZ'
            - 'Q3JlYXRlUmVtb3RlVGhyZWFk'
            - 'QwByAGUAYQB0AGUAUgBlAG0AbwB0AGUAVABoAHIAZQBhAGQA'
            - '0AZQBtAG0AbwB2AGUA'
            - '1lbW1vdm'
            - 'AGUAbQBtAG8AdgBlA'
            - 'bQBlAG0AbQBvAHYAZQ'
            - 'bWVtbW92Z'
            - 'ZW1tb3Zl'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

all of selection_*

Stage 1: selection_img

selection_img:
    - Image|endswith:
          - '\powershell.exe'
          - '\pwsh.exe'
    - OriginalFileName:
          - 'PowerShell.EXE'
          - 'pwsh.dll'

Stage 2: selection_hidden

selection_hidden:
    CommandLine|contains: ' hidden '

Stage 3: selection_encoded

selection_encoded:
    CommandLine|contains:
        - 'AGkAdABzAGEAZABtAGkAbgAgAC8AdAByAGEAbgBzAGYAZQByA'
        - 'aXRzYWRtaW4gL3RyYW5zZmVy'
        - 'IAaQB0AHMAYQBkAG0AaQBuACAALwB0AHIAYQBuAHMAZgBlAHIA'
        - 'JpdHNhZG1pbiAvdHJhbnNmZX'
        - 'YgBpAHQAcwBhAGQAbQBpAG4AIAAvAHQAcgBhAG4AcwBmAGUAcg'
        - 'Yml0c2FkbWluIC90cmFuc2Zlc'
        - 'AGMAaAB1AG4AawBfAHMAaQB6AGUA'
        - 'JABjAGgAdQBuAGsAXwBzAGkAegBlA'
        - 'JGNodW5rX3Npem'
        - 'QAYwBoAHUAbgBrAF8AcwBpAHoAZQ'
        - 'RjaHVua19zaXpl'
        - 'Y2h1bmtfc2l6Z'
        - 'AE8ALgBDAG8AbQBwAHIAZQBzAHMAaQBvAG4A'
        - 'kATwAuAEMAbwBtAHAAcgBlAHMAcwBpAG8Abg'
        - 'lPLkNvbXByZXNzaW9u'
        - 'SQBPAC4AQwBvAG0AcAByAGUAcwBzAGkAbwBuA'
        - 'SU8uQ29tcHJlc3Npb2'
        - 'Ty5Db21wcmVzc2lvb'
        - 'AE8ALgBNAGUAbQBvAHIAeQBTAHQAcgBlAGEAbQ'
        - 'kATwAuAE0AZQBtAG8AcgB5AFMAdAByAGUAYQBtA'
        - 'lPLk1lbW9yeVN0cmVhb'
        - 'SQBPAC4ATQBlAG0AbwByAHkAUwB0AHIAZQBhAG0A'
        - 'SU8uTWVtb3J5U3RyZWFt'
        - 'Ty5NZW1vcnlTdHJlYW'
        - '4ARwBlAHQAQwBoAHUAbgBrA'
        - '5HZXRDaHVua'
        - 'AEcAZQB0AEMAaAB1AG4Aaw'
        - 'LgBHAGUAdABDAGgAdQBuAGsA'
        - 'LkdldENodW5r'
        - 'R2V0Q2h1bm'
        - 'AEgAUgBFAEEARABfAEkATgBGAE8ANgA0A'
        - 'QASABSAEUAQQBEAF8ASQBOAEYATwA2ADQA'
        - 'RIUkVBRF9JTkZPNj'
        - 'SFJFQURfSU5GTzY0'
        - 'VABIAFIARQBBAEQAXwBJAE4ARgBPADYANA'
        - 'VEhSRUFEX0lORk82N'
        - 'AHIAZQBhAHQAZQBSAGUAbQBvAHQAZQBUAGgAcgBlAGEAZA'
        - 'cmVhdGVSZW1vdGVUaHJlYW'
        - 'MAcgBlAGEAdABlAFIAZQBtAG8AdABlAFQAaAByAGUAYQBkA'
        - 'NyZWF0ZVJlbW90ZVRocmVhZ'
        - 'Q3JlYXRlUmVtb3RlVGhyZWFk'
        - 'QwByAGUAYQB0AGUAUgBlAG0AbwB0AGUAVABoAHIAZQBhAGQA'
        - '0AZQBtAG0AbwB2AGUA'
        - '1lbW1vdm'
        - 'AGUAbQBtAG8AdgBlA'
        - 'bQBlAG0AbQBvAHYAZQ'
        - 'bWVtbW92Z'
        - 'ZW1tb3Zl'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • hidden corpus 2 (sigma 1, elastic 1)
  • 0AZQBtAG0AbwB2AGUA
  • 1lbW1vdm
  • 4ARwBlAHQAQwBoAHUAbgBrA
  • 5HZXRDaHVua
  • AE8ALgBDAG8AbQBwAHIAZQBzAHMAaQBvAG4A
  • AE8ALgBNAGUAbQBvAHIAeQBTAHQAcgBlAGEAbQ
  • AEcAZQB0AEMAaAB1AG4Aaw
  • AEgAUgBFAEEARABfAEkATgBGAE8ANgA0A
  • AGMAaAB1AG4AawBfAHMAaQB6AGUA
  • AGUAbQBtAG8AdgBlA
  • AGkAdABzAGEAZABtAGkAbgAgAC8AdAByAGEAbgBzAGYAZQByA
  • AHIAZQBhAHQAZQBSAGUAbQBvAHQAZQBUAGgAcgBlAGEAZA
  • IAaQB0AHMAYQBkAG0AaQBuACAALwB0AHIAYQBuAHMAZgBlAHIA
  • JABjAGgAdQBuAGsAXwBzAGkAegBlA
  • JGNodW5rX3Npem
  • JpdHNhZG1pbiAvdHJhbnNmZX
  • LgBHAGUAdABDAGgAdQBuAGsA
  • LkdldENodW5r
  • MAcgBlAGEAdABlAFIAZQBtAG8AdABlAFQAaAByAGUAYQBkA
  • NyZWF0ZVJlbW90ZVRocmVhZ
  • Q3JlYXRlUmVtb3RlVGhyZWFk
  • QASABSAEUAQQBEAF8ASQBOAEYATwA2ADQA
  • QAYwBoAHUAbgBrAF8AcwBpAHoAZQ
  • QwByAGUAYQB0AGUAUgBlAG0AbwB0AGUAVABoAHIAZQBhAGQA
  • R2V0Q2h1bm
  • RIUkVBRF9JTkZPNj
  • RjaHVua19zaXpl
  • SFJFQURfSU5GTzY0
  • SQBPAC4AQwBvAG0AcAByAGUAcwBzAGkAbwBuA
  • SQBPAC4ATQBlAG0AbwByAHkAUwB0AHIAZQBhAG0A
  • SU8uQ29tcHJlc3Npb2
  • SU8uTWVtb3J5U3RyZWFt
  • Ty5Db21wcmVzc2lvb
  • Ty5NZW1vcnlTdHJlYW
  • VABIAFIARQBBAEQAXwBJAE4ARgBPADYANA
  • VEhSRUFEX0lORk82N
  • Y2h1bmtfc2l6Z
  • YgBpAHQAcwBhAGQAbQBpAG4AIAAvAHQAcgBhAG4AcwBmAGUAcg
  • Yml0c2FkbWluIC90cmFuc2Zlc
  • ZW1tb3Zl
  • aXRzYWRtaW4gL3RyYW5zZmVy
  • bQBlAG0AbQBvAHYAZQ
  • bWVtbW92Z
  • cmVhdGVSZW1vdGVUaHJlYW
  • kATwAuAE0AZQBtAG8AcgB5AFMAdAByAGUAYQBtA
  • kATwAuAEMAbwBtAHAAcgBlAHMAcwBpAG8Abg
  • lPLk1lbW9yeVN0cmVhb
  • lPLkNvbXByZXNzaW9u
field:"CommandLine" kind:match
Imageends_with
  • \powershell.exe corpus 181 (sigma 180, splunk 1)
  • \pwsh.exe corpus 166 (sigma 166)
field:"Image" kind:ends_with
OriginalFileNameeq
  • PowerShell.EXE corpus 134 (sigma 86, splunk 30, elastic 18)
  • pwsh.dll corpus 115 (sigma 81, splunk 30, elastic 4)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq

Network Connection Initiated To Cloudflared Tunnels Domains

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
Kamran Saifullah, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects network connections to Cloudflared tunnels domains initiated by a process on the system. Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.

Known False Positives

  • Legitimate use of cloudflare tunnels will also trigger this.

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Command & Control
Exfiltration

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 3: Network connection

Rule Body

title: Network Connection Initiated To Cloudflared Tunnels Domains
id: 7cd1dcdc-6edf-4896-86dc-d1f19ad64903
related:
    - id: a1d9eec5-33b2-4177-8d24-27fe754d0812
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects network connections to Cloudflared tunnels domains initiated by a process on the system.
    Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
references:
    - https://defr0ggy.github.io/research/Abusing-Cloudflared-A-Proxy-Service-To-Host-Share-Applications/
    - https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/tunnel-vision-cloudflared-abused-in-the-wild/
    - Internal Research
author: Kamran Saifullah, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-05-27
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1567
    - attack.t1572
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - '.v2.argotunnel.com'
            - 'protocol-v2.argotunnel.com'
            - 'trycloudflare.com'
            - 'update.argotunnel.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of cloudflare tunnels will also trigger this.
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    Initiated: 'true'
    DestinationHostname|endswith:
        - '.v2.argotunnel.com'
        - 'protocol-v2.argotunnel.com'
        - 'trycloudflare.com'
        - 'update.argotunnel.com'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
DestinationHostnameends_with
  • .v2.argotunnel.com
  • protocol-v2.argotunnel.com
  • trycloudflare.com corpus 3 (sigma 3)
  • update.argotunnel.com
field:"DestinationHostname" kind:ends_with
Initiatedeq
  • true corpus 50 (sigma 50)
field:"Initiated" kind:eq value:"true"

Number Of Resource Creation Or Deployment Activities

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
sawwinnnaung
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Number of VM creations or deployment activities occur in Azure via the azureactivity log.

Known False Positives

  • Valid change

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Persistence
Privilege Escalation

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Number Of Resource Creation Or Deployment Activities
id: d2d901db-7a75-45a1-bc39-0cbf00812192
status: test
description: Number of VM creations or deployment activities occur in Azure via the azureactivity log.
references:
    - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/e534407884b1ec5371efc9f76ead282176c9e8bb/Detections/AzureActivity/Creating_Anomalous_Number_Of_Resources_detection.yaml
author: sawwinnnaung
date: 2020-05-07
modified: 2023-10-11
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    keywords:
        - Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/write
        - Microsoft.Resources/deployments/write
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Valid change
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

keywords

Stage 1: keywords

keywords:
    - Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/write
    - Microsoft.Resources/deployments/write

Potential Active Directory Enumeration Using AD Module - PsModule

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects usage of the "Import-Module" cmdlet to load the "Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dl" DLL. Which is often used by attackers to perform AD enumeration.

Known False Positives

  • Legitimate use of the library for administrative activity

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
ReconnaissanceNo specific technique
DiscoveryNo specific technique
ImpactNo specific technique

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Potential Active Directory Enumeration Using AD Module - PsModule
id: 74176142-4684-4d8a-8b0a-713257e7df8e
related:
    - id: 70bc5215-526f-4477-963c-a47a5c9ebd12
      type: similar
    - id: 9e620995-f2d8-4630-8430-4afd89f77604
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the "Import-Module" cmdlet to load the "Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dl" DLL. Which is often used by attackers to perform AD enumeration.
references:
    - https://github.com/samratashok/ADModule
    - https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1617108657166061568?s=20
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/active-directory-enumeration-with-ad-module-without-rsat-or-admin-privileges
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2023-01-22
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_cmdlet:
        Payload|contains:
            - 'Import-Module '
            - 'ipmo '
    selection_dll:
        Payload|contains: 'Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dll'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the library for administrative activity
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

all of selection_*

Stage 1: selection_cmdlet

selection_cmdlet:
    Payload|contains:
        - 'Import-Module '
        - 'ipmo '

Stage 2: selection_dll

selection_dll:
    Payload|contains: 'Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dll'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Payloadmatch
  • Import-Module
  • Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dll
  • ipmo
field:"Payload" kind:match

Potential COM Object Hijacking Via TreatAs Subkey - Registry

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
Kutepov Anton, oscd.community
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey

Known False Positives

  • Maybe some system utilities in rare cases use linking keys for backward compatibility

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Potential COM Object Hijacking Via TreatAs Subkey - Registry
id: 9b0f8a61-91b2-464f-aceb-0527e0a45020
status: test
description: Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey
references:
    - https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/
author: Kutepov Anton, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-23
modified: 2025-10-26
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.015
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - 'HKU\'
            - 'Classes\CLSID\'
            - '\TreatAs'
    filter_main_svchost:
        # Example of target object by svchost
        # TargetObject: HKU\S-1-5-21-1098798288-3663759343-897484398-1001_Classes\CLSID\{0003000A-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}\TreatAs
        Image: 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Maybe some system utilities in rare cases use linking keys for backward compatibility
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_persistence_com_key_linking/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: COM hijacking via TreatAs
      technique: T1546.015
      atomic_guid: 33eacead-f117-4863-8eb0-5c6304fbfaa9

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection and not 1 of filter_main_*

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    TargetObject|contains|all:
        - 'HKU\'
        - 'Classes\CLSID\'
        - '\TreatAs'

Stage 2: not filter_main_svchost

filter_main_svchost:
    Image: 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
TargetObjectmatch
  • Classes\CLSID\
  • HKU\
  • \TreatAs
field:"TargetObject" kind:match

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
ImageeqC:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe"

Potential Defense Evasion Activity Via Emoji Usage In CommandLine - 1

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
@Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects the usage of emojis in the command line, this could be a sign of potential defense evasion activity.

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
StealthNo specific technique

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Potential Defense Evasion Activity Via Emoji Usage In CommandLine - 1
id: 4a30ac0c-b9d6-4e01-b71a-5f851bbf4259
status: test
description: Detects the usage of emojis in the command line, this could be a sign of potential defense evasion activity.
author: '@Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport'
references:
    - Internal Research
tags:
    - attack.stealth
date: 2022-12-05
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '😀'
            - '😃'
            - '😄'
            - '😁'
            - '😆'
            - '😅'
            - '😂'
            - '🤣'
            - '🥲'
            - '🥹'
            - '☺️'
            - '😊'
            - '😇'
            - '🙂'
            - '🙃'
            - '😉'
            - '😌'
            - '😍'
            - '🥰'
            - '😘'
            - '😗'
            - '😙'
            - '😚'
            - '😋'
            - '😛'
            - '😝'
            - '😜'
            - '🤪'
            - '🤨'
            - '🧐'
            - '🤓'
            - '😎'
            - '🥸'
            - '🤩'
            - '🥳'
            - '😏'
            - '😒'
            - '😞'
            - '😔'
            - '😟'
            - '😕'
            - '🙁'
            - '☹️'
            - '😣'
            - '😖'
            - '😫'
            - '😩'
            - '🥺'
            - '😢'
            - '😭'
            - '😮‍💨'
            - '😤'
            - '😠'
            - '😡'
            - '🤬'
            - '🤯'
            - '😳'
            - '🥵'
            - '🥶'
            - '😱'
            - '😨'
            - '😰'
            - '😥'
            - '😓'
            - '🫣'
            - '🤗'
            - '🫡'
            - '🤔'
            - '🫢'
            - '🤭'
            - '🤫'
            - '🤥'
            - '😶'
            - '😶‍🌫️'
            - '😐'
            - '😑'
            - '😬'
            - '🫠'
            - '🙄'
            - '😯'
            - '😦'
            - '😧'
            - '😮'
            - '😲'
            - '🥱'
            - '😴'
            - '🤤'
            - '😪'
            - '😵'
            - '😵‍💫'
            - '🫥'
            - '🤐'
            - '🥴'
            - '🤢'
            - '🤮'
            - '🤧'
            - '😷'
            - '🤒'
            - '🤕'
            - '🤑'
            - '🤠'
            - '😈'
            - '👿'
            - '👹'
            - '👺'
            - '🤡'
            - '💩'
            - '👻'
            - '💀'
            - '☠️'
            - '👽'
            - '👾'
            - '🤖'
            - '🎃'
            - '😺'
            - '😸'
            - '😹'
            - '😻'
            - '😼'
            - '😽'
            - '🙀'
            - '😿'
            - '😾'
            - '👋'
            - '🤚'
            - '🖐'
            - '✋'
            - '🖖'
            - '👌'
            - '🤌'
            - '🤏'
            - '✌️'
            - '🤞'
            - '🫰'
            - '🤟'
            - '🤘'
            - '🤙'
            - '🫵'
            - '🫱'
            - '🫲'
            - '🫳'
            - '🫴'
            - '👈'
            - '👉'
            - '👆'
            - '🖕'
            - '👇'
            - '☝️'
            - '👍'
            - '👎'
            - '✊'
            - '👊'
            - '🤛'
            - '🤜'
            - '👏'
            - '🫶'
            - '🙌'
            - '👐'
            - '🤲'
            - '🤝'
            - '🙏'
            - '✍️'
            - '💪'
            - '🦾'
            - '🦵'
            - '🦿'
            - '🦶'
            - '👣'
            - '👂'
            - '🦻'
            - '👃'
            - '🫀'
            - '🫁'
            - '🧠'
            - '🦷'
            - '🦴'
            - '👀'
            - '👁'
            - '👅'
            - '👄'
            - '🫦'
            - '💋'
            - '🩸'
            - '👶'
            - '👧'
            - '🧒'
            - '👦'
            - '👩'
            - '🧑'
            - '👨'
            - '👩‍🦱'
            - '🧑‍🦱'
            - '👨‍🦱'
            - '👩‍🦰'
            - '🧑‍🦰'
            - '👨‍🦰'
            - '👱‍♀️'
            - '👱'
            - '👱‍♂️'
            - '👩‍🦳'
            - '🧑‍🦳'
            - '👨‍🦳'
            - '👩‍🦲'
            - '🧑‍🦲'
            - '👨‍🦲'
            - '🧔‍♀️'
            - '🧔'
            - '🧔‍♂️'
            - '👵'
            - '🧓'
            - '👴'
            - '👲'
            - '👳‍♀️'
            - '👳'
            - '👳‍♂️'
            - '🧕'
            - '👮‍♀️'
            - '👮'
            - '👮‍♂️'
            - '👷‍♀️'
            - '👷'
            - '👷‍♂️'
            - '💂‍♀️'
            - '💂'
            - '💂‍♂️'
            - '🕵️‍♀️'
            - '🕵️'
            - '🕵️‍♂️'
            - '👩‍⚕️'
            - '🧑‍⚕️'
            - '👨‍⚕️'
            - '👩‍🌾'
            - '🧑‍🌾'
            - '👨‍🌾'
            - '👩‍🍳'
            - '🧑‍🍳'
            - '👨‍🍳'
            - '👩‍🎓'
            - '🧑‍🎓'
            - '👨‍🎓'
            - '👩‍🎤'
            - '🧑‍🎤'
            - '👨‍🎤'
            - '👩‍🏫'
            - '🧑‍🏫'
            - '👨‍🏫'
            - '👩‍🏭'
            - '🧑‍🏭'
            - '👨‍🏭'
            - '👩‍💻'
            - '🧑‍💻'
            - '👨‍💻'
            - '👩‍💼'
            - '🧑‍💼'
            - '👨‍💼'
            - '👩‍🔧'
            - '🧑‍🔧'
            - '👨‍🔧'
            - '👩‍🔬'
            - '🧑‍🔬'
            - '👨‍🔬'
            - '👩‍🎨'
            - '🧑‍🎨'
            - '👨‍🎨'
            - '👩‍🚒'
            - '🧑‍🚒'
            - '👨‍🚒'
            - '👩‍✈️'
            - '🧑‍✈️'
            - '👨‍✈️'
            - '👩‍🚀'
            - '🧑‍🚀'
            - '👨‍🚀'
            - '👩‍⚖️'
            - '🧑‍⚖️'
            - '👨‍⚖️'
            - '👰‍♀️'
            - '👰'
            - '👰‍♂️'
            - '🤵‍♀️'
            - '🤵'
            - '🤵‍♂️'
            - '👸'
            - '🫅'
            - '🤴'
            - '🥷'
            - '🦸‍♀️'
            - '🦸'
            - '🦸‍♂️'
            - '🦹‍♀️'
            - '🦹'
            - '🦹‍♂️'
            - '🤶'
            - '🧑‍🎄'
            - '🎅'
            - '🧙‍♀️'
            - '🧙'
            - '🧙‍♂️'
            - '🧝‍♀️'
            - '🧝'
            - '🧝‍♂️'
            - '🧛‍♀️'
            - '🧛'
            - '🧛‍♂️'
            - '🧟‍♀️'
            - '🧟'
            - '🧟‍♂️'
            - '🧞‍♀️'
            - '🧞'
            - '🧞‍♂️'
            - '🧜‍♀️'
            - '🧜'
            - '🧜‍♂️'
            - '🧚‍♀️'
            - '🧚'
            - '🧚‍♂️'
            - '🧌'
            - '👼'
            - '🤰'
            - '🫄'
            - '🫃'
            - '🤱'
            - '👩‍🍼'
            - '🧑‍🍼'
            - '👨‍🍼'
            - '🙇‍♀️'
            - '🙇'
            - '🙇‍♂️'
            - '💁‍♀️'
            - '💁'
            - '💁‍♂️'
            - '🙅‍♀️'
            - '🙅'
            - '🙅‍♂️'
            - '🙆‍♀️'
            - '🙆'
            - '🙆‍♂️'
            - '🙋‍♀️'
            - '🙋'
            - '🙋‍♂️'
            - '🧏‍♀️'
            - '🧏'
            - '🧏‍♂️'
            - '🤦‍♀️'
            - '🤦'
            - '🤦‍♂️'
            - '🤷‍♀️'
            - '🤷'
            - '🤷‍♂️'
            - '🙎‍♀️'
            - '🙎'
            - '🙎‍♂️'
            - '🙍‍♀️'
            - '🙍'
            - '🙍‍♂️'
            - '💇‍♀️'
            - '💇'
            - '💇‍♂️'
            - '💆‍♀️'
            - '💆'
            - '💆‍♂️'
            - '🧖‍♀️'
            - '🧖'
            - '🧖‍♂️'
            - '💅'
            - '💃'
            - '🕺'
            - '👯‍♀️'
            - '👯'
            - '👯‍♂️'
            - '🕴'
            - '👩‍🦽'
            - '🧑‍🦽'
            - '👨‍🦽'
            - '👩‍🦼'
            - '🧑‍🦼'
            - '👨‍🦼'
            - '🚶‍♀️'
            - '🚶'
            - '🚶‍♂️'
            - '👩‍🦯'
            - '🧑‍🦯'
            - '👨‍🦯'
            - '🧎‍♀️'
            - '🧎'
            - '🧎‍♂️'
            - '🏃‍♀️'
            - '🏃'
            - '🏃‍♂️'
            - '🧍‍♀️'
            - '🧍'
            - '🧍‍♂️'
            - '👭'
            - '🧑‍🤝‍🧑'
            - '👬'
            - '👫'
            - '👩‍❤️‍👩'
            - '💑'
            - '👨‍❤️‍👨'
            - '👩‍❤️‍👨'
            - '👩‍❤️‍💋‍👩'
            - '💏'
            - '👨‍❤️‍💋‍👨'
            - '👩‍❤️‍💋‍👨'
            - '👪'
            - '👨‍👩‍👦'
            - '👨‍👩‍👧'
            - '👨‍👩‍👧‍👦'
            - '👨‍👩‍👦‍👦'
            - '👨‍👩‍👧‍👧'
            - '👨‍👨‍👦'
            - '👨‍👨‍👧'
            - '👨‍👨‍👧‍👦'
            - '👨‍👨‍👦‍👦'
            - '👨‍👨‍👧‍👧'
            - '👩‍👩‍👦'
            - '👩‍👩‍👧'
            - '👩‍👩‍👧‍👦'
            - '👩‍👩‍👦‍👦'
            - '👩‍👩‍👧‍👧'
            - '👨‍👦'
            - '👨‍👦‍👦'
            - '👨‍👧'
            - '👨‍👧‍👦'
            - '👨‍👧‍👧'
            - '👩‍👦'
            - '👩‍👦‍👦'
            - '👩‍👧'
            - '👩‍👧‍👦'
            - '👩‍👧‍👧'
            - '🗣'
            - '👤'
            - '👥'
            - '🫂'
            - '🧳'
            - '🌂'
            - '☂️'
            - '🧵'
            - '🪡'
            - '🪢'
            - '🧶'
            - '👓'
            - '🕶'
            - '🥽'
            - '🥼'
            - '🦺'
            - '👔'
            - '👕'
            - '👖'
            - '🧣'
            - '🧤'
            - '🧥'
            - '🧦'
            - '👗'
            - '👘'
            - '🥻'
            - '🩴'
            - '🩱'
            - '🩲'
            - '🩳'
            - '👙'
            - '👚'
            - '👛'
            - '👜'
            - '👝'
            - '🎒'
            - '👞'
            - '👟'
            - '🥾'
            - '🥿'
            - '👠'
            - '👡'
            - '🩰'
            - '👢'
            - '👑'
            - '👒'
            - '🎩'
            - '🎓'
            - '🧢'
            - '⛑'
            - '🪖'
            - '💄'
            - '💍'
            - '💼'
            - '👋🏻'
            - '🤚🏻'
            - '🖐🏻'
            - '✋🏻'
            - '🖖🏻'
            - '👌🏻'
            - '🤌🏻'
            - '🤏🏻'
            - '✌🏻'
            - '🤞🏻'
            - '🫰🏻'
            - '🤟🏻'
            - '🤘🏻'
            - '🤙🏻'
            - '🫵🏻'
            - '🫱🏻'
            - '🫲🏻'
            - '🫳🏻'
            - '🫴🏻'
            - '👈🏻'
            - '👉🏻'
            - '👆🏻'
            - '🖕🏻'
            - '👇🏻'
            - '☝🏻'
            - '👍🏻'
            - '👎🏻'
            - '✊🏻'
            - '👊🏻'
            - '🤛🏻'
            - '🤜🏻'
            - '👏🏻'
            - '🫶🏻'
            - '🙌🏻'
            - '👐🏻'
            - '🤲🏻'
            - '🙏🏻'
            - '✍🏻'
            - '💪🏻'
            - '🦵🏻'
            - '🦶🏻'
            - '👂🏻'
            - '🦻🏻'
            - '👃🏻'
            - '👶🏻'
            - '👧🏻'
            - '🧒🏻'
            - '👦🏻'
            - '👩🏻'
            - '🧑🏻'
            - '👨🏻'
            - '👩🏻‍🦱'
            - '🧑🏻‍🦱'
            - '👨🏻‍🦱'
            - '👩🏻‍🦰'
            - '🧑🏻‍🦰'
            - '👨🏻‍🦰'
            - '👱🏻‍♀️'
            - '👱🏻'
            - '👱🏻‍♂️'
            - '👩🏻‍🦳'
            - '🧑🏻‍🦳'
            - '👨🏻‍🦳'
            - '👩🏻‍🦲'
            - '🧑🏻‍🦲'
            - '👨🏻‍🦲'
            - '🧔🏻‍♀️'
            - '🧔🏻'
            - '🧔🏻‍♂️'
            - '👵🏻'
            - '🧓🏻'
            - '👴🏻'
            - '👲🏻'
            - '👳🏻‍♀️'
            - '👳🏻'
            - '👳🏻‍♂️'
            - '🧕🏻'
            - '👮🏻‍♀️'
            - '👮🏻'
            - '👮🏻‍♂️'
            - '👷🏻‍♀️'
            - '👷🏻'
            - '👷🏻‍♂️'
            - '💂🏻‍♀️'
            - '💂🏻'
            - '💂🏻‍♂️'
            - '🕵🏻‍♀️'
            - '🕵🏻'
            - '🕵🏻‍♂️'
            - '👩🏻‍⚕️'
            - '🧑🏻‍⚕️'
            - '👨🏻‍⚕️'
            - '👩🏻‍🌾'
            - '🧑🏻‍🌾'
            - '👨🏻‍🌾'
            - '👩🏻‍🍳'
            - '🧑🏻‍🍳'
            - '👨🏻‍🍳'
            - '👩🏻‍🎓'
            - '🧑🏻‍🎓'
            - '👨🏻‍🎓'
            - '👩🏻‍🎤'
            - '🧑🏻‍🎤'
            - '👨🏻‍🎤'
            - '👩🏻‍🏫'
            - '🧑🏻‍🏫'
            - '👨🏻‍🏫'
            - '👩🏻‍🏭'
            - '🧑🏻‍🏭'
            - '👨🏻‍🏭'
            - '👩🏻‍💻'
            - '🧑🏻‍💻'
            - '👨🏻‍💻'
            - '👩🏻‍💼'
            - '🧑🏻‍💼'
            - '👨🏻‍💼'
            - '👩🏻‍🔧'
            - '🧑🏻‍🔧'
            - '👨🏻‍🔧'
            - '👩🏻‍🔬'
            - '🧑🏻‍🔬'
            - '👨🏻‍🔬'
            - '👩🏻‍🎨'
            - '🧑🏻‍🎨'
            - '👨🏻‍🎨'
            - '👩🏻‍🚒'
            - '🧑🏻‍🚒'
            - '👨🏻‍🚒'
            - '👩🏻‍✈️'
            - '🧑🏻‍✈️'
            - '👨🏻‍✈️'
            - '👩🏻‍🚀'
            - '🧑🏻‍🚀'
            - '👨🏻‍🚀'
            - '👩🏻‍⚖️'
            - '🧑🏻‍⚖️'
            - '👨🏻‍⚖️'
            - '👰🏻‍♀️'
            - '👰🏻'
            - '👰🏻‍♂️'
            - '🤵🏻‍♀️'
            - '🤵🏻'
            - '🤵🏻‍♂️'
            - '👸🏻'
            - '🫅🏻'
            - '🤴🏻'
            - '🥷🏻'
            - '🦸🏻‍♀️'
            - '🦸🏻'
            - '🦸🏻‍♂️'
            - '🦹🏻‍♀️'
            - '🦹🏻'
            - '🦹🏻‍♂️'
            - '🤶🏻'
            - '🧑🏻‍🎄'
            - '🎅🏻'
            - '🧙🏻‍♀️'
            - '🧙🏻'
            - '🧙🏻‍♂️'
            - '🧝🏻‍♀️'
            - '🧝🏻'
            - '🧝🏻‍♂️'
            - '🧛🏻‍♀️'
            - '🧛🏻'
            - '🧛🏻‍♂️'
            - '🧜🏻‍♀️'
            - '🧜🏻'
            - '🧜🏻‍♂️'
            - '🧚🏻‍♀️'
            - '🧚🏻'
            - '🧚🏻‍♂️'
            - '👼🏻'
            - '🤰🏻'
            - '🫄🏻'
            - '🫃🏻'
            - '🤱🏻'
            - '👩🏻‍🍼'
            - '🧑🏻‍🍼'
            - '👨🏻‍🍼'
            - '🙇🏻‍♀️'
            - '🙇🏻'
            - '🙇🏻‍♂️'
            - '💁🏻‍♀️'
            - '💁🏻'
            - '💁🏻‍♂️'
            - '🙅🏻‍♀️'
            - '🙅🏻'
            - '🙅🏻‍♂️'
            - '🙆🏻‍♀️'
            - '🙆🏻'
            - '🙆🏻‍♂️'
            - '🙋🏻‍♀️'
            - '🙋🏻'
            - '🙋🏻‍♂️'
            - '🧏🏻‍♀️'
            - '🧏🏻'
            - '🧏🏻‍♂️'
            - '🤦🏻‍♀️'
            - '🤦🏻'
            - '🤦🏻‍♂️'
            - '🤷🏻‍♀️'
            - '🤷🏻'
            - '🤷🏻‍♂️'
            - '🙎🏻‍♀️'
            - '🙎🏻'
            - '🙎🏻‍♂️'
            - '🙍🏻‍♀️'
            - '🙍🏻'
            - '🙍🏻‍♂️'
            - '💇🏻‍♀️'
            - '💇🏻'
            - '💇🏻‍♂️'
            - '💆🏻‍♀️'
            - '💆🏻'
            - '💆🏻‍♂️'
            - '🧖🏻‍♀️'
            - '🧖🏻'
            - '🧖🏻‍♂️'
            - '💃🏻'
            - '🕺🏻'
            - '🕴🏻'
            - '👩🏻‍🦽'
            - '🧑🏻‍🦽'
            - '👨🏻‍🦽'
            - '👩🏻‍🦼'
            - '🧑🏻‍🦼'
            - '👨🏻‍🦼'
            - '🚶🏻‍♀️'
            - '🚶🏻'
            - '🚶🏻‍♂️'
            - '👩🏻‍🦯'
            - '🧑🏻‍🦯'
            - '👨🏻‍🦯'
            - '🧎🏻‍♀️'
            - '🧎🏻'
            - '🧎🏻‍♂️'
            - '🏃🏻‍♀️'
            - '🏃🏻'
            - '🏃🏻‍♂️'
            - '🧍🏻‍♀️'
            - '🧍🏻'
            - '🧍🏻‍♂️'
            - '👭🏻'
            - '🧑🏻‍🤝‍🧑🏻'
            - '👬🏻'
            - '👫🏻'
            - '🧗🏻‍♀️'
            - '🧗🏻'
            - '🧗🏻‍♂️'
            - '🏇🏻'
            - '🏂🏻'
            - '🏌🏻‍♀️'
            - '🏌🏻'
            - '🏌🏻‍♂️'
            - '🏄🏻‍♀️'
            - '🏄🏻'
            - '🏄🏻‍♂️'
            - '🚣🏻‍♀️'
            - '🚣🏻'
            - '🚣🏻‍♂️'
            - '🏊🏻‍♀️'
            - '🏊🏻'
            - '🏊🏻‍♂️'
            - '⛹🏻‍♀️'
            - '⛹🏻'
            - '⛹🏻‍♂️'
            - '🏋🏻‍♀️'
            - '🏋🏻'
            - '🏋🏻‍♂️'
            - '🚴🏻‍♀️'
            - '🚴🏻'
            - '🚴🏻‍♂️'
            - '🚵🏻‍♀️'
            - '🚵🏻'
            - '🚵🏻‍♂️'
            - '🤸🏻‍♀️'
            - '🤸🏻'
            - '🤸🏻‍♂️'
            - '🤽🏻‍♀️'
            - '🤽🏻'
            - '🤽🏻‍♂️'
            - '🤾🏻‍♀️'
            - '🤾🏻'
            - '🤾🏻‍♂️'
            - '🤹🏻‍♀️'
            - '🤹🏻'
            - '🤹🏻‍♂️'
            - '🧘🏻‍♀️'
            - '🧘🏻'
            - '🧘🏻‍♂️'
            - '🛀🏻'
            - '🛌🏻'
            - '👋🏼'
            - '🤚🏼'
            - '🖐🏼'
            - '✋🏼'
            - '🖖🏼'
            - '👌🏼'
            - '🤌🏼'
            - '🤏🏼'
            - '✌🏼'
            - '🤞🏼'
            - '🫰🏼'
            - '🤟🏼'
            - '🤘🏼'
            - '🤙🏼'
            - '🫵🏼'
            - '🫱🏼'
            - '🫲🏼'
            - '🫳🏼'
            - '🫴🏼'
            - '👈🏼'
            - '👉🏼'
            - '👆🏼'
            - '🖕🏼'
            - '👇🏼'
            - '☝🏼'
            - '👍🏼'
            - '👎🏼'
            - '✊🏼'
            - '👊🏼'
            - '🤛🏼'
            - '🤜🏼'
            - '👏🏼'
            - '🫶🏼'
            - '🙌🏼'
            - '👐🏼'
            - '🤲🏼'
            - '🙏🏼'
            - '✍🏼'
            - '💪🏼'
            - '🦵🏼'
            - '🦶🏼'
            - '👂🏼'
            - '🦻🏼'
            - '👃🏼'
            - '👶🏼'
            - '👧🏼'
            - '🧒🏼'
            - '👦🏼'
            - '👩🏼'
            - '🧑🏼'
            - '👨🏼'
            - '👩🏼‍🦱'
            - '🧑🏼‍🦱'
            - '👨🏼‍🦱'
            - '👩🏼‍🦰'
            - '🧑🏼‍🦰'
            - '👨🏼‍🦰'
            - '👱🏼‍♀️'
            - '👱🏼'
            - '👱🏼‍♂️'
            - '👩🏼‍🦳'
            - '🧑🏼‍🦳'
            - '👨🏼‍🦳'
            - '👩🏼‍🦲'
            - '🧑🏼‍🦲'
            - '👨🏼‍🦲'
            - '🧔🏼‍♀️'
            - '🧔🏼'
            - '🧔🏼‍♂️'
            - '👵🏼'
            - '🧓🏼'
            - '👴🏼'
            - '👲🏼'
            - '👳🏼‍♀️'
            - '👳🏼'
            - '👳🏼‍♂️'
            - '🧕🏼'
            - '👮🏼‍♀️'
            - '👮🏼'
            - '👮🏼‍♂️'
            - '👷🏼‍♀️'
            - '👷🏼'
            - '👷🏼‍♂️'
            - '💂🏼‍♀️'
            - '💂🏼'
            - '💂🏼‍♂️'
            - '🕵🏼‍♀️'
            - '🕵🏼'
            - '🕵🏼‍♂️'
            - '👩🏼‍⚕️'
            - '🧑🏼‍⚕️'
            - '👨🏼‍⚕️'
            - '👩🏼‍🌾'
            - '🧑🏼‍🌾'
            - '👨🏼‍🌾'
            - '👩🏼‍🍳'
            - '🧑🏼‍🍳'
            - '👨🏼‍🍳'
            - '👩🏼‍🎓'
            - '🧑🏼‍🎓'
            - '👨🏼‍🎓'
            - '👩🏼‍🎤'
            - '🧑🏼‍🎤'
            - '👨🏼‍🎤'
            - '👩🏼‍🏫'
            - '🧑🏼‍🏫'
            - '👨🏼‍🏫'
            - '👩🏼‍🏭'
            - '🧑🏼‍🏭'
            - '👨🏼‍🏭'
            - '👩🏼‍💻'
            - '🧑🏼‍💻'
            - '👨🏼‍💻'
            - '👩🏼‍💼'
            - '🧑🏼‍💼'
            - '👨🏼‍💼'
            - '👩🏼‍🔧'
            - '🧑🏼‍🔧'
            - '👨🏼‍🔧'
            - '👩🏼‍🔬'
            - '🧑🏼‍🔬'
            - '👨🏼‍🔬'
            - '👩🏼‍🎨'
            - '🧑🏼‍🎨'
            - '👨🏼‍🎨'
            - '👩🏼‍🚒'
            - '🧑🏼‍🚒'
            - '👨🏼‍🚒'
            - '👩🏼‍✈️'
            - '🧑🏼‍✈️'
            - '👨🏼‍✈️'
            - '👩🏼‍🚀'
            - '🧑🏼‍🚀'
            - '👨🏼‍🚀'
            - '👩🏼‍⚖️'
            - '🧑🏼‍⚖️'
            - '👨🏼‍⚖️'
            - '👰🏼‍♀️'
            - '👰🏼'
            - '👰🏼‍♂️'
            - '🤵🏼‍♀️'
            - '🤵🏼'
            - '🤵🏼‍♂️'
            - '👸🏼'
            - '🫅🏼'
            - '🤴🏼'
            - '🥷🏼'
            - '🦸🏼‍♀️'
            - '🦸🏼'
            - '🦸🏼‍♂️'
            - '🦹🏼‍♀️'
            - '🦹🏼'
            - '🦹🏼‍♂️'
            - '🤶🏼'
            - '🧑🏼‍🎄'
            - '🎅🏼'
            - '🧙🏼‍♀️'
            - '🧙🏼'
            - '🧙🏼‍♂️'
            - '🧝🏼‍♀️'
            - '🧝🏼'
            - '🧝🏼‍♂️'
            - '🧛🏼‍♀️'
            - '🧛🏼'
            - '🧛🏼‍♂️'
            - '🧜🏼‍♀️'
            - '🧜🏼'
            - '🧜🏼‍♂️'
            - '🧚🏼‍♀️'
            - '🧚🏼'
            - '🧚🏼‍♂️'
            - '👼🏼'
            - '🤰🏼'
            - '🫄🏼'
            - '🫃🏼'
            - '🤱🏼'
            - '👩🏼‍🍼'
            - '🧑🏼‍🍼'
            - '👨🏼‍🍼'
            - '🙇🏼‍♀️'
            - '🙇🏼'
            - '🙇🏼‍♂️'
            - '💁🏼‍♀️'
            - '💁🏼'
            - '💁🏼‍♂️'
            - '🙅🏼‍♀️'
            - '🙅🏼'
            - '🙅🏼‍♂️'
            - '🙆🏼‍♀️'
            - '🙆🏼'
            - '🙆🏼‍♂️'
            - '🙋🏼‍♀️'
            - '🙋🏼'
            - '🙋🏼‍♂️'
            - '🧏🏼‍♀️'
            - '🧏🏼'
            - '🧏🏼‍♂️'
            - '🤦🏼‍♀️'
            - '🤦🏼'
            - '🤦🏼‍♂️'
            - '🤷🏼‍♀️'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    CommandLine|contains:
        - '😀'
        - '😃'
        - '😄'
        - '😁'
        - '😆'
        - '😅'
        - '😂'
        - '🤣'
        - '🥲'
        - '🥹'
        - '☺️'
        - '😊'
        - '😇'
        - '🙂'
        - '🙃'
        - '😉'
        - '😌'
        - '😍'
        - '🥰'
        - '😘'
        - '😗'
        - '😙'
        - '😚'
        - '😋'
        - '😛'
        - '😝'
        - '😜'
        - '🤪'
        - '🤨'
        - '🧐'
        - '🤓'
        - '😎'
        - '🥸'
        - '🤩'
        - '🥳'
        - '😏'
        - '😒'
        - '😞'
        - '😔'
        - '😟'
        - '😕'
        - '🙁'
        - '☹️'
        - '😣'
        - '😖'
        - '😫'
        - '😩'
        - '🥺'
        - '😢'
        - '😭'
        - '😮‍💨'
        - '😤'
        - '😠'
        - '😡'
        - '🤬'
        - '🤯'
        - '😳'
        - '🥵'
        - '🥶'
        - '😱'
        - '😨'
        - '😰'
        - '😥'
        - '😓'
        - '🫣'
        - '🤗'
        - '🫡'
        - '🤔'
        - '🫢'
        - '🤭'
        - '🤫'
        - '🤥'
        - '😶'
        - '😶‍🌫️'
        - '😐'
        - '😑'
        - '😬'
        - '🫠'
        - '🙄'
        - '😯'
        - '😦'
        - '😧'
        - '😮'
        - '😲'
        - '🥱'
        - '😴'
        - '🤤'
        - '😪'
        - '😵'
        - '😵‍💫'
        - '🫥'
        - '🤐'
        - '🥴'
        - '🤢'
        - '🤮'
        - '🤧'
        - '😷'
        - '🤒'
        - '🤕'
        - '🤑'
        - '🤠'
        - '😈'
        - '👿'
        - '👹'
        - '👺'
        - '🤡'
        - '💩'
        - '👻'
        - '💀'
        - '☠️'
        - '👽'
        - '👾'
        - '🤖'
        - '🎃'
        - '😺'
        - '😸'
        - '😹'
        - '😻'
        - '😼'
        - '😽'
        - '🙀'
        - '😿'
        - '😾'
        - '👋'
        - '🤚'
        - '🖐'
        - '✋'
        - '🖖'
        - '👌'
        - '🤌'
        - '🤏'
        - '✌️'
        - '🤞'
        - '🫰'
        - '🤟'
        - '🤘'
        - '🤙'
        - '🫵'
        - '🫱'
        - '🫲'
        - '🫳'
        - '🫴'
        - '👈'
        - '👉'
        - '👆'
        - '🖕'
        - '👇'
        - '☝️'
        - '👍'
        - '👎'
        - '✊'
        - '👊'
        - '🤛'
        - '🤜'
        - '👏'
        - '🫶'
        - '🙌'
        - '👐'
        - '🤲'
        - '🤝'
        - '🙏'
        - '✍️'
        - '💪'
        - '🦾'
        - '🦵'
        - '🦿'
        - '🦶'
        - '👣'
        - '👂'
        - '🦻'
        - '👃'
        - '🫀'
        - '🫁'
        - '🧠'
        - '🦷'
        - '🦴'
        - '👀'
        - '👁'
        - '👅'
        - '👄'
        - '🫦'
        - '💋'
        - '🩸'
        - '👶'
        - '👧'
        - '🧒'
        - '👦'
        - '👩'
        - '🧑'
        - '👨'
        - '👩‍🦱'
        - '🧑‍🦱'
        - '👨‍🦱'
        - '👩‍🦰'
        - '🧑‍🦰'
        - '👨‍🦰'
        - '👱‍♀️'
        - '👱'
        - '👱‍♂️'
        - '👩‍🦳'
        - '🧑‍🦳'
        - '👨‍🦳'
        - '👩‍🦲'
        - '🧑‍🦲'
        - '👨‍🦲'
        - '🧔‍♀️'
        - '🧔'
        - '🧔‍♂️'
        - '👵'
        - '🧓'
        - '👴'
        - '👲'
        - '👳‍♀️'
        - '👳'
        - '👳‍♂️'
        - '🧕'
        - '👮‍♀️'
        - '👮'
        - '👮‍♂️'
        - '👷‍♀️'
        - '👷'
        - '👷‍♂️'
        - '💂‍♀️'
        - '💂'
        - '💂‍♂️'
        - '🕵️‍♀️'
        - '🕵️'
        - '🕵️‍♂️'
        - '👩‍⚕️'
        - '🧑‍⚕️'
        - '👨‍⚕️'
        - '👩‍🌾'
        - '🧑‍🌾'
        - '👨‍🌾'
        - '👩‍🍳'
        - '🧑‍🍳'
        - '👨‍🍳'
        - '👩‍🎓'
        - '🧑‍🎓'
        - '👨‍🎓'
        - '👩‍🎤'
        - '🧑‍🎤'
        - '👨‍🎤'
        - '👩‍🏫'
        - '🧑‍🏫'
        - '👨‍🏫'
        - '👩‍🏭'
        - '🧑‍🏭'
        - '👨‍🏭'
        - '👩‍💻'
        - '🧑‍💻'
        - '👨‍💻'
        - '👩‍💼'
        - '🧑‍💼'
        - '👨‍💼'
        - '👩‍🔧'
        - '🧑‍🔧'
        - '👨‍🔧'
        - '👩‍🔬'
        - '🧑‍🔬'
        - '👨‍🔬'
        - '👩‍🎨'
        - '🧑‍🎨'
        - '👨‍🎨'
        - '👩‍🚒'
        - '🧑‍🚒'
        - '👨‍🚒'
        - '👩‍✈️'
        - '🧑‍✈️'
        - '👨‍✈️'
        - '👩‍🚀'
        - '🧑‍🚀'
        - '👨‍🚀'
        - '👩‍⚖️'
        - '🧑‍⚖️'
        - '👨‍⚖️'
        - '👰‍♀️'
        - '👰'
        - '👰‍♂️'
        - '🤵‍♀️'
        - '🤵'
        - '🤵‍♂️'
        - '👸'
        - '🫅'
        - '🤴'
        - '🥷'
        - '🦸‍♀️'
        - '🦸'
        - '🦸‍♂️'
        - '🦹‍♀️'
        - '🦹'
        - '🦹‍♂️'
        - '🤶'
        - '🧑‍🎄'
        - '🎅'
        - '🧙‍♀️'
        - '🧙'
        - '🧙‍♂️'
        - '🧝‍♀️'
        - '🧝'
        - '🧝‍♂️'
        - '🧛‍♀️'
        - '🧛'
        - '🧛‍♂️'
        - '🧟‍♀️'
        - '🧟'
        - '🧟‍♂️'
        - '🧞‍♀️'
        - '🧞'
        - '🧞‍♂️'
        - '🧜‍♀️'
        - '🧜'
        - '🧜‍♂️'
        - '🧚‍♀️'
        - '🧚'
        - '🧚‍♂️'
        - '🧌'
        - '👼'
        - '🤰'
        - '🫄'
        - '🫃'
        - '🤱'
        - '👩‍🍼'
        - '🧑‍🍼'
        - '👨‍🍼'
        - '🙇‍♀️'
        - '🙇'
        - '🙇‍♂️'
        - '💁‍♀️'
        - '💁'
        - '💁‍♂️'
        - '🙅‍♀️'
        - '🙅'
        - '🙅‍♂️'
        - '🙆‍♀️'
        - '🙆'
        - '🙆‍♂️'
        - '🙋‍♀️'
        - '🙋'
        - '🙋‍♂️'
        - '🧏‍♀️'
        - '🧏'
        - '🧏‍♂️'
        - '🤦‍♀️'
        - '🤦'
        - '🤦‍♂️'
        - '🤷‍♀️'
        - '🤷'
        - '🤷‍♂️'
        - '🙎‍♀️'
        - '🙎'
        - '🙎‍♂️'
        - '🙍‍♀️'
        - '🙍'
        - '🙍‍♂️'
        - '💇‍♀️'
        - '💇'
        - '💇‍♂️'
        - '💆‍♀️'
        - '💆'
        - '💆‍♂️'
        - '🧖‍♀️'
        - '🧖'
        - '🧖‍♂️'
        - '💅'
        - '💃'
        - '🕺'
        - '👯‍♀️'
        - '👯'
        - '👯‍♂️'
        - '🕴'
        - '👩‍🦽'
        - '🧑‍🦽'
        - '👨‍🦽'
        - '👩‍🦼'
        - '🧑‍🦼'
        - '👨‍🦼'
        - '🚶‍♀️'
        - '🚶'
        - '🚶‍♂️'
        - '👩‍🦯'
        - '🧑‍🦯'
        - '👨‍🦯'
        - '🧎‍♀️'
        - '🧎'
        - '🧎‍♂️'
        - '🏃‍♀️'
        - '🏃'
        - '🏃‍♂️'
        - '🧍‍♀️'
        - '🧍'
        - '🧍‍♂️'
        - '👭'
        - '🧑‍🤝‍🧑'
        - '👬'
        - '👫'
        - '👩‍❤️‍👩'
        - '💑'
        - '👨‍❤️‍👨'
        - '👩‍❤️‍👨'
        - '👩‍❤️‍💋‍👩'
        - '💏'
        - '👨‍❤️‍💋‍👨'
        - '👩‍❤️‍💋‍👨'
        - '👪'
        - '👨‍👩‍👦'
        - '👨‍👩‍👧'
        - '👨‍👩‍👧‍👦'
        - '👨‍👩‍👦‍👦'
        - '👨‍👩‍👧‍👧'
        - '👨‍👨‍👦'
        - '👨‍👨‍👧'
        - '👨‍👨‍👧‍👦'
        - '👨‍👨‍👦‍👦'
        - '👨‍👨‍👧‍👧'
        - '👩‍👩‍👦'
        - '👩‍👩‍👧'
        - '👩‍👩‍👧‍👦'
        - '👩‍👩‍👦‍👦'
        - '👩‍👩‍👧‍👧'
        - '👨‍👦'
        - '👨‍👦‍👦'
        - '👨‍👧'
        - '👨‍👧‍👦'
        - '👨‍👧‍👧'
        - '👩‍👦'
        - '👩‍👦‍👦'
        - '👩‍👧'
        - '👩‍👧‍👦'
        - '👩‍👧‍👧'
        - '🗣'
        - '👤'
        - '👥'
        - '🫂'
        - '🧳'
        - '🌂'
        - '☂️'
        - '🧵'
        - '🪡'
        - '🪢'
        - '🧶'
        - '👓'
        - '🕶'
        - '🥽'
        - '🥼'
        - '🦺'
        - '👔'
        - '👕'
        - '👖'
        - '🧣'
        - '🧤'
        - '🧥'
        - '🧦'
        - '👗'
        - '👘'
        - '🥻'
        - '🩴'
        - '🩱'
        - '🩲'
        - '🩳'
        - '👙'
        - '👚'
        - '👛'
        - '👜'
        - '👝'
        - '🎒'
        - '👞'
        - '👟'
        - '🥾'
        - '🥿'
        - '👠'
        - '👡'
        - '🩰'
        - '👢'
        - '👑'
        - '👒'
        - '🎩'
        - '🎓'
        - '🧢'
        - '⛑'
        - '🪖'
        - '💄'
        - '💍'
        - '💼'
        - '👋🏻'
        - '🤚🏻'
        - '🖐🏻'
        - '✋🏻'
        - '🖖🏻'
        - '👌🏻'
        - '🤌🏻'
        - '🤏🏻'
        - '✌🏻'
        - '🤞🏻'
        - '🫰🏻'
        - '🤟🏻'
        - '🤘🏻'
        - '🤙🏻'
        - '🫵🏻'
        - '🫱🏻'
        - '🫲🏻'
        - '🫳🏻'
        - '🫴🏻'
        - '👈🏻'
        - '👉🏻'
        - '👆🏻'
        - '🖕🏻'
        - '👇🏻'
        - '☝🏻'
        - '👍🏻'
        - '👎🏻'
        - '✊🏻'
        - '👊🏻'
        - '🤛🏻'
        - '🤜🏻'
        - '👏🏻'
        - '🫶🏻'
        - '🙌🏻'
        - '👐🏻'
        - '🤲🏻'
        - '🙏🏻'
        - '✍🏻'
        - '💪🏻'
        - '🦵🏻'
        - '🦶🏻'
        - '👂🏻'
        - '🦻🏻'
        - '👃🏻'
        - '👶🏻'
        - '👧🏻'
        - '🧒🏻'
        - '👦🏻'
        - '👩🏻'
        - '🧑🏻'
        - '👨🏻'
        - '👩🏻‍🦱'
        - '🧑🏻‍🦱'
        - '👨🏻‍🦱'
        - '👩🏻‍🦰'
        - '🧑🏻‍🦰'
        - '👨🏻‍🦰'
        - '👱🏻‍♀️'
        - '👱🏻'
        - '👱🏻‍♂️'
        - '👩🏻‍🦳'
        - '🧑🏻‍🦳'
        - '👨🏻‍🦳'
        - '👩🏻‍🦲'
        - '🧑🏻‍🦲'
        - '👨🏻‍🦲'
        - '🧔🏻‍♀️'
        - '🧔🏻'
        - '🧔🏻‍♂️'
        - '👵🏻'
        - '🧓🏻'
        - '👴🏻'
        - '👲🏻'
        - '👳🏻‍♀️'
        - '👳🏻'
        - '👳🏻‍♂️'
        - '🧕🏻'
        - '👮🏻‍♀️'
        - '👮🏻'
        - '👮🏻‍♂️'
        - '👷🏻‍♀️'
        - '👷🏻'
        - '👷🏻‍♂️'
        - '💂🏻‍♀️'
        - '💂🏻'
        - '💂🏻‍♂️'
        - '🕵🏻‍♀️'
        - '🕵🏻'
        - '🕵🏻‍♂️'
        - '👩🏻‍⚕️'
        - '🧑🏻‍⚕️'
        - '👨🏻‍⚕️'
        - '👩🏻‍🌾'
        - '🧑🏻‍🌾'
        - '👨🏻‍🌾'
        - '👩🏻‍🍳'
        - '🧑🏻‍🍳'
        - '👨🏻‍🍳'
        - '👩🏻‍🎓'
        - '🧑🏻‍🎓'
        - '👨🏻‍🎓'
        - '👩🏻‍🎤'
        - '🧑🏻‍🎤'
        - '👨🏻‍🎤'
        - '👩🏻‍🏫'
        - '🧑🏻‍🏫'
        - '👨🏻‍🏫'
        - '👩🏻‍🏭'
        - '🧑🏻‍🏭'
        - '👨🏻‍🏭'
        - '👩🏻‍💻'
        - '🧑🏻‍💻'
        - '👨🏻‍💻'
        - '👩🏻‍💼'
        - '🧑🏻‍💼'
        - '👨🏻‍💼'
        - '👩🏻‍🔧'
        - '🧑🏻‍🔧'
        - '👨🏻‍🔧'
        - '👩🏻‍🔬'
        - '🧑🏻‍🔬'
        - '👨🏻‍🔬'
        - '👩🏻‍🎨'
        - '🧑🏻‍🎨'
        - '👨🏻‍🎨'
        - '👩🏻‍🚒'
        - '🧑🏻‍🚒'
        - '👨🏻‍🚒'
        - '👩🏻‍✈️'
        - '🧑🏻‍✈️'
        - '👨🏻‍✈️'
        - '👩🏻‍🚀'
        - '🧑🏻‍🚀'
        - '👨🏻‍🚀'
        - '👩🏻‍⚖️'
        - '🧑🏻‍⚖️'
        - '👨🏻‍⚖️'
        - '👰🏻‍♀️'
        - '👰🏻'
        - '👰🏻‍♂️'
        - '🤵🏻‍♀️'
        - '🤵🏻'
        - '🤵🏻‍♂️'
        - '👸🏻'
        - '🫅🏻'
        - '🤴🏻'
        - '🥷🏻'
        - '🦸🏻‍♀️'
        - '🦸🏻'
        - '🦸🏻‍♂️'
        - '🦹🏻‍♀️'
        - '🦹🏻'
        - '🦹🏻‍♂️'
        - '🤶🏻'
        - '🧑🏻‍🎄'
        - '🎅🏻'
        - '🧙🏻‍♀️'
        - '🧙🏻'
        - '🧙🏻‍♂️'
        - '🧝🏻‍♀️'
        - '🧝🏻'
        - '🧝🏻‍♂️'
        - '🧛🏻‍♀️'
        - '🧛🏻'
        - '🧛🏻‍♂️'
        - '🧜🏻‍♀️'
        - '🧜🏻'
        - '🧜🏻‍♂️'
        - '🧚🏻‍♀️'
        - '🧚🏻'
        - '🧚🏻‍♂️'
        - '👼🏻'
        - '🤰🏻'
        - '🫄🏻'
        - '🫃🏻'
        - '🤱🏻'
        - '👩🏻‍🍼'
        - '🧑🏻‍🍼'
        - '👨🏻‍🍼'
        - '🙇🏻‍♀️'
        - '🙇🏻'
        - '🙇🏻‍♂️'
        - '💁🏻‍♀️'
        - '💁🏻'
        - '💁🏻‍♂️'
        - '🙅🏻‍♀️'
        - '🙅🏻'
        - '🙅🏻‍♂️'
        - '🙆🏻‍♀️'
        - '🙆🏻'
        - '🙆🏻‍♂️'
        - '🙋🏻‍♀️'
        - '🙋🏻'
        - '🙋🏻‍♂️'
        - '🧏🏻‍♀️'
        - '🧏🏻'
        - '🧏🏻‍♂️'
        - '🤦🏻‍♀️'
        - '🤦🏻'
        - '🤦🏻‍♂️'
        - '🤷🏻‍♀️'
        - '🤷🏻'
        - '🤷🏻‍♂️'
        - '🙎🏻‍♀️'
        - '🙎🏻'
        - '🙎🏻‍♂️'
        - '🙍🏻‍♀️'
        - '🙍🏻'
        - '🙍🏻‍♂️'
        - '💇🏻‍♀️'
        - '💇🏻'
        - '💇🏻‍♂️'
        - '💆🏻‍♀️'
        - '💆🏻'
        - '💆🏻‍♂️'
        - '🧖🏻‍♀️'
        - '🧖🏻'
        - '🧖🏻‍♂️'
        - '💃🏻'
        - '🕺🏻'
        - '🕴🏻'
        - '👩🏻‍🦽'
        - '🧑🏻‍🦽'
        - '👨🏻‍🦽'
        - '👩🏻‍🦼'
        - '🧑🏻‍🦼'
        - '👨🏻‍🦼'
        - '🚶🏻‍♀️'
        - '🚶🏻'
        - '🚶🏻‍♂️'
        - '👩🏻‍🦯'
        - '🧑🏻‍🦯'
        - '👨🏻‍🦯'
        - '🧎🏻‍♀️'
        - '🧎🏻'
        - '🧎🏻‍♂️'
        - '🏃🏻‍♀️'
        - '🏃🏻'
        - '🏃🏻‍♂️'
        - '🧍🏻‍♀️'
        - '🧍🏻'
        - '🧍🏻‍♂️'
        - '👭🏻'
        - '🧑🏻‍🤝‍🧑🏻'
        - '👬🏻'
        - '👫🏻'
        - '🧗🏻‍♀️'
        - '🧗🏻'
        - '🧗🏻‍♂️'
        - '🏇🏻'
        - '🏂🏻'
        - '🏌🏻‍♀️'
        - '🏌🏻'
        - '🏌🏻‍♂️'
        - '🏄🏻‍♀️'
        - '🏄🏻'
        - '🏄🏻‍♂️'
        - '🚣🏻‍♀️'
        - '🚣🏻'
        - '🚣🏻‍♂️'
        - '🏊🏻‍♀️'
        - '🏊🏻'
        - '🏊🏻‍♂️'
        - '⛹🏻‍♀️'
        - '⛹🏻'
        - '⛹🏻‍♂️'
        - '🏋🏻‍♀️'
        - '🏋🏻'
        - '🏋🏻‍♂️'
        - '🚴🏻‍♀️'
        - '🚴🏻'
        - '🚴🏻‍♂️'
        - '🚵🏻‍♀️'
        - '🚵🏻'
        - '🚵🏻‍♂️'
        - '🤸🏻‍♀️'
        - '🤸🏻'
        - '🤸🏻‍♂️'
        - '🤽🏻‍♀️'
        - '🤽🏻'
        - '🤽🏻‍♂️'
        - '🤾🏻‍♀️'
        - '🤾🏻'
        - '🤾🏻‍♂️'
        - '🤹🏻‍♀️'
        - '🤹🏻'
        - '🤹🏻‍♂️'
        - '🧘🏻‍♀️'
        - '🧘🏻'
        - '🧘🏻‍♂️'
        - '🛀🏻'
        - '🛌🏻'
        - '👋🏼'
        - '🤚🏼'
        - '🖐🏼'
        - '✋🏼'
        - '🖖🏼'
        - '👌🏼'
        - '🤌🏼'
        - '🤏🏼'
        - '✌🏼'
        - '🤞🏼'
        - '🫰🏼'
        - '🤟🏼'
        - '🤘🏼'
        - '🤙🏼'
        - '🫵🏼'
        - '🫱🏼'
        - '🫲🏼'
        - '🫳🏼'
        - '🫴🏼'
        - '👈🏼'
        - '👉🏼'
        - '👆🏼'
        - '🖕🏼'
        - '👇🏼'
        - '☝🏼'
        - '👍🏼'
        - '👎🏼'
        - '✊🏼'
        - '👊🏼'
        - '🤛🏼'
        - '🤜🏼'
        - '👏🏼'
        - '🫶🏼'
        - '🙌🏼'
        - '👐🏼'
        - '🤲🏼'
        - '🙏🏼'
        - '✍🏼'
        - '💪🏼'
        - '🦵🏼'
        - '🦶🏼'
        - '👂🏼'
        - '🦻🏼'
        - '👃🏼'
        - '👶🏼'
        - '👧🏼'
        - '🧒🏼'
        - '👦🏼'
        - '👩🏼'
        - '🧑🏼'
        - '👨🏼'
        - '👩🏼‍🦱'
        - '🧑🏼‍🦱'
        - '👨🏼‍🦱'
        - '👩🏼‍🦰'
        - '🧑🏼‍🦰'
        - '👨🏼‍🦰'
        - '👱🏼‍♀️'
        - '👱🏼'
        - '👱🏼‍♂️'
        - '👩🏼‍🦳'
        - '🧑🏼‍🦳'
        - '👨🏼‍🦳'
        - '👩🏼‍🦲'
        - '🧑🏼‍🦲'
        - '👨🏼‍🦲'
        - '🧔🏼‍♀️'
        - '🧔🏼'
        - '🧔🏼‍♂️'
        - '👵🏼'
        - '🧓🏼'
        - '👴🏼'
        - '👲🏼'
        - '👳🏼‍♀️'
        - '👳🏼'
        - '👳🏼‍♂️'
        - '🧕🏼'
        - '👮🏼‍♀️'
        - '👮🏼'
        - '👮🏼‍♂️'
        - '👷🏼‍♀️'
        - '👷🏼'
        - '👷🏼‍♂️'
        - '💂🏼‍♀️'
        - '💂🏼'
        - '💂🏼‍♂️'
        - '🕵🏼‍♀️'
        - '🕵🏼'
        - '🕵🏼‍♂️'
        - '👩🏼‍⚕️'
        - '🧑🏼‍⚕️'
        - '👨🏼‍⚕️'
        - '👩🏼‍🌾'
        - '🧑🏼‍🌾'
        - '👨🏼‍🌾'
        - '👩🏼‍🍳'
        - '🧑🏼‍🍳'
        - '👨🏼‍🍳'
        - '👩🏼‍🎓'
        - '🧑🏼‍🎓'
        - '👨🏼‍🎓'
        - '👩🏼‍🎤'
        - '🧑🏼‍🎤'
        - '👨🏼‍🎤'
        - '👩🏼‍🏫'
        - '🧑🏼‍🏫'
        - '👨🏼‍🏫'
        - '👩🏼‍🏭'
        - '🧑🏼‍🏭'
        - '👨🏼‍🏭'
        - '👩🏼‍💻'
        - '🧑🏼‍💻'
        - '👨🏼‍💻'
        - '👩🏼‍💼'
        - '🧑🏼‍💼'
        - '👨🏼‍💼'
        - '👩🏼‍🔧'
        - '🧑🏼‍🔧'
        - '👨🏼‍🔧'
        - '👩🏼‍🔬'
        - '🧑🏼‍🔬'
        - '👨🏼‍🔬'
        - '👩🏼‍🎨'
        - '🧑🏼‍🎨'
        - '👨🏼‍🎨'
        - '👩🏼‍🚒'
        - '🧑🏼‍🚒'
        - '👨🏼‍🚒'
        - '👩🏼‍✈️'
        - '🧑🏼‍✈️'
        - '👨🏼‍✈️'
        - '👩🏼‍🚀'
        - '🧑🏼‍🚀'
        - '👨🏼‍🚀'
        - '👩🏼‍⚖️'
        - '🧑🏼‍⚖️'
        - '👨🏼‍⚖️'
        - '👰🏼‍♀️'
        - '👰🏼'
        - '👰🏼‍♂️'
        - '🤵🏼‍♀️'
        - '🤵🏼'
        - '🤵🏼‍♂️'
        - '👸🏼'
        - '🫅🏼'
        - '🤴🏼'
        - '🥷🏼'
        - '🦸🏼‍♀️'
        - '🦸🏼'
        - '🦸🏼‍♂️'
        - '🦹🏼‍♀️'
        - '🦹🏼'
        - '🦹🏼‍♂️'
        - '🤶🏼'
        - '🧑🏼‍🎄'
        - '🎅🏼'
        - '🧙🏼‍♀️'
        - '🧙🏼'
        - '🧙🏼‍♂️'
        - '🧝🏼‍♀️'
        - '🧝🏼'
        - '🧝🏼‍♂️'
        - '🧛🏼‍♀️'
        - '🧛🏼'
        - '🧛🏼‍♂️'
        - '🧜🏼‍♀️'
        - '🧜🏼'
        - '🧜🏼‍♂️'
        - '🧚🏼‍♀️'
        - '🧚🏼'
        - '🧚🏼‍♂️'
        - '👼🏼'
        - '🤰🏼'
        - '🫄🏼'
        - '🫃🏼'
        - '🤱🏼'
        - '👩🏼‍🍼'
        - '🧑🏼‍🍼'
        - '👨🏼‍🍼'
        - '🙇🏼‍♀️'
        - '🙇🏼'
        - '🙇🏼‍♂️'
        - '💁🏼‍♀️'
        - '💁🏼'
        - '💁🏼‍♂️'
        - '🙅🏼‍♀️'
        - '🙅🏼'
        - '🙅🏼‍♂️'
        - '🙆🏼‍♀️'
        - '🙆🏼'
        - '🙆🏼‍♂️'
        - '🙋🏼‍♀️'
        - '🙋🏼'
        - '🙋🏼‍♂️'
        - '🧏🏼‍♀️'
        - '🧏🏼'
        - '🧏🏼‍♂️'
        - '🤦🏼‍♀️'
        - '🤦🏼'
        - '🤦🏼‍♂️'
        - '🤷🏼‍♀️'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • ☂️ corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • ☝️
  • ☝🏻
  • ☝🏼
  • ☠️
  • ☹️
  • ☺️
  • ⛑
  • ⛹🏻
  • ⛹🏻‍♀️
  • ⛹🏻‍♂️
  • ✊
  • ✊🏻
  • ✊🏼
  • ✋
  • ✋🏻
  • ✋🏼
  • ✌️
  • ✌🏻
  • ✌🏼
  • ✍️
  • ✍🏻
  • ✍🏼
  • 🌂
  • 🎃
  • 🎅
  • 🎅🏻
  • 🎅🏼
  • 🎒
  • 🎓
  • 🎩
  • 🏂🏻
  • 🏃
  • 🏃‍♀️
  • 🏃‍♂️
  • 🏃🏻
  • 🏃🏻‍♀️
  • 🏃🏻‍♂️
  • 🏄🏻
  • 🏄🏻‍♀️
  • +937 more values (see full rule source)
field:"CommandLine" kind:match

PwnDrp Access

#
Status
test
Severity
critical
Author
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects downloads from PwnDrp web servers developed for red team testing and most likely also used for criminal activity

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Rule Body

title: PwnDrp Access
id: 2b1ee7e4-89b6-4739-b7bb-b811b6607e5e
status: test
description: Detects downloads from PwnDrp web servers developed for red team testing and most likely also used for criminal activity
references:
    - https://breakdev.org/pwndrop/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-04-15
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1102.001
    - attack.t1102.003
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-uri|contains: '/pwndrop/'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    c-uri|contains: '/pwndrop/'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
c-urimatch
  • /pwndrop/
field:"c-uri" kind:match value:"/pwndrop/"

Rare Remote Thread Creation By Uncommon Source Image

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects uncommon processes creating remote threads.

Known False Positives

  • This rule is best put in testing first in order to create a baseline that reflects the data in your environment.

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Privilege Escalation
Stealth

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 8: CreateRemoteThread

Rule Body

title: Rare Remote Thread Creation By Uncommon Source Image
id: 02d1d718-dd13-41af-989d-ea85c7fab93f
related:
    - id: 66d31e5f-52d6-40a4-9615-002d3789a119
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects uncommon processes creating remote threads.
references:
    - Personal research, statistical analysis
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io
author: Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community
date: 2019-10-27
modified: 2025-12-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: create_remote_thread
detection:
    selection:
        SourceImage|endswith:
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\cvtres.exe'
            - '\defrag.exe'
            - '\dialer.exe'
            - '\dnx.exe'
            - '\esentutl.exe'
            - '\excel.exe'
            - '\expand.exe'
            - '\find.exe'
            - '\findstr.exe'
            - '\forfiles.exe'
            - '\gpupdate.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\installutil.exe'
            - '\lync.exe'
            - '\makecab.exe'
            - '\mDNSResponder.exe'
            - '\monitoringhost.exe' # Loads .NET CLR by default and thus a favorite for process injection for .NET in-memory offensive tools.
            - '\msbuild.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\mspaint.exe'
            - '\outlook.exe'
            - '\ping.exe'
            - '\provtool.exe'
            - '\python.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\robocopy.exe'
            - '\runonce.exe'
            - '\sapcimc.exe'
            - '\smartscreen.exe'
            - '\spoolsv.exe'
            - '\tstheme.exe'
            - '\userinit.exe'
            - '\vssadmin.exe'
            - '\vssvc.exe'
            - '\w3wp.exe'
            - '\winscp.exe'
            - '\winword.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    filter_main_conhost:
        SourceImage:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\Defrag.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\makecab.exe'
        TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe'
    filter_main_provtol_svchost:
        SourceImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\provtool.exe'
        TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
    filter_main_provtool_system:
        SourceImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\provtool.exe'
        TargetImage: 'System'
    filter_main_userinit:
        SourceImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\userinit.exe'
        TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
    filter_main_winword:
        SourceImage|endswith: '\WINWORD.EXE'
        TargetImage|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\' # C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe
            - 'C:\Program Files\' # C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\vfs\ProgramFilesCommonX64\Microsoft Shared\Office16\AI\ai.exe
    filter_main_ms_office:
        # Raised by following issue: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/5529
        SourceImage|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\'
        TargetImage: 'System'
    filter_optional_explorer_vmtools:
        SourceImage|endswith: '\SysWOW64\explorer.exe'
        TargetImage:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - This rule is best put in testing first in order to create a baseline that reflects the data in your environment.
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    SourceImage|endswith:
        - '\bash.exe'
        - '\cscript.exe'
        - '\cvtres.exe'
        - '\defrag.exe'
        - '\dialer.exe'
        - '\dnx.exe'
        - '\esentutl.exe'
        - '\excel.exe'
        - '\expand.exe'
        - '\find.exe'
        - '\findstr.exe'
        - '\forfiles.exe'
        - '\gpupdate.exe'
        - '\hh.exe'
        - '\installutil.exe'
        - '\lync.exe'
        - '\makecab.exe'
        - '\mDNSResponder.exe'
        - '\monitoringhost.exe'
        - '\msbuild.exe'
        - '\mshta.exe'
        - '\mspaint.exe'
        - '\outlook.exe'
        - '\ping.exe'
        - '\provtool.exe'
        - '\python.exe'
        - '\regsvr32.exe'
        - '\robocopy.exe'
        - '\runonce.exe'
        - '\sapcimc.exe'
        - '\smartscreen.exe'
        - '\spoolsv.exe'
        - '\tstheme.exe'
        - '\userinit.exe'
        - '\vssadmin.exe'
        - '\vssvc.exe'
        - '\w3wp.exe'
        - '\winscp.exe'
        - '\winword.exe'
        - '\wmic.exe'
        - '\wscript.exe'

Stage 2: not filter_main_*

filter_main_conhost:
    SourceImage:
        - 'C:\Windows\System32\Defrag.exe'
        - 'C:\Windows\System32\makecab.exe'
    TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe'
filter_main_provtol_svchost:
    SourceImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\provtool.exe'
    TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
filter_main_provtool_system:
    SourceImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\provtool.exe'
    TargetImage: 'System'
filter_main_userinit:
    SourceImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\userinit.exe'
    TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
filter_main_winword:
    SourceImage|endswith: '\WINWORD.EXE'
    TargetImage|startswith:
        - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
        - 'C:\Program Files\'
filter_main_ms_office:
    SourceImage|startswith:
        - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
        - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\'
    TargetImage: 'System'

Stage 3: not filter_optional_explorer_vmtools

filter_optional_explorer_vmtools:
    SourceImage|endswith: '\SysWOW64\explorer.exe'
    TargetImage:
        - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe'
        - 'C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
SourceImageends_with
  • \bash.exe
  • \cscript.exe
  • \cvtres.exe
  • \defrag.exe
  • \dialer.exe
  • \dnx.exe
  • \esentutl.exe
  • \excel.exe corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • \expand.exe
  • \find.exe
  • \findstr.exe
  • \forfiles.exe
  • \gpupdate.exe
  • \hh.exe
  • \installutil.exe
  • \lync.exe
  • \mDNSResponder.exe
  • \makecab.exe
  • \monitoringhost.exe
  • \msbuild.exe
  • \mshta.exe
  • \mspaint.exe
  • \outlook.exe
  • \ping.exe
  • \provtool.exe
  • \python.exe
  • \regsvr32.exe
  • \robocopy.exe
  • \runonce.exe
  • \sapcimc.exe
  • \smartscreen.exe
  • \spoolsv.exe corpus 2 (sigma 1, splunk 1)
  • \tstheme.exe
  • \userinit.exe
  • \vssadmin.exe
  • \vssvc.exe corpus 2 (sigma 1, splunk 1)
  • \w3wp.exe
  • \winscp.exe
  • \winword.exe corpus 3 (sigma 3)
  • \wmic.exe
  • \wscript.exe
field:"SourceImage" kind:ends_with

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
SourceImageeqC:\Windows\System32\Defrag.exeexcludes:SourceImage field:"SourceImage" value:"C:\Windows\System32\Defrag.exe"
SourceImageeqC:\Windows\System32\makecab.exeexcludes:SourceImage field:"SourceImage" value:"C:\Windows\System32\makecab.exe"
TargetImageeqC:\Windows\System32\conhost.exeexcludes:TargetImage field:"TargetImage" value:"C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe"
SourceImagestarts_withC:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\excludes:SourceImage field:"SourceImage" value:"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\"
SourceImagestarts_withC:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\excludes:SourceImage field:"SourceImage" value:"C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\"
TargetImageeqSystemexcludes:TargetImage field:"TargetImage" value:"System"
TargetImagestarts_withC:\Program Files (x86)\excludes:TargetImage field:"TargetImage" value:"C:\Program Files (x86)\"
TargetImagestarts_withC:\Program Files\excludes:TargetImage field:"TargetImage" value:"C:\Program Files\"
SourceImageends_with\WINWORD.EXEexcludes:SourceImage field:"SourceImage" value:"\WINWORD.EXE"
SourceImageeqC:\Windows\System32\provtool.exeexcludes:SourceImage field:"SourceImage" value:"C:\Windows\System32\provtool.exe"
TargetImageeqC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeexcludes:TargetImage field:"TargetImage" value:"C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe"
SourceImageeqC:\Windows\System32\userinit.exeexcludes:SourceImage field:"SourceImage" value:"C:\Windows\System32\userinit.exe"
TargetImageeqC:\Windows\explorer.exeexcludes:TargetImage field:"TargetImage" value:"C:\Windows\explorer.exe"
TargetImageeqC:\Program Files (x86)\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exeexcludes:TargetImage field:"TargetImage" value:"C:\Program Files (x86)\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe"
TargetImageeqC:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exeexcludes:TargetImage field:"TargetImage" value:"C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe"
SourceImageends_with\SysWOW64\explorer.exeexcludes:SourceImage field:"SourceImage" value:"\SysWOW64\explorer.exe"

Remote Event Log Recon

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects remote RPC calls to get event log information via EVEN or EVEN6

Known False Positives

  • Remote administrative tasks on Windows Events

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
DiscoveryNo specific technique

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Remote Event Log Recon
id: 2053961f-44c7-4a64-b62d-f6e72800af0d
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls to get event log information via EVEN or EVEN6
references:
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.discovery
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:82273fdc-e32a-18c3-3f78-827929dc23ea and uuid:f6beaff7-1e19-4fbb-9f8f-b89e2018337c"'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid:
            - 82273fdc-e32a-18c3-3f78-827929dc23ea
            - f6beaff7-1e19-4fbb-9f8f-b89e2018337c
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Remote administrative tasks on Windows Events
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    EventLog: RPCFW
    EventID: 3
    InterfaceUuid:
        - 82273fdc-e32a-18c3-3f78-827929dc23ea
        - f6beaff7-1e19-4fbb-9f8f-b89e2018337c

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventLogeq
  • RPCFW corpus 17 (sigma 17)
field:"EventLog" kind:eq value:"RPCFW"
InterfaceUuideq
  • 82273fdc-e32a-18c3-3f78-827929dc23ea
  • f6beaff7-1e19-4fbb-9f8f-b89e2018337c
field:"InterfaceUuid" kind:eq

Roles Assigned Outside PIM

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Identifies when a privilege role assignment has taken place outside of PIM and may indicate an attack.

Known False Positives

  • Investigate where users are being assigned privileged roles outside of Privileged Identity Management and prohibit future assignments from there.

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Initial Access
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
Stealth

Rule Body

title: Roles Assigned Outside PIM
id: b1bc08d1-8224-4758-a0e6-fbcfc98c73bb
status: test
description: Identifies when a privilege role assignment has taken place outside of PIM and may indicate an attack.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#roles-are-being-assigned-outside-of-privileged-identity-management
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: pim
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'rolesAssignedOutsidePrivilegedIdentityManagementAlertConfiguration'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Investigate where users are being assigned privileged roles outside of Privileged Identity Management and prohibit future assignments from there.
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    riskEventType: 'rolesAssignedOutsidePrivilegedIdentityManagementAlertConfiguration'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
riskEventTypeeq
  • rolesAssignedOutsidePrivilegedIdentityManagementAlertConfiguration
field:"azure_ad::risk_event_types" kind:eq value:"rolesAssignedOutsidePrivilegedIdentityManagementAlertConfiguration"

Rundll32.EXE Calling DllRegisterServer Export Function Explicitly

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects when the DLL export function 'DllRegisterServer' is called in the commandline by Rundll32 explicitly where the DLL is located in a non-standard path.

Known False Positives

  • Legitimate usage as part of application installation, but less likely from e.g. temporary paths.
  • Not every instance is considered malicious, but this rule will capture the malicious usages.

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule Body

title: Rundll32.EXE Calling DllRegisterServer Export Function Explicitly
id: d81a9fc6-55db-4461-b962-0e78fea5b0ad
related:
    - id: 2569ed8c-1147-498a-9b8c-2ad3656b10ed # Renamed rundll32
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects when the DLL export function 'DllRegisterServer' is called in the commandline by Rundll32 explicitly where the DLL is located in a non-standard path.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/08/28/html-smuggling-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/94816439312563db982cd038cf77cbc5ef4c7003e3edee86e2b0f99e675ed4ed/behavior
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/olectl/nf-olectl-dllregisterserver
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2023-10-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_image:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
    selection_cmdline:
        CommandLine|contains: 'DllRegisterServer'
    filter_main_legit_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\Program Files (x86)'
            - ':\Program Files\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage as part of application installation, but less likely from e.g. temporary paths.
    - Not every instance is considered malicious, but this rule will capture the malicious usages.
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*

Stage 1: selection_image

selection_image:
    - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
    - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'

Stage 2: selection_cmdline

selection_cmdline:
    CommandLine|contains: 'DllRegisterServer'

Stage 3: not filter_main_legit_paths

filter_main_legit_paths:
    CommandLine|contains:
        - ':\Program Files (x86)'
        - ':\Program Files\'
        - ':\Windows\System32\'
        - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • DllRegisterServer corpus 3 (sigma 2, splunk 1)
field:"CommandLine" kind:match value:"DllRegisterServer"
Imageends_with
  • \rundll32.exe corpus 94 (sigma 94)
field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\rundll32.exe"
OriginalFileNameeq
  • RUNDLL32.EXE corpus 72 (sigma 35, splunk 21, elastic 16)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"RUNDLL32.EXE"

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

Scheduled Task Executing Payload from Registry

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects the creation of a schtasks that potentially executes a payload stored in the Windows Registry using PowerShell.

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule Body

title: Scheduled Task Executing Payload from Registry
id: 86588b36-c6d3-465f-9cee-8f9093e07798
related:
    - id: c4eeeeae-89f4-43a7-8b48-8d1bdfa66c78
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a schtasks that potentially executes a payload stored in the Windows Registry using PowerShell.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        # schtasks.exe /Create /F /TN "{97F2F70B-10D1-4447-A2F3-9B070C86E261}" /TR "cmd /c start /min \"\" powershell.exe -Command IEX([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String((Get-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Pvoeooxf).yzbbvhhdypa))) " /SC MINUTE /MO 30
        - Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    selection_cli_create:
        CommandLine|contains: '/Create'
    selection_cli_get:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Get-ItemProperty'
            - ' gp ' # Alias
    selection_cli_hive:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'HKCU:'
            - 'HKLM:'
            - 'registry::'
            - 'HKEY_'
    filter_main_encoding:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'FromBase64String'
            - 'encodedcommand'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*

Stage 1: selection_img

selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
    - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'

Stage 2: selection_cli_create

selection_cli_create:
    CommandLine|contains: '/Create'

Stage 3: selection_cli_get

selection_cli_get:
    CommandLine|contains:
        - 'Get-ItemProperty'
        - ' gp '

Stage 4: selection_cli_hive

selection_cli_hive:
    CommandLine|contains:
        - 'HKCU:'
        - 'HKLM:'
        - 'registry::'
        - 'HKEY_'

Stage 5: not filter_main_encoding

filter_main_encoding:
    CommandLine|contains:
        - 'FromBase64String'
        - 'encodedcommand'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • gp corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • /Create corpus 8 (sigma 6, splunk 2)
  • Get-ItemProperty corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • HKCU: corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • HKEY_ corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • HKLM: corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • registry:: corpus 2 (sigma 2)
field:"CommandLine" kind:match
Imageends_with
  • \schtasks.exe corpus 55 (sigma 55)
field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\schtasks.exe"
OriginalFileNameeq
  • schtasks.exe corpus 29 (sigma 18, elastic 7, splunk 4)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"schtasks.exe"

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
CommandLinematchFromBase64Stringexcludes:CommandLine field:"CommandLine" value:"FromBase64String"
CommandLinematchencodedcommandexcludes:CommandLine field:"CommandLine" value:"encodedcommand"

Service abuse with malicious ImagePath (service)

#
Status
experimental
Severity
high
Author
mdecrevoisier
Source
github.com/mdecrevoisier/SIGMA-detection-rules

Detects scenarios where an attacker modify the original service executable path with a malicious one.

Known False Positives

  • administrator reconfiguring service

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Service abuse with malicious ImagePath (service)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker modify the original service executable path with a malicious one.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1543.003-Create%20or%20Modify%20System%20Process-Windows%20Service
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc742019(v=ws.11)
- https://pentestlab.blog/2020/01/22/persistence-modify-existing-service/
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1543.003
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection: # sc config <service_name> binPath="C:\windows\system32\pentestlab.exe"
  selection_process:
    NewProcessName|endswith: \sc.exe
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - sc
      - config
      - binpath
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- administrator reconfiguring service
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection_process

selection_process:
  NewProcessName|endswith: \sc.exe
  CommandLine|contains|all:
    - sc
    - config
    - binpath

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • binpath corpus 6 (sigma 5, splunk 1)
  • config corpus 16 (sigma 15, splunk 1)
  • sc corpus 6 (sigma 6)
field:"CommandLine" kind:match
NewProcessNameends_with
  • \sc.exe corpus 30 (sigma 30)
field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\sc.exe"

Suspicious FromBase64String Usage On Gzip Archive - Process Creation

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
frack113
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects attempts of decoding a base64 Gzip archive via PowerShell. This technique is often used as a method to load malicious content into memory afterward.

Known False Positives

  • Legitimate administrative script

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Command & Control

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Suspicious FromBase64String Usage On Gzip Archive - Process Creation
id: d75d6b6b-adb9-48f7-824b-ac2e786efe1f
related:
    - id: df69cb1d-b891-4cd9-90c7-d617d90100ce
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects attempts of decoding a base64 Gzip archive via PowerShell. This technique is often used as a method to load malicious content into memory afterward.
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=43
author: frack113
date: 2022-12-23
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1132.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'FromBase64String'
            - 'MemoryStream'
            - 'H4sI'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative script
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
        - 'FromBase64String'
        - 'MemoryStream'
        - 'H4sI'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • FromBase64String corpus 15 (sigma 9, elastic 4, splunk 2)
  • H4sI
  • MemoryStream
field:"CommandLine" kind:match

Suspicious Inbox Manipulation Rules

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects suspicious rules that delete or move messages or folders are set on a user's inbox.

Known False Positives

  • Actual mailbox rules that are moving items based on their workflow.

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Rule Body

title: Suspicious Inbox Manipulation Rules
id: ceb55fd0-726e-4656-bf4e-b585b7f7d572
status: test
description: Detects suspicious rules that delete or move messages or folders are set on a user's inbox.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#suspicious-inbox-manipulation-rules
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1140
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'mcasSuspiciousInboxManipulationRules'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Actual mailbox rules that are moving items based on their workflow.
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    riskEventType: 'mcasSuspiciousInboxManipulationRules'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

Suspicious Nohup Execution

#
Status
test
Severity
high
Author
Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects execution of binaries located in potentially suspicious locations via "nohup"

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
ExecutionNo specific technique

Telemetry Coverage

PlatformRecord / event type
LinuxEvent ID 1: Process Create

Rule Body

title: Suspicious Nohup Execution
id: 457df417-8b9d-4912-85f3-9dbda39c3645
related:
    - id: e4ffe466-6ff8-48d4-94bd-e32d1a6061e2
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects execution of binaries located in potentially suspicious locations via "nohup"
references:
    - https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2023/05/gobrat.html
    - https://jstnk9.github.io/jstnk9/research/GobRAT-Malware/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/60bcd645450e4c846238cf0e7226dc40c84c96eba99f6b2cffcd0ab4a391c8b3/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3e44c807a25a56f4068b5b8186eee5002eed6f26d665a8b791c472ad154585d1/detection
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-06-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/nohup'
        CommandLine|contains: '/tmp/'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    Image|endswith: '/nohup'
    CommandLine|contains: '/tmp/'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • /tmp/ corpus 10 (sigma 8, elastic 2)
field:"CommandLine" kind:match value:"/tmp/"
Imageends_with
  • /nohup corpus 3 (sigma 3)
field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"/nohup"

Suspicious Process Discovery With Get-Process

#
Status
test
Severity
low
Author
frack113
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Get the processes that are running on the local computer.

Known False Positives

  • Legitimate PowerShell scripts

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

TacticTechniques
Discovery

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Suspicious Process Discovery With Get-Process
id: af4c87ce-bdda-4215-b998-15220772e993
status: test
description: Get the processes that are running on the local computer.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1057/T1057.md#atomic-test-3---process-discovery---get-process
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-process?view=powershell-7.4
author: frack113
date: 2022-03-17
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1057
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: Get-Process
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: low

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    ScriptBlockText|contains: Get-Process

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

System Information Discovery Using System_Profiler

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
Stephen Lincoln `@slincoln_aiq` (AttackIQ)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects the execution of "system_profiler" with specific "Data Types" that have been seen being used by threat actors and malware. It provides system hardware and software configuration information. This process is primarily used for system information discovery. However, "system_profiler" can also be used to determine if virtualization software is being run for defense evasion purposes.

Known False Positives

  • Legitimate administrative activities

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: System Information Discovery Using System_Profiler
id: 4809c683-059b-4935-879d-36835986f8cf
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of "system_profiler" with specific "Data Types" that have been seen being used by threat actors and malware. It provides system hardware and software configuration information.
    This process is primarily used for system information discovery. However, "system_profiler" can also be used to determine if virtualization software is being run for defense evasion purposes.
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_za/research/20/k/new-macos-backdoor-connected-to-oceanlotus-surfaces.html
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/wp-content/uploads/pdf-gen/1630910064/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware.pdf
    - https://ss64.com/mac/system_profiler.html
    - https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x62.html
    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/04/09/oceanlotus-macos-malware-update/
    - https://gist.github.com/nasbench/9a1ba4bc7094ea1b47bc42bf172961af
author: Stephen Lincoln `@slincoln_aiq` (AttackIQ)
date: 2024-01-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.t1497.001
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '/system_profiler'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'system_profiler'
    selection_cmd:
        # Note: This list is based on CTI reporting. Threat actors might use other data types. Please refere to https://gist.github.com/nasbench/9a1ba4bc7094ea1b47bc42bf172961af for a full list
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'SPApplicationsDataType'
            - 'SPHardwareDataType'
            - 'SPNetworkDataType'
            - 'SPUSBDataType'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative activities
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

all of selection_*

Stage 1: selection_img

selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: '/system_profiler'
    - CommandLine|contains: 'system_profiler'

Stage 2: selection_cmd

selection_cmd:
    CommandLine|contains:
        - 'SPApplicationsDataType'
        - 'SPHardwareDataType'
        - 'SPNetworkDataType'
        - 'SPUSBDataType'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • SPApplicationsDataType
  • SPHardwareDataType
  • SPNetworkDataType
  • SPUSBDataType
  • system_profiler
field:"CommandLine" kind:match
Imageends_with
  • /system_profiler
field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"/system_profiler"

System Network Connections Discovery - Linux

#
Status
test
Severity
low
Author
Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects usage of system utilities to discover system network connections

Known False Positives

  • Legitimate activities

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

PlatformRecord / event type
LinuxEvent ID 1: Process Create

Rule Body

title: System Network Connections Discovery - Linux
id: 4c519226-f0cd-4471-bd2f-6fbb2bb68a79
status: test
description: Detects usage of system utilities to discover system network connections
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1049/T1049.md
author: Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-19
modified: 2023-01-17
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1049
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/who'
            - '/w'
            - '/last'
            - '/lsof'
            - '/netstat'
    filter_landscape_sysinfo:
        ParentCommandLine|contains: '/usr/bin/landscape-sysinfo'
        Image|endswith: '/who'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate activities
level: low

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection and not 1 of filter_*

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    Image|endswith:
        - '/who'
        - '/w'
        - '/last'
        - '/lsof'
        - '/netstat'

Stage 2: not filter_landscape_sysinfo

filter_landscape_sysinfo:
    ParentCommandLine|contains: '/usr/bin/landscape-sysinfo'
    Image|endswith: '/who'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Imageends_with
  • /last corpus 3 (sigma 3)
  • /lsof corpus 4 (sigma 4)
  • /netstat corpus 6 (sigma 6)
  • /w corpus 3 (sigma 3)
  • /who corpus 3 (sigma 3)
field:"Image" kind:ends_with

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
Imageends_with/whoexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"/who"
ParentCommandLinematch/usr/bin/landscape-sysinfoexcludes:ParentCommandLine field:"ParentCommandLine" value:"/usr/bin/landscape-sysinfo"

Uncommon Child Process Of Appvlp.EXE

#
Status
test
Severity
medium
Author
Sreeman
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects uncommon child processes of Appvlp.EXE Appvlp or the Application Virtualization Utility is included with Microsoft Office. Attackers are able to abuse "AppVLP" to execute shell commands. Normally, this binary is used for Application Virtualization, but it can also be abused to circumvent the ASR file path rule folder or to mark a file as a system file.

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage

Telemetry Coverage

Rule Body

title: Uncommon Child Process Of Appvlp.EXE
id: 9c7e131a-0f2c-4ae0-9d43-b04f4e266d43
status: test
description: |
    Detects uncommon child processes of Appvlp.EXE
    Appvlp or the Application Virtualization Utility is included with Microsoft Office. Attackers are able to abuse "AppVLP" to execute shell commands.
    Normally, this binary is used for Application Virtualization, but it can also be abused to circumvent the ASR file path rule folder
    or to mark a file as a system file.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Appvlp/
author: Sreeman
date: 2020-03-13
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\appvlp.exe'
    # Note: Filters based on data from EchoTrail: https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/appvlp.exe/
    filter_main_generic:
        Image|endswith:
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe'
            - ':\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe'
    filter_optional_office_msoasb:
        Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office'
        Image|endswith: '\msoasb.exe'
    filter_optional_office_skype:
        Image|contains|all:
            - ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office'
            - '\SkypeSrv\'
        Image|endswith: '\SKYPESERVER.EXE'
    filter_optional_office_msouc:
        Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office'
        Image|endswith: '\MSOUC.EXE'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\appvlp.exe'

Stage 2: not filter_main_generic

filter_main_generic:
    Image|endswith:
        - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe'
        - ':\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe'

Stage 3: not filter_optional_*

filter_optional_office_msoasb:
    Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office'
    Image|endswith: '\msoasb.exe'
filter_optional_office_skype:
    Image|contains|all:
        - ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office'
        - '\SkypeSrv\'
    Image|endswith: '\SKYPESERVER.EXE'
filter_optional_office_msouc:
    Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office'
    Image|endswith: '\MSOUC.EXE'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
Imageends_with:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:":\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe"
Imageends_with:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:":\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe"
Imageends_with\MSOUC.EXEexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\MSOUC.EXE"
Imagematch:\Program Files\Microsoft Officeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:":\Program Files\Microsoft Office"
Imageends_with\SKYPESERVER.EXEexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\SKYPESERVER.EXE"
Imagematch\SkypeSrv\excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\SkypeSrv\"
Imageends_with\msoasb.exeexcludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\msoasb.exe"

Back to all Sigma rules