Sigma rules: 1r

title: Administrator login impersonation with forged Golden ticket
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker used a forged Golden ticket to login on a remote host. Per default or if specified, the ticket will be forged using the builtin administrator account (SID *-500). However, and it frequent cases, a non suspicious user name will be specificied during the forge in order to evade security monitoring. The rule works based on this trick.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0006-Credential%20Access/T1558-Steal%20or%20Forge%20Kerberos%20Tickets
- https://infosecwriteups.com/forest-an-asreproast-dcsync-and-golden-ticket-hackthebox-walkthrough-ade8dcdd1ee5
- https://attack.stealthbits.com/how-golden-ticket-attack-works
- https://www.hackingarticles.in/domain-persistence-golden-ticket-attack/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
- https://en.it-pirate.eu/azure-atp-golden-ticket-attack-how-golden-ticket-attacks-work/
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/kerberos-golden-tickets
- https://bond-o.medium.com/golden-ticket-attack-ea89553cf9c0
- https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/13813.localized-names-for-administrator-account-in-windows.aspx
- https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Metcalf-Red-Vs-Blue-Modern-Active-Directory-Attacks-Detection-And-Protection-wp.pdf
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1558.001
author: mdecrevoisier
status: stable
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4624
    TargetUserSid|endswith: '-500' # Refers to builtin Administrator SID account
    LogonProcessName: Kerberos
  filter:
    TargetUserName: # Excludes builtin admin account names when using a localized Windows OS version (select the ones applicable)
      - 'Administrator'  # Default
      - 'Järjestelmänvalvoja' # Finnish
      - 'Administrateur' # French
      - 'Administrador'  # Spanish / Portuguese
      - 'Administratör'  # Swedish
      - 'Rendszergazda'  # Hungarian
      - 'Администратор'  # Russian
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- login with renamed builtin administrator account ("administrator" renamed to "admin_org")
level: high

title: Arcadyan Router Exploitations
id: f0500377-bc70-425d-ac8c-e956cd906871
status: test
description: Detects exploitation of vulnerabilities in Arcadyan routers as reported in CVE-2021-20090 and CVE-2021-20091.
references:
    - https://medium.com/tenable-techblog/bypassing-authentication-on-arcadyan-routers-with-cve-2021-20090-and-rooting-some-buffalo-ea1dd30980c2
    - https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2021-13
    - https://blogs.juniper.net/en-us/security/freshly-disclosed-vulnerability-cve-2021-20090-exploited-in-the-wild
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-08-24
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2021-20090
    - cve.2021-20091
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    path_traversal:
        # CVE-2021-20090 (Bypass Auth: Path Traversal)
        cs-uri-query|contains: '..%2f'
    config_file_inj:
        cs-uri-query|contains|all:
            # Chaining of CVE-2021-20090 (Bypass Auth) and CVE-2021-20091 (Config File Injection)
            - '..%2f'
            - 'apply_abstract.cgi'
    noauth_list:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '/images/'
            - '/js/'
            - '/css/'
            - '/setup_top_login.htm'
            - '/login.html'
            - '/loginerror.html'
            - '/loginexclude.html'
            - '/loginlock.html'
    condition: (path_traversal or config_file_inj) and noauth_list
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: Bitbucket Global SSH Settings Changed
id: 16ab6143-510a-44e2-a615-bdb80b8317fc
status: test
description: Detects Bitbucket global SSH access configuration changes.
references:
    - https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/audit-log-events-776640423.html
    - https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/enable-ssh-access-to-git-repositories-776640358.html
author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf)
date: 2024-02-25
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.t1021.004
logsource:
    product: bitbucket
    service: audit
    definition: 'Requirements: "Advance" log level is required to receive these audit events.'
detection:
    selection:
        auditType.category: 'Global administration'
        auditType.action: 'SSH settings changed'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate user activity.
level: medium

title: Blackbyte Ransomware Registry
id: 83314318-052a-4c90-a1ad-660ece38d276
status: test
description: |
    Detects specific windows registry modifications made by BlackByte ransomware variants.
    BlackByte set three different registry values to escalate privileges and begin setting the stage for lateral movement and encryption.
    This rule triggers when any of the following registry keys are set to DWORD 1, however all three should be investigated as part of a larger BlackByte ransomware detection and response effort.
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/blackbyte-ransomware-pt-1-in-depth-analysis/
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-24
modified: 2025-10-21
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject:
            - 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy'
            - 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLinkedConnections'
            - 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem\LongPathsEnabled'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules-emerging-threats/2021/Malware/BlackByte/registry_set_win_malware_blackbyte_privesc_registry/info.yml

title: Chmod Targeting Sensitive Directories
id: 6419afd1-3742-47a5-a7e6-b50386cd15f8
status: test
description: |
    Detects chmod targeting files in sensitive directory paths on Linux systems.
    Attackers may use chmod to change permissions of files in these directories to maintain persistence, escalate privileges, or disrupt system operations.
references:
    - https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/new-backdoor-sysjoker/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.md
author: 'Christopher Peacock @SecurePeacock, SCYTHE @scythe_io'
date: 2022-06-03
modified: 2026-03-18
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1222.002
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/chmod'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/tmp/'
            - '/.Library/'
            - '/etc/'
            - '/opt/'
    filter_main_update_shells:
        CommandLine|contains: 'chmod --reference=/etc/shells'
        ParentCommandLine|endswith: '/update-shells'
    filter_main_postinst:
        CommandLine|contains: '/etc/'
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/var/lib/dpkg/info/'
            - '.postinst configure'
    filter_main_apt_key:
        CommandLine|startswith: 'chmod 700 /tmp/apt-key-gpghome.'
    filter_main_mkinitramfs:
        CommandLine|startswith: 'chmod 755 /var/tmp/mkinitramfs'
    filter_main_landscape:
        CommandLine: 'chmod 0775 /etc/landscape/'
    filter_main_ubuntu_apparmor:
        CommandLine: 'chmod 644 /etc/apparmor.d/tunables/home.d/ubuntu'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Some false positives are to be expected. Apply additional filters as needed before pushing to production.
level: medium

title: Cloudflared Quick Tunnel Execution
id: 222129f7-f4dc-4568-b0d2-22440a9639ba
related:
    - id: 7050bba1-1aed-454e-8f73-3f46f09ce56a
      type: similar
    - id: 9a019ffc-3580-4c9d-8d87-079f7e8d3fd4
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects creation of an ad-hoc Cloudflare Quick Tunnel, which can be used to tunnel local services such as HTTP, RDP, SSH and SMB.
    The free TryCloudflare Quick Tunnel will generate a random subdomain on trycloudflare[.]com, following a call to api[.]trycloudflare[.]com.
    The tool has been observed in use by threat groups including Akira ransomware.
references:
    - https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-networks/do-more-with-tunnels/trycloudflare/
    - https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared
    - https://www.intrinsec.com/akira_ransomware/
    - https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/tunnel-vision-cloudflared-abused-in-the-wild/
author: Sajid Nawaz Khan
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.001
date: 2023-12-20
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cloudflared.exe'
              - '\cloudflared-windows-386.exe'
              - '\cloudflared-windows-amd64.exe'
        - Hashes|contains:
              - 'SHA256=2fb6c04c4f95fb8d158af94c137f90ac820716deaf88d8ebec956254e046cb29'
              - 'SHA256=b3d21940a10fdef5e415ad70331ce257c24fe3bcf7722262302e0421791f87e8'
              - 'SHA256=1fbd8362b2d2d2e6a5750ae3db69cd1815e6c1d31da48a98b796450971a8e039'
              - 'SHA256=0409c9b12f9d0eda86e461ed9bdabeefb00172b26322079681a0bdf48e68dc28'
              - 'SHA256=7cfb411d04bac42ef93d1f0c93c0a481e38c6f4612b97ae89d4702595988edc7'
              - 'SHA256=5b3c2d846ab162dc6bc595cce3a49de5731afde5d6060be7066d21b013a28373'
              - 'SHA256=ce95df7f69664c3df19b76028e115931919a71517b776da7b42d353e2ff4a670'
              - 'SHA256=1293525a19cfe3bc8296b62fbfe19f083632ed644a1c18c10b045a1d3030d81a'
              - 'SHA256=af2b9161cfcb654b16408cd6b098afe9d1fb61a037d18d7090a119d4c0c8e0f0'
              - 'SHA256=39ddceb56a15798826a5fc4892fa2b474c444bb4d7a8bf2fa95e41cab10fa7a1'
              - 'SHA256=ccd11f2328023a0e7929e845d5b6e7bc783fb4650d65faef3ae090239d4bbce2'
              - 'SHA256=b6e5c5d2567ae8c69cc012ebcae30e6c9b5359d64a58d17ba75ec89f8bce71ac'
              - 'SHA256=f813484ea441404f18caad96f28138e8aaf0cb256163c09c2ab8a3acab87f69f'
              - 'SHA256=fc4a0802ab9c7409b892ca00636bec61e2acfc911bccfdeb9978b8ab5a2f828d'
              - 'SHA256=083150724b49604c8765c1ba19541fa260b133be0acb0647fcd936d81f054499'
              - 'SHA256=44303d6572956f28a0f2e4b188934fb9874f2584f5c81fa431a463cfbf28083b'
              - 'SHA256=5d38c46032a58e28ae5f7d174d8761ec3d64d186677f3ec53af5f51afb9bfd2f'
              - 'SHA256=e1e70fa42059911bc6685fafef957f9a73fc66f214d0704a9b932683a5204032'
              - 'SHA256=c01356092a365b84f84f0e66870bd1a05ba3feb53cafd973fa5fea2534bee234'
              - 'SHA256=b3f9c06151e30ee43d39e788a79cd918a314f24e04fe87f3de8272a2057b624f'
              - 'SHA256=cd81b2792f0739f473c31c9cb7cf2313154bfa28b839975802b90e8790bb5058'
              - 'SHA256=9ec7e6c8e1bfd883663d8d9d62c9e4f9ae373b731407181e32491b27a7218a2c'
              - 'SHA256=c2cfd23fdc6c0e1b1ffa0e545cbe556f18d11b362b4a89ba0713f6ab01c4827f'
              - 'SHA256=53f8adbd76c0eb16f5e43cadde422474d8a06f9c8f959389c1930042ad8beaa5'
              - 'SHA256=648c8d2f8001c113d2986dd00b7bbd181593d462bef73522cee212c4f71f95b3'
              - 'SHA256=ae047e2095e46c3f9c518b2be67ec753f4f0aad23b261a361fcb6144dcdb63b4'
              - 'SHA256=3153d2baa462978dd22ab33d1c2274ecc88c200225d6a3327f98d5b752d08f5c'
              - 'SHA256=f49cde976e628012c9db73e1c8d76081944ecf2297cdafeb78bb13290da274c4'
              - 'SHA256=d2513e58bb03ccc83affde685c6ef987924c37ce6707d8e9857e2524b0d7e90f'
              - 'SHA256=bb67c7623ba92fe64ffd9816b8d5b3b1ea3013960a30bd4cf6e295b3eb5b1bad'
              - 'SHA256=b34b3c3a91e3165d1481f0b3ec23eab93a1cfba94345a6cbfe5b18ddbd48eac7'
              - 'SHA256=f7848034e010d55f15e474ca998f96391e320ff29b00cfcc4c5e536529703e75'
              - 'SHA256=b6fc9493778cbe3bfc062d73f5cc604bc0ff058bc5e5dc6aac87f3a4008b54b6'
              - 'SHA256=f5c5e962577e2293c4ad10603816dce7cc273585969615fbf4e4bfa9eaff1688'
              - 'SHA256=d14c52d9220b606f428a8fe9f7c108b0d6f14cf71e7384749e98e6a95962e68f'
              - 'SHA256=d3a0e1a79158f3985cd49607ebe0cdfcc49cb9af96b8f43aefd0cdfe2f22e663'
              - 'SHA256=2fbbfc8299537ff80cadf9d0e27c223fe0ccb9052bf9d8763ad717bbfa521c77'
              - 'SHA256=19074674c6fbdaa573b3081745e5e26144fdf7a086d14e0e220d1814f1f13078'
    # Note:
    #   Accounts for the cloudflared binaries being renamed
    #   `tunnel` is optional, but has been included to reduce the possibility of parameter collision when not observed with known binary names
    selection_param:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '-url'
              - 'tunnel'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '.exe -url'
              - '.exe --url'
    selection_other:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-url'
            - '-no-autoupdate'
    condition: (selection_img and selection_param) or selection_other
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of Cloudflare Quick Tunnel
level: medium

title: CodeIntegrity - Revoked Image Loaded
id: 881b7725-47cc-4055-8000-425823344c59
status: test
description: Detects image load events with revoked certificates by code integrity.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-tag-explanations
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: codeintegrity-operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 3032 # Code Integrity determined a revoked image %2 is loaded into the system. Check with the publisher to see if a new signed version of the image is available.
            - 3035 # Code Integrity determined a revoked image %2 is loaded into the system. The image is allowed to load because kernel mode debugger is attached.
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: CVE-2021-21972 VSphere Exploitation
id: 179ed852-0f9b-4009-93a7-68475910fd86
status: test
description: Detects the exploitation of VSphere Remote Code Execution vulnerability as described in CVE-2021-21972
references:
    - https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2021-0002.html
    - https://f5.pm/go-59627.html
    - https://swarm.ptsecurity.com/unauth-rce-vmware
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-02-24
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2021-21972
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-query: '/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - OVA uploads to your VSphere appliance
level: high

title: ETW Logging Disabled In .NET Processes - Registry
id: a4c90ea1-2634-4ca0-adbb-35eae169b6fc
related:
    - id: bf4fc428-dcc3-4bbd-99fe-2422aeee2544
      type: similar
status: test
description: Potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1268712093928378368
    - https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0878832e-39d7-4eaf-8e16-a729c4c40975/what-can-i-use-e13c0d23ccbc4e12931bd9cc2eee27e4-for?forum=clr
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/ee2355c801d892f2894b0f7b14a20e6cc50e0e54/docs/design/coreclr/jit/viewing-jit-dumps.md#setting-configuration-variables
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/f62e93416a1799aecc6b0947adad55a0d9870732/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfigvalues.h#L35-L38
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/7abe42dc1123722ed385218268bb9fe04556e3d3/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfig.h#L33-L39
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/search?p=1&q=COMPlus_&unscoped_q=COMPlus_
    - https://bunnyinside.com/?term=f71e8cb9c76a
    - http://managed670.rssing.com/chan-5590147/all_p1.html
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/4f9ae42d861fcb4be2fcd5d3d55d5f227d30e723/docs/coding-guidelines/clr-jit-coding-conventions.md#1412-disabling-code
    - https://i.blackhat.com/EU-21/Wednesday/EU-21-Teodorescu-Veni-No-Vidi-No-Vici-Attacks-On-ETW-Blind-EDRs.pdf
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-06-05
modified: 2022-12-20
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_etw_enabled:
        EventID: 4657
        ObjectName|endswith: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework'
        ObjectValueName: 'ETWEnabled'
        NewValue: 0
    selection_complus:
        EventID: 4657
        ObjectName|contains: '\Environment'
        ObjectValueName:
            - 'COMPlus_ETWEnabled'
            - 'COMPlus_ETWFlags'
        NewValue: 0
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Folder Compress To Potentially Suspicious Output Via Compress-Archive Cmdlet
id: 85a8e5ba-bd03-4bfb-bbfa-a4409a8f8b98 # Process Creation
related:
    - id: 71ff406e-b633-4989-96ec-bc49d825a412 # PowerShell Classic
      type: similar
    - id: daf7eb81-35fd-410d-9d7a-657837e602bb # PowerShell Module
      type: similar
    - id: b7a3c9a3-09ea-4934-8864-6a32cacd98d9 # PowerShell Script
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects PowerShell scripts that make use of the "Compress-Archive" Cmdlet in order to compress folders and files where the output is stored in a potentially suspicious location that is used often by malware for exfiltration.
    An adversary might compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.md
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2021-07-20
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1074.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Compress-Archive -Path*-DestinationPath $env:TEMP'
            - 'Compress-Archive -Path*-DestinationPath*\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - 'Compress-Archive -Path*-DestinationPath*:\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_zip_compress/info.yml

title: HackTool - LittleCorporal Generated Maldoc Injection
id: 7bdde3bf-2a42-4c39-aa31-a92b3e17afac
status: test
description: Detects the process injection of a LittleCorporal generated Maldoc.
references:
    - https://github.com/connormcgarr/LittleCorporal
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-09
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1055.003
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        SourceImage|endswith: '\winword.exe'
        CallTrace|contains|all:
            - ':\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v2.'
            - 'UNKNOWN'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - NetExec Execution
id: 7638e5fe-600c-4289-a968-f49dd537ec7d
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects execution of the hacktool NetExec.
    NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation tool designed for Active Directory penetration testing and network enumeration
    In enterprise environments, the use of NetExec is considered suspicious or potentially malicious because it enables attackers to enumerate hosts, exploit network services, and move laterally across systems.
    Threat actors and red teams commonly use NetExec to identify vulnerable systems, harvest credentials, and execute commands remotely.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/12/17/cats-got-your-files-lynx-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec
    - https://www.netexec.wiki/
author: Chirag Damani
date: 2026-03-29
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\nxc.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' ftp '
            - ' ldap '
            - ' mssql '
            - ' nfs '
            - ' rdp '
            - ' smb '
            - ' ssh '
            - ' vnc '
            - ' winrm '
            - ' wmi '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of NetExec by security professionals or system administrators for network assessment and management.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_netexec/info.yml

title: History File Deletion
id: 1182f3b3-e716-4efa-99ab-d2685d04360f
status: test
description: Detects events in which a history file gets deleted, e.g. the ~/bash_history to remove traces of malicious activity
references:
    - https://github.com/sleventyeleven/linuxprivchecker/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.003/T1552.003.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-20
modified: 2022-09-15
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1565.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/rm'
            - '/unlink'
            - '/shred'
    selection_history:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '/.bash_history'
              - '/.zsh_history'
        - CommandLine|endswith:
              - '_history'
              - '.history'
              - 'zhistory'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: high

title: Linux Doas Tool Execution
id: 067d8238-7127-451c-a9ec-fa78045b618b
status: stable
description: Detects the doas tool execution in linux host platform. This utility tool allow standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does.
references:
    - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/linux_doas_tool_execution/
    - https://www.makeuseof.com/how-to-install-and-use-doas/
author: Sittikorn S, Teoderick Contreras
date: 2022-01-20
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/doas'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: low

title: Login to Disabled Account
id: 908655e0-25cf-4ae1-b775-1c8ce9cf43d8
status: test
description: Detect failed attempts to sign in to disabled accounts.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: AlertIQ
date: 2021-10-10
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        ResultType: 50057
        ResultDescription: 'User account is disabled. The account has been disabled by an administrator.'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Low Reputation Effective Top-Level Domain (eTLD)
id: cf5ee356-65c4-4556-8d11-6977fcdfed4b
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS queries to domains within known low reputation eTLDs. This rule uses AlphaSOC's threat intelligence data and is updated on a monthly basis.
references:
    - https://feeds.alphasoc.net/bad-etlds.txt
author: Norbert Jaśniewicz (AlphaSOC)
date: 2025-08-04
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - attack.initial-access
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: dns
detection:
    selection:
        query|endswith:
            - '.duckdns.org'
            - '.top'
            - '.ddns.net'
            - '.gl.at.ply.gg'
            - '.portmap.io'
            - '.icu'
            - '.zapto.org'
            - '.live'
            - '.hopto.org'
            - '.portmap.host'
            - '.sbs'
            - '.sytes.net'
            - '.click'
            - '.ydns.eu'
            - '.site'
            - '.cloud'
            - '.no-ip.org'
            - '.kozow.com'
            - '.lat'
            - '.pro'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: MSSQL Extended Stored Procedure Backdoor Maggie
id: 711ab2fe-c9ba-4746-8840-5228a58c3cb8
status: test
description: This rule detects the execution of the extended storage procedure backdoor named Maggie in the context of Microsoft SQL server
references:
    - https://medium.com/@DCSO_CyTec/mssql-meet-maggie-898773df3b01
author: Denis Szadkowski, DIRT / DCSO CyTec
date: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'MSSQLSERVER'
        EventID: 8128
        Message|contains: 'maggie'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate extended stored procedures named maggie
level: high

title: New File Exclusion Added To Time Machine Via Tmutil - MacOS
id: 9acf45ed-3a26-4062-bf08-56857613eb52
status: test
description: |
    Detects the addition of a new file or path exclusion to MacOS Time Machine via the "tmutil" utility.
    An adversary could exclude a path from Time Machine backups to prevent certain files from being backed up.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-12---disable-time-machine
    - https://www.loobins.io/binaries/tmutil/
author: Pratinav Chandra
date: 2024-05-29
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '/tmutil'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'tmutil'
    selection_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains: 'addexclusion'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrator activity
level: medium

title: OpenCanary - NMAP XMAS Scan
id: d7553d7b-f485-479c-b192-cdac6edd83a4
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP XMAS Scan
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5004
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via PlistBuddy
id: 65d506d3-fcfe-4071-b4b2-bcefe721bbbb
status: test
description: Detects potential persistence activity using LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons via the PlistBuddy utility
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/
    - https://www.manpagez.com/man/8/PlistBuddy/
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-02-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1543.001
    - attack.t1543.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/PlistBuddy'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'RunAtLoad'
            - 'true'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'LaunchAgents'
            - 'LaunchDaemons'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Qakbot Rundll32 Execution
id: cf879ffb-793a-4753-9a14-bc8f37cc90df
status: test
description: Detects specific process tree behavior of a "rundll32" execution often linked with potential Qakbot activity.
references:
    - https://github.com/pr0xylife/Qakbot/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-24
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_paths:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            # Note: Only add processes seen used by Qakbot to avoid collision with other strains of malware
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\curl.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: Only add paths seen used by Qakbot to avoid collision with other strains of malware
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
    selection_extension:
        CommandLine|contains: '.dll'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules-emerging-threats/2023/Malware/Qakbot/proc_creation_win_malware_qakbot_rundll32_execution/info.yml

title: Qakbot Regsvr32 Calc Pattern
id: 0033cf83-fb87-446d-9cac-43d63ad4d5a9
status: test
description: Detects a specific command line of "regsvr32" where the "calc" keyword is used in conjunction with the "/s" flag. This behavior is often seen used by Qakbot
references:
    - https://github.com/pr0xylife/Qakbot/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-26
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -s'
        CommandLine|endswith: ' calc'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: RDP Over Reverse SSH Tunnel
id: 5f699bc5-5446-4a4a-a0b7-5ef2885a3eb4
status: test
description: Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating with the loopback address and on TCP port 3389
references:
    - https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1096842275437625346
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-02-16
modified: 2024-03-12
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.001
    - car.2013-07-002
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        Initiated: 'true'
        SourcePort: 3389
    selection_destination:
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '::1/128'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Remote Access Tool Services Have Been Installed - System
id: 1a31b18a-f00c-4061-9900-f735b96c99fc
related:
    - id: c8b00925-926c-47e3-beea-298fd563728e
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects service installation of different remote access tools software. These software are often abused by threat actors to perform
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/misbehaving-rats/
author: Connor Martin, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2022-12-23
modified: 2023-06-22
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID:
            - 7045
            - 7036
        ServiceName|contains:
            # Based on https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/pull/2841
            - 'AmmyyAdmin' # https://www.ammyy.com/en/
            - 'Atera'
            - 'BASupportExpressSrvcUpdater' # https://www.systemlookup.com/O23/6837-BASupSrvcUpdater_exe.html
            - 'BASupportExpressStandaloneService' # https://www.systemlookup.com/O23/6839-BASupSrvc_exe.html
            - 'chromoting'
            - 'GoToAssist' # https://www.goto.com/it-management/resolve
            - 'GoToMyPC' # https://get.gotomypc.com/
            - 'jumpcloud'
            - 'LMIGuardianSvc' # https://www.logmein.com/
            - 'LogMeIn' # https://www.logmein.com/
            - 'monblanking'
            - 'Parsec'
            - 'RManService' # https://www.systemlookup.com/O23/7855-rutserv_exe.html
            - 'RPCPerformanceService' # https://www.remotepc.com/
            - 'RPCService' # https://www.remotepc.com/
            - 'SplashtopRemoteService' # https://www.splashtop.com/
            - 'SSUService'
            - 'TeamViewer'
            - 'TightVNC' # https://www.tightvnc.com/
            - 'vncserver'
            - 'Zoho'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Remote CHM File Download/Execution Via HH.EXE
id: f57c58b3-ee69-4ef5-9041-455bf39aaa89
status: test
description: Detects the usage of "hh.exe" to execute/download remotely hosted ".chm" files.
references:
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/follina-for-protocol-handlers.html
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/1cf4dd51f83dcb0ebe6ade902d6157ad2dbc6ac8/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/unintentional-leak-glimpse-attack-vectors-apt37
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-29
modified: 2024-01-31
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'HH.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\hh.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
            - '\\\\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Service Binary in User Controlled Folder
id: 277dc340-0540-42e7-8efb-5ff460045e07
related:
    - id: c625c4c2-515d-407f-8bb6-456f65955669
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
    Detects the setting of the "ImagePath" value of a service registry key to a path controlled by a non-administrator user such as "\AppData\" or "\ProgramData\".
    Attackers often use such directories for staging purposes.
    This rule might also trigger on badly written software, where if an attacker controls an auto starting service, they might achieve persistence or privilege escalation.
    Note that while ProgramData is a user controlled folder, software might apply strict ACLs which makes them only accessible to admin users. Remove such folders via filters if you experience a lot of noise.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-05-02
modified: 2024-03-25
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - 'ControlSet'
            - '\Services\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\ImagePath'
        Details|contains:
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - '\AppData\Local\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
    filter_optional_zoom:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Services\ZoomCptService'
        Details|contains: 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Zoom\Support\CptService.exe'
    filter_optional_mbami:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Services\MBAMInstallerService'
        Details|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Users\'
            - 'AppData\Local\Temp\MBAMInstallerService.exe'
    filter_main_windefend:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Services\WinDefend\'
            - '\Services\MpKs'
        Details|contains: 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules-threat-hunting/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_service_image_path_user_controlled_folder/info.yml

title: UAC Bypass Tools Using ComputerDefaults
id: 3c05e90d-7eba-4324-9972-5d7f711a60a8
status: test
description: Detects tools such as UACMe used to bypass UAC with computerdefaults.exe (UACMe 59)
references:
    - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-31
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'High'
            - 'System'
            - 'S-1-16-16384' # System
            - 'S-1-16-12288' # High
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\ComputerDefaults.exe'
    filter:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - ':\Windows\System32'
            - ':\Program Files'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Unix Shell Configuration Modification
id: a94cdd87-6c54-4678-a6cc-2814ffe5a13d
related:
    - id: e74e15cc-c4b6-4c80-b7eb-dfe49feb7fe9
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detect unix shell configuration modification. Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered when a new shell is opened.
references:
    - https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x68.html
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20221204161143/https://www.glitch-cat.com/p/green-lambert-and-attack
    - https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat
author: Peter Matkovski, IAI
date: 2023-03-06
modified: 2023-03-15
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.004
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection:
        type: 'PATH'
        name:
            - '/etc/shells'
            - '/etc/profile'
            - '/etc/profile.d/*'
            - '/etc/bash.bashrc'
            - '/etc/bashrc'
            - '/etc/zsh/zprofile'
            - '/etc/zsh/zshrc'
            - '/etc/zsh/zlogin'
            - '/etc/zsh/zlogout'
            - '/etc/csh.cshrc'
            - '/etc/csh.login'
            - '/root/.bashrc'
            - '/root/.bash_profile'
            - '/root/.profile'
            - '/root/.zshrc'
            - '/root/.zprofile'
            - '/home/*/.bashrc'
            - '/home/*/.zshrc'
            - '/home/*/.bash_profile'
            - '/home/*/.zprofile'
            - '/home/*/.profile'
            - '/home/*/.bash_login'
            - '/home/*/.bash_logout'
            - '/home/*/.zlogin'
            - '/home/*/.zlogout'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Admin or User activity are expected to generate some false positives
level: medium

title: Windows LAPS Credential Dump From Entra ID
id: a4b25073-8947-489c-a8dd-93b41c23f26d
status: test
description: Detects when an account dumps the LAPS password from Entra ID.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/NathanMcNulty/status/1785051227568632263
    - https://www.cloudcoffee.ch/microsoft-365/configure-windows-laps-in-microsoft-intune/
    - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-entra-blog/introducing-windows-local-administrator-password-solution-with/ba-p/1942487
author: andrewdanis
date: 2024-06-26
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098.005
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        category: 'Device'
        activityType|contains: 'Recover device local administrator password'
        additionalDetails.additionalInfo|contains: 'Successfully recovered local credential by device id'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Approved activity performed by an Administrator.
level: high