Sigma rules: 22

title: Addition of SID History to Active Directory Object
id: 2632954e-db1c-49cb-9936-67d1ef1d17d2
status: stable
description: An attacker can use the SID history attribute to gain additional privileges.
references:
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772
author: Thomas Patzke, @atc_project (improvements)
date: 2017-02-19
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID:
            - 4765
            - 4766
    selection2:
        EventID: 4738
    selection3:
        SidHistory:
            - '-'
            - '%%1793'
    filter_null:
        SidHistory:
    condition: selection1 or (selection2 and not selection3 and not filter_null)
falsepositives:
    - Migration of an account into a new domain
level: medium

title: Arbitrary File Download Via MSEDGE_PROXY.EXE
id: e84d89c4-f544-41ca-a6af-4b92fd38b023
status: test
description: Detects usage of "msedge_proxy.exe" to download arbitrary files
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/msedge_proxy/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\msedge_proxy.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'msedge_proxy.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: AWS EC2 Startup Shell Script Change
id: 1ab3c5ed-5baf-417b-bb6b-78ca33f6c3df
status: test
description: Detects changes to the EC2 instance startup script. The shell script will be executed as root/SYSTEM every time the specific instances are booted up.
references:
    - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/866376cd711666c775bbfcde0524c817f2c5b181/pacu/modules/ec2__startup_shell_script/main.py#L9
author: faloker
date: 2020-02-12
modified: 2022-06-07
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.004
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection_source:
        eventSource: ec2.amazonaws.com
        requestParameters.attribute: 'userData'
        eventName: ModifyInstanceAttribute
    condition: selection_source
falsepositives:
    - Valid changes to the startup script
level: high

title: Devtoolslauncher.exe Executes Specified Binary
id: cc268ac1-42d9-40fd-9ed3-8c4e1a5b87e6
status: test
description: The Devtoolslauncher.exe executes other binary
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Devtoolslauncher/
    - https://twitter.com/_felamos/status/1179811992841797632
author: Beyu Denis, oscd.community (rule), @_felamos (idea)
date: 2019-10-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\devtoolslauncher.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'LaunchForDeploy'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of devtoolslauncher.exe by legitimate user
level: high

title: Diskshadow command abuse to expose VSS backup
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attemps to create an IFM for dumping credentials.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0006-Credential%20Access/T1003-Credential%20dumping
- https://blog.menasec.net/2019/11/forensics-traces-of-ntdsdit-dumping.html
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2398
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration
- https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/
tags:
- attack.credential_dumping
- attack.t1003
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection: # Full command: "diskshadow.exe /s shadow.txt"
    EventID: 4688
    NewProcessName|endswith: \diskshadow.exe
    CommandLine|contains: diskshadow
    CommandLine|contains:
      - /s
      - -s
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrator manipulating VSS backup
level: high

title: GitHub Repository Pages Site Changed to Public
id: 0c46d4f4-a2bf-4104-9597-8d653fc2bb55
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects when a GitHub Pages site of a repository is made public. This usually is part of a publishing process but could indicate or lead to potential unauthorized exposure of sensitive information or code.
references:
    - https://docs.github.com/en/pages/getting-started-with-github-pages/creating-a-github-pages-site
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/exploiting-repos-6-ways-threat-actors-abuse-github-other-devops-platforms
    - https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/keeping-your-account-and-data-secure/security-log-events
author: Ivan Saakov
date: 2025-10-18
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1567.001
logsource:
    product: github
    service: audit
detection:
    selection:
        action: 'repo.pages_public'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate publishing of repository pages by authorized users
level: low

title: Goofy Guineapig Backdoor IOC
id: f0bafe60-1240-4798-9e60-4364b97e6bad
status: test
description: Detects malicious indicators seen used by the Goofy Guineapig malware
references:
    - https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/goofy-guineapig/NCSC-MAR-Goofy-Guineapig.pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename:
            - 'C:\ProgramData\GoogleUpdate\config.dat'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\GoogleUpdate\GoogleUpdate.exe'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\GoogleUpdate\GoogleUpdate\tmp.bat'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\GoogleUpdate\goopdate.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Google Cloud SQL Database Modified or Deleted
id: f346bbd5-2c4e-4789-a221-72de7685090d
status: test
description: Detect when a Cloud SQL DB has been modified or deleted.
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/mysql/admin-api/rest/v1beta4/users/update
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-10-15
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: gcp
    service: gcp.audit
detection:
    selection:
        gcp.audit.method_name:
            - cloudsql.instances.create
            - cloudsql.instances.delete
            - cloudsql.users.update
            - cloudsql.users.delete
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - SQL Database being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.
    - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - SQL Database modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: macOS Setuid/Setgid Privilege Escalation
id: 0f3109b3-d7e5-4c8a-a082-d8f0fa7be7a1
status: experimental
description: 'Detects setuid or setgid operations that transition to root (UID 0) from
  non-root users, which may indicate privilege escalation attempts.

  These syscalls allow processes to change their effective user ID or group ID, often

  used by attackers to gain elevated privileges. High-fidelity detection focuses on

  transitions to root from non-privileged users.

  '
author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
date: 2025/10/31
modified: 2025/10/31
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
logsource:
  product: macos
  service: endpointsecurity
detection:
  selection_setuid:
    esf.event_type: 24
    event.action: setuid
  selection_setgid:
    esf.event_type: 25
    event.action: setgid
  selection_to_root:
    TargetUserId: 0
  selection_root_source:
    UserId: 0
  condition: (selection_setuid or selection_setgid) and selection_to_root and not selection_root_source
falsepositives:
- Legitimate system utilities and services
- Software installation and updates
- Authorized administrative tools
fields:
- event_type
- event_name
- ProcessId
- User
- UserId
- TargetUser
- TargetUserId
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1548.001
- attack.t1068
level: high

title: Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ProcessCreation
id: 02030f2f-6199-49ec-b258-ea71b07e03dc
related:
    - id: 89819aa4-bbd6-46bc-88ec-c7f7fe30efa6
      type: derived
    - id: 7d0d0329-0ef1-4e84-a9f5-49500f9d7c6c
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
references:
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=2921
    - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/tree/master/PowerSharpBinaries
    - https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Invoke-ZeroLogon/blob/111d17c7fec486d9bb23387e2e828b09a26075e4/Invoke-ZeroLogon.ps1
    - https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/848c919bfce4e2d67b626cbcf4404341cfe3d3b6/Get-DXWebcamVideo.ps1
    - https://github.com/rvrsh3ll/Misc-Powershell-Scripts/blob/6f23bb41f9675d7e2d32bacccff75e931ae00554/OfficeMemScraper.ps1
    - https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray/blob/b13d64a5834694aa73fd2aea9911a83027c465a7/DomainPasswordSpray.ps1
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-assessment-black-basta-ransomware/ # Invoke-TotalExec
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/06/06/shining-the-light-on-black-basta/ # Invoke-TotalExec
    - https://github.com/calebstewart/CVE-2021-1675 # Invoke-Nightmare
    - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/blob/0927441f67161cc6dc08a53c63ceb8e333f55874/Collectors/AzureHound.ps1
    - https://bloodhound.readthedocs.io/en/latest/data-collection/azurehound.html
    - https://github.com/HarmJ0y/DAMP
    - https://github.com/samratashok/nishang
    - https://github.com/DarkCoderSc/PowerRunAsSystem/
    - https://github.com/besimorhino/powercat
    - https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Powermad
    - https://github.com/adrecon/ADRecon
    - https://github.com/adrecon/AzureADRecon
    - https://github.com/sadshade/veeam-creds/blob/6010eaf31ba41011b58d6af3950cffbf6f5cea32/Veeam-Get-Creds.ps1
    - https://github.com/The-Viper-One/Invoke-PowerDPAPI/
    - https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-02
modified: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.t1087.001
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1069.001
    - attack.t1069.002
    - attack.t1069
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Note: Please ensure alphabetical order when adding new entries
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Add-Exfiltration'
            - 'Add-Persistence'
            - 'Add-RegBackdoor'
            - 'Add-RemoteRegBackdoor'
            - 'Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor'
            - 'Check-VM'
            - 'ConvertTo-Rc4ByteStream'
            - 'Decrypt-Hash'
            - 'Disable-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Disable-MachineAccount'
            - 'Do-Exfiltration'
            - 'Enable-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Enable-MachineAccount'
            - 'Enabled-DuplicateToken'
            - 'Exploit-Jboss'
            - 'Export-ADR'
            - 'Export-ADRCSV'
            - 'Export-ADRExcel'
            - 'Export-ADRHTML'
            - 'Export-ADRJSON'
            - 'Export-ADRXML'
            - 'Find-Fruit'
            - 'Find-GPOLocation'
            - 'Find-TrustedDocuments'
            - 'Get-ADIDNS' # Covers: Get-ADIDNSNodeAttribute, Get-ADIDNSNodeOwner, Get-ADIDNSNodeTombstoned, Get-ADIDNSPermission, Get-ADIDNSZone
            - 'Get-ApplicationHost'
            - 'Get-ChromeDump'
            - 'Get-ClipboardContents'
            - 'Get-FoxDump'
            - 'Get-GPPPassword'
            - 'Get-IndexedItem'
            - 'Get-KerberosAESKey'
            - 'Get-Keystrokes'
            - 'Get-LSASecret'
            - 'Get-MachineAccountAttribute'
            - 'Get-MachineAccountCreator'
            - 'Get-PassHashes'
            - 'Get-RegAlwaysInstallElevated'
            - 'Get-RegAutoLogon'
            - 'Get-RemoteBootKey'
            - 'Get-RemoteCachedCredential'
            - 'Get-RemoteLocalAccountHash'
            - 'Get-RemoteLSAKey'
            - 'Get-RemoteMachineAccountHash'
            - 'Get-RemoteNLKMKey'
            - 'Get-RickAstley'
            - 'Get-Screenshot'
            - 'Get-SecurityPackages'
            - 'Get-ServiceFilePermission'
            - 'Get-ServicePermission'
            - 'Get-ServiceUnquoted'
            - 'Get-SiteListPassword'
            - 'Get-System'
            - 'Get-TimedScreenshot'
            - 'Get-UnattendedInstallFile'
            - 'Get-Unconstrained'
            - 'Get-USBKeystrokes'
            - 'Get-VaultCredential'
            - 'Get-VulnAutoRun'
            - 'Get-VulnSchTask'
            - 'Grant-ADIDNSPermission'
            - 'Gupt-Backdoor'
            - 'HTTP-Login'
            - 'Install-ServiceBinary'
            - 'Install-SSP'
            - 'Invoke-ACLScanner'
            - 'Invoke-ADRecon'
            - 'Invoke-ADSBackdoor'
            - 'Invoke-AgentSmith'
            - 'Invoke-AllChecks'
            - 'Invoke-ARPScan'
            - 'Invoke-AzureHound'
            - 'Invoke-BackdoorLNK'
            - 'Invoke-BadPotato'
            - 'Invoke-BetterSafetyKatz'
            - 'Invoke-BypassUAC'
            - 'Invoke-Carbuncle'
            - 'Invoke-Certify'
            - 'Invoke-ConPtyShell'
            - 'Invoke-CredentialInjection'
            - 'Invoke-DAFT'
            - 'Invoke-DCSync'
            - 'Invoke-DinvokeKatz'
            - 'Invoke-DllInjection'
            - 'Invoke-DNSUpdate'
            - 'Invoke-DNSExfiltrator'
            - 'Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray'
            - 'Invoke-DowngradeAccount'
            - 'Invoke-EgressCheck'
            - 'Invoke-Eyewitness'
            - 'Invoke-FakeLogonScreen'
            - 'Invoke-Farmer'
            - 'Invoke-Get-RBCD-Threaded'
            - 'Invoke-Gopher'
            - 'Invoke-Grouper' # Also Covers Invoke-GrouperX
            - 'Invoke-HandleKatz'
            - 'Invoke-ImpersonatedProcess'
            - 'Invoke-ImpersonateSystem'
            - 'Invoke-InteractiveSystemPowerShell'
            - 'Invoke-Internalmonologue'
            - 'Invoke-Inveigh'
            - 'Invoke-InveighRelay'
            - 'Invoke-KrbRelay'
            - 'Invoke-LdapSignCheck'
            - 'Invoke-Lockless'
            - 'Invoke-MalSCCM'
            - 'Invoke-Mimikatz'
            - 'Invoke-Mimikittenz'
            - 'Invoke-MITM6'
            - 'Invoke-NanoDump'
            - 'Invoke-NetRipper'
            - 'Invoke-Nightmare'
            - 'Invoke-NinjaCopy'
            - 'Invoke-OfficeScrape'
            - 'Invoke-OxidResolver'
            - 'Invoke-P0wnedshell'
            - 'Invoke-Paranoia'
            - 'Invoke-PortScan'
            - 'Invoke-PoshRatHttp' # Also Covers Invoke-PoshRatHttps
            - 'Invoke-PostExfil'
            - 'Invoke-PowerDump'
            - 'Invoke-PowerDPAPI'
            - 'Invoke-PowerShellTCP'
            - 'Invoke-PowerShellWMI'
            - 'Invoke-PPLDump'
            - 'Invoke-PsExec'
            - 'Invoke-PSInject'
            - 'Invoke-PsUaCme'
            - 'Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection'
            - 'Invoke-ReverseDNSLookup'
            - 'Invoke-Rubeus'
            - 'Invoke-RunAs'
            - 'Invoke-SafetyKatz'
            - 'Invoke-SauronEye'
            - 'Invoke-SCShell'
            - 'Invoke-Seatbelt'
            - 'Invoke-ServiceAbuse'
            - 'Invoke-ShadowSpray'
            - 'Invoke-Sharp' # Covers all "Invoke-Sharp" variants
            - 'Invoke-Shellcode'
            - 'Invoke-SMBScanner'
            - 'Invoke-Snaffler'
            - 'Invoke-Spoolsample'
            - 'Invoke-SpraySinglePassword'
            - 'Invoke-SSHCommand'
            - 'Invoke-StandIn'
            - 'Invoke-StickyNotesExtract'
            - 'Invoke-SystemCommand'
            - 'Invoke-Tasksbackdoor'
            - 'Invoke-Tater'
            - 'Invoke-Thunderfox'
            - 'Invoke-ThunderStruck'
            - 'Invoke-TokenManipulation'
            - 'Invoke-Tokenvator'
            - 'Invoke-TotalExec'
            - 'Invoke-UrbanBishop'
            - 'Invoke-UserHunter'
            - 'Invoke-VoiceTroll'
            - 'Invoke-Whisker'
            - 'Invoke-WinEnum'
            - 'Invoke-winPEAS'
            - 'Invoke-WireTap'
            - 'Invoke-WmiCommand'
            - 'Invoke-WMIExec'
            - 'Invoke-WScriptBypassUAC'
            - 'Invoke-Zerologon'
            - 'MailRaider'
            - 'New-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'New-DNSRecordArray'
            - 'New-HoneyHash'
            - 'New-InMemoryModule'
            - 'New-MachineAccount'
            - 'New-SOASerialNumberArray'
            - 'Out-Minidump'
            - 'Port-Scan'
            - 'PowerBreach'
            - 'powercat '
            - 'PowerUp'
            - 'PowerView'
            - 'Remove-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Remove-MachineAccount'
            - 'Remove-Update'
            - 'Rename-ADIDNSNode'
            - 'Revoke-ADIDNSPermission'
            - 'Set-ADIDNSNode' # Covers: Set-ADIDNSNodeAttribute, Set-ADIDNSNodeOwner
            - 'Set-MacAttribute'
            - 'Set-MachineAccountAttribute'
            - 'Set-Wallpaper'
            - 'Show-TargetScreen'
            - 'Start-CaptureServer'
            - 'Start-Dnscat2'
            - 'Start-WebcamRecorder'
            - 'Veeam-Get-Creds'
            - 'VolumeShadowCopyTools'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_malicious_cmdlets/info.yml

title: Modification of ld.so.preload
id: 4b3cb710-5e83-4715-8c45-8b2b5b3e5751
status: test
description: Identifies modification of ld.so.preload for shared object injection. This technique is used by attackers to load arbitrary code into processes.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1574.006/T1574.006.md
    - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/fd9b987a-1101-4ed3-bda6-a70300eaf57e.html
author: E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Tony Lambert), oscd.community
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.006
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection:
        type: 'PATH'
        name: '/etc/ld.so.preload'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: MSExchange Transport Agent Installation - Builtin
id: 4fe151c2-ecf9-4fae-95ae-b88ec9c2fca6
related:
    - id: 83809e84-4475-4b69-bc3e-4aad8568612f
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the Installation of a Exchange Transport Agent
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=7
author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-08
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: msexchange-management
detection:
    selection:
        - 'Install-TransportAgent'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate installations of exchange TransportAgents. AssemblyPath is a good indicator for this.
level: medium

title: Network Connection Initiated From Process Located In Potentially Suspicious Or Uncommon Location
id: 7b434893-c57d-4f41-908d-6a17bf1ae98f
related:
    - id: 8b48ad89-10d8-4382-a546-50588c410f0d
      type: similar
    - id: d635249d-86b5-4dad-a8c7-d7272b788586
      type: similar
    - id: 52182dfb-afb7-41db-b4bc-5336cb29b464
      type: similar
    - id: ae02ed70-11aa-4a22-b397-c0d0e8f6ea99
      type: similar
    - id: e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97
      type: similar
    - id: 8518ed3d-f7c9-4601-a26c-f361a4256a0c
      type: similar
    - id: 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794
      type: similar
    - id: 56454143-524f-49fb-b1c6-3fb8b1ad41fb
      type: similar
    - id: b6e04788-29e1-4557-bb14-77f761848ab8
      type: similar
    - id: a0d7e4d2-bede-4141-8896-bc6e237e977c
      type: similar
    - id: 297ae038-edc2-4b2e-bb3e-7c5fc94dd5c7
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects a network connection initiated by programs or processes running from suspicious or uncommon files system locations.
references:
    - https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17pSTDNpa0sf6pHeRhusvWG6rThciE8CsXTSlDUAZDyo
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-19
modified: 2026-03-29
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        Image|contains:
            - ':\$Recycle.bin'
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Default\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Fonts\'
            - ':\Windows\IME\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - '\config\systemprofile\'
            - '\Contacts\'
            - '\Favorites\'
            - '\Favourites\'
            - '\Music\'
            - '\Pictures\'
            - '\Videos\'
            - '\Windows\addins\'
    filter_main_domains:
        # Note: We exclude these domains to avoid duplicate filtering from e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - '.githubusercontent.com'       # Includes both gists and github repositories / Michael Haag (idea)
            - '0x0.st'
            - 'anonfiles.com'
            - 'bashupload.com'
            - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
            - 'chunk.io'
            - 'ddns.net'
            - 'dl.dropboxusercontent.com'
            - 'ghostbin.co'
            - 'github.com'
            - 'glitch.me'
            - 'gofile.io'
            - 'hastebin.com'
            - 'mediafire.com'
            - 'mega.co.nz'
            - 'mega.nz'
            - 'onrender.com'
            - 'pages.dev'
            - 'paste.ee'
            - 'pastebin.com'
            - 'pastebin.pl'
            - 'pastetext.net'
            - 'portmap.io'  # https://pro.twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/1795001037746761892/photo/2
            - 'privatlab.com'
            - 'privatlab.net'
            - 'send.exploit.in'
            - 'sendspace.com'
            - 'storage.googleapis.com'
            - 'storjshare.io'
            - 'supabase.co'
            - 'temp.sh'
            - 'transfer.sh'
            - 'trycloudflare.com'
            - 'ufile.io'
            - 'w3spaces.com'
            - 'workers.dev'
            - 'x0.at'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Network Reconnaissance Activity
id: e6313acd-208c-44fc-a0ff-db85d572e90e
status: test
description: Detects a set of suspicious network related commands often used in recon stages
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-07
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.t1082
    - car.2016-03-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'nslookup'
            - '_ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_nslookup_domain_discovery/info.yml

title: NTDS Exfiltration Filename Patterns
id: 3a8da4e0-36c1-40d2-8b29-b3e890d5172a
status: test
description: Detects creation of files with specific name patterns seen used in various tools that export the NTDS.DIT for exfiltration.
references:
    - https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/eb6535009f5fdafa954525687f09294918b5398d/modules/post/windows/gather/ntds_grabber.rb
    - https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/eb6535009f5fdafa954525687f09294918b5398d/data/post/powershell/NTDSgrab.ps1
    - https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/7d2991d78836b376452ca58b3d14daa61b67cb40/impacket/examples/secretsdump.py#L2405
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-11
modified: 2023-05-05
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\All.cab' # https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/eb6535009f5fdafa954525687f09294918b5398d/data/post/powershell/NTDSgrab.ps1
            - '.ntds.cleartext' # https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/7d2991d78836b376452ca58b3d14daa61b67cb40/impacket/examples/secretsdump.py#L2405
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Office Macro File Creation
id: 91174a41-dc8f-401b-be89-7bfc140612a0
related:
    - id: 0e29e3a7-1ad8-40aa-b691-9f82ecd33d66
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a new office macro files on the systems
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1566.001/T1566.001.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployoffice/compat/office-file-format-reference
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-23
modified: 2026-01-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.docm'
            - '.dotm'
            - '.xlsm'
            - '.xltm'
            - '.potm'
            - '.pptm'
    filter_main_office:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\WINWORD.EXE'
            - '\EXCEL.EXE'
            - '\POWERPNT.EXE'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\~$' # Temporary files created by Office applications
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Very common in environments that rely heavily on macro documents
level: low

title: Potential Nimbuspwn Exploit CVE-2022-29799 and CVE-2022-27800
id: 7ba05b43-adad-4c02-b5e9-c8c35cdf9fa8
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential exploitation attempts of Nimbuspwn vulnerabilities CVE-2022-29799 and CVE-2022-27800 in Linux systems.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/26/microsoft-finds-new-elevation-of-privilege-linux-vulnerability-nimbuspwn/
    - https://github.com/Immersive-Labs-Sec/nimbuspwn
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2022-05-04
modified: 2025-11-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - cve.2022-29799
    - cve.2022-27800
logsource:
    product: linux
detection:
    keywords:
        '|all':
            - 'networkd-dispatcher'
            - 'Error handling notification for interface'
            - '../../'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Privilege Escalation via Local Kerberos Relay over LDAP
id: 749c9f5e-b353-4b90-a9c1-05243357ca4b
status: test
description: |
    Detects a suspicious local successful logon event where the Logon Package is Kerberos, the remote address is set to localhost, and the target user SID is the built-in local Administrator account.
    This may indicate an attempt to leverage a Kerberos relay attack variant that can be used to elevate privilege locally from a domain joined limited user to local System privileges.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1518976397364056071?s=12&t=qKO5eKHvWhAP19a50FTZ7g
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/5fe7833312031a4787e07893e27e4ea7a7665745/rules/_deprecated/privilege_escalation_krbrelayup_suspicious_logon.toml#L38
author: Elastic, @SBousseaden
date: 2022-04-27
modified: 2024-08-13
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1548
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 3
        AuthenticationPackageName: 'Kerberos'
        IpAddress: '127.0.0.1'
        TargetUserSid|startswith: 'S-1-5-21-'
        TargetUserSid|endswith: '-500'
    filter_main_ip_null:
        IpPort: '0'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Shim Database Persistence via Sdbinst.EXE
id: 517490a7-115a-48c6-8862-1a481504d5a8
related:
    - id: 18ee686c-38a3-4f65-9f44-48a077141f42
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects installation of a new shim using sdbinst.exe.
    Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fin7-shim-databases-persistence
author: Markus Neis
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2023-12-06
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1546.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\sdbinst.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sdbinst.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '.sdb'
    filter_optional_iis:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Expected behavior for IIS Express (e.g. https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/15d4ff941f77f7bdfc9dfb2399b7b952a0a2c860976ef3e835998ff4796e5e91?environmentId=120)
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\IIS Express\iisexpressshim.sdb'
            - ':\Program Files\IIS Express\iisexpressshim.sdb'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sdbinst_shim_persistence/info.yml

title: Potential Suspicious PowerShell Keywords
id: 1f49f2ab-26bc-48b3-96cc-dcffbc93eadf
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious keywords that could indicate the use of a PowerShell exploitation framework
references:
    - https://posts.specterops.io/entering-a-covenant-net-command-and-control-e11038bcf462
    - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/CodeExecution/Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1
    - https://github.com/hlldz/Phant0m/blob/30c2935d8cf4aafda17ee2fab7cd0c4aa9a607c2/old/Invoke-Phant0m.ps1
    - https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/0dbe00ad401daa7137c81c99c268cfb7
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Perez Diego (@darkquassar), Tuan Le (NCSGroup)
date: 2019-02-11
modified: 2023-04-21
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'System.Reflection.Assembly.Load($'
            - '[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load($'
            - '[Reflection.Assembly]::Load($'
            - 'System.Reflection.AssemblyName'
            - 'Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess'
            - 'Reflection.Emit.CustomAttributeBuilder'
            - 'Runtime.InteropServices.UnmanagedType'
            - 'Runtime.InteropServices.DllImportAttribute'
            - 'SuspendThread'
            - 'rundll32'
            # - 'FromBase64'
            # - 'Invoke-WMIMethod' # Prone to FP
            # - 'http://127.0.0.1' # Prone to FP
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potentially Suspicious Wuauclt Network Connection
id: c649a6c7-cd8c-4a78-9c04-000fc76df954
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the Windows Update Client binary (wuauclt.exe) to proxy execute code and making network connections.
    One could easily make the DLL spawn a new process and inject to it to proxy the network connection and bypass this rule.
references:
    - https://dtm.uk/wuauclt/
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2024-03-12
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: The CommandLine field enrichment is required in order for this rule to be used.'
detection:
    selection:
        Image|contains: 'wuauclt'
        CommandLine|contains: ' /RunHandlerComServer'
    # "C:\WINDOWS\uus\AMD64\wuauclt.exe" /DeploymentHandlerFullPath \\?\C:\Windows\UUS\AMD64\UpdateDeploy.dll /ClassId aaa256e1-5b21-4993-9188-18f07ccb3b98 /RunHandlerComServer
    filter_main_ip:
        DestinationIp|cidr: # Ranges excluded based on https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/0f176092326ab9d1e19384d30224e5f29f760d82/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_dllhost_net_connections.yml
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'  # link-local address
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
    filter_main_msrange:  # Sysmon
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '20.184.0.0/13' # Microsoft Corporation
            - '20.192.0.0/10' # Microsoft Corporation
            - '23.79.0.0/16' # Microsoft Corporation
            - '51.10.0.0/15'
            - '51.103.0.0/16' # Microsoft Corporation
            - '51.104.0.0/15' # Microsoft Corporation
            - '52.224.0.0/11' # Microsoft Corporation
    filter_main_uus:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\Windows\UUS\Packages\Preview\amd64\updatedeploy.dll /ClassId'
            - ':\Windows\UUS\amd64\UpdateDeploy.dll /ClassId'
    filter_main_winsxs:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
            - '\UpdateDeploy.dll /ClassId '
    filter_main_cli_null:
        CommandLine: null
    filter_main_cli_empty:
        CommandLine: ''
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: PsExec Tool Execution From Suspicious Locations - PipeName
id: 41504465-5e3a-4a5b-a5b4-2a0baadd4463
related:
    - id: f3f3a972-f982-40ad-b63c-bca6afdfad7c
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects PsExec default pipe creation where the image executed is located in a suspicious location. Which could indicate that the tool is being used in an attack
references:
    - https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html
    - https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-04
modified: 2023-09-20
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.s0029
logsource:
    category: pipe_created
    product: windows
    definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
    selection:
        PipeName: '\PSEXESVC'
        Image|contains: # Add or remove locations depending on how and if you execute Psexec in your env
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate use of psexec from the locations mentioned above. This will require initial tuning based on your environment.
level: medium

title: PUA - 3Proxy Execution
id: f38a82d2-fba3-4781-b549-525efbec8506
status: test
description: Detects the use of 3proxy, a tiny free proxy server
references:
    - https://github.com/3proxy/3proxy
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-13
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\3proxy.exe'
    selection_pe:
        Description: '3proxy - tiny proxy server'
    selection_params: # param combos seen in the wild
        CommandLine|contains: '.exe -i127.0.0.1 -p'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity
level: high

title: SQL Server lateral movement with CLR activation
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker enables CLR (Common Language Runtime with .NET) to abuse store procedures in order to move lateraly.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1505.001-SQL%20Stored%20Procedures
- https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/21/mssql-lateral-movement/
- http://www.eventid.net/display-eventid-15457-source-MSSQLSERVER-eventno-9658-phase-1.htm
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1505.001
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: mssql
  category: application
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 15457
    EventData|contains: '<Data>clr enabled</Data><Data>0</Data><Data>1</Data>' # 0 is for previous status and 1 for new status
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None
level: high

title: Suspicious Msiexec Quiet Install From Remote Location
id: 8150732a-0c9d-4a99-82b9-9efb9b90c40c
related:
    - id: f7b5f842-a6af-4da5-9e95-e32478f3cd2f
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of Msiexec.exe to install packages hosted remotely quietly
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/27/raspberry-robin-worm-part-of-larger-ecosystem-facilitating-pre-ransomware-activity/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-28
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'msiexec.exe'
    selection_cli:
        # Note that there is no space before and after the arguments because it's possible to write a commandline as such
        # Example: msiexec -q/i [MSI Package]
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - '-i'
            - '-package'
            - '-a'
            - '-j'
    selection_quiet:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-q'
    selection_remote:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http'
            - '\\\\'
    filter_optional_openoffice:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\OpenOffice'
            - 'Installation Files\openoffice'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium