Sigma rules: 25

title: ADCS Certificate Template Configuration Vulnerability with Risky EKU
id: bfbd3291-de87-4b7c-88a2-d6a5deb28668
status: test
description: Detects certificate creation with template allowing risk permission subject and risky EKU
references:
    - https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf
author: Orlinum , BlueDefenZer
date: 2021-11-17
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: Certificate services loaded a template would trigger event ID 4898 and certificate Services template was updated would trigger event ID 4899. A risk permission seems to be coming if template contain specific flag with risky EKU.
detection:
    selection10:
        EventID: 4898
        TemplateContent|contains:
            - '1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2'
            - '1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4'
            - '1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2'
            - '2.5.29.37.0'
    selection11:
        TemplateContent|contains: 'CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT'

    selection20:
        EventID: 4899
        NewTemplateContent|contains:
            - '1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2'
            - '1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4'
            - '1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2'
            - '2.5.29.37.0'
    selection21:
        NewTemplateContent|contains: 'CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT'

    condition: (selection10 and selection11) or (selection20 and selection21)
falsepositives:
    - Administrator activity
    - Proxy SSL certificate with subject modification
    - Smart card enrollement
level: high

title: API Call From Hacking Distro
id: c85a99f2-bdfa-4d4a-8645-52628b2e4106
status: test
description: |
    An API call was invoked from a Linux hacking distribution (ex: Kali Linux, Parrot OS, etc.).
    When using the aws client, the default user agent is "aws-cli/{version} Python/{python_version} {platform}".
    This rule relies on the user agent string so it is easily bypassed by attackers who hardcode a benign-looing user agent in the botocore library.
references:
    - https://hackingthe.cloud/aws/general-knowledge/using_stolen_iam_credentials/
author: Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
date: 2025-04-24
modified: 2025-04-24
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        userAgent|contains: 
            - 'kali'
            - 'parrot'
            - 'pentoo'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
level: medium

title: Capabilities Discovery - Linux
id: d8d97d51-122d-4cdd-9e2f-01b4b4933530
status: test
description: Detects usage of "getcap" binary. This is often used during recon activity to determine potential binaries that can be abused as GTFOBins or other.
references:
    - https://github.com/SaiSathvik1/Linux-Privilege-Escalation-Notes
    - https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng
    - https://github.com/diego-treitos/linux-smart-enumeration
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-28
modified: 2026-01-24
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/getcap'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -r '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low

title: Inbox Rules Creation Or Update Activity Via ExchangePowerShell Cmdlet
id: 04580eed-e1d6-426b-a570-f6e64a4577f7
related:
    - id: d3577be1-42c9-44a7-b56e-2e8de97349d3
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects inbox rule creation or update via ExchangePowerShell cmdlet, a technique commonly observed in Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks to hide emails.
    The usage of inbox rules can be a sign of a compromised mailbox, where an attacker is attempting to evade detections by suppressing or redirecting incoming emails.
    Analysts should review these rules in context, validate whether they reflect normal user behavior, and correlate with other indicators such as unusual login activity or recent mailbox rule modifications.
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/email-hiding-rules/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/it-it/powershell/module/exchangepowershell/new-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/it-it/powershell/module/exchangepowershell/set-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) (InTheCyber)
date: 2026-02-10
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564.008
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1114.003
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_cmdlet:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'New-InboxRule'
            - 'Set-InboxRule'
    selection_params:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'DeleteMessage'
            - 'MarkAsRead'
            - 'MoveToFolder'
            - 'SubjectOrBodyContainsWords'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate inbox rules created by users or administrators to manage email flow such as filtering, organizing, or automating email handling.
level: medium

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - Security
id: fd0f5778-d3cb-4c9a-9695-66759d04702a
related:
    - id: 51aa9387-1c53-4153-91cc-d73c59ae1ca9
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block linked in the references
references:
    - https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888
author: Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community
date: 2019-11-08
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 4697
    selection_servicefilename:
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\['
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\['
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\['
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$env:ComSpec\[(\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}'
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name'
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\$VerbosePreference\.ToString\('
        - ServiceFileName|re: '\String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: New member added to an Exchange administration group (medium risk)
description: Detects scenarios where a new member is added to a sensitive group related to Exchange server
references:
- https://msexchangeguru.com/2015/12/18/rbac-2016/
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account%20manipulation
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 4728 # security global group member added
      - 4756 # universal group member added
      - 4732 # local and domain local group member added
    TargetUserName:
      - 'Security Reader'
      - 'Exchange View-Only Administrators'
      - 'Organization Management'
      - 'Public Folder Management'
      - 'Recipient Management'
      - 'Records Management'
      - 'Server Management'
      - 'UM Management'
      - 'View-only Organization Management'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Exchange administrator updating server configuration
- Exchange upgrade or migration
level: medium

title: New Port Forwarding Rule Added Via Netsh.EXE
id: 322ed9ec-fcab-4f67-9a34-e7c6aef43614
status: test
description: Detects the execution of netsh commands that configure a new port forwarding (PortProxy) rule
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling.html
    - https://adepts.of0x.cc/netsh-portproxy-code/
    - https://www.dfirnotes.net/portproxy_detection/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), omkar72, oscd.community, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2019-01-29
modified: 2023-09-01
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\netsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'netsh.exe'
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'interface'
            - 'portproxy'
            - 'add'
            - 'v4tov4'
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            # Example: netsh I p a v l=8001 listena=127.0.0.1 connectp=80 c=192.168.1.1
            - 'i ' # interface
            - 'p ' # portproxy
            - 'a ' # add
            - 'v ' # v4tov4
    selection_cli_3:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'connectp'
            - 'listena'
            - 'c='
    condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activity
    - WSL2 network bridge PowerShell script used for WSL/Kubernetes/Docker (e.g. https://github.com/microsoft/WSL/issues/4150#issuecomment-504209723)
level: medium

title: New User Created Via Net.EXE With Never Expire Option
id: b9f0e6f5-09b4-4358-bae4-08408705bd5c
related:
    - id: cd219ff3-fa99-45d4-8380-a7d15116c6dc
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects creation of local users via the net.exe command with the option "never expire"
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-12
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\net.exe'
              - '\net1.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'net.exe'
              - 'net1.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'user'
            - 'add'
            - 'expires:never'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Okta Password Health Report Query
id: 0d58814b-1660-4d31-8c93-d1086ed24cba
status: test
description: |
    Detects all activities against the endpoint "/reports/password-health/*" which should only be accessed via OKTA Admin Console UI.
    Use this rule to hunt for potential suspicious requests. Correlate this event with "admin console" login and alert on requests without any corresponding admin console login
references:
    - https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/okta-support-unit-breach
author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf)
date: 2023-10-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    service: okta
    product: okta
detection:
    selection:
        debugContext.debugData.requestUri|contains: '/reports/password-health/'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - OKTA Admin Activites via Web Console UI.
    - This rule is recommended to be used for threat hunting, especially in the context of OKTA support incident in OCT-2023.
    - This rule can be used to hunt the activity against endpoints like /reports/password-health/async_csv_download_schedule?, which are typically used from Okta Admin Console UI only, without any corresponding admin console login. See reference
level: low

title: Outdated Dependency Or Vulnerability Alert Disabled
id: 34e1c7d4-0cd5-419d-9f1b-1dad3f61018d
status: test
description: |
    Dependabot performs a scan to detect insecure dependencies, and sends Dependabot alerts.
    This rule detects when an organization owner disables Dependabot alerts private repositories or Dependabot security updates for all repositories.
author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf)
date: 2023-01-27
references:
    - https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-alerts/about-dependabot-alerts
    - https://docs.github.com/en/organizations/keeping-your-organization-secure/managing-security-settings-for-your-organization/managing-security-and-analysis-settings-for-your-organization
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1195.001
logsource:
    product: github
    service: audit
    definition: 'Requirements: The audit log streaming feature must be enabled to be able to receive such logs. You can enable following the documentation here: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/streaming-the-audit-log-for-your-enterprise#setting-up-audit-log-streaming'
detection:
    selection:
        action:
            - 'dependabot_alerts_new_repos.disable'
            - 'dependabot_alerts.disable'
            - 'dependabot_security_updates_new_repos.disable'
            - 'dependabot_security_updates.disable'
            - 'repository_vulnerability_alerts.disable'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Approved changes by the Organization owner. Please validate the 'actor' if authorized to make the changes.
level: high

title: Potential CVE-2023-23752 Exploitation Attempt
id: 0e1ebc5a-15d0-4bf6-8199-b2535397433a
status: test
description: Detects the potential exploitation attempt of CVE-2023-23752 an Improper access check, in web service endpoints in Joomla
references:
    - https://xz.aliyun.com/t/12175
    - https://twitter.com/momika233/status/1626464189261942786
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2023-02-23
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2023-23752
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'GET'
        cs-uri-query|contains|all:
            - '/api/index.php/v1/'
            - 'public=true'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Vulnerability scanners
level: high

title: Potential Devil Bait Malware Reconnaissance
id: e8954be4-b2b8-4961-be18-da1a5bda709c
related:
    - id: 8e0bb260-d4b2-4fff-bb8d-3f82118e6892
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects specific process behavior observed with Devil Bait samples
references:
    - https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/devil-bait/NCSC-MAR-Devil-Bait.pdf
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/fa71eee906a7849ba3f4bab74edb577bd1f1f8397ca428591b4a9872ce1f1e9b/behavior
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), NCSC (Idea)
date: 2023-05-15
modified: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_redirect:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\wscript.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '>>%APPDATA%\Microsoft\'
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '.xml'
            - '.txt'
    selection_recon_cmd:
        - CommandLine|re: 'ipconfig\s+/all'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              # Taken from a6f9043627f8be2452153b5dbf6278e9b91763c3b5c2aea537a859e0c8c6b504
              # If you find samples using other commands please add them
              - 'dir'
              - 'systeminfo'
              - 'tasklist'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Executable Run Itself As Sacrificial Process
id: bafd07c6-3ea5-454a-b4be-058fbb073de7
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects when an executable launches an identical instance of itself, a behavior often used to create a suspended “sacrificial” process for code injection or evasion.
    Investigate for indicators such as the process being started in suspended mode, rapid parent termination, memory manipulation (e.g., WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread), or unsigned binaries.
    Review command-line arguments, process ancestry, and network activity to confirm if this is legitimate behavior or process injection activity.
references:
    - https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/1605063/0/html
author: frack113
date: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|fieldref: ParentImage
    filter_main_path:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
    filter_main_original_fn:
        OriginalFileName:
            - 'Cmd.Exe'
            - 'CompatTelRunner.exe'
            - 'Discord.exe'
            - 'electron.exe' # Vs Code
            - 'EXPLORER.EXE'
            - 'httpd.exe'
            - 'IE4UINIT.EXE'
            - 'mmc.exe'
            - 'MpCmdRun.exe'
            - 'mscorsvw.exe'
            - 'msiexec.exe'
            - 'NGenTask.exe'
            - 'OneDriveSetup.exe'
            - 'PowerShell.EXE'
            - 'REGSVR32.EXE'
            - 'smss.exe'
            - 'Spotify.exe'
            - 'WerMgr'
    filter_main_product:
        Product:
            - 'Avira'
            - 'Evernote'
            - 'Firefox'
            - 'Microsoft Office'
            - 'Ninite'
            - 'Opera Browser Assistant Installer'
            - 'Opera Installer'
            - 'Sysinternals Sysmon'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software that may launch a new instance of itself, especially updaters or installers. Investigate each alert and apply whitelisting as needed.
# Increase the level after some initial tuning in your environment
level: low

title: Remote Task Creation via ATSVC Named Pipe - Zeek
id: dde85b37-40cd-4a94-b00c-0b8794f956b5
related:
    - id: f6de6525-4509-495a-8a82-1f8b0ed73a00
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects remote task creation via at.exe or API interacting with ATSVC namedpipe
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230409194125/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/03/threat-hunting-25-scheduled-tasks-for.html
author: 'Samir Bousseaden, @neu5rn'
date: 2020-04-03
modified: 2022-12-27
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.persistence
    - car.2013-05-004
    - car.2015-04-001
    - attack.t1053.002
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: smb_files
detection:
    selection:
        path: '\\\*\IPC$'
        name: 'atsvc'
        # Accesses: '*WriteData*'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Remote Thread Creation In Mstsc.Exe From Suspicious Location
id: c0aac16a-b1e7-4330-bab0-3c27bb4987c7
status: test
description: |
    Detects remote thread creation in the "mstsc.exe" process by a process located in a potentially suspicious location.
    This technique is often used by attackers in order to hook some APIs used by DLLs loaded by "mstsc.exe" during RDP authentications in order to steal credentials.
references:
    - https://github.com/S12cybersecurity/RDPCredentialStealer/blob/1b8947cdd065a06c1b62e80967d3c7af895fcfed/APIHookInjectorBin/APIHookInjectorBin/Inject.h#L25
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-28
modified: 2024-01-22
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: create_remote_thread
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\mstsc.exe'
        SourceImage|contains:
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\PerfLogs\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Remove Scheduled Cron Task/Job
id: c2e234de-03a3-41e1-b39a-1e56dc17ba67
status: test
description: |
    Detects usage of the 'crontab' utility to remove the current crontab.
    This is a common occurrence where cryptocurrency miners compete against each other by removing traces of other miners to hijack the maximum amount of resources possible
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/i/how-malicious-actors-abuse-native-linux-tools-in-their-attacks.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-15
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: 'crontab'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -r'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Suspicious Loading of Dbgcore/Dbghelp DLLs from Uncommon Location
id: 416bc4a2-7217-4519-8dc7-c3271817f1d5
related:
    - id: 9f5c1d59-33be-4e60-bcab-85d2f566effd
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects loading of dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll from uncommon locations such as user directories.
    These DLLs contain the MiniDumpWriteDump function, which can be abused for credential dumping purposes or in some cases for evading EDR/AV detection by suspending processes.
references:
    - https://blog.axelarator.net/hunting-for-edr-freeze/
    - https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/09/EDR-Freeze-Puts-EDRs-Antivirus-Into-Coma.html
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/you-bet-your-lsass-hunting-lsass-access.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-27
modified: 2026-01-09
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - '\$Recycle.Bin\'
            - '\Contacts\'
            # - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Documents\'
            # - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Favorites\'
            - '\Favourites\'
            - '\inetpub\wwwroot\'
            - '\Music\'
            - '\Pictures\'
            - '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
            - '\Users\Default\'
            - '\Videos\'
            #  - '\AppData\Local\Temp\' some installers may load from here
    selection_dll:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\dbgcore.dll'
            - '\dbghelp.dll'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_win_susp_dbgcore_dbghelp_load/info.yml

title: Suspicious Plink Port Forwarding
id: 48a61b29-389f-4032-b317-b30de6b95314
status: test
description: Detects suspicious Plink tunnel port forwarding to a local port
references:
    - https://www.real-sec.com/2019/04/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling/
    - https://medium.com/@informationsecurity/remote-ssh-tunneling-with-plink-exe-7831072b3d7d
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-01-19
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Description: 'Command-line SSH, Telnet, and Rlogin client'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -R '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity using a remote port forwarding to a local port
level: high

title: Sysmon Channel Reference Deletion
id: 18beca67-ab3e-4ee3-ba7a-a46ca8d7d0cc
status: test
description: Potential threat actor tampering with Sysmon manifest and eventually disabling it
references:
    - https://twitter.com/Flangvik/status/1283054508084473861
    - https://twitter.com/SecurityJosh/status/1283027365770276866
    - https://securityjosh.github.io/2020/04/23/Mute-Sysmon.html
    - https://gist.github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/cf08c38c61f7e46e8404b38201ca01c8
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-07-14
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID: 4657
        ObjectName|contains:
            - 'WINEVT\Publishers\{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}'
            - 'WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'
        ObjectValueName: 'Enabled'
        NewValue: 0
    selection2:
        EventID: 4663
        ObjectName|contains:
            - 'WINEVT\Publishers\{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}'
            - 'WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'
        AccessMask: '0x10000'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: System File Execution Location Anomaly
id: e4a6b256-3e47-40fc-89d2-7a477edd6915
related:
    - id: be58d2e2-06c8-4f58-b666-b99f6dc3b6cd # Dedicated SvcHost rule
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of a Windows system binary that is usually located in the system folder from an uncommon location.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/GelosSnake/status/934900723426439170
    - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/39828/
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/inno-setup-malware-redline-stealer-campaign.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Patrick Bareiss, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-11-27
modified: 2026-07-28
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\atbroker.exe'
            - '\audiodg.exe'
            - '\bcdedit.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\certreq.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cmstp.exe'
            - '\conhost.exe'
            - '\consent.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\dashost.exe'
            - '\defrag.exe'
            - '\dfrgui.exe' # Was seen used by Lazarus Group - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/39828/
            - '\dism.exe'
            - '\dllhost.exe'
            - '\dllhst3g.exe'
            - '\dwm.exe'
            - '\eventvwr.exe'
            - '\fsquirt.exe' # was seen used by sidewinder APT - https://securelist.com/sidewinder-apt/114089/
            - '\finger.exe'
            - '\logonui.exe'
            - '\LsaIso.exe'
            - '\lsass.exe'
            - '\lsm.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\ntoskrnl.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\runonce.exe'
            - '\RuntimeBroker.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\services.exe'
            - '\sihost.exe'
            - '\smartscreen.exe'
            - '\smss.exe'
            - '\spoolsv.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
            - '\taskhost.exe'
            - '\taskhostw.exe'
            - '\Taskmgr.exe'
            - '\userinit.exe'
            - '\werfault.exe'
            - '\werfaultsecure.exe'
            - '\wininit.exe'
            - '\winlogon.exe'
            - '\winver.exe'
            - '\wlanext.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wsl.exe'
            - '\wsmprovhost.exe' # Was seen used by Lazarus Group - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/39828/
    filter_main_generic:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\'
            - 'C:\$WinREAgent\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SystemTemp\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - 'C:\Windows\uus\'
            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
    filter_optional_system32:
        Image|contains: '\SystemRoot\System32\'
    filter_main_powershell:
        Image|contains:
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7-preview\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview' # pwsh installed from Microsoft Store
        Image|endswith: '\pwsh.exe'
    filter_main_wsl_programfiles:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\MicrosoftCorporationII.WindowsSubsystemForLinux'
            - 'C:\Program Files\WSL\'
        Image|endswith: '\wsl.exe'
    filter_main_wsl_appdata:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\'
        Image|endswith: '\wsl.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_system_exe_anomaly/info.yml

title: TanStack Supply-Chain Attack File Creation Indicators - Windows
id: 8a3f2c1e-5d7b-4e9a-b6c8-1f2a3d4e5f6a
status: experimental
description: Detects file creation indicators associated with the Mini Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign targeting TanStack npm packages and others such as mistralai, uipath, etc reported on early May 2026.
references:
    - https://socket.dev/blog/tanstack-npm-packages-compromised-mini-shai-hulud-supply-chain-attack
    - https://socket.dev/supply-chain-attacks/mini-shai-hulud
    - https://safedep.io/mass-npm-supply-chain-attack-tanstack-mistral/
author: Leonardo Gasparini
date: 2026-05-12
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1195.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1554
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_malware_files:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\router_init.js'
            - '\tanstack_runner.js'
    selection_persistence_claude_vscode:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\.claude\router_runtime.js'
            - '\.vscode\router_runtime.js'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Vim GTFOBin Abuse - Linux
id: 7ab8f73a-fcff-428b-84aa-6a5ff7877dea
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of "vim" and it's siblings commands to execute a shell or proxy commands.
    Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/vi/
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/vim/
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/rvim/
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/vimdiff/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Luc Génaux
date: 2022-12-28
modified: 2026-06-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/rvim'
            - '/vi'
            - '/vim'
            - '/vimdiff'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' --cmd '
            - ' -c'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':!/'
            - ':!$'
            - ':!..'
            - ':lua '
            - ':py '
            - ':shell'
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/csh'
            - '/bin/ksh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
            - '/bin/tmux'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Binaries Write Suspicious Extensions
id: b8fd0e93-ff58-4cbd-8f48-1c114e342e62
related:
    - id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Windows executables that write files with suspicious extensions
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-12
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_generic:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\lsass.exe'
            - '\RuntimeBroker.exe'
            - '\sihost.exe'
            - '\smss.exe'
            - '\wininit.exe'
            - '\winlogon.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.bat'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.iso'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.txt'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
    selection_special:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\dllhost.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.bat'
            - '.hta'
            - '.iso'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
    filter_main_AppLockerPolicyTest:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - ':\Users\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.ps1'
    filter_main_script_gpo_machine:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\GroupPolicy\DataStore\'
            - '\sysvol\'
            - '\Policies\'
            - '\Machine\Scripts\Startup\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.ps1'
            - '.bat'
    filter_main_clipchamp:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Clipchamp'
            - '.ps1'
    filter_main_powershell_preview:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.ps1'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_shell_write_susp_files_extensions/info.yml

title: Winrar Compressing Dump Files
id: 1ac14d38-3dfc-4635-92c7-e3fd1c5f5bfc
related:
    - id: ec570e53-4c76-45a9-804d-dc3f355ff7a7
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of WinRAR in order to compress a file with a ".dmp"/".dump" extension, which could be a step in a process of dump file exfiltration.
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-04
modified: 2023-09-12
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1560.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\rar.exe'
              - '\winrar.exe'
        - Description: 'Command line RAR'
    selection_extension:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.dmp'
            - '.dump'
            - '.hdmp'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of WinRAR with a command line in which ".dmp" or ".dump" appears accidentally
    - Legitimate use of WinRAR to compress WER ".dmp" files for troubleshooting
level: medium

title: Zimbra Collaboration Suite Email Server Unauthenticated RCE
id: dd218fb6-4d02-42dc-85f0-a0a376072efd
status: test
description: Detects an attempt to leverage the vulnerable servlet "mboximport" for an unauthenticated remote command injection
references:
    - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/08/10/mass-exploitation-of-unauthenticated-zimbra-rce-cve-2022-27925/
    - https://www.yang99.top/index.php/archives/82/
    - https://github.com/vnhacker1337/CVE-2022-27925-PoC
author: '@gott_cyber'
date: 2022-08-17
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2022-27925
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection_servlet:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/service/extension/backup/mboximport\?'
        cs-uri-query|contains|all:
            - 'account-name'
            - 'ow'
            - 'no-switch'
            - 'append'
        sc-status:
            - 401
            - 200
    selection_shell:
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/zimbraAdmin/'
        cs-uri-query|endswith: '.jsp'
        sc-status|contains: '200'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: ZxShell Malware
id: f0b70adb-0075-43b0-9745-e82a1c608fcc
status: test
description: Detects a ZxShell start by the called and well-known function name
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/5d2a4cde9fa7c2fdbf39b2e2ffd23378d0c50701a3095d1e91e3cf922d7b0b16?environmentId=100
    - https://pub-7cb8ac806c1b4c4383e585c474a24719.r2.dev/116309e7121bc8b0e66e4166c06f7b818e1d3629.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro
date: 2017-07-20
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1218.011
    - attack.s0412
    - attack.g0001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'zxFunction'
            - 'RemoteDiskXXXXX'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical