Sigma rules: 27

title: Aruba Network Service Potential DLL Sideloading
id: 90ae0469-0cee-4509-b67f-e5efcef040f7
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading activity via the Aruba Networks Virtual Intranet Access "arubanetsvc.exe" process using DLL Search Order Hijacking
references:
    - https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1616581559892545537?t=XLCBO9BziGzD7Bmbt8oMEQ&s=09
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-22
modified: 2023-03-15
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\arubanetsvc.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\wtsapi32.dll'
            - '\msvcr100.dll'
            - '\msvcp100.dll'
            - '\dbghelp.dll'
            - '\dbgcore.dll'
            - '\wininet.dll'
            - '\iphlpapi.dll'
            - '\version.dll'
            - '\cryptsp.dll'
            - '\cryptbase.dll'
            - '\wldp.dll'
            - '\profapi.dll'
            - '\sspicli.dll'
            - '\winsta.dll'
            - '\dpapi.dll'
    filter:
        ImageLoaded|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Audio Capture
id: a7af2487-9c2f-42e4-9bb9-ff961f0561d5
status: test
description: Detects attempts to record audio using the arecord and ecasound utilities.
references:
    - https://linux.die.net/man/1/arecord
    - https://linuxconfig.org/how-to-test-microphone-with-audio-linux-sound-architecture-alsa
    - https://manpages.debian.org/unstable/ecasound/ecasound.1.en.html
    - https://ecasound.seul.org/ecasound/Documentation/examples.html#fconversions
author: Pawel Mazur, Milad Cheraghi
date: 2021-09-04
modified: 2025-12-05
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1123
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection_execve:
        type: EXECVE
        a0: arecord
        a1: '-vv'
        a2: '-fdat'
    selection_syscall_memfd_create:
        type: SYSCALL
        exe|endswith: "/ecasound"
        SYSCALL: 'memfd_create'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low

title: Backdoor introduction via registry permission change through WMI (DAMP)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker modifies registry permissions on a local or remote target in order to introduce a backdoor and dump hashes and credentials.
correlation: correlate TargetLogonId from ID 4624 with SubjectLogonId from ID 4674 to identify the source of the change.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0005-Defense%20Evasion/T1112-Modify%20registry
- https://github.com/HarmJ0y/DAMP
- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/07_discovery/WIN-190625024610.html
- http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/remote-hash-extraction-on-demand-via-host-security-descriptor-modification/
- https://github.com/mitre/microsoft-windows-2012r2-memberserver-stig-baseline/blob/master/controls/V-1152.rb
- https://www.darkoperator.com/blog/2017/10/14/basics-of-tracking-wmi-activity
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1112
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003.002 # SAM
- attack.t1003.004 # LSA Secrets
- attack.t1003.005 # Cached Domain Credentials
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4674
    ProcessName|endswith: '\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe'
    ObjectServer: Security
    ObjectType: Key
    ObjectName|startswith:
      - '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\SecurePipeServers\winreg' # controls access to remote registry
      - '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\Data'  # required to calculate SysKey/bootkey
      - '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\GBG'   # required to calculate SysKey/bootkey
      - '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\JD'    # required to calculate SysKey/bootkey
      - '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\Skew1' # required to calculate SysKey/bootkey
      - '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Accounts'
      - '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Pol'
      - '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets'   # contains the encrypted machine account hash in \SECURITY\Policy\Secrets\$MACHINE.ACC\CurrVal
      - '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\PolEKList' # contains the encrypted LSA key
      - '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SECURITY\Cache'            # Contains domain cached credentials
      - '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SAM\SAM\DOMAINS\Account'   # contains local user hashes
      - '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SAM\SAM\DOMAINS\Builtin'
  filter:
    SubjectUserName|endswith: $
  condition: selection and not filter | count(ObjectName) by Computer > 10
  timeframe: 5m
falsepositives:
- None
level: high

title: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level - PowerShell
id: 61d0475c-173f-4844-86f7-f3eebae1c66b
related:
    - id: cf2e938e-9a3e-4fe8-a347-411642b28a9f # ProcCreation Registry
      type: similar
    - id: 87e3c4e8-a6a8-4ad9-bb4f-46e7ff99a180 # ProcCreation Cmdlet
      type: similar
    - id: fad91067-08c5-4d1a-8d8c-d96a21b37814 # Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects changing the PowerShell script execution policy to a potentially insecure level using the "Set-ExecutionPolicy" cmdlet.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-executionpolicy?view=powershell-7.4
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_execution_policies?view=powershell-7.4
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=2604
author: frack113
date: 2021-10-20
modified: 2023-12-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_cmdlet:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Set-ExecutionPolicy'
    selection_option:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'Unrestricted'
            - 'bypass'
    filter_optional_chocolatey:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - "(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://community.chocolatey.org/install.ps1')"
            - "(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://chocolatey.org/install.ps1')"
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrator script
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_set_policies_to_unsecure_level/info.yml

title: Compress Data and Lock With Password for Exfiltration With WINZIP
id: e2e80da2-8c66-4e00-ae3c-2eebd29f6b6d
status: test
description: An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party utilities
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-07-27
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1560.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_winzip:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'winzip.exe'
            - 'winzip64.exe'
    selection_password:
        CommandLine|contains: '-s"'
    selection_other:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -min '
            - ' -a '
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: CreateDump Process Dump
id: 515c8be5-e5df-4c5e-8f6d-a4a2f05e4b48
related:
    - id: 1a1ed54a-2ba4-4221-94d5-01dee560d71e
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects uses of the createdump.exe LOLOBIN utility to dump process memory
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/
    - https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-04
modified: 2022-08-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\createdump.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'FX_VER_INTERNALNAME_STR'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -u ' # Short version of '--full'
            - ' --full '
            - ' -f ' # Short version of '--name'
            - ' --name '
            - '.dmp '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Command lines that use the same flags
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_createdump_lolbin_execution/info.yml

title: DCERPC SMB Spoolss Named Pipe
id: 214e8f95-100a-4e04-bb31-ef6cba8ce07e
status: test
description: Detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be used to trigger the authentication via NTLM of any machine that has the spoolservice enabled.
references:
    - https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1
    - https://dirkjanm.io/a-different-way-of-abusing-zerologon/
    - https://twitter.com/_dirkjan/status/1309214379003588608
author: OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2018-11-28
modified: 2022-08-11
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$' # looking for the string \\*\IPC$
        RelativeTargetName: spoolss
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - 'Domain Controllers acting as printer servers too? :)'
level: medium

title: Esentutl Volume Shadow Copy Service Keys
id: 5aad0995-46ab-41bd-a9ff-724f41114971
status: test
description: Detects the volume shadow copy service initialization and processing via esentutl. Registry keys such as HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\VSS\\Diag\\VolSnap\\Volume are captured.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-3---esentutlexe-sam-copy
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-20
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: 'System\CurrentControlSet\Services\VSS'
        Image|endswith: 'esentutl.exe' # limit esentutl as in references, too many FP to filter
    filter:
        TargetObject|contains: 'System\CurrentControlSet\Services\VSS\Start'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Exploitation Indicator Of CVE-2022-42475
id: 293ccb8c-bed8-4868-8296-bef30e303b7e
status: test
description: Detects exploitation indicators of CVE-2022-42475 a heap-based buffer overflow in sslvpnd.
references:
    - https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-22-398
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/fortinet-says-ssl-vpn-pre-auth-rce-bug-is-exploited-in-attacks/
    - https://www.deepwatch.com/labs/customer-advisory-fortios-ssl-vpn-vulnerability-cve-2022-42475-exploited-in-the-wild/
    - https://community.fortinet.com/t5/FortiGate/Technical-Tip-Critical-vulnerability-Protect-against-heap-based/ta-p/239420
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Nilaa Maharjan, Douglasrose75
date: 2024-02-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - cve.2022-42475
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: fortios
    service: sslvpnd
    definition: 'Requirements: file creation events or equivalent must be collected from the FortiOS SSL-VPN appliance in order for this detection to function correctly'
detection:
    keywords:
        - '/data/etc/wxd.conf'
        - '/data/lib/libgif.so'
        - '/data/lib/libips.bak'
        - '/data/lib/libiptcp.so'
        - '/data/lib/libipudp.so'
        - '/data/lib/libjepg.so'
        - '/var/.sslvpnconfigbk'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Fax Service DLL Search Order Hijack
id: 828af599-4c53-4ed2-ba4a-a9f835c434ea
status: test
description: The Fax service attempts to load ualapi.dll, which is non-existent. An attacker can then (side)load their own malicious DLL using this service.
references:
    - https://windows-internals.com/faxing-your-way-to-system/
author: NVISO
date: 2020-05-04
modified: 2022-06-02
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\fxssvc.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: 'ualapi.dll'
    filter:
        ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - System
id: 8ca7004b-e620-4ecb-870e-86129b5b8e75
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 24)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        # ImagePath|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r)(?:\s|)\"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\\"\s+?\-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*\"'
        # Example 1: C:\winDoWs\SySTeM32\cmd.Exe /C"SET NOtI=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& PowERshElL -NOl SET-iteM ( 'VAR' + 'i'+ 'A' + 'blE:Ao6' + 'I0') ( [TYpe](\"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-F 'iRoN','mENT','e','nv') ) ; ${exECUtIONCOnTEXT}.\"IN`VO`KecOmMaND\".\"inVo`KES`crIPt\"( ( ( GEt-VAriAble ( 'a' + 'o6I0') -vaLU )::(\"{1}{4}{2}{3}{0}\" -f'e','gETenvIR','NtvaRIa','BL','ONme' ).Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'n','oti' ),( \"{0}{1}\" -f'pRoC','esS') )) )"
        # Example 2: cMD.exe /C "seT SlDb=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& pOWErShell .(( ^&(\"{1}{0}{2}{3}\" -f 'eT-vaR','G','iab','lE' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f '*m','DR*' ) ).\"na`ME\"[3,11,2]-JOIN'' ) ( ( ^&(\"{0}{1}\" -f'g','CI' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f 'ENV',':SlDb' ) ).\"VA`luE\" ) "
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '"set'
            - '-f'
        ImagePath|contains:
            - '/c'
            - '/r'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: LiteLLM / TeamPCP Supply Chain Attack Indicators
id: 36603778-030c-43c4-8cbb-cd3c1d1a80c7
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects process executions related to the backdoored versions of LiteLLM (v1.82.7 or v1.82.8).
    In March 2026, a supply chain attack was discovered involving the popular open-source LLM framework LiteLLM by Threat Actor TeamPCP.
    The malicious package harvests every credential on the system, encrypts and exfiltrates them, and installs a persistent C2 backdoor.
references:
    - https://novasky.io/hunts/hunting-litellm-supply-chain
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/71e35aef03099cd1f2d6446734273025a163597de93912df321ef118bf135238/
    - https://huskyhacks.io/posts/litellm-cred-stealer/
    - https://www.wiz.io/blog/threes-a-crowd-teampcp-trojanizes-litellm-in-continuation-of-campaign
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-03-30
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1195.002
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1560.001
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543.002
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_pth_package:
        # Execution of .pth file
        Image|contains: '/python3'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - "exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0"
            - "kI2NF9TQ1JJUFQgPSAiYV"
    selection_tar:
        Image|endswith: '/tar'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'tpcp.tar.gz'
            - 'payload.enc'
            - 'session.key.enc'
    selection_curl:
        Image|endswith: '/curl'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'models.litellm.cloud'
            - 'X-Filename: tpcp.tar.gz'
    selection_sysmon_service:
        ParentImage|contains: '/python3'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'systemctl'
            - '--user'
            - 'sysmon'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Malicious Driver Load By Name
id: 39b64854-5497-4b57-a448-40977b8c9679
status: test
description: Detects loading of known malicious drivers via the file name of the drivers.
references:
    - https://loldrivers.io/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-03
modified: 2023-12-02
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1068
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: driver_load
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\wfshbr64.sys'
            - '\ktmutil7odm.sys'
            - '\ktes.sys'
            - '\a26363e7b02b13f2b8d697abb90cd5c3.sys'
            - '\kt2.sys'
            - '\4748696211bd56c2d93c21cab91e82a5.sys'
            - '\malicious.sys'
            - '\a236e7d654cd932b7d11cb604629a2d0.sys'
            - '\spwizimgvt.sys'
            - '\c94f405c5929cfcccc8ad00b42c95083.sys'
            - '\fur.sys'
            - '\wantd.sys'
            - '\windbg.sys'
            - '\4118b86e490aed091b1a219dba45f332.sys'
            - '\gmer64.sys'
            - '\1fc7aeeff3ab19004d2e53eae8160ab1.sys'
            - '\poortry2.sys'
            - '\wintapix.sys'
            - '\daxin_blank6.sys'
            - '\6771b13a53b9c7449d4891e427735ea2.sys'
            - '\blacklotus_driver.sys'
            - '\air_system10.sys'
            - '\dkrtk.sys'
            - '\7.sys'
            - '\sense5ext.sys'
            - '\ktgn.sys'
            - '\ndislan.sys'
            - '\nlslexicons0024uvn.sys'
            - '\be6318413160e589080df02bb3ca6e6a.sys'
            - '\4.sys'
            - '\wantd_2.sys'
            - '\e29f6311ae87542b3d693c1f38e4e3ad.sys'
            - '\daxin_blank3.sys'
            - '\gftkyj64.sys'
            - '\daxin_blank2.sys'
            - '\wantd_4.sys'
            - '\reddriver.sys'
            - '\834761775.sys'
            - '\mlgbbiicaihflrnh.sys'
            - '\mjj0ge.sys'
            - '\daxin_blank.sys'
            - '\daxin_blank5.sys'
            - '\poortry1.sys'
            - '\msqpq.sys'
            - '\mimidrv.sys'
            - '\e939448b28a4edc81f1f974cebf6e7d2.sys'
            - '\prokiller64.sys'
            - '\nodedriver.sys'
            - '\wantd_3.sys'
            - '\lctka.sys'
            - '\kapchelper_x64.sys'
            - '\daxin_blank4.sys'
            - '\a9df5964635ef8bd567ae487c3d214c4.sys'
            - '\wantd_6.sys'
            - '\ntbios.sys'
            - '\wantd_5.sys'
            - '\pciecubed.sys'
            - '\mimikatz.sys'
            - '\nqrmq.sys'
            - '\2.sys'
            - '\poortry.sys'
            - '\ntbios_2.sys'
            - '\fgme.sys'
            - '\telephonuafy.sys'
            - '\typelibde.sys'
            - '\daxin_blank1.sys'
            - '\ef0e1725aaf0c6c972593f860531a2ea.sys'
            - '\5a4fe297c7d42539303137b6d75b150d.sys'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positives may occur if one of the vulnerable driver names mentioned above didn't change its name between versions. So always make sure that the driver being loaded is the legitimate one and the non vulnerable version.
    - If you experience a lot of FP you could comment the driver name or its exact known legitimate location (when possible)
level: medium

title: MSDT Execution Via Answer File
id: 9c8c7000-3065-44a8-a555-79bcba5d9955
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of "msdt.exe" using an answer file which is simulating the legitimate way of calling msdt via "pcwrun.exe" (For example from the compatibility tab).
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msdt/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-13
modified: 2025-10-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\msdt.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '\WINDOWS\diagnostics\index\PCWDiagnostic.xml'
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -af '
    filter_main_pcwrun:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\pcwrun.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Possible undocumented parents of "msdt" other than "pcwrun".
level: high

title: Network Connection Initiated To BTunnels Domains
id: 9e02c8ec-02b9-43e8-81eb-34a475ba7965
status: test
description: |
    Detects network connections to BTunnels domains initiated by a process on the system.
    Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
references:
    - https://defr0ggy.github.io/research/Utilizing-BTunnel-For-Data-Exfiltration/
author: Kamran Saifullah
date: 2024-09-13
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1567
    - attack.t1572
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationHostname|endswith: '.btunnel.co.in'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of BTunnels will also trigger this.
level: medium

title: Password Set to Never Expire via WMI
id: 7864a175-3654-4824-9f0d-f0da18ab27c0
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of wmic.exe to modify user account settings and explicitly disable password expiration.
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/the-unwanted-guest
author: "Daniel Koifman (KoifSec)"
date: 2025-07-30
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:   # Example command simulated:  wmic  useraccount where name='guest' set passwordexpires=false
        - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'useraccount'
            - ' set '
            - 'passwordexpires'
            - 'false'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative activity
level: medium

title: PIM Approvals And Deny Elevation
id: 039a7469-0296-4450-84c0-f6966b16dc6d
status: test
description: Detects when a PIM elevation is approved or denied. Outside of normal operations should be investigated.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Request Approved/Denied
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Actual admin using PIM.
level: high

title: Potential 7za.DLL Sideloading
id: 4f6edb78-5c21-42ab-a558-fd2a6fc1fd57
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "7za.dll"
references:
    - https://www.gov.pl/attachment/ee91f24d-3e67-436d-aa50-7fa56acf789d
author: X__Junior
date: 2023-06-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\7za.dll'
    filter_main_legit_path:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
        ImageLoaded|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate third party application located in "AppData" may leverage this DLL to offer 7z compression functionality and may generate false positives. Apply additional filters as needed.
level: low

title: Potential Command Line Path Traversal Evasion Attempt
id: 1327381e-6ab0-4f38-b583-4c1b8346a56b
status: test
description: Detects potential evasion or obfuscation attempts using bogus path traversal via the commandline
references:
    - https://twitter.com/hexacorn/status/1448037865435320323
    - https://twitter.com/Gal_B1t/status/1062971006078345217
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-10-26
modified: 2023-03-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        Image|contains: '\Windows\'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\..\Windows\'
            - '\..\System32\'
            - '\..\..\'
    selection_2:
        CommandLine|contains: '.exe\..\'
    filter_optional_google_drive:
        CommandLine|contains: '\Google\Drive\googledrivesync.exe\..\'
    filter_optional_citrix:
        CommandLine|contains: '\Citrix\Virtual Smart Card\Citrix.Authentication.VirtualSmartcard.Launcher.exe\..\'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Google Drive
    - Citrix
level: medium

title: Potential File Overwrite Via Sysinternals SDelete
id: a4824fca-976f-4964-b334-0621379e84c4
status: test
description: Detects the use of SDelete to erase a file not the free space
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1485/T1485.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-06-03
modified: 2023-02-28
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1485
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        OriginalFileName: sdelete.exe
    filter:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -h'
            - ' -c'
            - ' -z'
            - ' /\?'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential NetWire RAT Activity - Registry
id: 1d218616-71b0-4c40-855b-9dbe75510f7f
status: test
description: Detects registry keys related to NetWire RAT
references:
    - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-netwire-rat-variant-spread-by-phishing
    - https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/netwire-malware-what-it-is-how-it-works-and-how-to-prevent-it-malware-spotlight/
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/guloader-installing-netwire-rat/
    - https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2021/09/threat-thursday-netwire-rat-is-coming-down-the-line
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/41ecdbde-4997-4301-a350-0270448b4c8f/
author: Christopher Peacock
date: 2021-10-07
modified: 2025-11-03
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_add
detection:
    selection:
        # The configuration information is usually stored under HKCU:\Software\Netwire - RedCanary
        TargetObject|contains: '\software\NetWire'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Password Spraying Attempt Using Dsacls.EXE
id: bac9fb54-2da7-44e9-988f-11e9a5edbc0c
status: test
description: Detects possible password spraying attempts using Dsacls
references:
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/using-dsacls-to-check-ad-object-permissions#password-spraying-anyone
    - https://ss64.com/nt/dsacls.html
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc771151(v=ws.11)
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-20
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\dsacls.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: "DSACLS.EXE"
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/user:'
            - '/passwd:'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of dsacls to bind to an LDAP session
level: medium

title: Self Extraction Directive File Created In Potentially Suspicious Location
id: 760e75d8-c3b5-409b-a9bf-6130b4c4603f
related:
    - id: ab90dab8-c7da-4010-9193-563528cfa347
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation of Self Extraction Directive files (.sed) in a potentially suspicious location.
    These files are used by the "iexpress.exe" utility in order to create self extracting packages.
    Attackers were seen abusing this utility and creating PE files with embedded ".sed" entries.
references:
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/iexpress.exe-D594B2A33EFAFD0EABF09E3FDC05FCEA.html
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IExpress
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/602f4ae507fa8de57ada079adff25a6c2a899bd25cd092d0af7e62cdb619c93c/behavior
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2024-02-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.sed'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Spool process spawned a CMD shell (PrintNightmare vulnerability - CVE-2021-36958)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker exploits the PrintNightmare vulnerability and obtained a CMD shell.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0004-Privilege%20Escalation/T1574-DLL%20side-loading
- https://github.com/GossiTheDog/SystemNightmare
- https://github.com/outflanknl/PrintNightmare
- https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675
- https://github.com/xbufu/Mimispool
- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/tree/master/mimispool
- https://www.theregister.com/2021/09/21/microsoft_printnightmare/
- https://www.exabeam.com/information-security/detecting-the-printnightmre-cve-2021-1675-34527-vulnerability-using-exabeam/
- https://tdm.socprime.com/tdm/info/JCBHD21ATmuT/#sigma
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1574.002
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection_native:
    EventID: 4688
    Version: 2  # parent process name is available starting Windows 10 / Server 2016 and higher
    ParentProcessName|endswith: \spoolsv.exe
    NewProcessName|endswith: \cmd.exe

  selection_sysmon:
    EventID: 1
    ParentImage|endswith: \spoolsv.exe
    Image|endswith: \cmd.exe
  condition: selection_native or selection_sysmon
falsepositives:
- none
level: high

title: Stickey key IFEO registry changed (Reg via Sysmon)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker changed the IFEO settings related to sethc.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0004-Privilege%20Escalation/T1546-Image%20File%20Execution%20Options%20Injection
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/jonathantrull/2016/10/03/detecting-sticky-key-backdoors/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt29-domain-frontin
- https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ClearSky-Fox-Kitten-Campaign-v1.pdf
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/winrar-sfx-archives-can-run-powershell-without-being-detected/
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1546.008
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: registry_event
detection:

  selection_registry_set:
    EventID: 13 # RegistryEvent (Value Set)
    EventType: 'SetValue'
    TargetObject|endswith: # Sample command: REG ADD "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\sethc.exe" /t REG_SZ /v Debugger /d “C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe” /f
      - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\sethc.exe\Debugger'
      - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\Magnify.exe\Debugger'
      - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\Narrator.exe\Debugger'
      - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\utilman.exe\Debugger'
      - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\DisplaySwitch.exe\Debugger'
      - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\osk.exe\Debugger'

  selection_object_added:
    EventID: 12 # Registry object added
    EventType: 'CreateKey'
    TargetObject|endswith:
      - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\sethc.exe'
      - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\Magnify.exe'
      - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\Narrator.exe'
      - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\utilman.exe'
      - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\DisplaySwitch.exe'
      - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\osk.exe'

  condition: selection_registry_set or selection_object_added
falsepositives:
- None
level: high

title: Suspicious Computer Account Name Change CVE-2021-42287
id: 45eb2ae2-9aa2-4c3a-99a5-6e5077655466
status: test
description: Detects the renaming of an existing computer account to a account name that doesn't contain a $ symbol as seen in attacks against CVE-2021-42287
references:
    - https://medium.com/@mvelazco/hunting-for-samaccountname-spoofing-cve-2021-42287-and-domain-controller-impersonation-f704513c8a45
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-22
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1098
    - cve.2021-42287
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4781 # rename user
        OldTargetUserName|contains: '$'
    filter:
        NewTargetUserName|contains: '$'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) installation (PowerShell)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker enables the WSL to cary out malicious activities in a virtual instance to avoid detection.
references:
- https://www.hackers-arise.com/post/linux-basics-for-hackers-part-13-the-windows-subsystem-for-linux-wsl
- https://linuxhint.com/enable-wsl-optional-component/
- https://blog.lumen.com/no-longer-just-theory-black-lotus-labs-uncovers-linux-executables-deployed-as-stealth-windows-loaders/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/wsl/
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1564.006
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category:
    - ps_module
    - ps_classic_script
    - ps_script
detection: # full command "Enable-windowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName Microsoft-Windows-Subsystem-Linux"
  selection2_powershell_modern:
    EventID: 4103
    Payload|contains:
      - 'Enable-windowsOptionalFeature'
      - 'Microsoft-Windows-Subsystem-Linux'

  selection3_powershell_block:
    EventID: 4104
    ScriptBlockText|contains:
      - 'Enable-windowsOptionalFeature'
      - 'Microsoft-Windows-Subsystem-Linux'

  condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- developer computer (with Visual Studio Code)
- administrator activity
level: medium