Sigma rules: 28

title: Account Tampering - Suspicious Failed Logon Reasons
id: 9eb99343-d336-4020-a3cd-67f3819e68ee
status: test
description: This method uses uncommon error codes on failed logons to determine suspicious activity and tampering with accounts that have been disabled or somehow restricted.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1101431884540710913
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-02-19
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID:
            - 4625
            - 4776
    selection_status:
        - Status:
              - '0xC0000072'  # User logon to account disabled by administrator
              - '0xC000006F'  # User logon outside authorized hours
              - '0xC0000070'  # User logon from unauthorized workstation
              - '0xC0000413'  # Logon Failure: The machine you are logging onto is protected by an authentication firewall. The specified account is not allowed to authenticate to the machine
              - '0xC000018C'  # The logon request failed because the trust relationship between the primary domain and the trusted domain failed
              - '0xC000015B'  # The user has not been granted the requested logon type (aka logon right) at this machine
        - SubStatus:
              - '0xC0000072'  # User logon to account disabled by administrator
              - '0xC000006F'  # User logon outside authorized hours
              - '0xC0000070'  # User logon from unauthorized workstation
              - '0xC0000413'  # Logon Failure: The machine you are logging onto is protected by an authentication firewall. The specified account is not allowed to authenticate to the machine
              - '0xC000018C'  # The logon request failed because the trust relationship between the primary domain and the trusted domain failed
              - '0xC000015B'  # The user has not been granted the requested logon type (aka logon right) at this machine
    filter:
        SubjectUserSid: 'S-1-0-0'
    condition: all of selection_* and not filter
falsepositives:
    - User using a disabled account
level: medium

title: Antivirus - Hacktool Signature
id: fa0c05b6-8ad3-468d-8231-c1cbccb64fba
status: stable
description: |
    Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a hack tool or other attack tool.
    This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/2021/08/16/antivirus-event-analysis-cheat-sheet-v1-8-2/
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2021-08-16
modified: 2026-06-15
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204
logsource:
    category: antivirus
detection:
    selection:
        - Signature|startswith:
              - 'ATK/'  # Sophos
              - 'Exploit.Script.CVE'
              - 'HKTL'
              - 'HTOOL'
              - 'PWS.'
              - 'PWSX'
              - 'SecurityTool'
              # - 'FRP.'
        - Signature|contains:
              - 'Adfind'
              - 'BloodH'
              - 'BloodyAD'
              - 'Brutel'
              - 'BruteR'
              - 'Cobalt'
              - 'COBEACON'
              - 'Cometer'
              - 'DumpCreds'
              - 'EDRfreeze'
              - 'FastReverseProxy'
              - 'Hacktool'
              - 'Havoc'
              - 'Impacket'
              - 'Keylogger'
              - 'Koadic'
              - 'Mimikatz'
              - 'Nighthawk'
              - 'PentestPowerShell'
              - 'Potato'
              - 'PowerSploit'
              - 'PowerSSH'
              - 'PshlSpy'
              - 'PSWTool'
              - 'PWCrack'
              - 'PWDump'
              - 'Responder'
              - 'Rozena'
              - 'Rusthound'
              - 'Sbelt'
              - 'Seatbelt'
              - 'SecurityTool'
              - 'SharpDump'
              - 'SharpHound'
              - 'Shellcode'
              - 'Sliver'
              - 'Snaffler'
              - 'SOAPHound'
              - 'Splinter'
              - 'Stowaway'
              - 'Swrort'
              - 'Trojan.Hound'
              - 'TurtleLoader'
              - 'Undefend'
              - 'Undfnd'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Audit Policy Tampering Via Auditpol
id: 0a13e132-651d-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
related:
    - id: c6c56ada-612b-42d1-9a29-adad3c5c2c1e # Old auditpol
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
  Threat actors can use auditpol binary to change audit policy configuration to impair detection capability.
  This can be carried out by selectively disabling/removing certain audit policies as well as restoring a custom policy owned by the threat actor.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
author: Janantha Marasinghe (https://github.com/blueteam0ps)
date: 2021-02-02
modified: 2023-02-22
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\auditpol.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'AUDITPOL.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'disable' # disables a specific audit policy
            - 'clear'   # delete or clears audit policy
            - 'remove'  # removes an audit policy
            - 'restore' # restores an audit policy
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrator or administrator scripts might leverage the flags mentioned in the detection section. Either way, it should always be monitored
level: high

title: DNS Query Tor .Onion Address - Sysmon
id: b55ca2a3-7cff-4dda-8bdd-c7bfa63bf544
related:
    - id: 8384bd26-bde6-4da9-8e5d-4174a7a47ca2
      type: similar
    - id: a8322756-015c-42e7-afb1-436e85ed3ff5
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects DNS queries to an ".onion" address related to Tor routing networks
references:
    - https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/detecting-tor-use-with-logpoint/
    - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/f99542b94afe0ad2f19a82cc08262e7ac8e1428e/Detections/ASimDNS/imDNS_TorProxies.yaml
author: frack113
date: 2022-02-20
modified: 2025-09-12
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: dns_query
detection:
    selection:
        QueryName|endswith:
            - '.hiddenservice.net'
            - '.onion.ca'
            - '.onion.cab'
            - '.onion.casa'
            - '.onion.city'
            - '.onion.direct'
            - '.onion.dog'
            - '.onion.glass'
            - '.onion.gq'
            - '.onion.ink'
            - '.onion.it'
            - '.onion.link'
            - '.onion.lt'
            - '.onion.lu'
            - '.onion.nu'
            - '.onion.pet'
            - '.onion.plus'
            - '.onion.rip'
            - '.onion.sh'
            - '.onion.to'
            - '.onion.top'
            - '.onion'
            - '.s1.tor-gateways.de'
            - '.s2.tor-gateways.de'
            - '.s3.tor-gateways.de'
            - '.s4.tor-gateways.de'
            - '.s5.tor-gateways.de'
            - '.t2w.pw'
            - '.tor2web.ae.org'
            - '.tor2web.blutmagie.de'
            - '.tor2web.com'
            - '.tor2web.fi'
            - '.tor2web.io'
            - '.tor2web.org'
            - '.tor2web.xyz'
            - '.torlink.co'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: DumpStack.log Defender Evasion
id: 4f647cfa-b598-4e12-ad69-c68dd16caef8
status: test
description: Detects the use of the filename DumpStack.log to evade Microsoft Defender
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1479094189048713219
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-06
modified: 2022-06-17
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\DumpStack.log'
    selection_download:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -o DumpStack.log'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: Enabled User Right in AD to Control User Objects
id: 311b6ce2-7890-4383-a8c2-663a9f6b43cd
status: test
description: Detects scenario where if a user is assigned the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege right in Active Directory it would allow control of other AD user objects.
references:
    - https://blog.harmj0y.net/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/
author: '@neu5ron'
date: 2017-07-30
modified: 2021-12-02
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Policy Change > Audit Authorization Policy Change, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\Policy Change\Audit Authorization Policy Change'
detection:
    selection_base:
        EventID: 4704
    selection_keywords:
        PrivilegeList|contains: 'SeEnableDelegationPrivilege'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: File Encoded To Base64 Via Certutil.EXE
id: e62a9f0c-ca1e-46b2-85d5-a6da77f86d1a
status: test
description: Detects the execution of certutil with the "encode" flag to encode a file to base64. This can be abused by threat actors and attackers for data exfiltration
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-babyshark-malware-targets-u-s-national-security-think-tanks/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certutil/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-02-24
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-encode'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - As this is a general purpose rule, legitimate usage of the encode functionality will trigger some false positives. Apply additional filters accordingly
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_encode/info.yml

title: Github Delete Action Invoked
id: 16a71777-0b2e-4db7-9888-9d59cb75200b
status: test
description: Detects delete action in the Github audit logs for codespaces, environment, project and repo.
author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf)
date: 2023-01-19
modified: 2026-03-09
references:
    - https://docs.github.com/en/organizations/keeping-your-organization-secure/managing-security-settings-for-your-organization/reviewing-the-audit-log-for-your-organization#audit-log-actions
    - https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/keeping-your-account-and-data-secure/security-log-events#codespaces
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1213.003
logsource:
    product: github
    service: audit
    definition: 'Requirements: The audit log streaming feature must be enabled to be able to receive such logs. You can enable following the documentation here: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/streaming-the-audit-log-for-your-enterprise#setting-up-audit-log-streaming'
detection:
    selection:
        action:
            - 'codespaces.destroy'
            - 'environment.delete'
            - 'project.delete'
            - 'repo.destroy'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Validate the deletion activity is permitted. The "actor" field need to be validated.
level: medium

title: Hack Tool User Agent
id: c42a3073-30fb-48ae-8c99-c23ada84b103
status: test
description: Detects suspicious user agent strings user by hack tools in proxy logs
references:
    - https://github.com/fastly/waf_testbed/blob/8bfc406551f3045e418cbaad7596cff8da331dfc/templates/default/scanners-user-agents.data.erb
    - http://rules.emergingthreats.net/open/snort-2.9.0/rules/emerging-user_agents.rules
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-07-08
modified: 2022-07-07
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-useragent|contains:
            # Vulnerability scanner and brute force tools
            - '(hydra)'
            - ' arachni/'
            - ' BFAC '
            - ' brutus '
            - ' cgichk '
            - 'core-project/1.0'
            - ' crimscanner/'
            - 'datacha0s'
            - 'dirbuster'
            - 'domino hunter'
            - 'dotdotpwn'
            - 'FHScan Core'
            - 'floodgate'
            - 'get-minimal'
            - 'gootkit auto-rooter scanner'
            - 'grendel-scan'
            - ' inspath '
            - 'internet ninja'
            - 'jaascois'
            - ' zmeu '
            - 'masscan'
            - ' metis '
            - 'morfeus fucking scanner'
            - 'n-stealth'
            - 'nsauditor'
            - 'pmafind'
            - 'security scan'
            - 'springenwerk'
            - 'teh forest lobster'
            - 'toata dragostea'
            - ' vega/'
            - 'voideye'
            - 'webshag'
            - 'webvulnscan'
            - ' whcc/'
            # SQL Injection
            - ' Havij'
            - 'absinthe'
            - 'bsqlbf'
            - 'mysqloit'
            - 'pangolin'
            - 'sql power injector'
            - 'sqlmap'
            - 'sqlninja'
            - 'uil2pn'
            # Hack tool
            - 'ruler'  # https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/using-outlook-forms-lateral-movement-persistence/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; pt-PT; rv:1.9.1.2) Gecko/20090729 Firefox/3.5.2 (.NET CLR 3.5.30729)'  # SQLi Dumper
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - SharpUp PrivEsc Tool Execution
id: c484e533-ee16-4a93-b6ac-f0ea4868b2f1
status: test
description: Detects the use of SharpUp, a tool for local privilege escalation
references:
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpUp
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-20
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1615
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.t1574.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpUp.exe'
        - Description: 'SharpUp'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'HijackablePaths'
              - 'UnquotedServicePath'
              - 'ProcessDLLHijack'
              - 'ModifiableServiceBinaries'
              - 'ModifiableScheduledTask'
              - 'DomainGPPPassword'
              - 'CachedGPPPassword'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: HTTP Request With Empty User Agent
id: 21e44d78-95e7-421b-a464-ffd8395659c4
status: test
description: |
    Detects a potentially suspicious empty user agent strings in proxy log.
    Could potentially indicate an uncommon request method.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/Carlos_Perez/status/883455096645931008
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-07-08
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
      # Empty string - as used by Powershell's (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString
        c-useragent: ''
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Linux Crypto Mining Pool Connections
id: a46c93b7-55ed-4d27-a41b-c259456c4746
status: stable
description: Detects process connections to a Monero crypto mining pool
references:
    - https://www.poolwatch.io/coin/monero
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-10-26
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1496
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: network_connection
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname:
            - 'pool.minexmr.com'
            - 'fr.minexmr.com'
            - 'de.minexmr.com'
            - 'sg.minexmr.com'
            - 'ca.minexmr.com'
            - 'us-west.minexmr.com'
            - 'pool.supportxmr.com'
            - 'mine.c3pool.com'
            - 'xmr-eu1.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr-eu2.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr-us-east1.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr-us-west1.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr-asia1.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr-jp1.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr-au1.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr.2miners.com'
            - 'xmr.hashcity.org'
            - 'xmr.f2pool.com'
            - 'xmrpool.eu'
            - 'pool.hashvault.pro'
            - 'moneroocean.stream'
            - 'monerocean.stream'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of crypto miners
level: high

title: Lummac Stealer Activity - Execution Of More.com And Vbc.exe
id: 19b3806e-46f2-4b4c-9337-e3d8653245ea
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of more.com and vbc.exe in the process tree.
    This behavior was observed by a set of samples related to Lummac Stealer.
    The Lummac payload is injected into the vbc.exe process.
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/search/behaviour_processes%253A%2522C%253A%255C%255CWindows%255C%255CSysWOW64%255C%255Cmore.com%2522%2520behaviour_processes%253A%2522C%253A%255C%255CWindows%255C%255CMicrosoft.NET%255C%255CFramework%255C%255Cv4.0.30319%255C%255Cvbc.exe%2522/files
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/14d886517fff2cc8955844b252c985ab59f2f95b2849002778f03a8f07eb8aef
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/more.com-EDB3046610020EE614B5B81B0439895E.html
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/vbc.exe-A731372E6F6978CE25617AE01B143351.html
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2024-12-19
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # VT Query: behaviour_processes:"C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\more.com" behaviour_processes:"C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319\\vbc.exe"
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\more.com'
    selection_child:
        - Image|endswith: '\vbc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'vbc.exe'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Mail Forwarding/Redirecting Activity Via ExchangePowerShell Cmdlet
id: 0c7686d5-c74e-4292-b224-2a08e956ebc4
related:
    - id: c726e007-2cd0-4a55-abfb-79730fbedee5
      type: similar
    - id: 15b7abbb-8b40-4d01-9ee2-b51994b1d474
      type: obsolete
status: experimental
description: Detects email forwarding or redirecting activity via ExchangePowerShell Cmdlet
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/email-forwarding-rules/
    - https://github.com/PwC-IR/Business-Email-Compromise-Guide/blob/fe29ce06aef842efe4eb448c26bbe822bf5b895d/PwC-Business_Email_Compromise-Guide.pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) (InTheCyber)
date: 2026-03-01
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1114.003
    - attack.t1564.008
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1020
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_cmdlet:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'New-InboxRule'
            - 'Set-InboxRule'
            - 'Set-Mailbox'
    selection_params:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'ForwardAsAttachmentTo'
            - 'ForwardingAddress'
            - 'ForwardingSmtpAddress'
            - 'ForwardTo'
            - 'RedirectTo' # Also covers "RedirectToRecipients"
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate mail forwarding rules created by users or administrators to forward email to designated internal or external recipients for business or operational purposes.
level: medium

title: New User Created Via Net.EXE
id: cd219ff3-fa99-45d4-8380-a7d15116c6dc
related:
    - id: b9f0e6f5-09b4-4358-bae4-08408705bd5c
      type: similar
status: test
description: Identifies the creation of local users via the net.exe command.
references:
    - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/014c3f51-89c6-40f1-ac9c-5688f26090ab.html
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.md
author: Endgame, JHasenbusch (adapted to Sigma for oscd.community)
date: 2018-10-30
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\net.exe'
              - '\net1.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'net.exe'
              - 'net1.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'user'
            - 'add'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate user creation.
    - Better use event IDs for user creation rather than command line rules.
level: medium

title: NTFS symbolic link configuration change
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to modify the type of symbolic link than can be created.
references:
- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/08/10/lockbit-hive-and-blackcat-attack-automotive-supplier-in-triple-ransomware-attack/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/06/13/the-many-lives-of-blackcat-ransomware/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-behavior
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1547.009 # Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification 
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection: # 'fsutil behavior set SymlinkEvaluation R2L:1'
  selection:
    NewProcessName|endswith: '\fsutil.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - behavior
      - set
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- admin activity on file server
level: medium

title: NTLM Brute Force
id: 9c8acf1a-cbf9-4db6-b63c-74baabe03e59
status: test
description: Detects common NTLM brute force device names
references:
    - https://www.varonis.com/blog/investigate-ntlm-brute-force
author: Jerry Shockley '@jsh0x'
date: 2022-02-02
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: ntlm
    definition: Requires events from Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 8004
    devicename:
        WorkstationName:
            - 'Rdesktop'
            - 'Remmina'
            - 'Freerdp'
            - 'Windows7'
            - 'Windows8'
            - 'Windows2012'
            - 'Windows2016'
            - 'Windows2019'
    condition: selection and devicename
falsepositives:
    - Systems with names equal to the spoofed ones used by the brute force tools
level: medium

title: NTLM Hash Leak Via Curl NTLM Authentication
id: 916eb839-895e-47f8-99ee-3008bf377a3e
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of curl with NTLM authentication and empty credentials (-u :), which can be abused to leak the currently logged-in user's NTLMv2 challenge-response to an
    attacker-controlled server, enabling offline cracking or relay attacks.
    When no credentials are provided, the Microsoft-shipped curl passes a NULL identity to Windows SSPI, which automatically falls back to the current user's logon session credentials
    stored in LSASS — without requiring a plaintext password.
    This behavior is exclusive to the curl binary shipped by Microsoft (available since Windows 10 / Windows Server 2019), which is built with SSPI support.
references:
    - https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/master/lib/vauth/ntlm_sspi.c#L128-L140
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/acquirecredentialshandle--ntlm
    - https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html#--ntlm
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-06-04
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1187
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'curl.exe'
    selection_ntlm_flag:
        CommandLine|contains: '--ntlm'
    selection_empty_creds:
        CommandLine|re: '(?i)\s(-u|--user)\s*:'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Should be very rare as it's not widely known or used, but could occur in legitimate use cases where curl is used with NTLM authentication and empty credentials, such as in certain scripts or automation tasks.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_ntlm_hash_leak_attempt/info.yml

title: OCSP responder auditing settings changed or disabled
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker would attempt to alter or disable OCSP responder auditing settings to evade detection and perform further escalation via ADCS vulnerabilities.
requirements: requires to have the OCSP role installed and to have enabled auditing in the responder properties.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0005-Defense%20Evasion/T1222.001-File%20and%20Directory%20Permissions%20Modification
- https://www.gradenegger.eu/en/overview-of-the-audit-events-generated-by-the-online-responder-ocsp/
- https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/active-directory-certificate-services-hardening-wp-en.pdf
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-active-directory-certificate-services-abuse
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/investigating-active-directory-certificate-abuse.pdf
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1562.002 # Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools 
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5123
    PropertyName: AuditFilter
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Rare PKI/ADCS/OSCP admin changes
level: high

title: OpenCanary - FTP Login Attempt
id: 6991bc2b-ae2e-447f-bc55-3a1ba04c14e5
status: test
description: Detects instances where an FTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 2000
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential DLL File Download Via PowerShell Invoke-WebRequest
id: 0f0450f3-8b47-441e-a31b-15a91dc243e2
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL files being downloaded using the PowerShell Invoke-WebRequest or Invoke-RestMethod cmdlets.
references:
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/onenote-growing-threat-malware-distribution
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Hieu Tran
date: 2023-03-13
modified: 2025-07-18
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Invoke-RestMethod '
            - 'Invoke-WebRequest '
            - 'IRM '
            - 'IWR '
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'http'
            - 'OutFile'
            - '.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_download_dll/info.yml

title: Potential NTLM Coercion Via Certutil.EXE
id: 6c6d9280-e6d0-4b9d-80ac-254701b64916
status: test
description: Detects possible NTLM coercion via certutil using the 'syncwithWU' flag
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/issues/243
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-01
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -syncwithWU '
            - ' \\\\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_ntlm_coercion/info.yml

title: Potential Persistence Via Event Viewer Events.asp
id: a1e11042-a74a-46e6-b07c-c4ce8ecc239b
status: test
description: Detects potential registry persistence technique using the Event Viewer "Events.asp" technique
references:
    - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1626648985824788480
    - https://admx.help/?Category=Windows_7_2008R2&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.InternetCommunicationManagement::EventViewer_DisableLinks
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/02/15/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-103/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f296668303c29d3f4c07e42bdd2b28d8dd6625f9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-17
modified: 2023-03-05
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Covers both "\Policies\" and "\Software\" paths for both "Machine" and "User" level configs
        # Also "MicrosoftRedirectionProgramCommandLineParameters" key
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer\MicrosoftRedirectionProgram'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer\MicrosoftRedirectionURL'
    filter_default_redirect_program:
        Image|endswith: 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe' # Set via GPO
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer\MicrosoftRedirectionProgram'
        Details: '%%SystemRoot%%\PCHealth\HelpCtr\Binaries\HelpCtr.exe'
    filter_default_redirect_program_cli:
        Image|endswith: 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe' # Set via GPO
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer\MicrosoftRedirectionProgramCommandLineParameters'
        Details: '-url hcp://services/centers/support?topic=%%s'
    filter_url:
        Details: 'http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/events.asp'
    filter_cleaner:
        Details: '(Empty)'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Event Viewer Registry Modification - Redirection URL
      technique: T1112
      atomic_guid: 6174be7f-5153-4afd-92c5-e0c3b7cdb5ae
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Event Viewer Registry Modification - Redirection Program
      technique: T1112
      atomic_guid: 81483501-b8a5-4225-8b32-52128e2f69db

title: Potential WerFault ReflectDebugger Registry Value Abuse
id: 0cf2e1c6-8d10-4273-8059-738778f981ad
related:
    - id: fabfb3a7-3ce1-4445-9c7c-3c27f1051cdd
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects potential WerFault "ReflectDebugger" registry value abuse for persistence.
references:
    - https://cocomelonc.github.io/malware/2022/11/02/malware-pers-18.html
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/08/31/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-85/
author: X__Junior
date: 2023-05-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Hangs\ReflectDebugger'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PUA- IOX Tunneling Tool Execution
id: d7654f02-e04b-4934-9838-65c46f187ebc
status: test
description: Detects the use of IOX - a tool for port forwarding and intranet proxy purposes
references:
    - https://github.com/EddieIvan01/iox
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-08
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\iox.exe'
    selection_commandline:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.exe fwd -l '
            - '.exe fwd -r '
            - '.exe proxy -l '
            - '.exe proxy -r '
    selection_hashes:
        # v0.4
        Hashes|contains:
            - "MD5=9DB2D314DD3F704A02051EF5EA210993"
            - "SHA1=039130337E28A6623ECF9A0A3DA7D92C5964D8DD"
            - "SHA256=C6CF82919B809967D9D90EA73772A8AA1C1EB3BC59252D977500F64F1A0D6731"
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use
level: high

title: Renamed PingCastle Binary Execution
id: 2433a154-bb3d-42e4-86c3-a26bdac91c45
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed "PingCastle" binary based on the PE metadata fields.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/
    - https://www.pingcastle.com/documentation/scanner/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-01-11
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PingCastleReporting.exe'
              - 'PingCastleCloud.exe'
              - 'PingCastle.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '--scanner aclcheck'
              - '--scanner antivirus'
              - '--scanner computerversion'
              - '--scanner foreignusers'
              - '--scanner laps_bitlocker'
              - '--scanner localadmin'
              - '--scanner nullsession'
              - '--scanner nullsession-trust'
              - '--scanner oxidbindings'
              - '--scanner remote'
              - '--scanner share'
              - '--scanner smb'
              - '--scanner smb3querynetwork'
              - '--scanner spooler'
              - '--scanner startup'
              - '--scanner zerologon'
        - CommandLine|contains: '--no-enum-limit'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '--healthcheck'
              - '--level Full'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '--healthcheck'
              - '--server '
    filter_main_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\PingCastleReporting.exe'
            - '\PingCastleCloud.exe'
            - '\PingCastle.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: SMB over QUIC Via PowerShell Script
id: 6df07c3b-8456-4f8b-87bb-fe31ec964cae
related:
    - id: 2238d337-42fb-4971-9a68-63570f2aede4
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the mounting of Windows SMB shares over QUIC, which can be an unexpected event in some enterprise environments
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/74438b0237d141ee9c99747976447dc884cb1a39/atomics/T1570/T1570.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/smbshare/new-smbmapping?view=windowsserver2022-ps
    - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/making-smb-accessible-with-ntlmquic/
author: frack113
date: 2023-07-21
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1570
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'New-SmbMapping'
            - '-TransportType QUIC'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Due to the nature of the script block, the matching of the string could sometimes result in a false positive. Use this rule to hunt for potential malicious or suspicious scripts.
level: medium

title: Spring Framework Exceptions
id: ae48ab93-45f7-4051-9dfe-5d30a3f78e33
status: stable
description: Detects suspicious Spring framework exceptions that could indicate exploitation attempts
references:
    - https://docs.spring.io/spring-security/site/docs/current/api/overview-tree.html
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-08-06
modified: 2020-09-01
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: spring
detection:
    keywords:
        - AccessDeniedException
        - CsrfException
        - InvalidCsrfTokenException
        - MissingCsrfTokenException
        - CookieTheftException
        - InvalidCookieException
        - RequestRejectedException
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Application bugs
level: medium

title: Sticky Key Like Backdoor Execution
id: 2fdefcb3-dbda-401e-ae23-f0db027628bc
related:
    - id: baca5663-583c-45f9-b5dc-ea96a22ce542
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jonathantrull/detecting-sticky-key-backdoors
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), @twjackomo, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2018-03-15
modified: 2023-03-07
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.008
    - car.2014-11-003
    - car.2014-11-008
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\winlogon.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wt.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'sethc.exe'
            - 'utilman.exe'
            - 'osk.exe'
            - 'Magnify.exe'
            - 'Narrator.exe'
            - 'DisplaySwitch.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical