Sigma rules: 29

title: Abuse of Service Permissions to Hide Services Via Set-Service - PS
id: 953945c5-22fe-4a92-9f8a-a9edc1e522da
related:
    - id: 514e4c3a-c77d-4cde-a00f-046425e2301e
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the "Set-Service" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be hidden from other utilities such as "sc.exe", "Get-Service"...etc. (Works only in powershell 7)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/set-service?view=powershell-7.2
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.011
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Set-Service '
            - 'DCLCWPDTSD'
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - '-SecurityDescriptorSddl '
            - '-sd '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare intended use of hidden services
    - Rare FP could occur due to the non linearity of the ScriptBlockText log
level: high

title: AWS Bucket Deleted
id: 39c9f26d-6e3b-4dbb-9c7a-4154b0281112
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the deletion of S3 buckets in AWS CloudTrail logs.
    Monitoring the deletion of S3 buckets is critical for security and data integrity, as it may indicate potential data loss or unauthorized access attempts.
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_DeleteBucket.html
    - https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/s3api/delete-bucket.html
author: Ivan Saakov, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection_event_name:
        eventName: 'DeleteBucket'
    selection_status_success:
        errorCode: 'Success'
    selection_status_null:
        errorCode: null
    condition: selection_event_name and 1 of selection_status_*
falsepositives:
    - During maintenance operations or testing, authorized administrators may delete S3 buckets as part of routine data management or cleanup activities.
level: medium

title: Binary Padding - MacOS
id: 95361ce5-c891-4b0a-87ca-e24607884a96
status: test
description: Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This rule detect using dd and truncate to add a junk data to file.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1027.001/T1027.001.md
    - https://linux.die.net/man/1/truncate
    - https://linux.die.net/man/1/dd
author: 'Igor Fits, Mikhail Larin, oscd.community'
date: 2020-10-19
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027.001
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_truncate:
        Image|endswith: '/truncate'
        CommandLine|contains: '-s +'
    selection_dd:
        Image|endswith: '/dd'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'if=/dev/zero' # if input is not /dev/zero, then there is no null padding
            - 'if=/dev/random' # high-quality random data
            - 'if=/dev/urandom' # low-quality random data
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate script work
level: high

title: CodeIntegrity - Unsigned Kernel Module Loaded
id: 951f8d29-f2f6-48a7-859f-0673ff105e6f
status: test
description: Detects the presence of a loaded unsigned kernel module on the system.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-tag-explanations
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: codeintegrity-operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 3001 # Code Integrity determined an unsigned kernel module %2 is loaded into the system. Check with the publisher to see if a signed version of the kernel module is available
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Encoded PowerShell payload deployed (PowerShell)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker deployed a service pointing to a hidden and encoded PowerShell payload.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0002-Execution/T1059.001-PowerShell
- https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/psexec-pass-hash/
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/from-powershell-to-payload-an-analysis-of-weaponized-malware
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/malware-deep-dive-examining-a-powershell-payload
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.md
- https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/vulnerabilities-exploits-and-malware-driving-attack-campaigns-in-october-2019
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/getting-the-bacon-from-cobalt-strike-beacon/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-OWASSRF/
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1027
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category:
    - ps_module
    - ps_classic_script
    - ps_script
detection:
  selection_powershell_native:
    EventID: 800
    EventData|contains|all:
      - 'FromBase64String'
      - 'IO.StreamReader'
      - 'IO.Compression.'

  selection_powershell_modern:
    EventID: 4103
    Payload|contains|all:
      - 'FromBase64String'
      - 'IO.StreamReader'
      - 'IO.Compression.'

  selection_powershell_block:
    EventID: 4104
    ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
      - 'FromBase64String'
      - 'IO.StreamReader'
      - 'IO.Compression.'

  condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high

#- 'FromBase64String'
#- 'IO.StreamReader'
#- 'IO.Compression.'
#- '[System.Convert]::'
#- '[Convert]'
#- 'System.Diagnostics.Process'

title: Forest Blizzard APT - Custom Protocol Handler DLL Registry Set
id: d807056b-0e00-4cec-b7f8-b8b7518e382b
status: test
description: |
    Detects the setting of the DLL that handles the custom protocol handler.
    Seen being created by Forest Blizzard APT as reported by MSFT.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/04/22/analyzing-forest-blizzards-custom-post-compromise-tool-for-exploiting-cve-2022-38028-to-obtain-credentials/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-04-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\CLSID\{026CC6D7-34B2-33D5-B551-CA31EB6CE345}\Server'
        Details|endswith: '.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Github SSH Certificate Configuration Changed
id: 2f575940-d85e-4ddc-af13-17dad6f1a0ef
status: test
description: Detects when changes are made to the SSH certificate configuration of the organization.
references:
    - https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/organizations/managing-git-access-to-your-organizations-repositories/about-ssh-certificate-authorities
    - https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/audit-log-events-for-your-enterprise#ssh_certificate_authority
author: Romain Gaillard (@romain-gaillard)
date: 2024-07-29
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: github
    service: audit
    definition: 'Requirements: The audit log streaming feature must be enabled to be able to receive such logs. You can enable following the documentation here: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/streaming-the-audit-log-for-your-enterprise#setting-up-audit-log-streaming'
detection:
    selection:
        action:
            - 'ssh_certificate_authority.create' # An SSH certificate authority for an organization or enterprise was created.
            - 'ssh_certificate_requirement.disable' # The requirement for members to use SSH certificates to access an organization resources was disabled.
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Allowed administrative activities.
level: medium

title: HackTool - CoercedPotato Named Pipe Creation
id: 4d0083b3-580b-40da-9bba-626c19fe4033
status: test
description: Detects the pattern of a pipe name as used by the hack tool CoercedPotato
references:
    - https://blog.hackvens.fr/articles/CoercedPotato.html
    - https://github.com/hackvens/CoercedPotato
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-11
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: pipe_created
    definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
    selection:
        PipeName|contains: '\coerced\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - Pypykatz Credentials Dumping Activity
id: a29808fd-ef50-49ff-9c7a-59a9b040b404
status: test
description: Detects the usage of "pypykatz" to obtain stored credentials. Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database through Windows registry where the SAM database is stored
references:
    - https://github.com/skelsec/pypykatz
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-2---registry-parse-with-pypykatz
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-05
modified: 2023-02-05
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - \pypykatz.exe
            - \python.exe
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'live'
            - 'registry'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: High risk event - grant Management APIs scopes
id: b275f0fa-3f2d-493f-a741-67e861ef77ed
status: experimental
description: |
    Excessive permissions can lead to unauthorized access. Auth0 Management API scopes should be given to trusted applications and monitored.
author: Okta
date: 2025-07-11
modified: 2025-09-01
logsource:
    product: auth0
detection:
    selection:
        data.type: sapi
        data.description:
            - Update client grant
    filter_1:
        data.details.response.body.audience:
            - 'https://{your-tenant-domain}/api/v2/'
        data.details.request.body.scope{}|startswith:
        # Example of scopes. Limit this list to relevant scopes to be monitored
            - 'delete:'
            - 'update:'
    filter_2:
        data.details.response.body.client_id:
        # List client_ids for trusted applications
            - '{trusted-client_id-1}'
            - '{trusted-client_id-2}'
    condition: selection and filter_1 and not filter_2
explanation: >
    The query collects log entries issued when applications' settings are modified, i.e. "Update client grant".
    It filters by audience to locate Management API related activities.
    The Splunk query provides modifying IPs, client_ids of applications which were assigned to risky scopes, and a list of these scopes.
splunk: |
    index=auth0 data.tenant_name="{your-tenant-name}"
    data.type=sapi data.description="Update client grant"
    data.details.response.body.audience="https://{your-tenant-domain}/api/v2/"
    ```Add more monitored scopes```
    data.details.request.body.scope{} IN ("{mgg-api-scope-1}", "{mgg-api-scope-2}")
    ```Trigger an alert when scopes are granted to applications that are not on the list of allowed clients.```
    NOT data.details.response.body.client_id IN ({trusted-client_id-1}, {trusted-client_id-2})
    | fields _time, data.ip, data.details.request.body.scope{}, data.details.response.body.client_id
    ```Display the information in a table```
    | table _time, data.ip, data.details.response.body.client_id, data.details.request.body.scope{}
comments:
    - The Splunk query above shall be tuned to reflect a valid tenant name, audience, monitored Management API scopes, and trusted client_ids.
    - To reduce a number of alerts, the query can be adjusted to watch for a more critical set of scopes, e.g. focus on "delete:*", but not "read:*",
      and/or trigger alerts when scopes are granted to applications that are not on the list of trusted clients.
    - To get a full list of available Management APIs scope and their descriptions, you can go to Applications --> Auth0 Management API --> Permissions.
    - To get an easier to copy list, you can go to Applications --> Auth0 Management API --> API Explorer --> Copy the token.
    - Then go to Management API documentation (https://auth0.com/docs/api/management/v2), click "Set API Token" and paste the earlier copied token. Now, you see all scopes that are easy to copy and use in the splunk query given above.
tenant_logs: |
    type:"sapi" AND description: "Update client grant"
prevention:
    - Control tenant admins, i.e. "Admin", as this role has permissions to modify any application.
    - Enforce MFA for tenant admins to reduce the risk of an adversary gaining access.
    - Control Management API scopes that allow modification of grants - *:client_grants
    - Control usage of Management API from only trusted IPs by applying Network ACL scoped to "management".
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate updates by an administrator. This rule is designed for threat hunting and to be a starting point for further investigation.
    - Trusted client_id has not been listed, e.g. see filter_2.
level: medium
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1548

title: High risk local/domain local group membership change
description: Detects scenarios where a suspicious group membership is changed. Having Microsoft LAPS installed may trigger false positive events for the builtin administrators group triggered by the system account (S-1-5-18).
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account%20manipulation
- https://ss64.com/nt/syntax-groups.html
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/security-identifiers
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4732 # local and domain local group
    TargetSid|startswith: 'S-1-5-32'
    TargetSid|endswith:
      - '-544' # Administrators
      - '-547' # Power Users
      - '-548' # Account Operators
      - '-549' # Server Operators
      - '-551' # Backup Operators
      - '-578' # Hyper-V Administrators
  filter:
    SubjectUserSid: 'S-1-5-18' # LAPS or others IAM solutions may trigger this as a false positive
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Administrator activity
level: high

title: Host constrained delegation settings changed for potential abuse (Rubeus) - Any protocol
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker modifies host delegation settings for privilege escalation.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account%20manipulation
- https://dirkjanm.io/krbrelayx-unconstrained-delegation-abuse-toolkit/
- https://www.alsid.com/crb_article/kerberos-delegation/
- https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/s4u2pwnage/
- https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-kerberos-constrained-delegation
- https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/delegating-like-a-boss-abusing-kerberos-delegation-in-active-directory/
- https://stealthbits.com/blog/what-is-kerberos-delegation-an-overview-of-kerberos-delegation/
- https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1
- https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/delegations#talk
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection: # Delegation to specified service, any protocol
    EventID: 4742
    UserAccountControl: '%%2098' # Enable option "Approved for authenticated delegation"
  filter:
    AllowedToDelegateTo: '-' # Can be: "cifs/srv01 cifs/srv02.demo.lan dcom/dc03..."
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Rare administrator modifying host delegation settings
level: high

title: Hypervisor-protected Code Integrity (HVCI) Related Registry Tampering Via CommandLine
id: 6225c53a-a96e-4235-b28f-8d7997cd96eb
related:
    - id: 8b7273a4-ba5d-4d8a-b04f-11f2900d043a
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the tampering of Hypervisor-protected Code Integrity (HVCI) related registry values via command line tool reg.exe.
    HVCI uses virtualization-based security to protect code integrity by ensuring that only trusted code can run in kernel mode.
    Adversaries may tamper with HVCI to load malicious or unsigned drivers, which can be used to escalate privileges, maintain persistence, or evade security mechanisms.
references:
    - https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/sharpening-the-knife-gold-blades-strategic-evolution
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/hardware-security/enable-virtualization-based-protection-of-code-integrity
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-01-26
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'reg.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'add '
            - 'New-ItemProperty '
            - 'Set-ItemProperty '
            - 'si '  # SetItem Alias
    selection_cli_base:
        CommandLine|contains: '\DeviceGuard'
    selection_cli_key:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity'
            - 'HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate system administration tasks that require disabling HVCI for troubleshooting purposes when certain drivers or applications are incompatible with it.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hvci_registry_tampering/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable Hypervisor-Enforced Code Integrity (HVCI)
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: 70bd71e6-eba4-4e00-92f7-617911dbe020

title: Java Running with Remote Debugging
id: 8f88e3f6-2a49-48f5-a5c4-2f7eedf78710
status: test
description: Detects a JAVA process running with remote debugging allowing more than just localhost to connect
references:
    - https://dzone.com/articles/remote-debugging-java-applications-with-jdwp
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2023-02-01
tags:
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_jdwp_transport:
        CommandLine|contains: 'transport=dt_socket,address='
    selection_old_jvm_version:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'jre1.'
            - 'jdk1.'
    exclusion:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'address=127.0.0.1'
            - 'address=localhost'
    condition: all of selection_* and not exclusion
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Kerberoasting Activity - Initial Query
id: d04ae2b8-ad54-4de0-bd87-4bc1da66aa59
status: test
description: |
    This rule will collect the data needed to start looking into possible kerberoasting activity.
    Further analysis or computation within the query is needed focusing on requests from one specific host/IP towards multiple service names within a time period of 5 seconds.
    You can then set a threshold for the number of requests and time between the requests to turn this into an alert.
references:
    - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/art_of_kerberoast/
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=3513
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2022-01-21
modified: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1558.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4769
        Status: '0x0' # Translated as status from failure code field. Query only for successes
        TicketEncryptionType: '0x17' # RC4 ticket encryption type
    filter_main_krbtgt:
        ServiceName|endswith:
            - 'krbtgt' # Ignore requests for the krbtgt service
            - '$' # Ignore requests from service names that end with $ which are associated with genuine kerberos traffic
    filter_main_machine_accounts:
        TargetUserName|contains: '$@' # Ignore requests from machines
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legacy applications.
level: medium

title: LSASS process dump by a non system account
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker will dump the LSASS memory content using tools like Mimikatz, ProcDump, TaskMgr, ...
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0006-Credential%20Access/T1003-Credential%20dumping
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003.001
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 4656 # A handle to an object was requested. / Kernel object
      - 4663 # An attempt was made to access an object / Kernel object
    ObjectType: Process
    ObjectServer: Security
    ObjectName|endswith: '\System32\lsass.exe'
    # AccessMask:
      #- '0x1410'
      #- '0x1010'
      #- '0x1438' # could refers to misc::memssp
      #- '0x143a'
      #- '0x1418'
  filter:
    SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
    ProcessName:
      - '*\\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\SwReporter\\*\software_reporter_tool.exe' # Google Chrome Security tool
      - '*\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\*'
      - '*\Program Files\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\*'
      - '*\system32\csrss.exe'
      - '*\system32\wininit.exe'
      - '*\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe' # See LSASSY dedicated rule
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Antivirus, security products, browsers
level: high

title: macOS File Transfer Tool Execution
id: b2c3d4e5-f6a7-4b8c-9d0e-1f2a3b4c5d6e
status: experimental
description: 'Detects execution of file transfer tools (scp, rsync, sftp) which may
  indicate

  lateral movement or data staging for exfiltration. Adversaries often use these

  utilities to move files between compromised systems.

  '
author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
date: 2025/10/31
modified: 2025/10/31
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570/
logsource:
  product: macos
  service: endpointsecurity
detection:
  selection_event:
    esf.event_type: 9
    event.action: exec
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - /scp
    - /rsync
    - /sftp
  condition: selection_event and selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate system administration and backup operations
- Automated file synchronization tasks
- Development workflows using rsync for deployments
fields:
- Image
- CommandLine
- ProcessId
- ParentProcessId
- User
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.004
- attack.t1570
level: medium

title: OCSP responder security settings changed
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker would attempt to escalate privileges by changing the security settings of the responder.
requirements: requires to have the OCSP role installed and to have enabled auditing in the responder properties.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0005-Defense%20Evasion/T1222.001-File%20and%20Directory%20Permissions%20Modification
- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=5124
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1222
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5124
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Rare PKI/ADCS/OSCP admin changes
level: high

title: Potential AMSI Bypass Using NULL Bits
id: 92a974db-ab84-457f-9ec0-55db83d7a825
related:
    - id: fa2559c8-1197-471d-9cdd-05a0273d4522
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of special strings/null bits in order to potentially bypass AMSI functionalities
references:
    - https://github.com/r00t-3xp10it/hacking-material-books/blob/43cb1e1932c16ff1f58b755bc9ab6b096046853f/obfuscation/simple_obfuscation.md#amsi-bypass-using-null-bits-satoshi
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-04
modified: 2023-05-09
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - "if(0){{{0}}}' -f $(0 -as [char]) +"
            - "#<NULL>"
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potential Encrypted Registry Blob Related To SNAKE Malware
id: 7e163e96-b9a5-45d6-b2cd-d7d87b13c60b
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a registry value in the ".wav\OpenWithProgIds" key with an uncommon name. This could be related to SNAKE Malware as reported by CISA
references:
    - https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/09/2003218554/-1/-1/0/JOINT_CSA_HUNTING_RU_INTEL_SNAKE_MALWARE_20230509.PDF
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-10
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Classes\.wav\OpenWithProgIds\'
    filter_main_wav:
        - TargetObject|endswith: '.AssocFile.WAV'
        - TargetObject|contains: '.wav.'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Some additional tuning might be required to tune out legitimate processes that write to this key by default
level: medium

title: Potential Persistence Via Netsh Helper DLL - Registry
id: c90362e0-2df3-4e61-94fe-b37615814cb1
related:
    - id: 56321594-9087-49d9-bf10-524fe8479452
      type: similar
    - id: e7b18879-676e-4a0e-ae18-27039185a8e7
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the Netsh registry key to add a new DLL value. This change might be an indication of a potential persistence attempt by adding a malicious Netsh helper
references:
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1128-netsh-helper-dll
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/29/persistence-netsh-helper-dll/
author: Anish Bogati
date: 2023-11-28
modified: 2025-10-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.007
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NetSh'
        Details|contains: '.dll'
    filter_main_poqexec:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe'
        Details:
            - 'ipmontr.dll'
            - 'iasmontr.dll'
            - 'ippromon.dll'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate helper added by different programs and the OS
level: medium

title: Potential Provisioning Registry Key Abuse For Binary Proxy Execution
id: 2a4b3e61-9d22-4e4a-b60f-6e8f0cde6f25
related:
    - id: 7f5d1c9a-3e83-48df-95a7-2b98aae6c13c # CLI Generic
      type: similar
    - id: f9999590-1f94-4a34-a91e-951e47bedefd # CLI Abuse
      type: similar
    - id: 7021255e-5db3-4946-a8b9-0ba7a4644a69 # Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential abuse of the provisioning registry key for indirect command execution through "Provlaunch.exe".
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Provlaunch/
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1674399582162153472
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-08-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potentially Suspicious Mofcomp Execution
id: 1dd05363-104e-4b4a-b963-196a534b03a1
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of the "mofcomp" utility as a child of a suspicious shell or script running utility or by having a suspicious path in the commandline.
    The "mofcomp" utility parses a file containing MOF statements and adds the classes and class instances defined in the file to the WMI repository.
    Attackers abuse this utility to install malicious MOF scripts
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
    - https://github.com/The-DFIR-Report/Sigma-Rules/blob/75260568a7ffe61b2458ca05f6f25914efb44337/win_mofcomp_execution.yml
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/mofcomp
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-12
modified: 2026-08-06
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\mofcomp.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'mofcomp.exe'
    selection_case:
        - ParentImage|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\wsl.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
              - '\Contacts\'
              - '\Favorites\'
              - '\Favourites\'
              - '\Music\'
              - '\Pictures\'
              - '\Users\Public\'
              - '\Videos\'
              - '\WINDOWS\Temp\'
              - '%appdata%'
              - '%temp%'
              - '%tmp%'
    filter_main_wmiprvse:
        ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'C:\Windows\TEMP\'
        CommandLine|endswith: '.mof'
    filter_main_installutil:
        ParentCommandLine|endswith: '\InstallUtil.exe /Uninstall C:\Windows\CCM\Microsoft.ConfigurationManager.SVProvider.dll'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\InstallUtil.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Windows\TEMP'
            - '.tmp'
    filter_optional_null_parent:
        ParentCommandLine: null
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potentially Suspicious Regsvr32 HTTP/FTP Pattern
id: 867356ee-9352-41c9-a8f2-1be690d78216
related:
    - id: 8e2b24c9-4add-46a0-b4bb-0057b4e6187d
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects regsvr32 execution to download/install/register new DLLs that are hosted on Web or FTP servers.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1461041276514623491
    - https://twitter.com/tccontre18/status/1480950986650832903
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-24
modified: 2023-05-26
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.010
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'REGSVR32.EXE'
    selection_flag:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /i'
            - ' -i'
    selection_protocol:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'ftp'
            - 'http'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: PowerShell Console History Logs Deleted
id: ff301988-c231-4bd0-834c-ac9d73b86586
status: test
description: Detects the deletion of the PowerShell console History logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-15
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070
logsource:
    category: file_delete
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Powershell Executed From Headless ConHost Process
id: 056c7317-9a09-4bd4-9067-d051312752ea
related:
    - id: 00ca75ab-d5ce-43be-b86c-55ff39c6abfc
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of powershell commands from headless ConHost window.
    The "--headless" flag hides the windows from the user upon execution.
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/fake-browser-updates-lead-to-boinc-volunteer-computing-software
author: Matt Anderson (Huntress)
date: 2024-07-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1564.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\conhost.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CONHOST.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '--headless'
            - 'powershell'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_conhost_headless_powershell/info.yml

title: Powershell WMI Persistence
id: 9e07f6e7-83aa-45c6-998e-0af26efd0a85
status: test
description: Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.003/T1546.003.md
    - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/data/module_source/persistence/Persistence.psm1#L545
author: frack113
date: 2021-08-19
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1546.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_ioc:
        - ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
              - 'New-CimInstance '
              - '-Namespace root/subscription '
              - '-ClassName __EventFilter '
              - '-Property ' # is a variable name
        - ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
              - 'New-CimInstance '
              - '-Namespace root/subscription '
              - '-ClassName CommandLineEventConsumer '
              - '-Property ' # is a variable name
    condition: selection_ioc
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_wmi_persistence/info.yml

title: Process Execution From WebDAV Share
id: f8de9dd5-7a63-4cfd-9d0c-ae124878b5a9
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects execution of processes with image paths starting with WebDAV shares (\\), which might indicate malicious file execution from remote web shares.
    Execution of processes from WebDAV shares can be a sign of lateral movement or exploitation attempts, especially if the process is not a known legitimate application.
    Exploitation Attempt of vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-33053 also involves executing processes from WebDAV paths.
references:
    - https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/stealth-falcon-zero-day/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-06-13
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1105
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|startswith: '\\\\'
        Image|contains: '\DavWWWRoot\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of WebDAV shares for process execution
    - Known applications executing from WebDAV paths
level: low

title: PUA - Process Hacker Driver Load
id: 67add051-9ee7-4ad3-93ba-42935615ae8d
related:
    - id: 10cb6535-b31d-4512-9962-513dcbc42cc1
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects driver load of the Process Hacker tool
references:
    - https://processhacker.sourceforge.io/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-16
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - cve.2021-21551
    - attack.t1543
logsource:
    category: driver_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - ImageLoaded|endswith: '\kprocesshacker.sys'
        - Hashes|contains:
              - 'IMPHASH=821D74031D3F625BCBD0DF08B70F1E77'
              - 'IMPHASH=F86759BB4DE4320918615DC06E998A39'
              - 'IMPHASH=0A64EEB85419257D0CE32BD5D55C3A18'
              - 'IMPHASH=6E7B34DFC017700B1517B230DF6FF0D0'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of process hacker or system informer by developers or system administrators
level: high

title: Pubprn.vbs Proxy Execution
id: 1fb76ab8-fa60-4b01-bddd-71e89bf555da
status: test
description: Detects the use of the 'Pubprn.vbs' Microsoft signed script to execute commands.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/Pubprn/
author: frack113
date: 2022-05-28
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1216.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\pubprn.vbs'
            - 'script:'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_pubprn/info.yml

title: Remote Access Tool - Action1 Arbitrary Code Execution and Remote Sessions
id: aa3168fb-d594-4f93-a92d-7a9ba675b766
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of Action1 in order to execute arbitrary code or establish a remote session.

    Action1 is a powerful Remote Monitoring and Management tool that enables users to execute commands, scripts, and binaries.
    Through the web interface of action1, the administrator must create a new policy or an app to establish remote execution and then points that the agent is installed.

    Hunting Opportunity 1- Weed Out The Noise

    When threat actors execute a script, a command, or a binary through these new policies and apps, the names of these become visible in the command line during the execution process. Below is an example of the command line that contains the deployment of a binary through  a policy with name "test_app_1":

    ParentCommandLine: "C:\WINDOWS\Action1\action1_agent.exe schedule:Deploy_App__test_app_1_1681327673425 runaction:0"

    After establishing a baseline, we can split the command to extract the policy name and group all the policy names and inspect the results with a list of frequency occurrences.

    Hunting Opportunity 2 - Remote Sessions On Out Of Office Hours

    If you have admins within your environment using remote sessions to administer endpoints, you can create a threat-hunting query and modify the time of the initiated sessions looking for abnormal activity.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/Kostastsale/status/1646256901506605063?s=20
    - https://www.action1.com/documentation/
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2023-04-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_app_deployment_exec:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\action1_agent.exe'
        Image|contains: '\Windows\Action1\package_downloads\'
    selection_command_exec:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            - '\Action1\scripts\Run_Command_'
            - '\Action1\scripts\Run_PowerShell_'
    selection_remote_session_init:
        Image|endswith: '\agent1_remote.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - If Action1 is among the approved software in your environment, you might find that this is a noisy query. See description for ideas on how to alter this query and start looking for suspicious activities.
level: medium

title: Remote schedule task creation via named pipes (ATexec)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker remotely creates a scheduled task over named pipes to execute commands or elevate privileges.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0002-Execution/T1053.005-Scheduled%20Task
- https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/atexec.py
- https://u0041.co/blog/post/1
- https://blog.menasec.net/2019/03/threat-hunting-25-scheduled-tasks-for.html
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1053.005
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5145
    ShareName: '\\*\IPC$'
    RelativeTargetName: atsvc
    AccessList|contains: '%%4417' # WriteData
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrator activity, backup solutions
level: medium