Sigma rules: 2c

title: Applications That Are Using ROPC Authentication Flow
id: 55695bc0-c8cf-461f-a379-2535f563c854
status: test
description: |
    Resource owner password credentials (ROPC) should be avoided if at all possible as this requires the user to expose their current password credentials to the application directly.
    The application then uses those credentials to authenticate the user against the identity provider.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-authentication-flows
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-06-01
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: ROPC
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Applications that are being used as part of automated testing or a legacy application that cannot use any other modern authentication flow
level: medium

title: Arbitrary File Download Via IMEWDBLD.EXE
id: 863218bd-c7d0-4c52-80cd-0a96c09f54af
related:
    - id: 8d7e392e-9b28-49e1-831d-5949c6281228
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects usage of "IMEWDBLD.exe" to download arbitrary files
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-10---windows---powershell-download
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/IMEWDBLD/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\IMEWDBLD.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'imewdbld.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
# Note: Please reduce this to medium if you find legitimate use case of this utility with a URL
level: high

title: Azure New CloudShell Created
id: 72af37e2-ec32-47dc-992b-bc288a2708cb
status: test
description: Identifies when a new cloudshell is created inside of Azure portal.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations
author: Austin Songer
date: 2021-09-21
modified: 2022-08-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName: MICROSOFT.PORTAL/CONSOLES/WRITE
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - A new cloudshell may be created by a system administrator.
level: medium

title: BITS payload downloaded via PowerShell
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker downloads a payload by abusing BITS software. For more precise information, inspect "Bits-client" event log and search for ID 59 and 60.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1197-BITS%20jobs
- https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/background-intelligent-transfer-protocol-ab81cd900aa7
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bitsadmin-examples
- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190/
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/12/12/multi-stage-downloader-trojan-sload-abuses-bits-almost-exclusively-for-malicious-activities/
- https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/background-intelligent-transfer-protocol-ab81cd900aa7
- https://www.hackingarticles.in/windows-for-pentester-bitsadmin/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/09/25/from-screenconnect-to-hive-ransomware-in-61-hours/
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1048 # Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1570 # Lateral Tool Transfer
- attack.Command_and_control
- attack.t1105 # Ingress Tool Transfer
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1197 # Bits jobs
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category:
    - ps_module
    - ps_classic_script
    - ps_script
detection: # Full command: 'Start-BitsTransfer -Priority foreground -Source https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1197/T1197.md -Destination C:\Users\bits.ps1'
  selection1_powershell_native:
    EventID: 800
    EventData|contains|all:
      - Start-BitsTransfer
      - '-Source'
    EventData|contains:
      - 'http://'
      - 'https://'
      - 'ftp://'

  selection2_powershell_modern:
    EventID: 4103
    Payload|contains|all:
      - Start-BitsTransfer
      - '-Source'
    Payload|contains:
      - 'http://'
      - 'https://'
      - 'ftp://'

  selection3_powershell_block:
    EventID: 4104
    ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
      - Start-BitsTransfer
      - '-Source'
    ScriptBlockText|contains:
      - 'http://'
      - 'https://'
      - 'ftp://'

  condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- None
level: medium

title: CVE-2020-5902 F5 BIG-IP Exploitation Attempt
id: 44b53b1c-e60f-4a7b-948e-3435a7918478
status: test
description: Detects the exploitation attempt of the vulnerability found in F5 BIG-IP and described in CVE-2020-5902
references:
    - https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254
    - https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/
    - https://twitter.com/yorickkoster/status/1279709009151434754
    - https://www.criticalstart.com/f5-big-ip-remote-code-execution-exploit/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-07-05
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2020-5902
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection_base:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '/tmui/'
            - '/hsqldb'
    selection_traversal:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '..;/'
            - '.jsp/..'
    condition: selection_base and selection_traversal
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: Disabling Multi Factor Authentication
id: 60de9b57-dc4d-48b9-a6a0-b39e0469f876
status: test
description: Detects disabling of Multi Factor Authentication.
references:
    - https://research.splunk.com/cloud/c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f5c949e/
author: Splunk Threat Research Team (original rule), Harjot Singh @cyb3rjy0t (sigma rule)
date: 2023-09-18
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1556.006
logsource:
    service: audit
    product: m365
detection:
    selection:
        Operation|contains: 'Disable Strong Authentication.'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: FortiGate - New Administrator Account Created
id: cd0a4943-0edd-42cf-b50c-06f77a10d4c1
status: experimental
description: Detects the creation of an administrator account on a Fortinet FortiGate Firewall.
references:
    - https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-535
    - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/fortios-log-message-reference/398/event
    - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/cli-reference/390485493/config-system-admin
    - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/fortios-log-message-reference/44547/44547-logid-event-config-objattr
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) (InTheCyber)
date: 2025-11-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.001
logsource:
    product: fortigate
    service: event
detection:
    selection:
        action: 'Add'
        cfgpath: 'system.admin'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - An administrator account can be created for legitimate purposes. Investigate the account details to determine if it is authorized.
level: medium

title: HackTool - CACTUSTORCH Remote Thread Creation
id: 2e4e488a-6164-4811-9ea1-f960c7359c40
status: test
description: Detects remote thread creation from CACTUSTORCH as described in references.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1090588499517079552 # Deleted
    - https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/CACTUSTORCH
author: '@SBousseaden (detection), Thomas Patzke (rule)'
date: 2019-02-01
modified: 2023-05-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055.012
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.t1218.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: create_remote_thread
detection:
    selection:
        SourceImage|endswith:
            - '\System32\cscript.exe'
            - '\System32\wscript.exe'
            - '\System32\mshta.exe'
            - '\winword.exe'
            - '\excel.exe'
        TargetImage|contains: '\SysWOW64\'
        StartModule: null
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - NoFilter Execution
id: 7b14c76a-c602-4ae6-9717-eff868153fc0
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of NoFilter, a tool for abusing the Windows Filtering Platform for privilege escalation via hardcoded policy name indicators
references:
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/NoFilter/blob/121d215ab130c5e8e3ad45a7e7fcd56f4de97b4d/NoFilter/Consts.cpp
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/NoFilter
    - https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/nofilter-abusing-windows-filtering-platform-for-privilege-escalation
    - https://x.com/_st0pp3r_/status/1742203752361128162?s=20
author: Stamatis Chatzimangou (st0pp3r)
date: 2024-01-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134
    - attack.t1134.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: Audit Filtering Platform Policy Change needs to be enabled'
detection:
    selection_5447:
        EventID: 5447
        FilterName|contains: 'RonPolicy'
    selection_5449:
        EventID: 5449
        ProviderContextName|contains: 'RonPolicy'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - System
id: f7385ee2-0e0c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 26)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2023-02-20
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '&&'
            - 'clipboard]::'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: KrbRelayUp Service Installation
id: e97d9903-53b2-41fc-8cb9-889ed4093e80
status: test
description: Detects service creation from KrbRelayUp tool used for privilege escalation in Windows domain environments where LDAP signing is not enforced (the default settings)
references:
    - https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp
author: Sittikorn S, Tim Shelton
date: 2022-05-11
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 7045
        ServiceName: 'KrbSCM'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Massive services termination burst
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to stop multiples services on a host. Attacker may target services related to databases, security products or backups (Veeam, Symantec, Acronis ...).
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
- https://fourcore.io/blogs/ryuk-ransomware-simulation-mitre-ttp
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/12/13/diavol-ransomware/
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/black-basta-ransomware-attacks-deploy-custom-edr-evasion-tools-tied-to-fin7-threat-actor/
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/h/ransomware-actor-abuses-genshin-impact-anti-cheat-driver-to-kill-antivirus.html
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1489 # Service Stop 
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.1562.001 # Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools 
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection: # net stop <service> | sc stop <service>
  selection_net_stop:  
    NewProcessName|endswith:
      - '\net1.exe'
      - '\net.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - net
      - stop
  
  selection_sc_stop:
    NewProcessName|endswith: '\sc.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - sc
      - stop

  condition: selection_net_stop or selection_sc_stop | count(EventRecordID) by Computer > 2
  timeframe: 1m
falsepositives:
- Administrator debugging
level: high

title: Network Communication Initiated To File Sharing Domains From Process Located In Suspicious Folder
id: e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97
related:
    - id: 635dbb88-67b3-4b41-9ea5-a3af2dd88153
      type: obsolete
    - id: 8b48ad89-10d8-4382-a546-50588c410f0d
      type: similar
    - id: d635249d-86b5-4dad-a8c7-d7272b788586
      type: similar
    - id: 52182dfb-afb7-41db-b4bc-5336cb29b464
      type: similar
    - id: ae02ed70-11aa-4a22-b397-c0d0e8f6ea99
      type: similar
    - id: 7b434893-c57d-4f41-908d-6a17bf1ae98f
      type: similar
    - id: 8518ed3d-f7c9-4601-a26c-f361a4256a0c
      type: similar
    - id: 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794
      type: similar
    - id: 56454143-524f-49fb-b1c6-3fb8b1ad41fb
      type: similar
    - id: b6e04788-29e1-4557-bb14-77f761848ab8
      type: similar
    - id: a0d7e4d2-bede-4141-8896-bc6e237e977c
      type: similar
    - id: 297ae038-edc2-4b2e-bb3e-7c5fc94dd5c7
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects executables located in potentially suspicious directories initiating network connections towards file sharing domains.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/900741347035889665
    - https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1032799638213066752
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
    - https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-321a
    - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/data/module_source/exfil/Invoke-ExfilDataToGitHub.ps1
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-08-30
modified: 2026-03-29
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_paths:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\$Recycle.bin'
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Default\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Fonts\'
            - ':\Windows\IME\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Temp\'
            - '\config\systemprofile\'
            - '\Windows\addins\'
    selection_domains:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - '.githubusercontent.com'       # Includes both gists and github repositories / Michael Haag (idea)
            - '0x0.st'
            - 'anonfiles.com'
            - 'bashupload.com'
            - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
            - 'chunk.io'
            - 'ddns.net'
            - 'dl.dropboxusercontent.com'
            - 'ghostbin.co'
            - 'github.com'
            - 'glitch.me'
            - 'gofile.io'
            - 'hastebin.com'
            - 'mediafire.com'
            - 'mega.co.nz'
            - 'mega.nz'
            - 'onrender.com'
            - 'pages.dev'
            - 'paste.ee'
            - 'pastebin.com'
            - 'pastebin.pl'
            - 'pastetext.net'
            - 'pixeldrain.com'
            - 'privatlab.com'
            - 'privatlab.net'
            - 'send.exploit.in'
            - 'sendspace.com'
            - 'storage.googleapis.com'
            - 'storjshare.io'
            - 'supabase.co'
            - 'temp.sh'
            - 'transfer.sh'
            - 'trycloudflare.com'
            - 'ufile.io'
            - 'w3spaces.com'
            - 'workers.dev'
            - 'x0.at'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Some installers located in the temp directory might communicate with the Github domains in order to download additional software. Baseline these cases or move the github domain to a lower level hunting rule.
level: high

title: New Virtual Smart Card Created Via TpmVscMgr.EXE
id: c633622e-cab9-4eaa-bb13-66a1d68b3e47
status: test
description: Detects execution of "Tpmvscmgr.exe" to create a new virtual smart card.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-tpmvscmgr
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-15
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\tpmvscmgr.exe'
        OriginalFileName: 'TpmVscMgr.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: 'create'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage by an administrator
level: medium

title: Okta Admin Role Assignment Created
id: 139bdd4b-9cd7-49ba-a2f4-744d0a8f5d8c
status: test
description: Detects when a new admin role assignment is created. Which could be a sign of privilege escalation or persistence
references:
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/
author: Nikita Khalimonenkov
date: 2023-01-19
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: okta
    service: okta
detection:
    selection:
        eventType: 'iam.resourceset.bindings.add'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate creation of a new admin role assignment
level: medium

title: OpenSSH service activation on Windows
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker enables the OpenSSH server on Windows to perform stealthy lateral movement.
references:
 - https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0008-Lateral%20Movement/T1021.004-Remote%20Service%20SSH
 - https://winaero.com/enable-openssh-server-windows-10/
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/openssh/openssh_install_firstuse
 - https://virtualizationreview.com/articles/2020/05/21/ssh-server-on-windows-10.aspx
 - https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
 - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/18/defenders-beware-a-case-for-post-ransomware-investigations/
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.004
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category:
    - ps_module
    - ps_classic_script
    - ps_script
detection:
  selection_powershell_native:
    EventID: 800
    EventData|contains|all:
      - Set-Service
      - StartupType
      - Name
      - sshd
      #- Automatic / Manual

  selection_powershell_modern:
    EventID: 4103
    Payload|contains|all:
      - Set-Service
      - StartupType
      - Name
      - sshd
      #- Automatic / Manual

  selection_powershell_block:
    EventID: 4104
    ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
      - Set-Service
      - StartupType
      - Name
      - sshd
      #- Automatic / Manual

  condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- legitimate administrator activation
level: medium

title: Payload Decoded and Decrypted via Built-in Utilities
id: 234dc5df-40b5-49d1-bf53-0d44ce778eca
status: test
description: Detects when a built-in utility is used to decode and decrypt a payload after a macOS disk image (DMG) is executed. Malware authors may attempt to evade detection and trick users into executing malicious code by encoding and encrypting their payload and placing it in a disk image file. This behavior is consistent with adware or malware families such as Bundlore and Shlayer.
references:
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-5d42c3d772e04f1e8d0eb60f5233bc79def1ea73105a2d8822f44164f77ef823
author: Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-10-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1204
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1140
    - attack.s0482
    - attack.s0402
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/openssl'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/Volumes/'
            - 'enc'
            - '-base64'
            - ' -d '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: PDQ Deploy Remote Adminstartion Tool Execution
id: d679950c-abb7-43a6-80fb-2a480c4fc450
related:
    - id: 12b8e9f5-96b2-41e1-9a42-8c6779a5c184
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detect use of PDQ Deploy remote admin tool
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/9e5b12c4912c07562aec7500447b11fa3e17e254/atomics/T1072/T1072.md
    - https://www.pdq.com/pdq-deploy/
author: frack113
date: 2022-10-01
modified: 2023-01-30
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1072
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Description: PDQ Deploy Console
        - Product: PDQ Deploy
        - Company: PDQ.com
        - OriginalFileName: PDQDeployConsole.exe
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use
level: medium

title: Potential Base64 Decoded From Images
id: 09a910bf-f71f-4737-9c40-88880ba5913d
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of tail to extract bytes at an offset from an image and then decode the base64 value to create a new file with the decoded content. The detected execution is a bash one-liner.
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/16bafdf741e7a13137c489f3c8db1334f171c7cb13b62617d691b0a64783cc48/behavior
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/483fafc64a2b84197e1ef6a3f51e443f84dc5742602e08b9e8ec6ad690b34ed0/behavior
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-12-20
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1140
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    # Example:  /bin/bash sh -c tail -c +21453 '/Volumes/Installer/Installer.app/Contents/Resources/workout-logo.jpeg' | base64 --decode > /tmp/54A0A2CD-FAD1-4D4D-AAF5-5266F6344ABE.zip
    # VT Query: 'behavior_processes:"tail" (behavior_processes:"jpeg" or behavior_processes:"jpg" or behavior_processes:"png" or behavior_processes:"gif") behavior_processes:"base64" behavior_processes:"--decode >" and tag:dmg'
    selection_image:
        Image|endswith: '/bash'
    selection_view:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'tail'
            - '-c'
    selection_b64:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'base64'
            - '-d' # Also covers "--decode"
            - '>'
    selection_files:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.avif'
            - '.gif'
            - '.jfif'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.pjp'
            - '.pjpeg'
            - '.png'
            - '.svg'
            - '.webp'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential File Download Via MS-AppInstaller Protocol Handler
id: 180c7c5c-d64b-4a63-86e9-68910451bc8b
related:
    - id: 7cff77e1-9663-46a3-8260-17f2e1aa9d0a
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects usage of the "ms-appinstaller" protocol handler via command line to potentially download arbitrary files via AppInstaller.EXE
    The downloaded files are temporarly stored in ":\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.DesktopAppInstaller_8wekyb3d8bbwe\AC\INetCache\<RANDOM-8-CHAR-DIRECTORY>"
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/AppInstaller/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ms-appinstaller://?source='
            - 'http'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potential Notepad++ CVE-2025-49144 Exploitation
id: 933f0bb5-0681-4fe7-8a17-4e6cccbaac44
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2025-49144, a local privilege escalation vulnerability in Notepad++ installers (v8.8.1 and prior) where the installer calls regsvr32.exe without specifying the full path.
    This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges by placing a malicious regsvr32.exe alongside this Legitimate Notepad++ installer.
    The vulnerability is triggered when the installer attempts to register the NppShell.dll file, which is a component of Notepad++.
references:
    - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-49144
    - https://x.com/NullSecurityX/status/1937444064867029179
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-06-26
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.008
    - cve.2025-49144
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
        CommandLine|startswith: 'regsvr32 /s'
        CommandLine|contains: '\contextMenu\NppShell.dll'
    filter_main_legit_regsvr32:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\regsvr32.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regsvr32.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential SPN Enumeration Via Setspn.EXE
id: 1eeed653-dbc8-4187-ad0c-eeebb20e6599
status: test
description: Detects service principal name (SPN) enumeration used for Kerberoasting
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200329173843/https://p16.praetorian.com/blog/how-to-use-kerberoasting-t1208-for-privilege-escalation
    - https://www.praetorian.com/blog/how-to-use-kerberoasting-t1208-for-privilege-escalation/?edition=2019
author: Markus Neis, keepwatch
date: 2018-11-14
modified: 2023-10-23
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1558.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_pe:
        - Image|endswith: '\setspn.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'setspn.exe'
        - Description|contains|all:
              - 'Query or reset the computer'
              - 'SPN attribute'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -q '
            - ' /q '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administration activity
level: medium

title: Potential XXE Exploitation Attempt In JVM Based Application
id: c4e06896-e27c-4583-95ac-91ce2279345d
status: test
description: Detects XML parsing issues, if the application expects to work with XML make sure that the parser is initialized safely.
references:
    - https://rules.sonarsource.com/java/RSPEC-2755
    - https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/XML_External_Entity_(XXE)_Processing
    - https://www.wix.engineering/post/threat-and-vulnerability-hunting-with-application-server-error-logs
author: Moti Harmats
date: 2023-02-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: jvm
    definition: 'Requirements: application error logs must be collected (with LOG_LEVEL=ERROR and above)'
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'SAXParseException'
        - 'DOMException'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - If the application expects to work with XML there may be parsing issues that don't necessarily mean XXE.
level: high

title: RDP Enable or Disable via Win32_TerminalServiceSetting WMI Class
id: 4b8f6d3a-9c5e-4f2a-a7d8-6b9c3e5f2a8d
related:
    - id: a2863fbc-d5cb-48d5-83fb-d976d4b1743b
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects enabling or disabling of Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) using alternate methods such as WMIC or PowerShell.
    In PowerShell one-liner commands, the "SetAllowTSConnections" method of the "Win32_TerminalServiceSetting" class may be used to enable or disable RDP.
    In WMIC, the "rdtoggle" alias or "Win32_TerminalServiceSetting" class may be used for the same purpose.
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_gb/research/22/e/uncovering-a-kingminer-botnet-attack-using-trend-micro-managed-x.html
    - https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/72f20a3fa26775b932bd819f1824c6377802a768/src/windows-hardening/basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md#firewall
    - https://github.com/Lifailon/RSA/blob/rsa/Sources/RSA-1.4.1.ps1#L1468
author: Daniel Koifman (KoifSec), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-15
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\wmic.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'wmic.exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli_method:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'rdtoggle'
            - 'Win32_TerminalServiceSetting'
    selection_cli_property:
        CommandLine|contains: 'SetAllowTSConnections'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate system administrators enabling RDP for remote support
    - System configuration scripts during deployment
level: medium

title: RDP to HTTP or HTTPS Target Ports
id: b1e5da3b-ca8e-4adf-915c-9921f3d85481
status: test
description: Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating to target systems on TCP port 80 or 443
references:
    - https://twitter.com/tekdefense/status/1519711183162556416?s=12&t=OTsHCBkQOTNs1k3USz65Zg
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-29
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.001
    - car.2013-07-002
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        Initiated: 'true'
        SourcePort: 3389
        DestinationPort:
            - 80
            - 443
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Remote File Copy
id: 7a14080d-a048-4de8-ae58-604ce58a795b
status: stable
description: Detects the use of tools that copy files from or to remote systems
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide
author: Ömer Günal
date: 2020-06-18
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    product: linux
detection:
    tools:
        - 'scp '
        - 'rsync '
        - 'sftp '
    filter:
        - '@'
        - ':'
    condition: tools and filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: low

title: Shai-Hulud Malware Indicators - Linux
id: 11bb9b26-4179-4a06-afcb-1ec31fce1627
related:
    - id: 540703fb-a874-4385-a9d6-7cd1bfab268c
      type: similar
    - id: 8f2a9c3b-7e5d-4f1a-9b8e-2c4d6a8f9e1b
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects potential Shai-Hulud malware indicators based on specific command line arguments associated with its execution.
references:
    - https://www.wiz.io/blog/shai-hulud-2-0-ongoing-supply-chain-attack
    - https://www.aikido.dev/blog/shai-hulud-strikes-again-hitting-zapier-ensdomains
    - https://semgrep.dev/blog/2025/digging-for-secrets-sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-of-the-npm-worm/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Shai-Hulud'
            - 'SHA1HULUD'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software containing similar strings
level: high

title: Sticky key file created from CMD copy
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to replace the original sethc.exe file by cmd.exe.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0004-Privilege%20Escalation/T1546-Image%20File%20Execution%20Options%20Injection
- https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/jonathantrull/2016/10/03/detecting-sticky-key-backdoors/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt29-domain-frontin
- https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ClearSky-Fox-Kitten-Campaign-v1.pdf
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1546.008
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: file_event
detection:
  selection: # command: 'copy /y C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe C:\windows\system32\sethc.exe'
    EventID: 11 # File created
    Image|endswith:
      - \cmd.exe
      - \powershell.exe
      - \pwsh.exe # PowerShell v6
      - \powershell_ise.exe # Development GUI
    TargetFilename|endswith:
      - \sethc.exe  # Full path 'C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe'
      - \seth2c.exe # Full path 'C:\Windows\System32\seth2c.exe'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None
level: high

title: Suspicious Encoded Scripts in a WMI Consumer
id: 83844185-1c5b-45bc-bcf3-b5bf3084ca5b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious encoded payloads in WMI Event Consumers
references:
    - https://github.com/RiccardoAncarani/LiquidSnake
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-09-01
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: wmi_event
detection:
    selection_destination:
        Destination|base64offset|contains:
            - 'WriteProcessMemory'
            - 'This program cannot be run in DOS mode'
            - 'This program must be run under Win32'
    condition: selection_destination
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Interactive PowerShell as SYSTEM
id: 5b40a734-99b6-4b98-a1d0-1cea51a08ab2
status: test
description: Detects the creation of files that indicator an interactive use of PowerShell in the SYSTEM user context
references:
    - https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/PowerSploit_Invoke-Mimikatz.htm
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-07
modified: 2022-08-13
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-Interactive'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity
    - PowerShell scripts running as SYSTEM user
level: high

title: Suspicious Use of CSharp Interactive Console
id: a9e416a8-e613-4f8b-88b8-a7d1d1af2f61
status: test
description: Detects the execution of CSharp interactive console by PowerShell
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/detecting-attacks-leveraging-the-net-framework/
author: Michael R. (@nahamike01)
date: 2020-03-08
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1127
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\csi.exe'
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
        OriginalFileName: 'csi.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Possible depending on environment. Pair with other factors such as net connections, command-line args, etc.
level: high

title: Visual Studio Code Tunnel Service Installation
id: 30bf1789-379d-4fdc-900f-55cd0a90a801
status: test
description: Detects the installation of VsCode tunnel (code-tunnel) as a service.
references:
    - https://ipfyx.fr/post/visual-studio-code-tunnel/
    - https://badoption.eu/blog/2023/01/31/code_c2.html
    - https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/remote/tunnels
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-25
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'tunnel '
            - 'service'
            - 'internal-run'
            - 'tunnel-service.log'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate installation of code-tunnel as a service
level: medium