Sigma rules: 2d

title: Access of Sudoers File Content
id: 0f79c4d2-4e1f-4683-9c36-b5469a665e06
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a text-based file access or inspection utilities to read the content of /etc/sudoers in order to potentially list all users that have sudo rights.
references:
    - https://github.com/sleventyeleven/linuxprivchecker/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-20
modified: 2025-06-04
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1592.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/cat'
            - '/ed'
            - '/egrep'
            - '/emacs'
            - '/fgrep'
            - '/grep'
            - '/head'
            - '/less'
            - '/more'
            - '/nano'
            - '/tail'
        CommandLine|contains: ' /etc/sudoers'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: medium

title: Activity From Anonymous IP Address
id: be4d9c86-d702-4030-b52e-c7859110e5e8
status: test
description: Identifies that users were active from an IP address that has been identified as an anonymous proxy IP address.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#activity-from-anonymous-ip-address
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'riskyIPAddress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: Bypass UAC via Fodhelper.exe
id: 7f741dcf-fc22-4759-87b4-9ae8376676a2
status: test
description: Identifies use of Fodhelper.exe to bypass User Account Control. Adversaries use this technique to execute privileged processes.
references:
    - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/e491ce22-792f-11e9-8f5c-d46d6d62a49e.html
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md
author: E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Tony Lambert), oscd.community
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\fodhelper.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of fodhelper.exe utility by legitimate user
level: high

title: CVE-2023-46747 Exploitation Activity - Webserver
id: e9928831-ba14-42ea-a4bc-33d352b9929a
related:
    - id: f195b2ff-e542-41bf-8d91-864fb81e5c20
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects exploitation activity of CVE-2023-46747 an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in F5 BIG-IP.
references:
    - https://github.com/AliBrTab/CVE-2023-46747-POC/tree/main
    - https://github.com/0xorOne/nuclei-templates/blob/2fef4270ec6e5573d0a1732cb18bcfc4b1580a88/http/cves/2023/CVE-2023-46747.yaml
    - https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/wUoBy7ZiqJL2CUOMC-8Wdg
    - https://www.praetorian.com/blog/refresh-compromising-f5-big-ip-with-request-smuggling-cve-2023-46747/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-11-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2023-46747
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
    definition: 'Requirements: The POST request body data must be collected in order to make use of this detection'
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-stem|contains: '/mgmt/tm/util/bash'
    keywords_hex:
        '|all':
            - '2f746d75692f436f6e74726f6c2f666f726d' # /tmui/Control/form
            - '666f726d5f706167653d253266746d756925326673797374656d253266757365722532666372656174652e6a7370' # form_page=%2ftmui%2fsystem%2fuser%2fcreate.jsp
    keywords_plain:
        '|all':
            - '/tmui/Control/form'
            - 'form_page=%2ftmui%2fsystem%2fuser%2fcreate.jsp'
    condition: selection and (keywords_hex or keywords_plain)
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Diamond Sleet APT Scheduled Task Creation
id: 3b8e5084-4de9-449a-a40d-0e11014f2e2d
status: test
description: |
    Detects registry event related to the creation of a scheduled task used by Diamond Sleet APT during exploitation of Team City CVE-2023-42793 vulnerability
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/10/18/multiple-north-korean-threat-actors-exploiting-the-teamcity-cve-2023-42793-vulnerability/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-24
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The Advanced Audit Policy setting Object Access > Audit Other Object Access Events has to be configured to allow this detection. We also recommend extracting the Command field from the embedded XML in the event data.'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4698
        TaskName: '\Windows TeamCity Settings User Interface'
        TaskContent|contains: 'uTYNkfKxHiZrx3KJ'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: Disable Or Stop Services
id: de25eeb8-3655-4643-ac3a-b662d3f26b6b
status: test
description: |
    Detects the usage of utilities such as 'systemctl', 'service'...etc to stop or disable tools and services on Linux systems.
    Attackers may stop or disable security tools and services to evade detection, maintain persistence, or disrupt system operations.
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/pl_pl/research/20/i/the-evolution-of-malicious-shell-scripts.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-15
modified: 2025-03-18
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1489
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/service'
            - '/systemctl'
            - '/chkconfig'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' stop '
            - ' disable '
    filter_main_legit_snapd:
        Image|endswith: '/systemctl'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '--no-reload disable snap-snapd-'
            - ' stop snap-snapd-'
    filter_main_ssh_preinstall:
        Image|endswith: '/systemctl'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: 'tmp.ci/preinst upgrade'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' stop '
            - 'ssh.'
    filter_main_ubuntu_upgrade:
        ParentCommandLine|contains: '/dpkg/info/ubuntu-pro-client.prerm upgrade'
        Image|endswith: '/systemctl'
    filter_optional_aws_agent:
        Image|endswith: '/systemctl'
        CommandLine|endswith: 'snap.amazon-ssm-agent.amazon-ssm-agent.service'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
    - Some false positives are to be expected. Apply additional filters as needed before pushing to production.
level: medium

title: DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution
id: 98a96a5a-64a0-4c42-92c5-489da3866cb0
status: test
description: Well-known DNS Exfiltration tools execution
references:
    - https://github.com/iagox86/dnscat2
    - https://github.com/yarrick/iodine
author: Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048.001
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - attack.t1132.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\iodine.exe'
        - Image|contains: '\dnscat2'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Download from Suspicious Dyndns Hosts
id: 195c1119-ef07-4909-bb12-e66f5e07bf3c
status: test
description: Detects download of certain file types from hosts with dynamic DNS names (selected list)
references:
    - https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/security-essentials/dynamic-dns-security-and-potential-threats
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-11-08
modified: 2023-05-18
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1568
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-uri-extension:
            - 'exe'
            - 'vbs'
            - 'bat'
            - 'rar'
            - 'ps1'
            - 'doc'
            - 'docm'
            - 'xls'
            - 'xlsm'
            - 'pptm'
            - 'rtf'
            - 'hta'
            - 'dll'
            - 'ws'
            - 'wsf'
            - 'sct'
            - 'zip'
            # If you want to add more extensions - see https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TWS238xacAto-fLKh1n5uTsdijWdCEsGIM0Y0Hvmc5g/
        cs-host|endswith:
            - '.hopto.org'
            - '.no-ip.org'
            - '.no-ip.info'
            - '.no-ip.biz'
            - '.no-ip.com'
            - '.noip.com'
            - '.ddns.name'
            - '.myftp.org'
            - '.myftp.biz'
            - '.serveblog.net'
            - '.servebeer.com'
            - '.servemp3.com'
            - '.serveftp.com'
            - '.servequake.com'
            - '.servehalflife.com'
            - '.servehttp.com'
            - '.servegame.com'
            - '.servepics.com'
            - '.myvnc.com'
            - '.ignorelist.com'
            - '.jkub.com'
            - '.dlinkddns.com'
            - '.jumpingcrab.com'
            - '.ddns.info'
            - '.mooo.com'
            - '.dns-dns.com'
            - '.strangled.net'
            - '.adultdns.net'
            - '.craftx.biz'
            - '.ddns01.com'
            - '.dns53.biz'
            - '.dnsapi.info'
            - '.dnsd.info'
            - '.dnsdynamic.com'
            - '.dnsdynamic.net'
            - '.dnsget.org'
            - '.fe100.net'
            - '.flashserv.net'
            - '.ftp21.net'
            - '.http01.com'
            - '.http80.info'
            - '.https443.com'
            - '.imap01.com'
            - '.kadm5.com'
            - '.mysq1.net'
            - '.ns360.info'
            - '.ntdll.net'
            - '.ole32.com'
            - '.proxy8080.com'
            - '.sql01.com'
            - '.ssh01.com'
            - '.ssh22.net'
            - '.tempors.com'
            - '.tftpd.net'
            - '.ttl60.com'
            - '.ttl60.org'
            - '.user32.com'
            - '.voip01.com'
            - '.wow64.net'
            - '.x64.me'
            - '.xns01.com'
            - '.dyndns.org'
            - '.dyndns.info'
            - '.dyndns.tv'
            - '.dyndns-at-home.com'
            - '.dnsomatic.com'
            - '.zapto.org'
            - '.webhop.net'
            - '.25u.com'
            - '.slyip.net'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Software downloads
level: medium

title: Google Workspace Granted Domain API Access
id: 04e2a23a-9b29-4a5c-be3a-3542e3f982ba
status: test
description: Detects when an API access service account is granted domain authority.
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging#3
    - https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-domain-settings#AUTHORIZE_API_CLIENT_ACCESS
author: Austin Songer
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2023-10-11
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: gcp
    service: google_workspace.admin
detection:
    selection:
        eventService: admin.googleapis.com
        eventName: AUTHORIZE_API_CLIENT_ACCESS
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown

level: medium

title: Host constrained delegation settings changed for potential abuse (Rubeus) - Kerberos only
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker modifies host delegation settings for privilege escalation.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account%20manipulation
- https://dirkjanm.io/krbrelayx-unconstrained-delegation-abuse-toolkit/
- https://www.alsid.com/crb_article/kerberos-delegation/
- https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/s4u2pwnage/
- https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-kerberos-constrained-delegation
- https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/delegating-like-a-boss-abusing-kerberos-delegation-in-active-directory/
- https://stealthbits.com/blog/what-is-kerberos-delegation-an-overview-of-kerberos-delegation/
- https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1
- https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/delegations#talk
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection: # Delegation to specified service, Kerberos only
    EventID: 4742
    UserAccountControl: '-'  # Avoid duplicate with with "constrained delegation to any protocol"
  filter:
    AllowedToDelegateTo: '-' # Can be: "cifs/srv01 cifs/srv02.demo.lan dcom/dc03..."
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Rare administrator modifying host delegation settings
level: high

title: macOS ESF Suspicious W+X Memory Mapping
id: 1d3f5c4b-3c5b-4a2a-bf6d-0d1a9e7f2d77
status: experimental
description: Detect processes creating writable and executable memory mappings which
  can indicate shellcode/JIT usage.
author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
date: 2025-10-29
logsource:
  product: macos
  service: endpointsecurity
level: high
detection:
  selection_evt:
    esf.event_type: 20
    event.action: mprotect
  selection_flags:
    MemoryProtection|contains:
    - wx
    - xw
  condition: selection_evt and selection_flags
falsepositives:
- legitimate JIT engines (e.g., browsers, VMs)
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
modified: 2025/01/15

title: Okta Admin Functions Access Through Proxy
id: 9058ca8b-f397-4fd1-a9fa-2b7aad4d6309
status: test
description: Detects access to Okta admin functions through proxy.
references:
    - https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/okta-support-unit-breach
    - https://dataconomy.com/2023/10/23/okta-data-breach/
    - https://blog.cloudflare.com/how-cloudflare-mitigated-yet-another-okta-compromise/
author: Muhammad Faisal @faisalusuf
date: 2023-10-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    service: okta
    product: okta
detection:
    selection:
        debugContext.debugData.requestUri|contains: 'admin'
        securityContext.isProxy: 'true'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positives are expected if administrators access these function through proxy legitimatly. Apply additional filters if necessary
level: medium

title: OpenSSH server firewall configuration on Windows (command)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker configure the Windows firewall to allow incoming connections to perform stealthy lateral movement.
references:
 - https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0008-Lateral%20Movement/T1021.004-Remote%20Service%20SSH
 - https://winaero.com/enable-openssh-server-windows-10/
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/openssh/openssh_install_firstuse
 - https://virtualizationreview.com/articles/2020/05/21/ssh-server-on-windows-10.aspx
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1562.004
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection_event:
    EventID: 4688

  selection_netsh_adv: # Command for firewall rule creation (available starting Server 2012 R2)
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - netsh
      - advfirewall
      - localport=
      - '22'

  selection_netsh: # Command for firewall rule creation (deprecated)
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - netsh
      - firewall
      - portopening
      - '22'

  condition: selection_event and (selection_netsh_adv or selection_netsh)
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high

title: Possible DCSync Attack
id: 56fda488-113e-4ce9-8076-afc2457922c3
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls to MS-DRSR from non DC hosts, which could indicate DCSync / DCShadow attacks.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-drsr/f977faaa-673e-4f66-b9bf-48c640241d47?redirectedfrom=MSDN
    - https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-DRSR.md
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.t1033
    - attack.discovery
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes, enable DRSR UUID (e3514235-4b06-11d1-ab04-00c04fc2dcd2) for "dangerous" opcodes (not 0,1 or 12) only from trusted IPs (DCs)'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid: e3514235-4b06-11d1-ab04-00c04fc2dcd2
    filter:
        OpNum:
            - 0
            - 1
            - 12
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential APT FIN7 Exploitation Activity
id: 6676896b-2cce-422d-82af-5a1abe65e241
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential APT FIN7 exploitation activity as reported by Google.
    In order to obtain initial access, FIN7 used compromised Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials to login to a target server and initiate specific Windows process chains.
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/evolution-of-fin7/
author: Alex Walston (@4ayymm)
date: 2024-07-29
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_notepad_plus:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\notepad++.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
    selection_rdpinit:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\rdpinit.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\notepad++.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Notepad++ can legitimately spawn cmd (Open Containing Folder in CMD)
level: medium

title: Potential PowerShell Execution Policy Tampering - ProcCreation
id: cf2e938e-9a3e-4fe8-a347-411642b28a9f
related:
    - id: fad91067-08c5-4d1a-8d8c-d96a21b37814 # ProcCreation Registry
      type: similar
    - id: 87e3c4e8-a6a8-4ad9-bb4f-46e7ff99a180 # ProcCreation Cmdlet
      type: similar
    - id: 61d0475c-173f-4844-86f7-f3eebae1c66b # PowerShell ScriptBlock
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects changes to the PowerShell execution policy registry key in order to bypass signing requirements for script execution from the CommandLine
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/de-de/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-executionpolicy?view=powershell-7.3
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-11
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\ShellIds\Microsoft.PowerShell\ExecutionPolicy'
            - '\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ExecutionPolicy'
    selection_values:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Bypass'
            - 'RemoteSigned'
            - 'Unrestricted'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Python Image Load By Non-Python Process
id: cbb56d62-4060-40f7-9466-d8aaf3123f83
status: test
description: |
    Detects the image load of "Python Core" by a non-Python process. This might be indicative of a execution of executable that has been bundled from Python code.
    Various tools like Py2Exe, PyInstaller, and cx_Freeze are used to bundle Python code into standalone executables.
    Threat actors often use these tools to bundle malicious Python scripts into executables, sometimes to obfuscate the code or to bypass security measures.
references:
    - https://www.py2exe.org/
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit-42-technical-analysis-seaduke/
author: Patrick St. John, OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-05-03
modified: 2025-08-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        Description: 'Python Core'
    filter_main_generic:
        - Image|contains: 'Python'  # FPs with python38.dll, python.exe etc.
        - Image|startswith:
              - 'C:\Program Files\'
              - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
              - 'C:\ProgramData\Anaconda3\' # Comment out if you don't use Anaconda in your environment
    filter_optional_null_image:
        Image: null
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Py2Exe Binaries
    - Known false positive caused with Python Anaconda
    - Various legitimate software is bundled from Python code into executables
level: low

title: Regedit as Trusted Installer
id: 883835a7-df45-43e4-bf1d-4268768afda4
status: test
description: Detects a regedit started with TrustedInstaller privileges or by ProcessHacker.exe
references:
    - https://twitter.com/1kwpeter/status/1397816101455765504
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-05-27
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\regedit.exe'
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\TrustedInstaller.exe'
            - '\ProcessHacker.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Remote Printing Abuse for Lateral Movement
id: bc3a4b0c-e167-48e1-aa88-b3020950e560
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls to possibly abuse remote printing service via MS-RPRN / MS-PAR
references:
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rprn/d42db7d5-f141-4466-8f47-0a4be14e2fc1
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-pan/e44d984c-07d3-414c-8ffc-f8c8ad8512a8
    - https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-RPRN-PAR.md
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:12345678-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ab or 76f03f96-cdfd-44fc-a22c-64950a001209 or ae33069b-a2a8-46ee-a235-ddfd339be281 or 0b6edbfa-4a24-4fc6-8a23-942b1eca65d1'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid:
            - 12345678-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ab
            - 76f03f96-cdfd-44fc-a22c-64950a001209
            - 0b6edbfa-4a24-4fc6-8a23-942b1eca65d1
            - ae33069b-a2a8-46ee-a235-ddfd339be281
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Actual printing
level: high

title: Remote Thread Creation In Uncommon Target Image
id: a1a144b7-5c9b-4853-a559-2172be8d4a03
related:
    - id: f016c716-754a-467f-a39e-63c06f773987
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects uncommon target processes for remote thread creation
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220319032520/https://blog.redbluepurple.io/offensive-research/bypassing-injection-detection
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-16
modified: 2025-07-04
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: create_remote_thread
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith:
            - '\calc.exe'
            - '\calculator.exe'
            - '\mspaint.exe'
            - '\notepad.exe'
            - '\ping.exe'
            - '\sethc.exe'
            - '\spoolsv.exe'
            - '\wordpad.exe'
            - '\write.exe'
    filter_main_csrss:
        SourceImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\csrss.exe'
    filter_main_notepad:
        SourceImage:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\explorer.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe'
        TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe'
    filter_main_sethc:
        SourceImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe'
        TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\Sethc.exe'
    filter_optional_aurora_1:
        StartFunction: 'EtwpNotificationThread'
    filter_optional_aurora_2:
        SourceImage|contains: 'unknown process'
    filter_optional_vmtoolsd:
        SourceImage: 'C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe'
        StartFunction: 'GetCommandLineW'
        TargetImage:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe'
    filter_optional_xerox_pjems:
        SourceImage: 'C:\Program Files\Xerox\XeroxPrintExperience\CommonFiles\XeroxPrintJobEventManagerService.exe'
        StartFunction: 'LoadLibraryW'
        TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Renamed Procdump tool used for dumping LSASS process
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to dump the LSASS process content using a renamed version of the Procdump tool.
references:
- https://www.intrinsec.com/apt27-analysis/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1569.002
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection_name:
    - Image|endswith: '\procdump.exe'
    - OriginalFilename: 'procdump.exe'

  selection_paramters:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - accepteula
      - '-ma' # Write a 'Full' dump file.
  condition: selection_name or selection_paramters
falsepositives:
- None 
level: high

title: Service DACL Abuse To Hide Services Via Sc.EXE
id: a537cfc3-4297-4789-92b5-345bfd845ad0
related:
    - id: 99cf1e02-00fb-4c0d-8375-563f978dfd37 # Deny Service Access
      type: similar
    - id: 98c5aeef-32d5-492f-b174-64a691896d25 # Generic SD tampering
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the "sc.exe" utility adding a new service with special permission seen used by threat actors which makes the service hidden and unremovable.
references:
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/10/threat-hunting-in-large-datasets-by.html
    - https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/
    - https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672
    - https://itconnect.uw.edu/tools-services-support/it-systems-infrastructure/msinf/other-help/understanding-sddl-syntax/
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)
date: 2021-12-20
modified: 2022-08-08
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'sdset'
            # Summary of permissions
            #   DC: Delete All Child Objects
            #   LC: List Contents
            #   WP: Write All Properties
            #   DT: Delete Subtree
            #   SD: Delete
            - 'DCLCWPDTSD'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Set Files as System Files Using Attrib.EXE
id: bb19e94c-59ae-4c15-8c12-c563d23fe52b
related:
    - id: efec536f-72e8-4656-8960-5e85d091345b
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of "attrib" with the "+s" flag to mark files as system files
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.md#atomic-test-3---create-windows-system-file-with-attrib
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/attrib
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sure-ill-take-new-combojack-malware-alters-clipboards-steal-cryptocurrency/
author: frack113
date: 2022-02-04
modified: 2023-03-14
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564.001
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\attrib.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'ATTRIB.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: ' +s '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low

title: Suspicious Get-ADDBAccount Usage
id: b140afd9-474b-4072-958e-2ebb435abd68
status: test
description: Detects suspicious invocation of the Get-ADDBAccount script that reads from a ntds.dit file and may be used to get access to credentials without using any credential dumpers
references:
    - https://www.n00py.io/2022/03/manipulating-user-passwords-without-mimikatz/
    - https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals/blob/7ba59c12ee9a1cb430d7dc186a3366842dd612c8/Documentation/PowerShell/Get-ADDBAccount.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-16
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection:
        Payload|contains|all:
            - 'Get-ADDBAccount'
            - 'BootKey '
            - 'DatabasePath '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious modification of a fake domain controller SPN (DCshadow) (Directory Services)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker update the Service Principal Name (SPN) of a computer account in order to perform "Kerberos redirection" and escalate privileges.
requirements: auditing SACL ("Write all properties") must be placed on the OU to monitor using the Active Directory console (https://www.manageengine.com/products/active-directory-audit/active-directory-auditing-configuration-guide-configure-object-level-auditing-manually.html).
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account%20manipulation
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1207-creating-rogue-domain-controllers-with-dcshadow
- https://medium.com/@maarten.goet/dcshadow-detecting-a-rogue-domain-controller-replicating-malicious-changes-to-your-active-1e22440df9ad
- https://github.com/AlsidOfficial/UncoverDCShadow
- https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor
- https://blog.alsid.eu/dcshadow-explained-4510f52fc19d
- https://stealthbits.com/blog/detecting-dcshadow-with-event-logs/
- https://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2018/05/dcshadow-sacl.html
- https://blog.stealthbits.com/creating-persistence-with-dcshadow/
- https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows/active-directory-methodology/dcshadow
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098 # Account Manipulation 
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5136
    AttributeLDAPDisplayName: servicePrincipalName
    ObjectClas: computer
    OperationType: '%%14674' # Value is added
    AttributeValue|startswith: 'GC/'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Rare administrator modifications on user objects
level: high

title: Suspicious Rundll32 Setupapi.dll Activity
id: 285b85b1-a555-4095-8652-a8a4106af63f
status: test
description: setupapi.dll library provide InstallHinfSection function for processing INF files. INF file may contain instructions allowing to create values in the registry, modify files and install drivers. This technique could be used to obtain persistence via modifying one of Run or RunOnce registry keys, run process or use other DLLs chain calls (see references) InstallHinfSection function in setupapi.dll calls runonce.exe executable regardless of actual content of INF file.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Setupapi/
    - https://gist.githubusercontent.com/bohops/0cc6586f205f3691e04a1ebf1806aabd/raw/baf7b29891bb91e76198e30889fbf7d6642e8974/calc_exe.inf
    - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/huntresslabs/evading-autoruns/master/shady.inf
    - https://twitter.com/Z3Jpa29z/status/1313742350292746241?s=20
author: Konstantin Grishchenko, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-07
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\runonce.exe'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'setupapi.dll'
            - 'InstallHinfSection'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Scripts and administrative tools that use INF files for driver installation with setupapi.dll
level: medium

title: Suspicious ScreenSave Change by Reg.exe
id: 0fc35fc3-efe6-4898-8a37-0b233339524f
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity.
    Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.002/T1546.002.md
    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf
author: frack113
date: 2021-08-19
modified: 2022-06-02
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1546.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_reg:
        Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop'
            - 'HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop'
    selection_option_1: # /force Active ScreenSaveActive
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/v ScreenSaveActive'
            - '/t REG_SZ'
            - '/d 1'
            - '/f'
    selection_option_2: # /force  set ScreenSaveTimeout
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/v ScreenSaveTimeout'
            - '/t REG_SZ'
            - '/d '
            - '/f'
    selection_option_3: # /force set ScreenSaverIsSecure
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/v ScreenSaverIsSecure'
            - '/t REG_SZ'
            - '/d 0'
            - '/f'
    selection_option_4: # /force set a .scr
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/v SCRNSAVE.EXE'
            - '/t REG_SZ'
            - '/d '
            - '.scr'
            - '/f'
    condition: selection_reg and 1 of selection_option_*
falsepositives:
    - GPO
level: medium

title: Systemd Service Creation
id: 1bac86ba-41aa-4f62-9d6b-405eac99b485
status: test
description: Detects a creation of systemd services which could be used by adversaries to execute malicious code.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1543.002/T1543.002.md
author: 'Pawel Mazur'
date: 2022-02-03
modified: 2022-02-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1543.002
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    path:
        type: 'PATH'
        nametype: 'CREATE'
    name_1:
        name|startswith:
            - '/usr/lib/systemd/system/'
            - '/etc/systemd/system/'
    name_2:
        name|contains: '/.config/systemd/user/'
    condition: path and 1 of name_*
falsepositives:
    - Admin work like legit service installs.
level: medium

title: Transferring Files with Credential Data via Network Shares - Zeek
id: 2e69f167-47b5-4ae7-a390-47764529eff5
related:
    - id: 910ab938-668b-401b-b08c-b596e80fdca5
      type: similar
status: test
description: Transferring files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using network shares
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
author: '@neu5ron, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community'
date: 2020-04-02
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.003
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: smb_files
detection:
    selection:
        name:
            - '\mimidrv'
            - '\lsass'
            - '\windows\minidump\'
            - '\hiberfil'
            - '\sqldmpr'
            - '\sam'
            - '\ntds.dit'
            - '\security'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Transferring sensitive files for legitimate administration work by legitimate administrator
level: medium

title: Turla Group Named Pipes
id: 739915e4-1e70-4778-8b8a-17db02f66db1
status: test
description: Detects a named pipe used by Turla group samples
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Markus Neis
date: 2017-11-06
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.g0010
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: pipe_created
    definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
    selection:
        PipeName:
            - '\atctl'    # https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/a4ddb2664a6c87a1d3c5da5a5a32a5df9a0b0c8f2e951811bd1ec1d44d42ccf1/detection
            - '\comnap'   # https://www.gdatasoftware.com/blog/2015/01/23926-analysis-of-project-cobra
            - '\iehelper' # ruag apt case
            - '\sdlrpc'   # project cobra https://www.gdatasoftware.com/blog/2015/01/23926-analysis-of-project-cobra
            - '\userpipe' # ruag apt case
            # - '\rpc' # may cause too many false positives : http://kb.palisade.com/index.php?pg=kb.page&id=483
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical