Sigma rules: 2e

title: Commvault QOperation Path Traversal Webshell Drop (CVE-2025-57790)
id: bd3b3fff-a018-4994-9876-68af5809160f
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of qoperation.exe with the -file argument to write a JSP file to the webroot, indicating a webshell drop.
    This is a post-authentication step corresponding to CVE-2025-57790.
references:
    - https://labs.watchtowr.com/guess-who-would-be-stupid-enough-to-rob-the-same-vault-twice-pre-auth-rce-chains-in-commvault/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-20
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - cve.2025-57790
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # qoperation execute -af F:\Program Files\Commvault\ContentStore\Reports\MetricsUpload\Upload\ABC1234\rekt.xml -file F:\Program Files\Commvault\ContentStore\Apache\webapps\ROOT\wT-poc.jsp
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'qoperation'
            - 'exec'
            - ' -af '
            - '.xml '
            - '\Apache\webapps\ROOT\'
            - '.jsp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Creation Of a Suspicious ADS File Outside a Browser Download
id: 573df571-a223-43bc-846e-3f98da481eca
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a suspicious ADS (Alternate Data Stream) file by software other than browsers
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/exploited-windows-zero-day-lets-javascript-files-bypass-security-warnings/
author: frack113
date: 2022-10-22
modified: 2023-06-12
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: create_stream_hash
detection:
    selection:
        Contents|startswith: '[ZoneTransfer]  ZoneId=3'
        TargetFilename|endswith: ':Zone.Identifier'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '.exe'
            - '.scr'
            - '.bat'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.docx'
            - '.hta'
            - '.jse'
            - '.lnk'
            - '.pptx'
            - '.ps'
            - '.reg'
            - '.sct'
            - '.vb'
            - '.wsc'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.xlsx'
    filter_optional_brave:
        Image|endswith: '\brave.exe'
    filter_optional_chrome:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
    filter_optional_firefox:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
    filter_optional_ie:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
    filter_optional_maxthon:
        Image|endswith: '\maxthon.exe'
    filter_optional_edge_1:
        - Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\'
        - Image|endswith: '\WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
        - Image:
              - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
              - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
    filter_optional_edge_2:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\msedgewebview2.exe'
    filter_optional_opera:
        Image|endswith: '\opera.exe'
    filter_optional_safari:
        Image|endswith: '\safari.exe'
    filter_optional_seamonkey:
        Image|endswith: '\seamonkey.exe'
    filter_optional_vivaldi:
        Image|endswith: '\vivaldi.exe'
    filter_optional_whale:
        Image|endswith: '\whale.exe'
    filter_optional_snipping_tool:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.ScreenSketch_'
        Image|endswith: '\SnippingTool\SnippingTool.exe'
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.ScreenSketch_'
            - '\TempState\Screenshot '
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.png:Zone.Identifier'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Other legitimate browsers not currently included in the filter (please add them)
    - Legitimate downloads via scripting or command-line tools (Investigate to determine if it's legitimate)
level: medium

title: DNS Query To MEGA Hosting Website
id: 613c03ba-0779-4a53-8a1f-47f914a4ded3
related:
    - id: 66474410-b883-415f-9f8d-75345a0a66a6
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects DNS queries for subdomains related to MEGA sharing website
references:
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/05/27/detecting-rclone-an-effective-tool-for-exfiltration/
author: Aaron Greetham (@beardofbinary) - NCC Group
date: 2021-05-26
modified: 2023-09-18
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1567.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: dns_query
detection:
    selection:
        QueryName|contains: 'userstorage.mega.co.nz'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate DNS queries and usage of Mega
level: medium

title: Download From Suspicious TLD - Blacklist
id: 00d0b5ab-1f55-4120-8e83-487c0a7baf19
related:
    - id: b5de2919-b74a-4805-91a7-5049accbaefe
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs
references:
    - https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shady-tld-research-gdn-and-our-2016-wrap
    - https://promos.mcafee.com/en-US/PDF/MTMW_Report.pdf
    - https://www.spamhaus.org/statistics/tlds/
    - https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/06/bad-men-at-work-please-dont-click/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-11-07
modified: 2023-05-18
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-uri-extension:
            - 'exe'
            - 'vbs'
            - 'bat'
            - 'rar'
            - 'ps1'
            - 'doc'
            - 'docm'
            - 'xls'
            - 'xlsm'
            - 'pptm'
            - 'rtf'
            - 'hta'
            - 'dll'
            - 'ws'
            - 'wsf'
            - 'sct'
            - 'zip'
            # If you want to add more extensions - see https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TWS238xacAto-fLKh1n5uTsdijWdCEsGIM0Y0Hvmc5g/
        cs-host|endswith:
            # Symantec / Chris Larsen analysis
            - '.country'
            - '.stream'
            - '.gdn'
            - '.mom'
            - '.xin'
            - '.kim'
            - '.men'
            - '.loan'
            - '.download'
            - '.racing'
            - '.online'
            - '.science'
            - '.ren'
            - '.gb'
            - '.win'
            - '.top'
            - '.review'
            - '.vip'
            - '.party'
            - '.tech'
            - '.xyz'
            - '.date'
            - '.faith'
            - '.zip'
            - '.cricket'
            - '.space'
            # McAfee report
            - '.info'
            - '.vn'
            - '.cm'
            - '.am'
            - '.cc'
            - '.asia'
            - '.ws'
            - '.tk'
            - '.biz'
            - '.su'
            - '.st'
            - '.ro'
            - '.ge'
            - '.ms'
            - '.pk'
            - '.nu'
            - '.me'
            - '.ph'
            - '.to'
            - '.tt'
            - '.name'
            - '.tv'
            - '.kz'
            - '.tc'
            - '.mobi'
            # Spamhaus
            - '.study'
            - '.click'
            - '.link'
            - '.trade'
            - '.accountant'
            # Spamhaus 2018 https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/06/bad-men-at-work-please-dont-click/
            - '.cf'
            - '.gq'
            - '.ml'
            - '.ga'
            # Custom
            - '.pw'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - All kinds of software downloads
level: low

title: Exchange group membership change to perform DCsync attack
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker adds its account into a sensitive Exchange group to obtain "Replicating Directory Changes /all" and perform DCsync attack.
references:
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=4119
- https://pentestlab.blog/2019/09/12/microsoft-exchange-acl/
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0006-Credential%20Access
- https://blog.fox-it.com/2018/04/26/escalating-privileges-with-acls-in-active-directory/
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003.006
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 4728 # security global group member added
      - 4756 # universal group member added > groups below are per default with this group type
      - 4732 # local and domain local group member added
    TargetUserName:
      - 'Exchange Trusted Subsystem'
      - 'Exchange Windows Permissions'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Exchange administrator updating server configuration
- Exchange upgrade or migration
level: high

title: Exploit for CVE-2017-0261
id: 864403a1-36c9-40a2-a982-4c9a45f7d833
status: test
description: Detects Winword starting uncommon sub process FLTLDR.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2017-0261 and CVE-2017-0262
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/eps-processing-zero-days.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-02-22
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
    - cve.2017-0261
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\WINWORD.EXE'
        Image|contains: '\FLTLDR.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Several false positives identified, check for suspicious file names or locations (e.g. Temp folders)
level: medium

title: Failed Event Log Clear Via WMI NTEventLogFile ClearEventLog
id: d4f1a2b3-7c8e-4d5f-b6a9-1e0c2d3f4e5b
status: test
description: |
    Detects failed attempts to clear Windows event logs via the WMI NTEventLogFile ClearEventLog method.
    Event 5858 in the WMI-Activity operational log is an error event, meaning it is only generated
    when the WMI operation encounters an error (e.g. access denied, provider failure).
    It could be an indication of an attacker attempting to clear event logs via WMI, but failing due to insufficient privileges or other issues.
    Successful clearing operations will NOT produce this event; for those, correlate with
    Security event 1102 or System event 104.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/cleareventlog-method-in-class-win32-nteventlogfile
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-07-01
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: wmi
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5858
        Operation|contains|all:
            - 'Win32_NTEventlogFile'
            - 'cleareventlog'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/builtin/wmi/win_wmi_activity_nteventlogfile_cleareventlog/info.yml

title: File Download From Browser Process Via Inline URL
id: 94771a71-ba41-4b6e-a757-b531372eaab6
status: test
description: Detects execution of a browser process with a URL argument pointing to a file with a potentially interesting extension. This can be abused to download arbitrary files or to hide from the user for example by launching the browser in a minimized state.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1478116126005641220
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msedge/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-11
modified: 2025-10-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\brave.exe'
            - '\chrome.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\opera.exe'
            - '\vivaldi.exe'
    selection_http:
        CommandLine|contains: 'http'
    selection_extensions:
        - CommandLine|endswith:
              - '.7z'
              - '.dat'
              - '.dll'
              - '.exe'
              - '.hta'
              - '.ps1'
              - '.psm1'
              - '.txt'
              - '.vbe'
              - '.vbs'
              - '.zip'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '.7z"'
              - '.dat"'
              - '.dll"'
              - '.hta"'
              - '.ps1"'
              - '.psm1"'
              - '.txt"'
              - '.vbe"'
              - '.vbs"'
              - '.zip"'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_browsers_inline_file_download/info.yml

title: Grixba Malware Reconnaissance Activity
id: af688c76-4ce4-4309-bfdd-e896f01acf27
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects execution of the Grixba reconnaissance tool based on suspicious command-line parameter combinations.
    This tool is used by the Play ransomware group for network enumeration, data gathering, and event log clearing.
references:
    - https://fieldeffect.com/blog/grixba-play-ransomware-impersonates-sentinelone
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/09/08/blurring-the-lines-intrusion-shows-connection-with-three-major-ransomware-gangs/
author: yxinmiracle, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-26
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1595.001
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1046
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_mode_flag:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-m '
            - '-mode '
            - '-m:'
            - '-mode:'
    selection_input_flag:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-i '
            - '-input '
            - '-i:'
            - '-input:'
    selection_scan_value:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'scan '
            - 'scanall '
    selection_input_options:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':f '
            - ':r '
            - ':s '
            - ' f '
            - ' r '
            - ' s '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate tools that use similar command-line argument structures (e.g., a tool with '--mode scan' and '--input file.txt') could trigger this rule. However, the specific combinations are indicative of reconnaissance or defense evasion.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules-emerging-threats/2025/Malware/Grixba/proc_creation_win_malware_grixba_recon/info.yml

title: Group Membership Reconnaissance Via Whoami.EXE
id: bd8b828d-0dca-48e1-8a63-8a58ecf2644f
status: test
description: Detects the execution of whoami.exe with the /group command line flag to show group membership for the current user, account type, security identifiers (SID), and attributes.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/whoami
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-28
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\whoami.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'whoami.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /groups'
            - ' -groups'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - PowerShell Module
id: 6bfb8fa7-b2e7-4f6c-8d9d-824e5d06ea9e
related:
    - id: 0adfbc14-0ed1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 24)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2024-04-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_4103:
        Payload|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r)(?:\s|)"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\"\s+?-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*"'
    condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: KrbRelayUp service installation (native)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to escalate privileges while abusing KrbRelayUp attack.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0002-Execution/T1569.002-Service%20execution
- https://www.hub.trimarcsecurity.com/post/webcast-top-10-ways-to-improve-active-directory-security-quickly
- https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp/blob/main/README.md
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1569
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: system
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 7045 # service installation
    ServiceName: 'KrbSCM'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None
level: high

title: Mount Execution With Hidepid Parameter
id: ec52985a-d024-41e3-8ff6-14169039a0b3
status: test
description: Detects execution of the "mount" command with "hidepid" parameter to make invisible processes to other users from the system
references:
    - https://blogs.blackberry.com/
    - https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/linux-hide-processes-from-other-users/
    - https://twitter.com/Joseliyo_Jstnk/status/1620131033474822144
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-01-12
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/mount'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'hidepid=2'
            - ' -o '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Network proxy configuration changed
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to modify proxy configuration in order to bypass network restrictions.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1090 # proxy
- attack.t0884 # connection proxy
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: proxy_configuration
detection:
  selection_baseline:
    Channel: Microsoft-Windows-WinINet-Config/ProxyConfigChanged
    EventID: 5600
  selection_proxy:
    - pwszAutoConfigUrl|startswith: http
    - pwszProxy|startswith: http
    - pwszProxyBypass|startswith: http
  filter:
    - pwszAutoConfigUrl: #<http://your_company_url_proxy.lan>
    - pwszProxy: #<http://your_company_url_proxy.lan>
  condition: selection_baseline and selection_proxy and not filter
falsepositives:
- admin proxy debugging
- new proxy configuration applied 
level: medium

title: Number of oustanding SMB requests increased
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker (specially Blackcat) increase the number of oufstanding requests to distribute malware payloads.
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/06/13/the-many-lives-of-blackcat-ransomware/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-2000-server/cc960259(v=technet.10)
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1021.002 # Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares 
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:  # reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services \LanmanServer\Parameters /v MaxMpxCt /d 65535 /t REG_DWORD /f
  selection:
    NewProcessName|endswith: '\reg.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'REG ADD'
      - '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters'
      - 'MaxMpxCt'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- system administrator activity or debugging
level: medium

title: Okta User Account Locked Out
id: 14701da0-4b0f-4ee6-9c95-2ffb4e73bb9a
status: test
description: Detects when an user account is locked out.
references:
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-09-12
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1531
logsource:
    product: okta
    service: okta
detection:
    selection:
        displayMessage: Max sign in attempts exceeded
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Password Policy Enumerated
id: 12ba6a38-adb3-4d6b-91ba-a7fb248e3199
status: test
description: Detects when the password policy is enumerated.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4661
    - https://github.com/jpalanco/alienvault-ossim/blob/f74359c0c027e42560924b5cff25cdf121e5505a/os-sim/agent/src/ParserUtil.py#L951
author: Zach Mathis
date: 2023-05-19
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1201
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: dfd8c0f4-e6ad-4e07-b91b-f2fca0ddef64
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4661 # A handle to an object was requested.
        AccessList|contains: '%%5392' # ReadPasswordParameters
        ObjectServer: 'Security Account Manager'
    condition: selection
level: medium

title: Pingback Backdoor Activity
id: b2400ffb-7680-47c0-b08a-098a7de7e7a9
related:
    - id: 35a7dc42-bc6f-46e0-9f83-81f8e56c8d4b # DLL Load
      type: similar
    - id: 2bd63d53-84d4-4210-80ff-bf0658f1bf78 # File Indicators
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the use of Pingback backdoor that creates ICMP tunnel for C2 as described in the trustwave report
references:
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/backdoor-at-the-end-of-the-icmp-tunnel
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/4a54c651-b70b-4b72-84d7-f34d301d6406
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-05-05
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\updata.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'config'
            - 'msdtc'
            - 'start'
            - 'auto'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential CVE-2021-40444 Exploitation Attempt
id: 894397c6-da03-425c-a589-3d09e7d1f750
status: test
description: Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2021-40444 via suspicious process patterns seen in in-the-wild exploitations
references:
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444
    - https://twitter.com/neonprimetime/status/1435584010202255375
    - https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/476188/1/iochtml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), @neonprimetime
date: 2021-09-08
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
    - cve.2021-40444
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\control.exe'
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\winword.exe'
            - '\powerpnt.exe'
            - '\excel.exe'
    filter:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '\control.exe input.dll'
            - '\control.exe" input.dll'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential CVE-2023-36874 Exploitation - Fake Wermgr.Exe Creation
id: ad0960eb-0015-4d16-be13-b3d9f18f1342
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a file named "wermgr.exe" being created in an uncommon directory. This could be a sign of potential exploitation of CVE-2023-36874.
references:
    - https://github.com/Wh04m1001/CVE-2023-36874
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/falcon-complete-zero-day-exploit-cve-2023-36874/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-23
modified: 2025-01-13
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - cve.2023-36874
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\wermgr.exe'
    filter_main_locations:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - ':\$WINDOWS.~BT\NewOS\'
            - ':\$WinREAgent\' # From "wuauclt.exe"
            - ':\Windows\servicing\LCU\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
            - ':\WUDownloadCache\' # Windows Update Download Cache
            - ':\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\Download\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Pikabot C2 Activity
id: cae6cee6-0244-44d2-84ed-e65f548eb7dc
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of rundll32 that leads to an external network connection.
    The malware Pikabot has been seen to use this technique to initiate C2-communication through hard-coded Windows binaries.
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d72af640b71b8e3eca3eba660dd7c7f029ff8852bcacaa379e7b6c57cf4d9b44
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/6bb4cdbaef03b732a93559a58173e7f16b29bfb159a1065fae9185000ff23b4b
    - https://github.com/pr0xylife/Pikabot/blob/7f7723a74ca325ec54c6e61e076acce9a4b20538/Pikabot_06.12.2023.txt
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2023-10-27
modified: 2024-01-26
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1573
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: network_connection
    definition: 'Requirements: By default the network_connection type event might not contain the ParentImage. Make sure you collect such fields in order to use this rule'
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            # Note: Only add processes seen used by Pikabot to avoid collision with other strains of malware
            - '\SearchFilterHost.exe'
            - '\SearchProtocolHost.exe'
            - '\sndvol.exe'
            - '\wermgr.exe'
            - '\wwahost.exe'
        Protocol: tcp
        Initiated: 'true'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential RjvPlatform.DLL Sideloading From Non-Default Location
id: 0e0bc253-07ed-43f1-816d-e1b220fe8971
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "RjvPlatform.dll" by "SystemResetPlatform.exe" located in a non-default location.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1666716511988330499
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\RjvPlatform.dll'
        Image: '\SystemResetPlatform.exe'
    filter_main_legit_path:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\SystemResetPlatform\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PUA - Restic Backup Tool Execution
id: 6ddff2e8-ea1a-45d0-8938-93dfc1d67ae7
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of the Restic backup tool, which can be used for data exfiltration.
    Threat actors may leverage Restic to back up and exfiltrate sensitive data to remote storage locations, including cloud services.
    If not legitimately used in the enterprise environment, its presence may indicate malicious activity.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2024/09/30/nitrogen-campaign-drops-sliver-and-ends-with-blackcat-ransomware/#exfiltration
    - https://restic.net/
    - https://restic.readthedocs.io/en/stable/030_preparing_a_new_repo.html
author: Nounou Mbeiri, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048
    - attack.t1567.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_specific:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '--password-file'
              - 'init'
              - ' -r '
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '--use-fs-snapshot'
              - 'backup'
              - ' -r '
    selection_restic:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'sftp:'
            - 'rest:http'
            - 's3:s3.'
            - 's3.http'
            - 'azure:'
            - ' gs:'
            - 'rclone:'
            - 'swift:'
            - ' b2:'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' init '
            - ' -r '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of Restic for backup purposes within the organization.
level: high

title: PUA - Suspicious ActiveDirectory Enumeration Via AdFind.EXE
id: 455b9d50-15a1-4b99-853f-8d37655a4c1b
related:
    - id: 9a132afa-654e-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
      type: similar
    - id: 514e7e3e-b3b4-4a67-af60-be20f139198b
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects active directory enumeration activity using known AdFind CLI flags
references:
    - https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/
    - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-13
modified: 2023-03-05
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_password: # Listing password policy
        CommandLine|contains:
            - lockoutduration
            - lockoutthreshold
            - lockoutobservationwindow
            - maxpwdage
            - minpwdage
            - minpwdlength
            - pwdhistorylength
            - pwdproperties
    selection_enum_ad: # Enumerate Active Directory Admins
        CommandLine|contains: '-sc admincountdmp'
    selection_enum_exchange: # Enumerate Active Directory Exchange AD Objects
        CommandLine|contains: '-sc exchaddresses'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Authorized administrative activity
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_adfind_enumeration/info.yml

title: Remote Access Tool - Cmd.EXE Execution via AnyViewer
id: bc533330-fc29-44c0-b245-7dc6e5939c87
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of "cmd.exe" via the AnyViewer RMM agent on a remote management sessions.
references:
    - https://www.anyviewer.com/help/remote-technical-support.html
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2024-08-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\AVCore.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: 'AVCore.exe" -d'
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use for admin activity.
level: medium

title: Renamed AdFind Execution
id: df55196f-f105-44d3-a675-e9dfb6cc2f2b
status: test
description: Detects the use of a renamed Adfind.exe. AdFind continues to be seen across majority of breaches. It is used to domain trust discovery to plan out subsequent steps in the attack chain.
references:
    - https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
    - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx
    - https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/blob/bf62ece1c679b07b5fb49c4bae947fe24c81811f/fin6/Emulation_Plan/Phase1.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-21
modified: 2025-02-26
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1069.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'domainlist'
            - 'trustdmp'
            - 'dcmodes'
            - 'adinfo'
            - ' dclist '
            - 'computer_pwdnotreqd'
            - 'objectcategory='
            - '-subnets -f'
            - 'name="Domain Admins"'
            - '-sc u:'
            - 'domainncs'
            - 'dompol'
            - ' oudmp '
            - 'subnetdmp'
            - 'gpodmp'
            - 'fspdmp'
            - 'users_noexpire'
            - 'computers_active'
            - 'computers_pwdnotreqd'
    selection_2:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'IMPHASH=BCA5675746D13A1F246E2DA3C2217492'
            - 'IMPHASH=53E117A96057EAF19C41380D0E87F1C2'
            - 'IMPHASH=d144de8117df2beceaba2201ad304764'
            - 'IMPHASH=12ce1c0f3f5837ecc18a3782408fa975'
            - 'IMPHASH=4fbf3f084fbbb2470b80b2013134df35'
            - 'IMPHASH=49b639b4acbecc49d72a01f357aa4930'
            - 'IMPHASH=680dad9e300346e05a85023965867201'
            - 'IMPHASH=21aa085d54992511b9f115355e468782'
    selection_3:
        OriginalFileName: 'AdFind.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\AdFind.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection* and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_adfind/info.yml

title: Renamed CURL.EXE Execution
id: 7530cd3d-7671-43e3-b209-976966f6ea48
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed "CURL.exe" binary based on the PE metadata fields
references:
    - https://twitter.com/Kostastsale/status/1700965142828290260
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-11
modified: 2023-10-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - OriginalFileName: 'curl.exe'
        - Description: 'The curl executable'
    filter_main_img:
        Image|contains: '\curl'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_curl/info.yml