Sigma rules: 2f

title: AWS EnableRegion Command Monitoring
id: a5ffb6ea-c784-4e01-b30a-deb6e58ca2ab
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of the EnableRegion command in AWS CloudTrail logs.
    While AWS has 30+ regions, some of them are enabled by default, others must be explicitly enabled in each account separately.
    There may be situations where security monitoring does not cover some new AWS regions.
    Monitoring the EnableRegion command is important for identifying potential persistence mechanisms employed by adversaries, as enabling additional regions can facilitate continued access and operations within an AWS environment.
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/accounts/latest/reference/API_EnableRegion.html
    - https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/2.14.0/reference/account/enable-region.html
author: Ivan Saakov, Sergey Zelenskiy
date: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventName: 'EnableRegion'
        eventSource: 'account.amazonaws.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the EnableRegion command by authorized administrators.
level: medium

title: DLL Loaded via CertOC.EXE
id: 242301bc-f92f-4476-8718-78004a6efd9f
related:
    - id: 84232095-ecca-4015-b0d7-7726507ee793
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to loads the target DLL file.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/sblmsrsn/status/1445758411803480072?s=20
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-fe98e74189873d6df72a15df2eaa0315c59ba9cdaca93ecd68afc4ea09194ef2
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certoc/
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-10-23
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certoc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertOC.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -LoadDLL '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: DNS Resolution Failure Spike
id: b2c3d4e5-f6a7-4b8c-9d0e-1f2a3b4c5d6e
status: experimental
description: Detects spike in DNS resolution failures which may indicate C2 infrastructure
  takedown or DGA activity
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002/
author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
date: 2025/10/29
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1568.002
logsource:
  product: macos
  service: unifiedlog
  category: network_events
detection:
  selection:
    subsystem: com.apple.network
    message|contains:
    - DNS query failed
    - resolution error
    - NXDOMAIN
  condition: selection
  timeframe: 1m
  # Note: Count aggregation (> 50 in 1m) would need to be applied
  # at query time in Kibana/Elasticsearch, not in Sigma rule
falsepositives:
- Network connectivity issues
- DNS server problems
level: medium
modified: 2025/01/15

title: ETW Logging Tamper In .NET Processes Via CommandLine
id: 41421f44-58f9-455d-838a-c398859841d4
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to environment variables related to ETW logging via the CommandLine.
    This could indicate potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1268712093928378368
    - https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0878832e-39d7-4eaf-8e16-a729c4c40975/what-can-i-use-e13c0d23ccbc4e12931bd9cc2eee27e4-for?forum=clr
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/ee2355c801d892f2894b0f7b14a20e6cc50e0e54/docs/design/coreclr/jit/viewing-jit-dumps.md#setting-configuration-variables
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/f62e93416a1799aecc6b0947adad55a0d9870732/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfigvalues.h#L35-L38
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/7abe42dc1123722ed385218268bb9fe04556e3d3/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfig.h#L33-L39
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/search?p=1&q=COMPlus_&unscoped_q=COMPlus_
    - https://bunnyinside.com/?term=f71e8cb9c76a
    - http://managed670.rssing.com/chan-5590147/all_p1.html
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/4f9ae42d861fcb4be2fcd5d3d55d5f227d30e723/docs/coding-guidelines/clr-jit-coding-conventions.md#1412-disabling-code
    - https://i.blackhat.com/EU-21/Wednesday/EU-21-Teodorescu-Veni-No-Vidi-No-Vici-Attacks-On-ETW-Blind-EDRs.pdf
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-05-02
modified: 2022-12-09
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'COMPlus_ETWEnabled'
            - 'COMPlus_ETWFlags'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: IAM User Created
id: 8f3a7b2c-1d4e-5f6a-9b0c-2e3d4f5a6b7c
status: test
description: |
    Detects when an IAM user creates a new IAM user via CreateUser.
    This is a common persistence technique where an attacker with compromised
    credentials creates a backdoor IAM user for continued access even after
    the originally compromised credentials are rotated.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003/
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_CreateUser.html
    - https://hackingthe.cloud/aws/post_exploitation/create_a_console_session_from_iam_credentials/
author: nishikawaakira (@nishikawaakira)
date: 2026-05-03
modified: 2026-05-29
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.003
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
        eventName: CreateUser
    filter:
        errorCode|exists: true
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate IAM administrators creating new users
    - Automated provisioning systems (Terraform, CloudFormation, SCIM)
level: high

title: Impacket DCOMexec privilege abuse via MMC
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker execute the Impacket DCOMexec tool in order to abuse DCOM services.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0008-Lateral%20Movement/T1021.003-Distributed%20Component%20Object%20Model%20(DCOM)
- https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/
- https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
- https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/dcomexec.py
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/lateral-movement/t1175-distributed-component-object-model
- https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/traces-of-windows-remote-command-execution.html
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.003
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4674
    ProcessName|endswith: '\mmc.exe'
    ObjectName|startswith:
      - '\BaseNamedObjects\HWNDInterface:'
      - '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\WinSock2\Parameters'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- applications using DCOM components remotely
- rare administrator modifications of DCOM settings
level: high

title: Invoke-Obfuscation RUNDLL LAUNCHER - PowerShell Module
id: a23791fe-8846-485a-b16b-ca691e1b03d4
related:
    - id: e6cb92b4-b470-4eb8-8a9d-d63e8583aae0
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via RUNDLL LAUNCHER
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 23)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-18
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_4103:
        Payload|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32.exe'
            - 'shell32.dll'
            - 'shellexec_rundll'
            - 'powershell'
    condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - System
id: 63e3365d-4824-42d8-8b82-e56810fefa0c
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task29)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ImagePath|contains: '(Clipboard|i'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Amazon SSM Agent Hijacking
id: d20ee2f4-822c-4827-9e15-41500b1fff10
status: test
description: Detects potential Amazon SSM agent hijack attempts as outlined in the Mitiga research report.
references:
    - https://www.mitiga.io/blog/mitiga-security-advisory-abusing-the-ssm-agent-as-a-remote-access-trojan
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/amazons-aws-ssm-agent-can-be-used-as-post-exploitation-rat-malware/
    - https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2023/08/02/aws-instances-attackers-access/
author: Muhammad Faisal
date: 2023-08-02
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\amazon-ssm-agent.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-register '
            - '-code '
            - '-id '
            - '-region '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate activity of system administrators
level: medium

title: Potential Defense Evasion Via Rename Of Highly Relevant Binaries
id: 0ba1da6d-b6ce-4366-828c-18826c9de23e
related:
    - id: 36480ae1-a1cb-4eaa-a0d6-29801d7e9142
      type: similar
    - id: 2569ed8c-1147-498a-9b8c-2ad3656b10ed # Renamed Rundll32 Specific
      type: derived
    - id: a7a7e0e5-1d57-49df-9c58-9fe5bc0346a2 # Renamed PsExec
      type: obsolete
    - id: d178a2d7-129a-4ba4-8ee6-d6e1fecd5d20 # Renamed PowerShell
      type: obsolete
    - id: d4d2574f-ac17-4d9e-b986-aeeae0dc8fe2 # Renamed Rundll32
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName datapoint.
references:
    - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/12/BinaryRename.html
    - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/29/BinaryRename2.html
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk-en/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/megacortex-ransomware-spotted-attacking-enterprise-networks
    - https://twitter.com/christophetd/status/1164506034720952320
    - https://threatresearch.ext.hp.com/svcready-a-new-loader-reveals-itself/
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/malicious-browser-extention-crashfix-kongtuke
author: Matthew Green - @mgreen27, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2019-06-15
modified: 2026-06-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.003
    - car.2013-05-009
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Description: 'Execute processes remotely'
        - Product: 'Sysinternals PsExec'
        - Description|startswith:
              - 'Windows PowerShell'
              - 'pwsh'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'certutil.exe'
              - 'cmstp.exe'
              - 'cscript.exe'
              - 'IE4UINIT.EXE'
              - 'finger.exe'
              - 'mshta.exe'
              - 'msiexec.exe'
              - 'msxsl.exe'
              - 'powershell_ise.exe'
              - 'powershell.exe'
              - 'psexec.c'        # old versions of psexec (2016 seen)
              - 'psexec.exe'
              - 'psexesvc.exe'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'reg.exe'
              - 'regsvr32.exe'
              - 'rundll32.exe'
              - 'WerMgr'
              - 'wmic.exe'
              - 'wscript.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cmstp.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\ie4uinit.exe'
            - '\finger.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\msxsl.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\psexec.exe'
            - '\psexec64.exe'
            - '\psexec64a.exe'
            - '\PSEXESVC.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\reg.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\wermgr.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Custom applications use renamed binaries adding slight change to binary name. Typically this is easy to spot and add to whitelist
    - PsExec installed via Windows Store doesn't contain original filename field (False negative)
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary_highly_relevant/info.yml

title: Potential Ransomware or Unauthorized MBR Tampering Via Bcdedit.EXE
id: c9fbe8e9-119d-40a6-9b59-dd58a5d84429
status: test
description: Detects potential malicious and unauthorized usage of bcdedit.exe
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/devtest/bcdedit--set
    - https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1372536434125512712/photo/2
author: '@neu5ron'
date: 2019-02-07
modified: 2023-02-15
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1542.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\bcdedit.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'bcdedit.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'delete'
            - 'deletevalue'
            - 'import'
            - 'safeboot'
            - 'network'
    condition: all of selection_*
level: medium

title: Potential RDP Exploit CVE-2019-0708
id: aaa5b30d-f418-420b-83a0-299cb6024885
status: test
description: Detect suspicious error on protocol RDP, potential CVE-2019-0708
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20190710034152/https://github.com/zerosum0x0/CVE-2019-0708
    - https://github.com/Ekultek/BlueKeep
author: 'Lionel PRAT, Christophe BROCAS, @atc_project (improvements)'
date: 2019-05-24
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1210
    - car.2013-07-002
    - cve.2019-0708
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 56
            - 50
        Provider_Name: TermDD
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Bad connections or network interruptions
# too many false positives
level: medium

title: Privilege escalation via runas (command)
description: Detects scenarios where attack attempts to elevate privileges via the command runas.
correlation: correlation between the 3 event IDs can be done over SubjectLogonId in order to get more context.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0004-Privilege%20Escalation/T1134-Access%20Token%20Manipulation
- https://www.elastic.co/fr/blog/how-attackers-abuse-access-token-manipulation
- http://www.pseale.com/pretend-youre-on-the-domain-with-runas-netonly
- https://blog.palantir.com/windows-privilege-abuse-auditing-detection-and-defense-3078a403d74e
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1134.002
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection: # Full command: 'runas /user:<domain>\<user> cmd.exe'

  selection_command:
    EventID: 4688
    NewProcessName|endswith: '\runas.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - runas
      - '/user:'

  selection_login:
    EventID: 4624
    LogonType: 2
    LogonProcessName: seclogo
    #AuthenticationPackageName: Negotiate
    ProcessName|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
    IpAddress: '::1'

  selection_swtich_cred:
    EventID: 4648
    TargetServerName: localhost
    ProcessName|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
    IpAddress: '::1 '

  condition: selection_login and selection_command and selection_swtich_cred
falsepositives:
- Administrator activity
level: medium

title: Process Execution Error In JVM Based Application
id: d65f37da-a26a-48f8-8159-3dde96680ad2
status: test
description: Detects process execution related exceptions in JVM based apps, often relates to RCE
references:
    - https://www.wix.engineering/post/threat-and-vulnerability-hunting-with-application-server-error-logs
author: Moti Harmats
date: 2023-02-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: jvm
    definition: 'Requirements: application error logs must be collected (with LOG_LEVEL=ERROR and above)'
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'Cannot run program'
        - 'java.lang.ProcessImpl'
        - 'java.lang.ProcessBuilder'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Application bugs
level: high

title: RDP Port Forwarding Rule Added Via Netsh.EXE
id: 782d6f3e-4c5d-4b8c-92a3-1d05fed72e63
status: test
description: Detects the execution of netsh to configure a port forwarding of port 3389 (RDP) rule
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community
date: 2019-01-29
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\netsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'netsh.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' i'
            - ' p'
            - '=3389'
            - ' c'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activity
level: high

title: Remote Thread Creation Via PowerShell In Uncommon Target
id: 99b97608-3e21-4bfe-8217-2a127c396a0e
related:
    - id: eeb2e3dc-c1f4-40dd-9bd5-149ee465ad50
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a remote thread from a Powershell process in an uncommon target process
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/06/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-06-25
modified: 2023-11-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.011
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: create_remote_thread
detection:
    selection:
        SourceImage|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        TargetImage|endswith:
            # Note: Please add additional potential interesting targets to increase coverage
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Scheduled Task Deletion
id: 4f86b304-3e02-40e3-aa5d-e88a167c9617
status: test
description: Detects scheduled task deletion events. Scheduled tasks are likely to be deleted if not used for persistence. Malicious Software often creates tasks directly under the root node e.g. \TASKNAME
references:
    - https://twitter.com/matthewdunwoody/status/1352356685982146562
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4699
author: David Strassegger, Tim Shelton
date: 2021-01-22
modified: 2023-01-20
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - car.2013-08-001
    - attack.t1053.005
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: The Advanced Audit Policy setting Object Access > Audit Other Object Access Events has to be configured to allow this detection. We also recommend extracting the Command field from the embedded XML in the event data.'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4699
    filter_main_generic:
        TaskName: '\Microsoft\Windows\RemovalTools\MRT_ERROR_HB' # Triggered by ParentCommandLine=C:\WINDOWS\system32\MRT.exe /EHB /HeartbeatFailure ErrorStack,Previous=ErrorStack,Previous=ErrorStack,Previous=ErrorStack,Previous=ErrorStack,Previous=SubmitHeartbeatReportData,Hr=0x80072f8f,Hr=0x80072f8f,Hr=0x80072f8f,Hr=0x80072f8f,Hr=0x80072f8f /HeartbeatError 0x80072f8f
    filter_main_firefox:
        TaskName|contains: '\Mozilla\Firefox Default Browser Agent ' # Triggered by firefox updates
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Software installation
level: low

title: Suspicious Diantz Alternate Data Stream Execution
id: 6b369ced-4b1d-48f1-b427-fdc0de0790bd
status: test
description: Compress target file into a cab file stored in the Alternate Data Stream (ADS) of the target file.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Diantz/
author: frack113
date: 2021-11-26
modified: 2022-12-31
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - diantz.exe
            - .cab
        CommandLine|re: ':[^\\]'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Very Possible
level: medium

title: Suspicious MacOS Firmware Activity
id: 7ed2c9f7-c59d-4c82-a7e2-f859aa676099
status: test
description: Detects when a user manipulates with Firmward Password on MacOS. NOTE - this command has been disabled on silicon-based apple computers.
references:
    - https://github.com/usnistgov/macos_security/blob/932a51f3e819dd3e02ebfcf3ef433cfffafbe28b/rules/os/os_firmware_password_require.yaml
    - https://www.manpagez.com/man/8/firmwarepasswd/
    - https://support.apple.com/guide/security/firmware-password-protection-sec28382c9ca/web
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-09-30
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection1:
        Image: '/usr/sbin/firmwarepasswd'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'setpasswd'
            - 'full'
            - 'delete'
            - 'check'
    condition: selection1
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: medium

title: Suspicious Scheduled Task Name As GUID
id: ff2fff64-4cd6-4a2b-ba7d-e28a30bbe66b
status: test
description: Detects creation of a scheduled task with a GUID like name
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/10/31/follina-exploit-leads-to-domain-compromise/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-31
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '/Create '
    selection_tn:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Can start with single or double quote
            - '/TN "{'
            - "/TN '{"
            - "/TN {"
    selection_end:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Ending of the name to avoid possible FP in the rest of the commandline
            - '}"'
            - "}'"
            - '} '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software naming their tasks as GUIDs
level: medium

title: Uncommon Child Process Spawned By Odbcconf.EXE
id: 8e3c7994-131e-4ba5-b6ea-804d49113a26
status: test
description: Detects an uncommon child process of "odbcconf.exe" binary which normally shouldn't have any child processes.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-ver16
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/
    - https://medium.com/@cyberjyot/t1218-008-dll-execution-using-odbcconf-exe-803fa9e08dac
author: Harjot Singh @cyb3rjy0t
date: 2023-05-22
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.008
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\odbcconf.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - In rare occurrences where "odbcconf" crashes. It might spawn a "werfault" process
    - Other child processes will depend on the DLL being registered by actions like "regsvr". In case where the DLLs have external calls (which should be rare). Other child processes might spawn and additional filters need to be applied.
level: medium

title: Uncommon Connection to Active Directory Web Services
id: b3ad3c0f-c949-47a1-a30e-b0491ccae876
status: test
description: |
    Detects uncommon network connections to the Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) from processes not typically associated with ADWS management.
references:
    - https://medium.com/falconforce/soaphound-tool-to-collect-active-directory-data-via-adws-165aca78288c
    - https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/FalconFriday/blob/a9219dfcfd89836f34660223f47d766982bdce46/Discovery/ADWS_Connection_from_Unexpected_Binary-Win.md
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2024-01-26
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: true
        DestinationPort: 9389
    filter_main_dsac:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\dsac.exe'
    filter_main_ms_monitoring_agent:
        Image: 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Monitoring Agent\'
    filter_main_powershell:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7\pwsh.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7-preview\pwsh.ex'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - ADWS is used by a number of legitimate applications that need to interact with Active Directory. These applications should be added to the allow-listing to avoid false positives.
level: medium

title: Use Get-NetTCPConnection - PowerShell Module
id: aff815cc-e400-4bf0-a47a-5d8a2407d4e1
status: test
description: Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1049/T1049.md#atomic-test-2---system-network-connections-discovery-with-powershell
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-10
modified: 2022-12-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1049
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection:
        ContextInfo|contains: 'Get-NetTCPConnection'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low

title: User browser credentials dump via network share (DonPapi, Lazagne)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempt to dump browser credentials (Firefox, Google Chrome, ...) via network share.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0006-Credential%20Access/T1555-Credentials%20from%20Password%20Stores
- https://github.com/login-securite/DonPAPI
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/12/13/diavol-ransomware/
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1555.003
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection_event:
    EventID: 5145
    ShareName: '\\*\C$'
  selection_browsers_credentials:
    - RelativeTargetName|endswith:
      - '\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\'
      - '\AppData\Local\Temp\edge-cookies.json'
    - RelativeTargetName|contains:
      - '\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\'
      - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Login Data\'
      - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Cookies\'
  condition: selection_event and selection_browsers_credentials
falsepositives:
- Roaming user profile, vulnerability scanners
level: high

title: WMIC Remote Command Execution
id: 7773b877-5abb-4a3e-b9c9-fd0369b59b00
related:
    - id: e42af9df-d90b-4306-b7fb-05c863847ebd
      type: obsolete
    - id: 09af397b-c5eb-4811-b2bb-08b3de464ebf
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the execution of WMIC to query information on a remote system
references:
    - https://securelist.com/moonbounce-the-dark-side-of-uefi-firmware/105468/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wmic
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-14
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\WMIC.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '/node:'
    filter_main_localhost:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'localhost'
            - '127.0.0.1'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: WMI Execute Remote Process
      technique: T1047
      atomic_guid: 9c8ef159-c666-472f-9874-90c8d60d136b
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_remote_execution/info.yml