Sigma rules: 2o

title: Bitbucket User Login Failure Via SSH
id: d3f90469-fb05-42ce-b67d-0fded91bbef3
status: test
description: |
    Detects SSH user login access failures.
    Please note that this rule can be noisy and is recommended to use with correlation based on "author.name" field.
references:
    - https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/view-and-configure-the-audit-log-776640417.html
    - https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/enable-ssh-access-to-git-repositories-776640358.html
author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf)
date: 2024-02-25
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1021.004
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: bitbucket
    service: audit
    definition: 'Requirements: "Advance" log level is required to receive these audit events.'
detection:
    selection:
        auditType.category: 'Authentication'
        auditType.action: 'User login failed(SSH)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate user wrong password attempts.
level: medium

title: Change to Authentication Method
id: 4d78a000-ab52-4564-88a5-7ab5242b20c7
status: test
description: Change to authentication method could be an indicator of an attacker adding an auth method to the account so they can have continued access.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: AlertIQ
date: 2021-10-10
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1556
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        LoggedByService: 'Authentication Methods'
        Category: 'UserManagement'
        OperationName: 'User registered security info'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: CodePage Modification Via MODE.COM
id: d48c5ffa-3b02-4c0f-9a9e-3c275650dd0e
related:
    - id: 12fbff88-16b5-4b42-9754-cd001a789fb3
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects a CodePage modification using the "mode.com" utility.
    This behavior has been used by threat actors behind Dharma ransomware.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/intl/code-page-identifiers
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/mode
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/mode.com-59D1ED51ACB8C3D50F1306FD75F20E99.html
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5e75ef02517afd6e8ba6462b19217dc4a5a574abb33d10eb0f2bab49d8d48c22/behavior
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2024-01-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\mode.com'
        - OriginalFileName: 'MODE.COM'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' con '
            - ' cp '
            - ' select='
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low

title: Executable from Webdav
id: aac2fd97-bcba-491b-ad66-a6edf89c71bf
status: test
description: 'Detects executable access via webdav6. Can be seen in APT 29 such as from the emulated APT 29 hackathon https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/'
references:
    - http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2012/06/webdav-server-to-download-custom.html
    - https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29
author: 'SOC Prime, Adam Swan'
date: 2020-05-01
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: http
detection:
    selection_webdav:
        - c-useragent|contains: 'WebDAV'
        - c-uri|contains: 'webdav'
    selection_executable:
        - resp_mime_types|contains: 'dosexec'
        - c-uri|endswith: '.exe'
    condition: selection_webdav and selection_executable
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: File with high volume downloaded via BITS
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker downloads a payload by abusing BITS software. For more precise information, inspect "Bits-client" event log and search for ID 59 and 60.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1197-BITS%20jobs
- https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/background-intelligent-transfer-protocol-ab81cd900aa7
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bitsadmin-examples
- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190/
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/12/12/multi-stage-downloader-trojan-sload-abuses-bits-almost-exclusively-for-malicious-activities/
- https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/background-intelligent-transfer-protocol-ab81cd900aa7
- https://www.hackingarticles.in/windows-for-pentester-bitsadmin/
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1048 # Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1570 # Lateral Tool Transfer
- attack.Command_and_control
- attack.t1105 # Ingress Tool Transfer
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1197 # Bits jobs
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: bits
detection:
  selection_baseline:
    EventID: 60   # BITS Task stopped
    hr: 0         # Indicate download completed successfully
  selection_size: # Size is provided in Bytes (524288000 =~ 500Mb)
    - fileLength >= 524288000
    - bytesTotal >= 524288000
  condition: selection_baseline and selection_size
falsepositives:
- Microsoft updates, WSL ISO download
level: medium

title: HackTool - HandleKatz Duplicating LSASS Handle
id: b1bd3a59-c1fd-4860-9f40-4dd161a7d1f5
status: test
description: Detects HandleKatz opening LSASS to duplicate its handle to later dump the memory without opening any new handles
references:
    - https://github.com/codewhitesec/HandleKatz
author: Bhabesh Raj (rule), @thefLinkk
date: 2022-06-27
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe' # Theoretically, can be any benign process holding handle to LSASS
        GrantedAccess: '0x1440' # Only PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION
        # Example: C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+9d234\|UNKNOWN(00000000001C119B)
        CallTrace|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll+'
        CallTrace|contains: '|UNKNOWN('
        CallTrace|endswith: ')'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - PCHunter Execution
id: fca949cc-79ca-446e-8064-01aa7e52ece5
status: test
description: Detects suspicious use of PCHunter, a tool like Process Hacker to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level stuff
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20231210115125/http://www.xuetr.com/
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/falcon-overwatch-report-finds-increase-in-ecrime/
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/20/kernel-hacking-tool-you-might-have-never-heard-of-xuetr-pchunter/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2022-10-10
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.t1057
    - attack.t1012
    - attack.t1083
    - attack.t1007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_image:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\PCHunter64.exe'
            - '\PCHunter32.exe'
    selection_pe:
        - OriginalFileName: 'PCHunter.exe'
        - Description: 'Epoolsoft Windows Information View Tools'
    selection_hashes:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'SHA1=5F1CBC3D99558307BC1250D084FA968521482025'
            - 'MD5=987B65CD9B9F4E9A1AFD8F8B48CF64A7'
            - 'SHA256=2B214BDDAAB130C274DE6204AF6DBA5AEEC7433DA99AA950022FA306421A6D32'
            - 'IMPHASH=444D210CEA1FF8112F256A4997EED7FF'
            - 'SHA1=3FB89787CB97D902780DA080545584D97FB1C2EB'
            - 'MD5=228DD0C2E6287547E26FFBD973A40F14'
            - 'SHA256=55F041BF4E78E9BFA6D4EE68BE40E496CE3A1353E1CA4306598589E19802522C'
            - 'IMPHASH=0479F44DF47CFA2EF1CCC4416A538663'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: HackTool - Sliver C2 Implant Activity Pattern
id: 42333b2c-b425-441c-b70e-99404a17170f
status: test
description: Detects process activity patterns as seen being used by Sliver C2 framework implants
references:
    - https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/79f2d48fcdfc2bee4713b78d431ea4b27f733f30/implant/sliver/shell/shell_windows.go#L36
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/looking-for-the-sliver-lining-hunting-for-emerging-command-and-control-frameworks/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-25
modified: 2023-03-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: '-NoExit -Command [Console]::OutputEncoding=[Text.UTF8Encoding]::UTF8'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: Interesting Service Enumeration Via Sc.EXE
id: e83e8899-c9b2-483b-b355-5decc942b959
status: test
description: |
    Detects the enumeration and query of interesting and in some cases sensitive services on the system via "sc.exe".
    Attackers often try to enumerate the services currently running on a system in order to find different attack vectors.
references:
    - https://www.n00py.io/2021/05/dumping-plaintext-rdp-credentials-from-svchost-exe/
    - https://pentestlab.blog/tag/svchost/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2024-02-12
tags:
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: 'query'
    selection_cmd:
        # Note: add more interesting services
        CommandLine|contains: 'termservice'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
# Note: can be upgraded to medium after an initial baseline
level: low

title: Invoke-Obfuscation COMPRESS OBFUSCATION - PowerShell Module
id: 7034cbbb-cc55-4dc2-8dad-36c0b942e8f1
related:
    - id: 20e5497e-331c-4cd5-8d36-935f6e2a9a07
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via COMPRESS OBFUSCATION
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task 19)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-18
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_4103:
        Payload|contains|all:
            - 'new-object'
            - 'text.encoding]::ascii'
        Payload|contains:
            - 'system.io.compression.deflatestream'
            - 'system.io.streamreader'
        Payload|endswith: 'readtoend'
    condition: selection_4103
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: JexBoss Command Sequence
id: 8ec2c8b4-557a-4121-b87c-5dfb3a602fae
status: test
description: Detects suspicious command sequence that JexBoss
references:
    - https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR18-312A
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-08-24
modified: 2025-11-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.004
logsource:
    product: linux
detection:
    keywords:
        '|all':
            - 'bash -c /bin/bash'
            - '&/dev/tcp/'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Lolbin Unregmp2.exe Use As Proxy
id: 727454c0-d851-48b0-8b89-385611ab0704
status: test
description: Detect usage of the "unregmp2.exe" binary as a proxy to launch a custom version of "wmpnscfg.exe"
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Unregmp2/
author: frack113
date: 2022-12-29
modified: 2024-06-04
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\unregmp2.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'unregmp2.exe'
    selection_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' /HideWMP'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Microsoft Office Trusted Location Updated
id: a0bed973-45fa-4625-adb5-6ecdf9be70ac
related:
    - id: f742bde7-9528-42e5-bd82-84f51a8387d2
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects changes to the registry keys related to "Trusted Location" of Microsoft Office. Attackers might add additional trusted locations to avoid macro security restrictions.
references:
    - https://admx.help/?Category=Office2016&Policy=excel16.Office.Microsoft.Policies.Windows::L_TrustedLoc01
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-21
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: 'Security\Trusted Locations\Location'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Path'
    filter_main_office_click_to_run:
        Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\'
        Image|endswith: '\OfficeClickToRun.exe'
    filter_main_office_apps:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - During office installations or setup, trusted locations are added, which will trigger this rule.
level: medium

title: Multi Factor Authentication Disabled For User Account
id: b18454c8-0be3-41f7-86bc-9c614611b839
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the "StrongAuthenticationRequirement" value, where the state is set to "0" or "Disabled".
    Threat actors were seen disabling multi factor authentication for users in order to maintain or achieve access to the account. Also see in SIM Swap attacks.
references:
    - https://www.sans.org/blog/defending-against-scattered-spider-and-the-com-with-cybercrime-intelligence/
author: Harjot Singh (@cyb3rjy0t)
date: 2024-08-21
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
    definition: 'Requirements: The TargetResources array needs to be mapped accurately in order for this rule to work'
detection:
    selection:
        LoggedByService: 'Core Directory'
        Category: 'UserManagement'
        OperationName: 'Update user'
        TargetResources.ModifiedProperties.DisplayName: 'StrongAuthenticationRequirement'
        TargetResources.ModifiedProperties.NewValue|contains: "State\":0"
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate authorized activity.
level: medium

title: New or Renamed User Account with '$' Character
id: cfeed607-6aa4-4bbd-9627-b637deb723c8
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation of a user with the "$" character. This can be used by attackers to hide a user or trick detection systems that lack the parsing mechanisms.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1387743867663958021
author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2024-01-16
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_create:
        EventID: 4720 # create user
        SamAccountName|contains: '$'
    selection_rename:
        EventID: 4781 # rename user
        NewTargetUserName|contains: '$'
    filter_main_homegroup:
        EventID: 4720
        TargetUserName: 'HomeGroupUser$'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: New PDQDeploy Service - Server Side
id: ee9ca27c-9bd7-4cee-9b01-6e906be7cae3
status: test
description: |
    Detects a PDQDeploy service installation which indicates that PDQDeploy was installed on the machines.
    PDQDeploy can be abused by attackers to remotely install packages or execute commands on target machines
references:
    - https://documentation.pdq.com/PDQDeploy/13.0.3.0/index.html?windows-services.htm
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-22
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_root:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
    selection_service:
        - ImagePath|contains: 'PDQDeployService.exe'
        - ServiceName:
              - 'PDQDeploy'
              - 'PDQ Deploy'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the tool
level: medium

title: Potentially Suspicious Child Process Of VsCode
id: 5a3164f2-b373-4152-93cf-090b13c12d27
status: test
description: Detects uncommon or suspicious child processes spawning from a VsCode "code.exe" process. This could indicate an attempt of persistence via VsCode tasks or terminal profiles.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1618021838407495681
    - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1618021415852335105
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-26
modified: 2023-10-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\code.exe'
    selection_children_images:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\calc.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    selection_children_cli:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Invoke-Expressions'
            - 'IEX'
            - 'Invoke-Command'
            - 'ICM'
            - 'DownloadString'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'wscript'
            - 'cscript'
    selection_children_paths:
        Image|contains:
            # Add more suspicious locations
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - ':\Temp\'
    condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_children_*
falsepositives:
    - In development environment where VsCode is used heavily. False positives may occur when developers use task to compile or execute different types of code. Remove or add processes accordingly
level: medium

title: Powershell Execute Batch Script
id: b5522a23-82da-44e5-9c8b-e10ed8955f88
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution.
    The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems.
    The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands.
    Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops.
    Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple system
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.md#atomic-test-1---create-and-execute-batch-script
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_start:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: Start-Process
    selection_batch:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - '.cmd'
            - '.bat'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration script
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_execute_batch_script/info.yml

title: PowerShell Script Run in AppData
id: ac175779-025a-4f12-98b0-acdaeb77ea85
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious command line execution that invokes PowerShell with reference to an AppData folder
references:
    - https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/1082851155481288706
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/f87f1c4e-47e2-4c46-9cf4-31454c06ce03
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2019-01-09
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'powershell.exe'
            - '\powershell'
            - '\pwsh'
            - 'pwsh.exe'
    selection2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/c '
            - '\AppData\'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Local\'
            - 'Roaming\'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative scripts
level: medium

title: PsExec Service Execution
id: fdfcbd78-48f1-4a4b-90ac-d82241e368c5
related:
    - id: fa91cc36-24c9-41ce-b3c8-3bbc3f2f67ba
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects launch of the PSEXESVC service, which means that this system was the target of a psexec remote execution
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec
    - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ro2QuZTIMBM
author: Thomas Patzke, Romaissa Adjailia, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-06-12
modified: 2023-02-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image: 'C:\Windows\PSEXESVC.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'psexesvc.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative tasks
level: medium

title: PUA - Process Hacker Execution
id: 811e0002-b13b-4a15-9d00-a613fce66e42
related:
    - id: 5722dff1-4bdd-4949-86ab-fbaf707e767a
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of Process Hacker based on binary metadata information (Image, Hash, Imphash, etc).
    Process Hacker is a tool to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level options.
    Threat actors abused older vulnerable versions to manipulate system processes.
references:
    - https://processhacker.sourceforge.io/
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/falcon-overwatch-report-finds-increase-in-ecrime/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-10
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1622
    - attack.t1564
    - attack.t1543
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|contains: '\ProcessHacker_'
        - Image|endswith: '\ProcessHacker.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'ProcessHacker.exe'
              - 'Process Hacker'
        - Description: 'Process Hacker'
        - Product: 'Process Hacker'
        - Hashes|contains:
              - 'MD5=68F9B52895F4D34E74112F3129B3B00D'
              - 'MD5=B365AF317AE730A67C936F21432B9C71'
              - 'SHA1=A0BDFAC3CE1880B32FF9B696458327CE352E3B1D'
              - 'SHA1=C5E2018BF7C0F314FED4FD7FE7E69FA2E648359E'
              - 'SHA256=D4A0FE56316A2C45B9BA9AC1005363309A3EDC7ACF9E4DF64D326A0FF273E80F'
              - 'SHA256=BD2C2CF0631D881ED382817AFCCE2B093F4E412FFB170A719E2762F250ABFEA4'
              - 'IMPHASH=3695333C60DEDECDCAFF1590409AA462'
              - 'IMPHASH=04DE0AD9C37EB7BD52043D2ECAC958DF'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - While sometimes 'Process Hacker is used by legitimate administrators, the execution of Process Hacker must be investigated and allowed on a case by case basis
level: medium

title: Publicly Accessible RDP Service
id: 1fc0809e-06bf-4de3-ad52-25e5263b7623
status: test
description: |
    Detects connections from routable IPs to an RDP listener. Which is indicative of a publicly-accessible RDP service.
author: Josh Brower @DefensiveDepth
date: 2020-08-22
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.001
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: rdp
detection:
    selection:
        id.orig_h|cidr:
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - '2620:83:8000::/48'
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
    # approved_rdp:
      # dst_ip:
        # - x.x.x.x
    condition: not selection # and not approved_rdp
falsepositives:
    - Although it is recommended to NOT have RDP exposed to the internet, verify that this is a) allowed b) the server has not already been compromised via some brute force or remote exploit since it has been exposed to the internet. Work to secure the server if you are unable to remove it from being exposed to the internet.
level: high

title: Remote DCOM/WMI Lateral Movement
id: 68050b10-e477-4377-a99b-3721b422d6ef
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls that performs remote DCOM operations. These could be abused for lateral movement via DCOM or WMI.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-srvs/accf23b0-0f57-441c-9185-43041f1b0ee9
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1021.003
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:367abb81-9844-35f1-ad32-98f038001003'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid:
            - 4d9f4ab8-7d1c-11cf-861e-0020af6e7c57
            - 99fcfec4-5260-101b-bbcb-00aa0021347a
            - 000001a0-0000-0000-c000-000000000046
            - 00000131-0000-0000-c000-000000000046
            - 00000143-0000-0000-c000-000000000046
            - 00000000-0000-0000-c000-000000000046
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Some administrative tasks on remote host
level: high

title: Sdiagnhost Calling Suspicious Child Process
id: f3d39c45-de1a-4486-a687-ab126124f744
status: test
description: Detects sdiagnhost.exe calling a suspicious child process (e.g. used in exploits for Follina / CVE-2022-30190)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984
    - https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/f420d295-0457-4e9b-9b9e-6732be227583/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/c4117d9a-f463-461a-b90f-4cd258746798/
author: Nextron Systems, @Kostastsale
date: 2022-06-01
modified: 2024-08-23
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\sdiagnhost.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            # Add more suspicious LOLBins
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\taskkill.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            # - '\csc.exe'   # https://app.any.run/tasks/f420d295-0457-4e9b-9b9e-6732be227583/
            - '\calc.exe'  # https://app.any.run/tasks/f420d295-0457-4e9b-9b9e-6732be227583/
    filter_main_cmd_bits:
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'bits'
    filter_main_powershell_noprofile:
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '-noprofile -'
            - '-noprofile'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Start of NT Virtual DOS Machine
id: 16905e21-66ee-42fe-b256-1318ada2d770
status: test
description: Ntvdm.exe allows the execution of 16-bit Windows applications on 32-bit Windows operating systems, as well as the execution of both 16-bit and 32-bit DOS applications
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/compatibility/ntvdm-and-16-bit-app-support
    - https://support.microsoft.com/fr-fr/topic/an-ms-dos-based-program-that-uses-the-ms-dos-protected-mode-interface-crashes-on-a-computer-that-is-running-windows-7-5dc739ea-987b-b458-15e4-d28d5cca63c7
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/93fe92fa-8b2b-4d92-8c09-a841aed2e793/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/214094a7-0abc-4a7b-a564-1b757faed79d/
author: frack113
date: 2022-07-16
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\ntvdm.exe'
            - '\csrstub.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use
level: medium

title: Suspicious Scripting in a WMI Consumer
id: fe21810c-2a8c-478f-8dd3-5a287fb2a0e0
status: test
description: Detects suspicious commands that are related to scripting/powershell in WMI Event Consumers
references:
    - https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/615bf1f6bac3c1bdc417025c40c073e6c2771a76/yara/gen_susp_lnk_files.yar#L19
    - https://github.com/RiccardoAncarani/LiquidSnake
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro
date: 2019-04-15
modified: 2023-09-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: wmi_event
detection:
    selection_destination:
        - Destination|contains|all:
              - 'new-object'
              - 'net.webclient'
              - '.downloadstring'
        - Destination|contains|all:
              - 'new-object'
              - 'net.webclient'
              - '.downloadfile'
        - Destination|contains:
              - ' iex('
              - ' -nop '
              - ' -noprofile '
              - ' -decode '
              - ' -enc '
              - 'WScript.Shell'
              - 'System.Security.Cryptography.FromBase64Transform'
    condition: selection_destination
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative scripts
level: high

title: WCE wceaux.dll Access
id: 1de68c67-af5c-4097-9c85-fe5578e09e67
status: test
description: Detects wceaux.dll access while WCE pass-the-hash remote command execution on source host
references:
    - https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html
    - https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-06-14
modified: 2025-01-30
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.s0005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 4656
            - 4663
        ObjectName|endswith: '\wceaux.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

title: WinRM listening service reconnaissance (process)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker enumerates different remote WinRM listeners for lateral movement purposes.
correlation: correlate TargetLogonId from event ID 4688 with TargetLogonId from event ID 4624 to identify the source host.
references:
- https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2012/11/08/abusing-windows-remote-management-winrm-with-metasploit/
- https://securethelogs.com/2019/08/30/hacking-windows-remote-management-winrm/
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/lateral-movement/winrs-for-lateral-movement
- https://www.redcanary.com/blog/lateral-movement-winrm-wmi/
- https://bohops.com/2020/05/12/ws-management-com-another-approach-for-winrm-lateral-movement/
- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190511223310.html
- https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/WinRM.htm
- https://github.com/bohops/WSMan-WinRM
- https://github.com/mez-0/CSharpWinRM
- https://github.com/antonioCoco/RogueWinRM
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.006
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection:
    NewProcessName|endswith: \wsmprovhost.exe
  filter:
    TargetUserName|endswith: '$'
  condition: selection and not filter | count(Computer) > 30
  timeframe: 15m
falsepositives:
- Administrator activity, Windows Server Manager, applications using WinRM
level: medium