Sigma rules: 2s

title: Access To Sysvol Policies Share By Uncommon Process
id: 8344c19f-a023-45ff-ad63-a01c5396aea0
status: test
description: Detects file access requests to the Windows Sysvol Policies Share by uncommon processes
references:
    - https://github.com/vletoux/pingcastle
author: frack113
date: 2023-12-21
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.006
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: file_access
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File ETW provider'
detection:
    selection:
        FileName|startswith: '\\'
        FileName|contains|all:
            - '\sysvol\'
            - '\Policies\'
    filter_main_generic:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\'
            - ':\Program Files\'
            - ':\Windows\explorer.exe'
            - ':\Windows\system32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Attempt To Modify CloudTrail Log Settings
id: 0f11648b-4759-4491-9ff0-e61a28010bfd
status: test
description: |
    An attacker may have attempted to modify CloudTrail log settings for anti-forensics but it was denied due to a lack of permissions.
    An attacker can use the `update-trail` command to disable multi-region logging, so their attacks do not get logged to the other regions.
    Ex: `aws cloudtrail update-trail --name [my-trail] --no-is-multi-region-trail --no-include-global-service-events`
    The attacker may also modify the settings so that the logs get encrypted with a key the attacker only has to prevent reading of the logs.
    The attacker may also redirect the logs to a S3 bucket they control.
references:
    - https://medium.com/daniel-grzelak/disrupting-aws-logging-a42e437d6594
    - https://logrhythm.com/blog/aws-defense-evasion-and-centralized-multi-account-logging/
    - https://traildiscover.cloud/#CloudTrail-UpdateTrail
author: Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
date: 2025-04-23
modified: 2025-04-23
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1562.008 # Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Logs
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'cloudtrail.amazonaws.com'
        eventName: 'UpdateTrail'
        errorCode: 'AccessDenied'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Admins trying to modify log settings but lacked permissions.
level: medium

title: Axios NPM Compromise File Creation Indicators - Windows
id: cd6386fa-bb9a-4b67-b006-786b6ab5d2ba
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects file creation events linked to the Axios NPM supply chain compromise. Axios is a popular JavaScript HTTP client.
    On March 30, 2026, malicious versions (1.14.1, 0.30.4) were published to npm, injecting a dependency (plain-crypto-js@4.2.1) that executed a postinstall script as a cross-platform RAT dropper.
    The dropper contacted a C2 server, delivered platform-specific payloads, deleted itself, and replaced package.json to evade detection.
    The attack used cscript.exe (VBScript), curl.exe (C2), and PowerShell masquerading as Windows Terminal.
references:
    - https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/axios-compromised-on-npm-malicious-versions-drop-remote-access-trojan
    - https://www.derp.ca/research/axios-npm-supply-chain-rat/
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/zh_hk/research/26/c/axios-npm-package-compromised.html
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/axios-supply-chain-compromise-detections
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e10b1fa84f1d6481625f741b69892780140d4e0e7769e7491e5f4d894c2e0e09
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-04-01
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1195.002
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\node.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
    selection_fils:
        - TargetFilename:
              - 'C:\ProgramData\wt.exe'
              - 'C:\ProgramData\system.bat'
        - TargetFilename|contains|all:
              - 'C:\Users\'
              - '\AppData\Local\Temp\6202033.vbs'
        - TargetFilename|contains|all:
              - 'C:\Users\'
              - '\AppData\Local\Temp\6202033.ps1'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Highly unlikely
level: high

title: Bitbucket Full Data Export Triggered
id: 195e1b9d-bfc2-4ffa-ab4e-35aef69815f8
status: test
description: Detects when full data export is attempted.
references:
    - https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/audit-log-events-776640423.html
    - https://confluence.atlassian.com/adminjiraserver0811/importing-and-exporting-data-1019391889.html
author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf)
date: 2024-02-25
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1213.003
logsource:
    product: bitbucket
    service: audit
    definition: 'Requirements: "Advance" log level is required to receive these audit events.'
detection:
    selection:
        auditType.category: 'Data pipeline'
        auditType.action: 'Full data export triggered'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate user activity.
level: high

title: Brutforce with denied access due to account restrictions policies
name: bruteforce_denied_account_restriction_policies
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attemps to use a comprimised account but failed to login due to account restrictions policies (permissions, time restrictions, workstation, logon type, ...)
references:
  - https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0001-Initial%20access/T1078-Valid%20accounts
  - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625
tags:
  - attack.privilege_escalation
  - attack.t1078
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4625
    Status: # Failure code can be defined in "Status" or "Substatus" fields. Usually, if Substatus == 0x0, refers to Status.
      - "0xc0000022" # STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED - A process has requested access to an object, but has not been granted those access rights.
      - "0xC0000413" # STATUS_AUTHENTICATION_FIREWALL_FAILED - Account is not allowed to authenticate to the machine
      - "0xC000006E" # STATUS_ACCOUNT_RESTRICTION - Indicates a referenced user name and authentication information are valid, but some user account restriction has prevented successful authentication (such as time-of-day restrictions).
      - "0xC000006F" # STATUS_INVALID_LOGON_HOURS - The user account has time restrictions and cannot be logged onto at this time.
      - "0xC0000070" # STATUS_INVALID_WORKSTATION - The user account is restricted so that it cannot be used to log on from the source workstation.
      - "0xC000015B" # STATUS_LOGON_TYPE_NOT_GRANTED - A user has requested a type of logon (for example, interactive or network) that has not been granted. An administrator has control over who can logon interactively and through the network.
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - missconfigured accounts
level: medium

---
title: Brutforce with denied access due to account restrictions policies Count
status: experimental
correlation:
  type: value_count
  rules:
    - bruteforce_denied_account_restriction_policies # Referenced here
  group-by:
    - Computer
  timespan: 30m
  condition:
    gte: 10
    field: EventRecordID
level: high

title: Bypass UAC Using DelegateExecute
id: 46dd5308-4572-4d12-aa43-8938f0184d4f
status: test
description: Bypasses User Account Control using a fileless method
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/shobjidl_core/nn-shobjidl_core-iexecutecommand
    - https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20100312-01/?p=14623
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md#atomic-test-7---bypass-uac-using-sdclt-delegateexecute
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-05
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\open\command\DelegateExecute'
        Details: (Empty)
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_bypass_uac_using_delegateexecute/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Bypass UAC using sdclt DelegateExecute
      technique: T1548.002
      atomic_guid: 3be891eb-4608-4173-87e8-78b494c029b7

title: Certificate Exported Via PowerShell - ScriptBlock
id: aa7a3fce-bef5-4311-9cc1-5f04bb8c308c
related:
    - id: 9e716b33-63b2-46da-86a4-bd3c3b9b5dfb
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects calls to cmdlets inside of PowerShell scripts that are used to export certificates from the local certificate store. Threat actors were seen abusing this to steal private keys from compromised machines.
references:
    - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-112a
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/pki/export-pfxcertificate?view=windowsserver2022-ps
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/breaking-the-chain-defending-against-certificate-services-abuse.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-04-23
modified: 2023-05-18
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'Export-PfxCertificate'
            - 'Export-Certificate'
    filter_optional_module_export:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'CmdletsToExport = @('
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate certificate exports by administrators. Additional filters might be required.
level: medium

title: Curl.EXE Execution
id: bbeaed61-1990-4773-bf57-b81dbad7db2d
related:
    - id: e218595b-bbe7-4ee5-8a96-f32a24ad3468 # Suspicious curl execution
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a curl process start on Windows, which could indicates a file download from a remote location or a simple web request to a remote server
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200128160046/https://twitter.com/reegun21/status/1222093798009790464
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-05
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
        - Product: 'The curl executable'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Scripts created by developers and admins
    - Administrative activity
level: low

title: DirLister Execution
id: b4dc61f5-6cce-468e-a608-b48b469feaa2
status: test
description: Detect the usage of "DirLister.exe" a utility for quickly listing folder or drive contents. It was seen used by BlackCat ransomware to create a list of accessible directories and files.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1083/T1083.md
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/07/14/blackcat-ransomware-attacks-not-merely-a-byproduct-of-bad-luck/
author: frack113
date: 2022-08-20
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - OriginalFileName: 'DirLister.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\DirLister.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use by users
level: low
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dirlister_execution/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Launch DirLister Executable
      technique: T1083
      atomic_guid: c5bec457-43c9-4a18-9a24-fe151d8971b7

title: Guest User Invited By Non Approved Inviters
id: 0b4b72e3-4c53-4d5b-b198-2c58cfef39a9
status: test
description: Detects when a user that doesn't have permissions to invite a guest user attempts to invite one.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts#things-to-monitor
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-10
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Invite external user
        Status: failure
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - A non malicious user is unaware of the proper process
level: medium

title: HackTool - Generic Process Access
id: d0d2f720-d14f-448d-8242-51ff396a334e
status: test
description: Detects process access requests from hacktool processes based on their default image name
references:
    - https://jsecurity101.medium.com/bypassing-access-mask-auditing-strategies-480fb641c158
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/you-bet-your-lsass-hunting-lsass-access.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-11-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.s0002
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - SourceImage|endswith:
              - '\Akagi.exe'
              - '\Akagi64.exe'
              - '\atexec_windows.exe'
              - '\Certify.exe'
              - '\Certipy.exe'
              - '\CoercedPotato.exe'
              - '\crackmapexec.exe'
              - '\CreateMiniDump.exe'
              - '\dcomexec_windows.exe'
              - '\dpapi_windows.exe'
              - '\findDelegation_windows.exe'
              - '\GetADUsers_windows.exe'
              - '\GetNPUsers_windows.exe'
              - '\getPac_windows.exe'
              - '\getST_windows.exe'
              - '\getTGT_windows.exe'
              - '\GetUserSPNs_windows.exe'
              - '\gmer.exe'
              - '\hashcat.exe'
              - '\htran.exe'
              - '\ifmap_windows.exe'
              - '\impersonate.exe'
              - '\Inveigh.exe'
              - '\LocalPotato.exe'
              - '\mimikatz_windows.exe'
              - '\mimikatz.exe'
              - '\netview_windows.exe'
              - '\nmapAnswerMachine_windows.exe'
              - '\opdump_windows.exe'
              - '\PasswordDump.exe'
              - '\Potato.exe'
              - '\PowerTool.exe'
              - '\PowerTool64.exe'
              - '\psexec_windows.exe'
              - '\PurpleSharp.exe'
              - '\pypykatz.exe'
              - '\QuarksPwDump.exe'
              - '\rdp_check_windows.exe'
              - '\Rubeus.exe'
              - '\SafetyKatz.exe'
              - '\sambaPipe_windows.exe'
              - '\SelectMyParent.exe'
              - '\SharpChisel.exe'
              - '\SharPersist.exe'
              - '\SharpEvtMute.exe'
              - '\SharpImpersonation.exe'
              - '\SharpLDAPmonitor.exe'
              - '\SharpLdapWhoami.exe'
              - '\SharpUp.exe'
              - '\SharpView.exe'
              - '\smbclient_windows.exe'
              - '\smbserver_windows.exe'
              - '\sniff_windows.exe'
              - '\sniffer_windows.exe'
              - '\split_windows.exe'
              - '\SpoolSample.exe'
              - '\Stracciatella.exe'
              - '\SysmonEOP.exe'
              - '\temp\rot.exe'
              - '\ticketer_windows.exe'
              - '\TruffleSnout.exe'
              - '\winPEASany_ofs.exe'
              - '\winPEASany.exe'
              - '\winPEASx64_ofs.exe'
              - '\winPEASx64.exe'
              - '\winPEASx86_ofs.exe'
              - '\winPEASx86.exe'
              - '\xordump.exe'
        - SourceImage|contains:
              - '\goldenPac'
              - '\just_dce_'
              - '\karmaSMB'
              - '\kintercept'
              - '\LocalPotato'
              - '\ntlmrelayx'
              - '\rpcdump'
              - '\samrdump'
              - '\secretsdump'
              - '\smbexec'
              - '\smbrelayx'
              - '\wmiexec'
              - '\wmipersist'
              - 'HotPotato'
              - 'Juicy Potato'
              - 'JuicyPotato'
              - 'PetitPotam'
              - 'RottenPotato'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: HackTool - SharpMove Tool Execution
id: 055fb54c-a8f4-4aee-bd44-f74cf30a0d9d
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of SharpMove, a .NET utility performing multiple tasks such as "Task Creation", "SCM" query, VBScript execution using WMI via its PE metadata and command line options.
references:
    - https://github.com/0xthirteen/SharpMove/
    - https://pentestlab.blog/tag/sharpmove/
author: Luca Di Bartolomeo (CrimpSec)
date: 2024-01-29
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpMove.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: SharpMove.exe
    selection_cli_computer:
        # In its current implementation the "computername" flag is required in all actions
        CommandLine|contains: 'computername='
    selection_cli_actions:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'action=create'
            - 'action=dcom'
            - 'action=executevbs'
            - 'action=hijackdcom'
            - 'action=modschtask'
            - 'action=modsvc'
            - 'action=query'
            - 'action=scm'
            - 'action=startservice'
            - 'action=taskscheduler'
    condition: selection_img or all of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Invocation of Active Directory Diagnostic Tool (ntdsutil.exe)
id: 2afafd61-6aae-4df4-baed-139fa1f4c345
status: test
description: Detects execution of ntdsutil.exe, which can be used for various attacks against the NTDS database (NTDS.DIT)
references:
    - https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/ntdsutil.htm
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2022-03-11
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\ntdsutil.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - NTDS maintenance
level: medium

title: LSASS Process Crashed - Application
id: a18e0862-127b-43ca-be12-1a542c75c7c5
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects Windows error reporting events where the process that crashed is LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service).
    This could be the cause of a provoked crash by techniques such as Lsass-Shtinkering to dump credentials.
references:
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/Lsass-Shtinkering
    - https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Asaf%20Gilboa%20-%20LSASS%20Shtinkering%20Abusing%20Windows%20Error%20Reporting%20to%20Dump%20LSASS.pdf
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-erref/596a1078-e883-4972-9bbc-49e60bebca55
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-07
modified: 2025-12-03
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Application Error'
        EventID: 1000
        AppName: 'lsass.exe'
        ExceptionCode: 'c0000001' # STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate crashing of the lsass process
level: high

title: macOS HTTP Tools with Protocol Indicators
id: 77d4f6aa-6313-48b5-8575-c78c9e1b184f
status: experimental
description: 'Detects execution of HTTP/HTTPS tools (curl, wget) with protocol indicators

  in command line, which may indicate command and control communication over

  web protocols. Focus on automated or scripted usage patterns.

  '
author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
date: 2025/10/31
modified: 2025/10/31
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/
logsource:
  product: macos
  service: endpointsecurity
detection:
  selection_event:
    esf.event_type: 9
    event.action: exec
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - /curl
    - /wget
    - /fetch
  selection_cmdline:
    CommandLine|contains:
    - http://
    - https://
    - ftp://
  condition: selection_event and selection_process and selection_cmdline
falsepositives:
- Software updates and package management
- Legitimate scripts downloading files
- Development and CI/CD workflows
- System administration tasks
fields:
- Image
- CommandLine
- ProcessId
- ParentProcessId
- User
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1105
level: low

title: Mimikatz Use
id: 06d71506-7beb-4f22-8888-e2e5e2ca7fd8
status: test
description: This method detects mimikatz keywords in different Eventlogs (some of them only appear in older Mimikatz version that are however still used by different threat groups)
references:
    - https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE (additional keywords)
date: 2017-01-10
modified: 2022-01-05
tags:
    - attack.s0002
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.credential-access
    - car.2013-07-001
    - car.2019-04-004
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.006
logsource:
    product: windows
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'dpapi::masterkey'
        - 'eo.oe.kiwi'
        - 'event::clear'
        - 'event::drop'
        - 'gentilkiwi.com'
        - 'kerberos::golden'
        - 'kerberos::ptc'
        - 'kerberos::ptt'
        - 'kerberos::tgt'
        - 'Kiwi Legit Printer'
        - 'lsadump::'
        - 'mimidrv.sys'
        - '\mimilib.dll'
        - 'misc::printnightmare'
        - 'misc::shadowcopies'
        - 'misc::skeleton'
        - 'privilege::backup'
        - 'privilege::debug'
        - 'privilege::driver'
        - 'sekurlsa::'
    filter:
        EventID: 15  # Sysmon's FileStream Events (could cause false positives when Sigma rules get copied on/to a system)
    condition: keywords and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Naughty administrators
    - AV Signature updates
    - Files with Mimikatz in their filename
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/builtin/win_alert_mimikatz_keywords/info.yml

title: Network Security Group Rule Created
id: 63bbdbed-e157-47ba-b731-5d7db61112b1
status: test
description:
    Creates a network security group rule.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/manage-network-security-group?tabs=network-security-group-portal#network-security-group-rule
author: Fukusuke Takahashi
date: 2025-12-02
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName: MICROSOFT.NETWORK/NETWORKSECURITYGROUPS/SECURITYRULES/WRITE
        properties.statusCode: Created
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
level: informational

title: NewActiveScriptEventConsumer Creation Attempt via Wmic.EXE
id: ebef4391-1a81-4761-a40a-1db446c0e625
status: test
description: |
    Detects the attempt to create an ActiveScriptEventConsumer via WMIC.EXE.
    An ActiveScriptEventConsumer is a built-in Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) class that
    automatically executes a predefined script (in VBScript or JScript) whenever a specific system event occurs.
    Adversaries often abuse ActiveScriptEventConsumer to maintain persistence on a compromised host by executing a malicious script whenever a specific event occurs.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/johnlatwc/status/1408062131321270282?s=12
    - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-25
modified: 2026-06-19
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\WMIC.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ActiveScriptEventConsumer'
            - ' CREATE '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software creating script event consumers
level: high

title: OpenSSH server firewall configuration on Windows (firewall)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker configure the Windows firewall to allow incoming connections to perform stealthy lateral movement.
references:
 - https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0008-Lateral%20Movement/T1021.004-Remote%20Service%20SSH
 - https://winaero.com/enable-openssh-server-windows-10/
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/openssh/openssh_install_firstuse
 - https://virtualizationreview.com/articles/2020/05/21/ssh-server-on-windows-10.aspx
 - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/18/defenders-beware-a-case-for-post-ransomware-investigations/
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1562.004
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: firewall-as
detection:
  selection_event:
    EventID: 2004

  selection_process: # New firewall rule creation (process focus)
    ApplicationPath|endswith: '\sshd.exe' # full path 'C:\Windows\system32\OpenSSH\sshd.exe'

  selection_port:  # New firewall rule creation (port focus)
    LocalPorts: 22 # Attackers may change port 

  condition: selection_event and (selection_process or selection_port)
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high

title: Potential AutoLogger Sessions Tampering
id: f37b4bce-49d0-4087-9f5b-58bffda77316
related:
    - id: d7b81144-b866-48a4-9bcc-275dc69d870e
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects tampering with autologger trace sessions which is a technique used by attackers to disable logging.
    The AutoLogger event tracing session records events up that occur early in the operating system boot process.
    Applications and device drivers can use the AutoLogger session to capture traces before the user logs in, and also used by security solutions as telemetry source.
    Adversaries may disable these sessions to evade detection and prevent security monitoring of early boot activities and system events.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/MichalKoczwara/status/1553634816016498688
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
    - https://i.blackhat.com/EU-21/Wednesday/EU-21-Teodorescu-Veni-No-Vidi-No-Vici-Attacks-On-ETW-Blind-EDRs.pdf
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/configuring-and-starting-an-autologger-session
    - https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-01
modified: 2025-12-26
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_main:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Control\WMI\Autologger\'
    selection_values:
        TargetObject|contains: # We only care about some autologger to avoid FP. Add more if you need
            - '\EventLog-'
            - '\Defender'
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\Enabled'
            - '\Start'
        Details: DWORD (0x00000000)
    filter_main_wevtutil:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\wevtutil.exe'
    filter_main_defender:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Defender\'
        Image|endswith: '\MsMpEng.exe'
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\DefenderApiLogger\'
            - '\DefenderAuditLogger\'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disable_autologger_sessions/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable EventLog-Application Auto Logger Session Via Registry - Cmd
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: 653c6e17-14a2-4849-851d-f1c0cc8ea9ab
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable EventLog-Application Auto Logger Session Via Registry - PowerShell
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: da86f239-9bd3-4e85-92ed-4a94ef111a1c
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable EventLog-Application ETW Provider Via Registry - Cmd
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: 1cac9b54-810e-495c-8aac-989e0076583b
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable EventLog-Application ETW Provider Via Registry - PowerShell
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: 8f907648-1ebf-4276-b0f0-e2678ca474f0

title: Potential Browser Data Stealing
id: 47147b5b-9e17-4d76-b8d2-7bac24c5ce1b
related:
    - id: fc028194-969d-4122-8abe-0470d5b8f12f
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.
    Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future.
    Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.md
    - https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-04/aa24-109a-stopransomware-akira-ransomware_2.pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-23
modified: 2025-03-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1555.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cmd:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'copy-item'
              - 'copy '
              - 'cpi '
              - ' cp '
              - 'move '
              - 'move-item'
              - ' mi '
              - ' mv '
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\esentutl.exe' # akira ransomware
              - '\xcopy.exe'
              - '\robocopy.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'esentutl.exe'
              - 'XCOPY.EXE'
              - 'robocopy.exe'
    selection_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Amigo\User Data'
            - '\BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\User Data'
            - '\CentBrowser\User Data'
            - '\Chromium\User Data'
            - '\CocCoc\Browser\User Data'
            - '\Comodo\Dragon\User Data'
            - '\Elements Browser\User Data'
            - '\Epic Privacy Browser\User Data'
            - '\Google\Chrome Beta\User Data'
            - '\Google\Chrome SxS\User Data'
            - '\Google\Chrome\User Data\'
            - '\Kometa\User Data'
            - '\Maxthon5\Users'
            - '\Microsoft\Edge\User Data'
            - '\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles'
            - '\Nichrome\User Data'
            - '\Opera Software\Opera GX Stable\'
            - '\Opera Software\Opera Neon\User Data'
            - '\Opera Software\Opera Stable\'
            - '\Orbitum\User Data'
            - '\QIP Surf\User Data'
            - '\Sputnik\User Data'
            - '\Torch\User Data'
            - '\uCozMedia\Uran\User Data'
            - '\Vivaldi\User Data'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potential Persistence Via CHM Helper DLL
id: 976dd1f2-a484-45ec-aa1d-0e87e882262b
status: test
description: Detects when an attacker modifies the registry key "HtmlHelp Author" to achieve persistence
references:
    - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/htmlhelpauthor.html
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/22/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-76/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-21
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\HtmlHelp Author\Location'
            - '\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\HtmlHelp Author\Location'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Qakbot Registry Activity
id: 1c8e96cd-2bed-487d-9de0-b46c90cade56
status: test
description: Detects a registry key used by IceID in a campaign that distributes malicious OneNote files
references:
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/onenote-growing-threat-malware-distribution
author: Hieu Tran
date: 2023-03-13
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Software\firm\soft\Name'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PUA - Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) Execution
id: 32410e29-5f94-4568-b6a3-d91a8adad863
status: test
description: Detects the use of Fast Reverse Proxy. frp is a fast reverse proxy to help you expose a local server behind a NAT or firewall to the Internet.
references:
    - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/38156/
    - https://github.com/fatedier/frp
author: frack113, Florian Roth
date: 2022-09-02
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\frpc.exe'
            - '\frps.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '\frpc.ini'
    selection_hashes:
        # v0.44.0
        Hashes|contains:
            - "MD5=7D9C233B8C9E3F0EA290D2B84593C842"
            - "SHA1=06DDC9280E1F1810677935A2477012960905942F"
            - "SHA256=57B0936B8D336D8E981C169466A15A5FD21A7D5A2C7DAF62D5E142EE860E387C"
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use
level: high

title: ScreenConnect - SlashAndGrab Exploitation Indicators
id: 05164d17-8e11-4d7d-973e-9e4962436b87
status: test
description: |
    Detects indicators of exploitation by threat actors during exploitation of the "SlashAndGrab" vulnerability related to ScreenConnect as reported Team Huntress
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/slashandgrab-screen-connect-post-exploitation-in-the-wild-cve-2024-1709-cve-2024-1708
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-02-23
tags:
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        - TargetFilename|contains|all:
              - 'C:\Windows\Temp\ScreenConnect\'
              - '\LB3.exe'
        - TargetFilename|contains:
              - 'C:\mpyutd.msi'
              - 'C:\perflogs\RunSchedulerTaskOnce.ps1'
              - 'C:\ProgramData\1.msi'
              - 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\mpyutd.msi'
              - 'C:\ProgramData\update.dat'
              - 'C:\Users\oldadmin\Documents\MilsoftConnect\Files\ta.exe'
              - 'C:\Windows\Help\Help\SentinelAgentCore.dll'
              - 'C:\Windows\Help\Help\SentinelUI.exe'
              - 'C:\Windows\spsrv.exe'
              - 'C:\Windows\Temp\svchost.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules-emerging-threats/2024/TA/SlashAndGrab-Exploitation-In-Wild/file_event_win_apt_unknown_exploitation_indicators/info.yml

title: Serial console process spawning CMD shell (via command)
description: Detects if an attacker open a privileged CMD shell while accessing to an Azure virtual machine via serial cable.
references:
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/sim-swapping-abuse-azure-serial
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.003 # Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell 
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\sacsess.exe' # C:\Windows\System32\sacsess.exe 
    Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Virtual machine recovery by administrator
level: high

title: Server Side Template Injection Strings
id: ada3bc4f-f0fd-42b9-ba91-e105e8af7342
status: test
description: Detects SSTI attempts sent via GET requests in access logs
references:
    - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/ssti-server-side-template-injection
    - https://github.com/payloadbox/ssti-payloads
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-14
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1221
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    select_method:
        cs-method: 'GET'
    keywords:
        - '={{'
        - '=%7B%7B'
        - '=${'
        - '=$%7B'
        - '=<%='
        - '=%3C%25='
        - '=@('
        - 'freemarker.template.utility.Execute'
        - .getClass().forName('javax.script.ScriptEngineManager')
        - 'T(org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils)'
    filter:
        sc-status: 404
    condition: select_method and keywords and not filter
falsepositives:
    - User searches in search boxes of the respective website
    - Internal vulnerability scanners can cause some serious FPs when used, if you experience a lot of FPs due to this think of adding more filters such as "User Agent" strings and more response codes
level: high

title: Service abuse with malicious ImagePath (Reg via command)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker modify the original service executable path with a malicious one.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1543.003-Create%20or%20Modify%20System%20Process-Windows%20Service
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc742019(v=ws.11)
- https://pentestlab.blog/2020/01/22/persistence-modify-existing-service/
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1574.010
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4688
    NewProcessName|endswith: \reg.exe
    CommandLine|contains|all: # Full command: reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\xboxgip" /v ImagePath /t REG_SZ /d "C:\tmp\pentestlab.exe"
      - REG ADD
      - '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\'
      - ImagePath
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- administrator reconfiguring service
level: high

title: SharpHound host enumeration over Kerberos
name: sharphound_enumeration_kerberos
description: Detect if a source host is requesting multiple Kerberos Service tickets (TGS) for different assets in a short period of time.
references:
  - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4769
  - https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0007-Discovery/T1087-Account%20discovery
  - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/sharing-is-not-caring-hunting-for-file-share-discovery.html
tags:
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1069.002
  - attack.t1087.002
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4769
    ServiceName|endswith: "$"
    Status: 0x0
  filter:
    - IpAddress:
        - "::1"
        - "%domain_controllers_ip%"
    - TargetUserName|contains: "$@" # excludes computer accounts
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
  - Administrator activity, backup software
level: medium

---
title: SharpHound host enumeration over Kerberos Count
status: experimental
correlation:
  type: value_count
  rules:
    - sharphound_enumeration_kerberos
  group-by:
    - ServiceName
  timespan: 5m
  condition:
    gte: 20
    field: IpAddress
level: high

title: SonicWall SSL/VPN Jarrewrite Exploitation
id: 6f55f047-112b-4101-ad32-43913f52db46
status: test
description: Detects exploitation attempts of the SonicWall Jarrewrite Exploit
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20210126045316/https://darrenmartyn.ie/2021/01/24/visualdoor-sonicwall-ssl-vpn-exploit/
    - https://github.com/darrenmartyn/VisualDoor
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-01-25
modified: 2023-04-27
tags:
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.initial-access
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/cgi-bin/jarrewrite.sh'
        cs-user-agent|contains:
            - ':;'
            - '() {'
            - '/bin/bash -c'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high