Sigma rules: 2v

title: All Rules Have Been Deleted From The Windows Firewall Configuration
id: 79609c82-a488-426e-abcf-9f341a39365d
status: test
description: Detects when a all the rules have been deleted from the Windows Defender Firewall configuration
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/dd364427(v=ws.10)
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-17
modified: 2024-01-22
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1686.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: firewall-as
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 2033 # All rules have been deleted from the Windows Defender Firewall configuration on this computer
            - 2059 # All rules have been deleted from the Windows Defender Firewall configuration on this computer. (Windows 11)
    filter_main_svchost:
        ModifyingApplication|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
    filter_optional_msmpeng:
        ModifyingApplication|contains|all:
            - ':\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
            - '\MsMpEng.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
level: high

title: Allow Service Access Using Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE
id: 6c8fbee5-dee8-49bc-851d-c3142d02aa47
related:
    - id: a537cfc3-4297-4789-92b5-345bfd845ad0 # Generic SD tampering
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious DACL modifications to allow access to a service from a suspicious trustee. This can be used to override access restrictions set by previous ACLs.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1628720819537936386
    - https://itconnect.uw.edu/tools-services-support/it-systems-infrastructure/msinf/other-help/understanding-sddl-syntax/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/sid-strings
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-28
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_sc:
        - Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
    selection_sdset:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'sdset'
            - 'A;' # Allow Access
    selection_trustee:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ';IU' # Interactively logged-on user
            - ';SU' # Service logon user
            - ';BA' # Built-in administrators
            - ';SY' # Local system
            - ';WD' # Everyone
    filter_optional_hexnode:
        ParentImage: 'C:\Hexnode\Hexnode Agent\Current\HexnodeAgent.exe'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sc_sdset_allow_service_changes/info.yml

title: Always Install Elevated MSI Spawned Cmd And Powershell
id: 1e53dd56-8d83-4eb4-a43e-b790a05510aa
status: test
description: Detects Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) spawning "cmd" or "powershell"
references:
    - https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kheirkhabarovoffzonefinal-181117201458/95/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment-50-638.jpg
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Mangatas Tondang (rule), oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-10-20
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'Cmd.Exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|contains|all:
            - '\Windows\Installer\'
            - 'msi'
        ParentImage|endswith: 'tmp'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: APT29 2018 Phishing Campaign File Indicators
id: 3a3f81ca-652c-482b-adeb-b1c804727f74
related:
    - id: 7453575c-a747-40b9-839b-125a0aae324b # ProcessCreation
      type: derived
status: stable
description: Detects indicators of APT 29 (Cozy Bear) phishing-campaign as reported by mandiant
references:
    - https://twitter.com/DrunkBinary/status/1063075530180886529
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign
author: '@41thexplorer'
date: 2018-11-20
modified: 2023-02-20
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.011
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - 'ds7002.lnk'
            - 'ds7002.pdf'
            - 'ds7002.zip'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: Azure Subscription Permission Elevation Via ActivityLogs
id: 09438caa-07b1-4870-8405-1dbafe3dad95
status: test
description: |
    Detects when a user has been elevated to manage all Azure Subscriptions.
    This change should be investigated immediately if it isn't planned.
    This setting could allow an attacker access to Azure subscriptions in your environment.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftauthorization
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-11-26
modified: 2022-08-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName: MICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ELEVATEACCESS/ACTION
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - If this was approved by System Administrator.
level: high

title: Bash Interactive Shell
id: 6104e693-a7d6-4891-86cb-49a258523559
status: test
description: Detects execution of the bash shell with the interactive flag "-i".
references:
    - https://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet
    - https://www.revshells.com/
    - https://linux.die.net/man/1/bash
author: '@d4ns4n_'
date: 2023-04-07
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/bash'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -i '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low

title: Bitsadmin to Uncommon TLD
id: 9eb68894-7476-4cd6-8752-23b51f5883a7
status: test
description: Detects Bitsadmin connections to domains with uncommon TLDs
references:
    - https://twitter.com/jhencinski/status/1102695118455349248
    - https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Investigating+Microsoft+BITS+Activity/23281/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton
date: 2019-03-07
modified: 2023-05-17
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1197
    - attack.s0190
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-useragent|startswith: 'Microsoft BITS/'
    falsepositives:
        cs-host|endswith:
            - '.com'
            - '.net'
            - '.org'
            - '.scdn.co' # spotify streaming
            - '.sfx.ms' # Microsoft domain, example request: https://oneclient.sfx.ms/PreSignInSettings/Prod/2022-08-15-21-xx-xx/PreSignInSettingsConfig.json
    condition: selection and not falsepositives
falsepositives:
    - Rare programs that use Bitsadmin and update from regional TLDs e.g. .uk or .ca
level: high

title: Brutforce enumeration with unexisting users (Kerberos)
name: bruteforce_non_existing_users_kerberos
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to enumerate potential existing users, resulting in failed Kerberos TGT requests with unexisting or invalid accounts.
references:
  - https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0006-Credential%20Access/T1110.xxx-Brut%20force
  - https://github.com/ropnop/kerbrute
tags:
  - attack.credential_access
  - attack.t1110
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 4771
      - 4768
    Status: "0x6" # KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
  filter:
    - IpAddress: "%domain_controllers_ips%" # reduce amount of false positives
    - TicketOptions: 0x50800000 # covered by Kerbrute rule
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
  - Missconfigured application or identity services
level: high

---
title: Brutforce enumeration with unexisting users (Kerberos) Count
status: experimental
correlation:
  type: value_count
  rules:
    - bruteforce_non_existing_users_kerberos # Referenced here
  group-by:
    - Computer
  timespan: 30m
  condition:
    gte: 20
    field: TargetUserName # Count how many failed logins with non existing users were reported on the domain controller.
level: high

title: CVE-2021-41773 Exploitation Attempt
id: 3007fec6-e761-4319-91af-e32e20ac43f5
status: test
description: |
  Detects exploitation of flaw in path normalization in Apache HTTP server 2.4.49.
  An attacker could use a path traversal attack to map URLs to files outside the expected document root.
  If files outside of the document root are not protected by "require all denied" these requests can succeed.
  Additionally this flaw could leak the source of interpreted files like CGI scripts.
  This issue is known to be exploited in the wild. This issue only affects Apache 2.4.49 and not earlier versions.
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-41773
    - https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/e150697086e70c552b2588f369f2d17815cb1782
    - https://twitter.com/ptswarm/status/1445376079548624899
    - https://twitter.com/h4x0r_dz/status/1445401960371429381
    - https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/9d2889356eebba661c8407038e430759dfd4ec31/cves/2021/CVE-2021-41773.yaml
    - https://twitter.com/bl4sty/status/1445462677824761878
author: daffainfo, Florian Roth
date: 2021-10-05
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2021-41773
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '/cgi-bin/.%2e/'
            - '/icons/.%2e/'
            - '/cgi-bin/.%%32%65/'
            - '/icons/.%%32%65/'
            - '/cgi-bin/.%%%25%33'
            - '/icons/.%%%25%33'
        sc-status:
            - 200
            - 301
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Domain password policy enumeration
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to enumerate the domain password policy with native commands or tools like CME (--pass-pol).
correlation: correlate TargetLogonId from ID 4624 with SubjectLogonId from ID 4661 to identify the source of the enumeration.
requirements: extended rights auditing enabled (https://www.manageengine.com/products/active-directory-audit/active-directory-auditing-configuration-guide-configure-object-level-auditing-manually.html)
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0007-Discovery/T1201-Password%20Policy%20Discovery
- https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets/page/crackmapexec
- https://www.infosecmatter.com/crackmapexec-module-library/
- https://github.com/PSGumshoe/PSGumshoe/blob/master/DirectoryService/PrivateFunctions.ps1
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1201
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4661
    ProcessName|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
    ObjectServer: 'Security Account Manager'
    ObjectName|startswith: DC=
    ObjectType: SAM_DOMAIN
    Properties|contains|all:
      - 'c7407360-20bf-11d0-a768-00aa006e0529' # Domain-Password property set
      - 'bf9679a4-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # lockOutObservationWindow
      - 'bf9679a5-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # Lockout-Duration
      - 'bf9679a6-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # lockoutThreshold
      - 'bf9679bb-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # Max-Pwd-Age attribute
      - 'bf9679c2-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # Min-Pwd-Age
      - 'bf9679c3-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # Min-Pwd-Length
      - 'bf967a09-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # Pwd-History-Length
      - 'bf967a0b-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # Pwd-Properties
      - 'bf967977-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # Force-Logoff
  filter:
    SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Administrator activity
level: high

title: Explorer NOUACCHECK Flag
id: 534f2ef7-e8a2-4433-816d-c91bccde289b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious starts of explorer.exe that use the /NOUACCHECK flag that allows to run all sub processes of that newly started explorer.exe without any UAC checks
references:
    - https://twitter.com/ORCA6665/status/1496478087244095491
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-23
modified: 2022-04-21
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '/NOUACCHECK'
    filter_dc_logon:
        - ParentCommandLine: 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule'
        - ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe' # coarse filter needed for ID 4688 Events
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Domain Controller User Logon
    - Unknown how many legitimate software products use that method
level: high

title: FTP Connection Open Attempt Via Winscp CLI
id: c1477deb-37cf-4439-9ffb-44499acb89d0
status: experimental
description: Detects the execution of Winscp with the "-command" and the "open" flags in order to open an FTP connection. Akira ransomware was seen using this technique in order to exfiltrate data.
references:
    - https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2024/07/akira-ransomware-targets-the-latam-airline-industry
author: frack113
date: 2025-10-12
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\WinSCP.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'winscp.exe'
    selection_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-command'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'open '
            - 'ftp://' # cover ftp and sftp
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Google Workspace User Granted Admin Privileges
id: 2d1b83e4-17c6-4896-a37b-29140b40a788
status: test
description: Detects when an Google Workspace user is granted admin privileges.
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging#3
    - https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings#GRANT_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE
author: Austin Songer
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2023-10-11
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: gcp
    service: google_workspace.admin
detection:
    selection:
        eventService: admin.googleapis.com
        eventName:
            - GRANT_DELEGATED_ADMIN_PRIVILEGES
            - GRANT_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Google Workspace admin role privileges, may be modified by system administrators.
level: medium

title: HackTool - Inveigh Execution
id: b99a1518-1ad5-4f65-bc95-1ffff97a8fd0
status: test
description: Detects the use of Inveigh a cross-platform .NET IPv4/IPv6 machine-in-the-middle tool
references:
    - https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/11/23/pysa-mespinoza-ransomware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-24
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\Inveigh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - '\Inveigh.exe'
              - '\Inveigh.dll'
        - Description: 'Inveigh'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - ' -SpooferIP'
              - ' -ReplyToIPs '
              - ' -ReplyToDomains '
              - ' -ReplyToMACs '
              - ' -SnifferIP'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Very unlikely
level: critical

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - Security
id: dcf2db1f-f091-425b-a821-c05875b8925a
related:
    - id: 8ca7004b-e620-4ecb-870e-86129b5b8e75
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 24)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        # ServiceFileName|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r)(?:\s|)\"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\\"\s+?\-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*\"'
        # Example 1: C:\winDoWs\SySTeM32\cmd.Exe /C"SET NOtI=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& PowERshElL -NOl SET-iteM ( 'VAR' + 'i'+ 'A' + 'blE:Ao6' + 'I0') ( [TYpe](\"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-F 'iRoN','mENT','e','nv') ) ; ${exECUtIONCOnTEXT}.\"IN`VO`KecOmMaND\".\"inVo`KES`crIPt\"( ( ( GEt-VAriAble ( 'a' + 'o6I0') -vaLU )::(\"{1}{4}{2}{3}{0}\" -f'e','gETenvIR','NtvaRIa','BL','ONme' ).Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'n','oti' ),( \"{0}{1}\" -f'pRoC','esS') )) )"
        # Example 2: cMD.exe /C "seT SlDb=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& pOWErShell .(( ^&(\"{1}{0}{2}{3}\" -f 'eT-vaR','G','iab','lE' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f '*m','DR*' ) ).\"na`ME\"[3,11,2]-JOIN'' ) ( ( ^&(\"{0}{1}\" -f'g','CI' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f 'ENV',':SlDb' ) ).\"VA`luE\" ) "
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '"set'
            - '-f'
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - '/c'
            - '/r'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Lace Tempest File Indicators
id: e94486ea-2650-4548-bf25-88cbd0bb32d7
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell script file creation with specific names or suffixes which was seen being used often in PowerShell scripts by FIN7
references:
    - https://www.sysaid.com/blog/service-desk/on-premise-software-security-vulnerability-notification
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - TargetFilename|endswith:
              - ':\Program Files\SysAidServer\tomcat\webapps\usersfiles\user.exe'
              - ':\Program Files\SysAidServer\tomcat\webapps\usersfiles.war'
              - ':\Program Files\SysAidServer\tomcat\webapps\leave'
        - TargetFilename|contains: ':\Program Files\SysAidServer\tomcat\webapps\user.'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Linux AF_ALG Socket Creation - Kernel Crypto API Exploit Indicator
id: 474b415a-8b3d-4e6a-9f12-0d5c8a7b6e94
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects creation of AF_ALG (Address Family 38) sockets via the socket() syscall.
    AF_ALG is the Linux kernel crypto API interface. It is exploited in CVE-2026-31431
    to achieve local privilege escalation via a buffer overflow in the AF_ALG AEAD
    splice path that corrupts the page cache of SUID binaries.
    Legitimate AF_ALG usage is rare and confined to specific crypto utilities and VPN
    daemons using non-default kernel offload configurations.
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31431
    - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/socket.2.html
    - https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/crypto/userspace-if.html
    - https://xint.io/blog/copy-fail-linux-distributions
    - https://github.com/theori-io/copy-fail-CVE-2026-31431
    - https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/81d6f7807536a0436dfada07e9292e3702d2bed4/include/linux/socket.h#L245
author: Gene Kazimiarovich
date: 2026-04-30
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - cve.2026-31431
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
    definition: |
        Required auditd configuration:
        auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -k af_alg_detect
detection:
    selection:
        type: 'SYSCALL'
        SYSCALL: 'socket'
        a0: 26  # auditd SYSCALL args are commonly logged in hex; 0x26 == 38 (AF_ALG)
    filter_main_legitimate:
        exe|endswith:
            - '/cryptsetup'
            - '/kcapi-speed'
            - '/kcapi-enc'
            - '/kcapi-dgst'
            - '/charon'
            - '/charon-systemd'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Disk encryption utilities using kernel crypto offload (cryptsetup with --use-kernel-crypto)
    - Libkcapi userspace tools for kernel crypto API benchmarking
    - StrongSwan IKE daemon with kernel-libipsec plugin
level: high

title: Massive service failures - Tchopper
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker uses the Tchopper tool by abusing the display name of a service as a placeholder to upload an obfuscated payload. Service name may come with very high entropy.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0002-Execution/T1569.002-Service%20execution
- https://github.com/lawrenceamer/TChopper
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1569
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: system
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 7000 # EVENT_SERVICE_START_FAILED
      - 7009 # EVENT_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT
  condition: selection | count(EventRecordID) by Computer > 100 # Count how many services failures are reported on the host.
  timeframe: 20m
falsepositives:
- Missconfigured services
level: high

title: Microsoft Defender default action changed to allow any threat (command)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to change Defender default action to allow any threats
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0005-Defense%20Evasion/T1562.001-Impair%20Defenses-Disable%20or%20Modify%20tool
- https://github.com/swagkarna/Defeat-Defender-V1.2
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/defender/set-mppreference?view=windowsserver2019-ps
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/defender-csp
- https://powershell.one/wmi/root/microsoft/windows/defender/msft_mppreference
- https://gist.github.com/pe3zx/7c5e0080c3b0869ccba1f1dc2ea0c5e0
- https://cloudbrothers.info/en/current-limits-defender-av-tamper-protection/
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1562.001
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4688
    CommandLine|contains:
      - Add-MpPreference
      - Set-MpPreference
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '6' # MP_THREAT_ACTION_ALLOW
      - 'Allow'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - HighThreatDefaultAction
      - ModerateThreatDefaultAction
      - LowThreatDefaultAction
      - SevereThreatDefaultAction
      - UnknownThreatDefaultAction
      - ThreatIDDefaultAction_Actions # used with "Add-MpPreference" for a specific identified threat
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None
level: high

title: New Kernel Driver Via SC.EXE
id: 431a1fdb-4799-4f3b-91c3-a683b003fc49
status: test
description: Detects creation of a new service (kernel driver) with the type "kernel"
references:
    - https://www.aon.com/cyber-solutions/aon_cyber_labs/yours-truly-signed-av-driver-weaponizing-an-antivirus-driver/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-14
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'create'
            - 'config'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'binPath'
            - 'type'
            - 'kernel'
    filter_optional_avira_driver:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'create netprotection_network_filter'
              - 'type= kernel start= '
              - 'binPath= System32\drivers\netprotection_network_filter'
              - 'DisplayName= netprotection_network_filter'
              - 'group= PNP_TDI tag= yes'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'create avelam binpath=C:\Windows\system32\drivers\avelam.sys'
              - 'type=kernel start=boot error=critical group=Early-Launch'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate installation of kernel drivers via sc.exe
level: medium

title: OilRig APT Activity
id: ce6e34ca-966d-41c9-8d93-5b06c8b97a06
related:
    - id: 53ba33fd-3a50-4468-a5ef-c583635cfa92 # System
      type: similar
    - id: c0580559-a6bd-4ef6-b9b7-83703d98b561 # Security
      type: similar
    - id: 7bdf2a7c-3acc-4091-9581-0a77dad1c5b5 # Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects OilRig activity as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20180402134442/https://nyotron.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Nyotron-OilRig-Malware-Report-March-2018C.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2018-03-23
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.g0049
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.s0111
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_schtasks:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'SC Scheduled Scan'
            - '\microsoft\Taskbar\autoit3.exe'
    selection_temp:
        Image|contains: '\Windows\Temp\DB\'
        Image|endswith: '.exe'
    selection_service:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\Service.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'i'
            - 'u'
    selection_autoit:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\local\microsoft\Taskbar\autoit3.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'nslookup.exe'
            - '-q=TXT'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: OpenSSH server listening on socket
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker enables the OpenSSH server and server starts to listening on SSH socket.
references:
 - https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0008-Lateral%20Movement/T1021.004-Remote%20Service%20SSH
 - https://winaero.com/enable-openssh-server-windows-10/
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/openssh/openssh_install_firstuse
 - https://virtualizationreview.com/articles/2020/05/21/ssh-server-on-windows-10.aspx
 - https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.004
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: openssh # Channel: 'OpenSSH/Operational'
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4
    process: sshd
    payload|startswith: 'Server listening on'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- legitimate administrator activation
level: medium

title: Outlook Security Settings Updated - Registry
id: c3cefdf4-6703-4e1c-bad8-bf422fc5015a
related:
    - id: 6763c6c8-bd01-4687-bc8d-4fa52cf8ba08 # EnableUnsafeClientMailRules
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects changes to the registry values related to outlook security settings
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1137/T1137.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/outlook/troubleshoot/security/information-about-email-security-settings
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-28
modified: 2026-01-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1137
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\Outlook\Security\'
    filter_main_outlook:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\'
        Image|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity
level: medium
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Office Application Startup - Outlook as a C2
      technique: T1137
      atomic_guid: bfe6ac15-c50b-4c4f-a186-0fc6b8ba936c

title: Potential Conti Ransomware Activity
id: 689308fc-cfba-4f72-9897-796c1dc61487
status: test
description: Detects a specific command used by the Conti ransomware group
references:
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/09/03/conti-affiliates-use-proxyshell-exchange-exploit-in-ransomware-attacks/
    - https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1447795359900704769?t=Xz7vaLTvaaCZ5kHoZa6gMw&s=19
author: frack113
date: 2021-10-12
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.s0575
    - attack.t1486
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-m '
            - '-net '
            - '-size ' # Size 10 in references
            - '-nomutex '
            - '-p \\\\'
            - '$'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: Potentially Suspicious Self Extraction Directive File Created
id: ab90dab8-c7da-4010-9193-563528cfa347
related:
    - id: 760e75d8-c3b5-409b-a9bf-6130b4c4603f
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation of a binary file with the ".sed" extension. The ".sed" extension stand for Self Extraction Directive files.
    These files are used by the "iexpress.exe" utility in order to create self extracting packages.
    Attackers were seen abusing this utility and creating PE files with embedded ".sed" entries.
    Usually ".sed" files are simple ini files and not PE binaries.
references:
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/iexpress.exe-D594B2A33EFAFD0EABF09E3FDC05FCEA.html
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IExpress
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/602f4ae507fa8de57ada079adff25a6c2a899bd25cd092d0af7e62cdb619c93c/behavior
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2024-02-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_executable_detected
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.sed'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: PowerShell ICMP Exfiltration
id: 4c4af3cd-2115-479c-8193-6b8bfce9001c
status: test
description: Detects Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - ICMP. Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1048.003/T1048.003.md#atomic-test-2---exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol---icmp
author: 'Bartlomiej Czyz @bczyz1, oscd.community'
date: 2020-10-10
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'New-Object'
            - 'System.Net.NetworkInformation.Ping'
            - '.Send('
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of System.Net.NetworkInformation.Ping class
level: medium

title: Remote AppX Package Downloaded from File Sharing or CDN Domain
id: 8b48ad89-10d8-4382-a546-50588c410f0d
related:
    - id: d635249d-86b5-4dad-a8c7-d7272b788586
      type: similar
    - id: 52182dfb-afb7-41db-b4bc-5336cb29b464
      type: similar
    - id: ae02ed70-11aa-4a22-b397-c0d0e8f6ea99
      type: similar
    - id: e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97
      type: similar
    - id: 7b434893-c57d-4f41-908d-6a17bf1ae98f
      type: similar
    - id: 8518ed3d-f7c9-4601-a26c-f361a4256a0c
      type: similar
    - id: 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794
      type: similar
    - id: 56454143-524f-49fb-b1c6-3fb8b1ad41fb
      type: similar
    - id: b6e04788-29e1-4557-bb14-77f761848ab8
      type: similar
    - id: a0d7e4d2-bede-4141-8896-bc6e237e977c
      type: similar
    - id: 297ae038-edc2-4b2e-bb3e-7c5fc94dd5c7
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects an appx package that was added to the pipeline of the "to be processed" packages which was downloaded from a file sharing or CDN domain.
references:
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/inside-malicious-windows-apps-for-malware-deployment/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/appxpkg/troubleshooting
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/11/11/bazarloader-call-me-back-attack-abuses-windows-10-apps-mechanism/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-11
modified: 2026-03-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: appxdeployment-server
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 854
        Path|contains:
            - '.githubusercontent.com'       # Includes both gists and github repositories / Michael Haag (idea)
            - '0x0.st'
            - 'anonfiles.com'
            - 'bashupload.com'
            - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
            - 'chunk.io'
            - 'ddns.net'
            - 'dl.dropboxusercontent.com'
            - 'ghostbin.co'
            - 'github.com'
            - 'glitch.me'
            - 'gofile.io'
            - 'hastebin.com'
            - 'mediafire.com'
            - 'mega.nz'
            - 'onrender.com'
            - 'pages.dev'
            - 'paste.ee'
            - 'pastebin.com'
            - 'pastebin.pl'
            - 'pastetext.net'
            - 'privatlab.com'
            - 'privatlab.net'
            - 'send.exploit.in'
            - 'sendspace.com'
            - 'storage.googleapis.com'
            - 'storjshare.io'
            - 'supabase.co'
            - 'temp.sh'
            - 'transfer.sh'
            - 'trycloudflare.com'
            - 'ufile.io'
            - 'w3spaces.com'
            - 'workers.dev'
            - 'x0.at'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely, unless the organization uses file sharing or CDN services to distribute internal applications.
level: high

title: Remove Immutable File Attribute
id: 34979410-e4b5-4e5d-8cfb-389fdff05c12
related:
    - id: a5b977d6-8a81-4475-91b9-49dbfcd941f7
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects usage of the 'chattr' utility to remove immutable file attribute.
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/i/how-malicious-actors-abuse-native-linux-tools-in-their-attacks.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-15
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1222.002
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/chattr'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -i '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrator interacting with immutable files (e.g. for instance backups).
level: medium

title: Suspicious Electron Application Child Processes
id: f26eb764-fd89-464b-85e2-dc4a8e6e77b8
related:
    - id: 378a05d8-963c-46c9-bcce-13c7657eac99
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects suspicious child processes of electron apps (teams, discord, slack, etc.). This could be a potential sign of ".asar" file tampering (See reference section for more information) or binary execution proxy through specific CLI arguments (see related rule)
references:
    - https://taggart-tech.com/quasar-electron/
    - https://github.com/mttaggart/quasar
    - https://positive.security/blog/ms-officecmd-rce
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msedge/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Teams/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/msedgewebview2/
    - https://medium.com/@MalFuzzer/one-electron-to-rule-them-all-dc2e9b263daf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-21
modified: 2024-07-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            # Add more electron based app to the list
            - '\chrome.exe' # Might require additional tuning
            - '\discord.exe'
            - '\GitHubDesktop.exe'
            - '\keybase.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\msedgewebview2.exe'
            - '\msteams.exe'
            - '\slack.exe'
            - '\teams.exe'
            # - '\code.exe' # Prone to a lot of FPs. Requires an additional baseline
    selection_child_image:
        Image|endswith:
            # Add more suspicious/unexpected paths
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\whoami.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    selection_child_paths:
        Image|contains:
            # Add more suspicious/unexpected paths
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    filter_optional_discord:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\Discord.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '\NVSMI\nvidia-smi.exe'
    condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_child_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
# Increase the level once FP rate is reduced (see status)
level: medium