Sigma rules: 33

title: Add New Download Source To Winget
id: 05ebafc8-7aa2-4bcd-a269-2aec93f9e842
related:
    - id: 81a0ecb5-0a41-4ba1-b2ba-c944eb92bfa2
      type: similar
    - id: c15a46a0-07d4-4c87-b4b6-89207835a83b
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of winget to add new additional download sources
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/package-manager/winget/source
    - https://github.com/nasbench/Misc-Research/tree/b9596e8109dcdb16ec353f316678927e507a5b8d/LOLBINs/Winget
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\winget.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'winget.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'source '
            - 'add '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - False positive are expected with legitimate sources
level: medium

title: Audit policy enumerated
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts enumerate the audit policy in place.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0005-Defense%20Evasion/T1070.xxx-Audit%20policy%20disabled
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol-get
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1082 # System Information Discovery
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection:
    NewProcessName|endswith: '\auditpol.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: # full command "Auditpol.exe /get /category:* " OR "Auditpol /backup /file:C:\Audit.ini"
      - get
      - backup
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrator debugging audit policy
- Vulnerability scanners (compiance module)
- Directory monitor
level: high

title: Cisco Clear Logs
id: ceb407f6-8277-439b-951f-e4210e3ed956
status: test
description: Clear command history in network OS which is used for defense evasion
references:
    - https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/datacenter/nexus5000/sw/command/reference/sysmgmt/n5k-sysmgmt-cr/n5k-sm_cmds_c.html
    - https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios/12_2sr/12_2sra/feature/guide/srmgtint.html#wp1127609
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019-08-12
modified: 2023-05-26
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070.003
logsource:
    product: cisco
    service: aaa
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'clear logging'
        - 'clear archive'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrators may run these commands
level: high

title: Cisco Modify Configuration
id: 671ffc77-50a7-464f-9e3d-9ea2b493b26b
status: test
description: Modifications to a config that will serve an adversary's impacts or persistence
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019-08-12
modified: 2025-04-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
    - attack.t1505
    - attack.t1565.002
    - attack.t1053
logsource:
    product: cisco
    service: aaa
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'ip http server'
        - 'ip https server'
        - 'kron policy-list'
        - 'kron occurrence'
        - 'policy-list'
        - 'access-list'
        - 'ip access-group'
        - 'archive maximum'
        - 'ntp server'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrators may run these commands
level: medium

title: Classes Autorun Keys Modification
id: 9df5f547-c86a-433e-b533-f2794357e242
related:
    - id: 17f878b8-9968-4578-b814-c4217fc5768c
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
    Detects modification of Windows Registry Classes keys used for persistence.
    Adversaries modify these autostart extensibility points (ASEP) to execute malicious code when file types are opened or actions are performed.
    Various legitimate software also uses these keys. Currently, this rule only filters out known legitimate software paths,
    thus it is recommended to review and tune filters for your environment to reduce false positives before deploying to production.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
    - https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d # a list with registry keys
author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_classes_base:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Software\Classes'
    selection_classes_target:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Folder\ShellEx\ExtShellFolderViews'
            - '\Folder\ShellEx\DragDropHandlers'
            - '\Folder\Shellex\ColumnHandlers'
            - '\Filter'
            - '\Exefile\Shell\Open\Command\(Default)'
            - '\Directory\Shellex\DragDropHandlers'
            - '\Directory\Shellex\CopyHookHandlers'
            - '\CLSID\{AC757296-3522-4E11-9862-C17BE5A1767E}\Instance'
            - '\CLSID\{ABE3B9A4-257D-4B97-BD1A-294AF496222E}\Instance'
            - '\CLSID\{7ED96837-96F0-4812-B211-F13C24117ED3}\Instance'
            - '\CLSID\{083863F1-70DE-11d0-BD40-00A0C911CE86}\Instance'
            - '\Classes\AllFileSystemObjects\ShellEx\DragDropHandlers'
            - '\.exe'
            - '\.cmd'
            - '\ShellEx\PropertySheetHandlers'
            - '\ShellEx\ContextMenuHandlers'
    filter_main_drivers:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\drvinst.exe'
    filter_main_empty:
        Details: '(Empty)'
    filter_main_null:
        Details: null
    filter_main_svchost:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
        # If more targets are found from "svchost". Please exclude the whole image
        TargetObject|contains: '\lnkfile\shellex\ContextMenuHandlers\'
    filter_optional_msoffice:
        Details: '{807583E5-5146-11D5-A672-00B0D022E945}'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason
    - Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason
level: medium

title: Disable Windows Defender AV Security Monitoring
id: a7ee1722-c3c5-aeff-3212-c777e4733217
status: test
description: Detects attackers attempting to disable Windows Defender using Powershell
references:
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/23/wastedlocker-a-new-ransomware-variant-developed-by-the-evil-corp-group/
    - https://rvsec0n.wordpress.com/2020/01/24/malwares-that-bypass-windows-defender/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
author: 'ok @securonix invrep-de, oscd.community, frack113'
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-18
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_pwsh_binary:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_pwsh_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring $true'
            - '-DisableRuntimeMonitoring $true'
    selection_sc_binary:
        - Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
    selection_sc_tamper_cmd_stop:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'stop'
            - 'WinDefend'
    selection_sc_tamper_cmd_delete:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'delete'
            - 'WinDefend'
    selection_sc_tamper_cmd_disabled:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'config'
            - 'WinDefend'
            - 'start=disabled'
    condition: all of selection_pwsh_* or (selection_sc_binary and 1 of selection_sc_tamper_*)
falsepositives:
    - 'Minimal, for some older versions of dev tools, such as pycharm, developers were known to sometimes disable Windows Defender to improve performance, but this generally is not considered a good security practice.'
level: high

title: DNS hosts file accessed via network share
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempt read the Hosts file content via network share.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0007-Discovery/T1018-Remote%20System%20Discovery
- https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/how-to-beat-nefilim-ransomware-attacks
- https://github.com/login-securite/DonPAPI
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1018
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5145
    ShareName: '\\*\C$'
    RelativeTargetName: 'Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None
level: high

title: Exchange Exploitation Used by HAFNIUM
id: 67bce556-312f-4c81-9162-c3c9ff2599b2
status: test
description: Detects exploitation attempts in Exchange server logs as described in blog posts reporting on HAFNIUM group activity
references:
    - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-03-03
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.g0125
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection_1:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/'
    selection_2:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/owa/auth/Current/'
        cs-user-agent:
            - 'DuckDuckBot/1.0;+(+http://duckduckgo.com/duckduckbot.html)'
            - 'facebookexternalhit/1.1+(+http://www.facebook.com/externalhit_uatext.php)'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Baiduspider/2.0;++http://www.baidu.com/search/spider.html)'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Bingbot/2.0;++http://www.bing.com/bingbot.htm)'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Googlebot/2.1;++http://www.google.com/bot.html'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Konqueror/3.5;+Linux)+KHTML/3.5.5+(like+Gecko)+(Exabot-Thumbnails)'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Yahoo!+Slurp;+http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/ysearch/slurp)'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+YandexBot/3.0;++http://yandex.com/bots)'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0+(X11;+Linux+x86_64)+AppleWebKit/537.36+(KHTML,+like+Gecko)+Chrome/51.0.2704.103+Safari/537.36'
    selection_3:
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/ecp/'
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-user-agent:
            - 'ExchangeServicesClient/0.0.0.0'
            - 'python-requests/2.19.1'
            - 'python-requests/2.25.1'
    selection_4:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '/aspnet_client/'
            - '/owa/'
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-user-agent:
            - 'antSword/v2.1'
            - 'Googlebot/2.1+(+http://www.googlebot.com/bot.html)'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Baiduspider/2.0;++http://www.baidu.com/search/spider.html)'
    selection_5:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '/owa/auth/Current/'
            - '/ecp/default.flt'
            - '/ecp/main.css'
        cs-method: 'POST'
    selection_6:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-query|contains|all:
            - '/ecp/'
            - '.js'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate access to other web applications that use the same folder names as Exchange (e.g. owa, ecp) but are not Microsoft Exchange related
level: high

title: File Recovery From Backup Via Wbadmin.EXE
id: 6fe4aa1e-0531-4510-8be2-782154b73b48
related:
    - id: 84972c80-251c-4c3a-9079-4f00aad93938
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the recovery of files from backups via "wbadmin.exe".
    Attackers can restore sensitive files such as NTDS.DIT or Registry Hives from backups in order to potentially extract credentials.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin-start-recovery
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wbadmin/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2024-05-10
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wbadmin.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'WBADMIN.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' recovery'
            - 'recoveryTarget'
            - 'itemtype:File'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Fortinet APT group abuse on Windows (user)
description: Detects scenarios where APT actors exploits Fortinet vulnerabilities to gain access into Windows infrastructure.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/EVTX_full_APT_attack_steps
- https://www.aha.org/system/files/media/file/2021/05/fbi-flash-tlp-white-apt-actors-exploiting-fortinet-vulnerabilities-to-gain-access-for-malicious-activity-5-27-21.pdf
- https://www.securityweek.com/fbi-shares-iocs-apt-attacks-exploiting-fortinet-vulnerabilities
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1136
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4720
    TargetUserName:
      - elie
      - WADGUtilityAccount
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None
level: high

title: GAC DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
id: 90217a70-13fc-48e4-b3db-0d836c5824ac
status: test
description: Detects any GAC DLL being loaded by an Office Product
references:
    - https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
author: Antonlovesdnb
date: 2020-02-19
modified: 2023-02-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\excel.exe'
            - '\mspub.exe'
            - '\onenote.exe'
            - '\onenoteim.exe' # Just in case
            - '\outlook.exe'
            - '\powerpnt.exe'
            - '\winword.exe'
        ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate macro usage. Add the appropriate filter according to your environment
level: high

title: Google Workspace Government Attack Warning
id: eafe6f2b-cfec-4612-aec2-49563c33a087
status: experimental
description: Detects a login attempt in Google Workspace flagged as a potential attack by a government-backed threat actor
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
    - https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/understanding-audit-logs
    - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/login#gov_attack_warning
author: Tom Kluter
date: 2026-04-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.impact
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    product: gcp
    service: google_workspace.login
detection:
    selection:
        protoPayload.serviceName: 'login.googleapis.com'
        protoPayload.metadata.event.eventName: 'gov_attack_warning'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: GUI Input Capture - macOS
id: 60f1ce20-484e-41bd-85f4-ac4afec2c541
status: test
description: Detects attempts to use system dialog prompts to capture user credentials
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1056.002/T1056.002.md
    - https://scriptingosx.com/2018/08/user-interaction-from-bash-scripts/
author: remotephone, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2025-12-05
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1056.002
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '/osascript'
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-e'
            - 'display'
            - 'dialog'
            - 'answer'
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'admin'
            - 'administrator'
            - 'authenticate'
            - 'authentication'
            - 'credentials'
            - 'pass'
            - 'password'
            - 'unlock'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration tools and activities
level: low

title: IcedID Malware Suspicious Single Digit DLL Execution Via Rundll32
id: 2bd8e100-5b3b-4b6a-bbb5-b129d3ddddc5
status: test
description: Detects RunDLL32.exe executing a single digit DLL named "1.dll" with the export function "DllRegisterServer". This behaviour was often seen used by malware and especially IcedID
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/05/22/icedid-macro-ends-in-nokoyawa-ransomware/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/08/28/html-smuggling-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-31
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.011
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '\1.dll, DllRegisterServer' # In case of full path exec
            - ' 1.dll, DllRegisterServer' # In case of direct exec
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: MacOS Emond Launch Daemon
id: 23c43900-e732-45a4-8354-63e4a6c187ce
status: test
description: Detects additions to the Emond Launch Daemon that adversaries may use to gain persistence and elevate privileges.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.014/T1546.014.md
    - https://posts.specterops.io/leveraging-emond-on-macos-for-persistence-a040a2785124
author: Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-23
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1546.014
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: macos
detection:
    selection_1:
        TargetFilename|contains: '/etc/emond.d/rules/'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.plist'
    selection_2:
        TargetFilename|contains: '/private/var/db/emondClients/'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: medium

title: macOS ULS Sudo Execution Logged
id: 7f4c4e1b-21d8-4b1c-8c3b-8f6e2d2a3b11
status: experimental
description: Detect sudo execution messages in Unified Logging. Adjust subsystem/category
  and message patterns to environment.
author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
date: 2025-10-29
logsource:
  product: macos
  service: unifiedlog
level: low
detection:
  selection:
    message|contains:
    - 'sudo:'
    - TTY=
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- normal admin usage
references:
- https://ss64.com/osx/sudo.html
modified: 2025/01/15

title: MSSQL XPCmdshell Suspicious Execution
id: 7f103213-a04e-4d59-8261-213dddf22314
status: test
description: Detects when the MSSQL "xp_cmdshell" stored procedure is used to execute commands
references:
    - https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-12
modified: 2024-06-26
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
    definition: 'Requirements: MSSQL audit policy to monitor for "xp_cmdshell" must be enabled in order to receive this event in the application log (Follow this tutorial https://dba.stackexchange.com/questions/103183/is-there-any-way-to-monitor-execution-of-xp-cmdshell-in-sql-server-2012)'
    # warning: The 'data' field used in the detection section is the container for the event data as a whole. You may have to adapt the rule for your backend accordingly
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name|contains: 'MSSQL' # Note: We use contains to account for other third party providers - See https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/4876
        EventID: 33205
        Data|contains|all:
            # You can modify this to include specific commands
            - 'object_name:xp_cmdshell'
            - 'statement:EXEC'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Network Sniffing - Linux
id: f4d3748a-65d1-4806-bd23-e25728081d01
status: test
description: |
  Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection.
  An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1040/T1040.md
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-21
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1040
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection_1:
        type: 'execve'
        a0: 'tcpdump'
        a1: '-c'
        a3|contains: '-i'
    selection_2:
        type: 'execve'
        a0: 'tshark'
        a1: '-c'
        a3: '-i'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrator or user uses network sniffing tool for legitimate reasons.
level: low

title: New User Account Creation Attempt Via ADSI in CommandLine
id: 7c9fed65-039a-4055-8c23-fa763d94aff6
related:
    - id: e50d5d26-0cf6-4045-b82b-13c0a4e316be
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects PowerShell command line arguments containing ADSI (Active Directory Service Interfaces) patterns
    trying to create a new user account via the WinNT or LDAP provider. This is an uncommon method to create
    user accounts and may indicate an attempt to evade detection by avoiding more commonly monitored commands
    such as "net user", "New-LocalUser" or "New-ADUser".
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adsi/user-creation-with-the-adsi-ldap-provider
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adsi/adsi-winnt-provider
author: William Gokah (idea), Raylee Hawkins, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-08-13
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.001
    - attack.t1136.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli_adsi:
        CommandLine|contains: '[ADSI]'
    selection_cli_create_user:
        # Example (WinNT - local user):
        #   powershell.exe -Command "$c = [ADSI]('WinNT://' + $env:COMPUTERNAME); $u = $c.Create('User','NewUser'); $u.SetPassword('P@ssw0rd!'); $u.SetInfo()"
        # Example (LDAP - domain user):
        #   $ou = [ADSI]"LDAP://CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=com"; $user = $ou.Create("user", "CN=NewUser"); $user.Put("sAMAccountName","NewUser"); $user.SetInfo()
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.Create("user'
            - ".Create('user"
    selection_cli_adsi_provider:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'WinNT://' # Local user creation via WinNT provider
            - 'LDAP://' # Domain user creation via LDAP provider
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative scripts that use ADSI to provision user accounts but should be rare in most environments
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_adsi_create_user/info.yml

title: Possible impact of 'SMOKEDHAM backdoor' with MSDTC service privilege escalation via command line
id: 726e148b-a091-4786-8f4e-3066d69608e1
description: This rule detects activity related to 'SMOKEDHAM backdoor' which manipulate the default running service accounf of the MSDTC service in order to DLL side-load a malicious binary.
references:
- https://medium.com/trac-labs/who-ordered-the-smokedham-backdoor-delicacies-in-the-wild-87f51e2e5bd2
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1574.002 # Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading 
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1543.003 # Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service 
author: mdecrevoisier
status: production
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'config'
            - 'msdtc'
            - 'LocalSystem'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- None  (administrators should not change the service account for MSDTC service)
level: medium

title: Potential DLL Sideloading Of Non-Existent DLLs From System Folders
id: 6b98b92b-4f00-4f62-b4fe-4d1920215771
related:
    - id: df6ecb8b-7822-4f4b-b412-08f524b4576c # FileEvent rule
      type: similar
    - id: 602a1f13-c640-4d73-b053-be9a2fa58b77
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
    Detects loading of specific system DLL files that are usually not present on the system (or at least not in system directories) but may be loaded by legitimate processes, potentially indicating phantom DLL hijacking attempts.
    Phantom DLL hijacking involves placing malicious DLLs with names of non-existent system binaries in locations where legitimate applications may search for them, leading to execution of the malicious DLLs.
references:
    - http://remoteawesomethoughts.blogspot.com/2019/05/windows-10-task-schedulerservice.html
    - https://clement.notin.org/blog/2020/09/12/CVE-2020-7315-McAfee-Agent-DLL-injection/
    - https://decoded.avast.io/martinchlumecky/png-steganography/
    - https://github.com/Wh04m1001/SysmonEoP
    - https://itm4n.github.io/cdpsvc-dll-hijacking/
    - https://posts.specterops.io/lateral-movement-scm-and-dll-hijacking-primer-d2f61e8ab992
    - https://securelist.com/passiveneuron-campaign-with-apt-implants-and-cobalt-strike/117745/
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/4-ways-adversaries-hijack-dlls/
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/12/08/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-5/
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2025/06/14/wermgr-exe-boot-offdmpsvc-dll-lolbin/
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2025/06/14/wpr-exe-boottrace-phantom-dll-axeonoffhelper-dll-lolbin/
    - https://x.com/0gtweet/status/1564131230941122561
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), SBousseaden
date: 2022-12-09
modified: 2026-01-24
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            # Add other DLLs
            - ':\Windows\System32\axeonoffhelper.dll'
            - ':\Windows\System32\cdpsgshims.dll'
            - ':\Windows\System32\oci.dll'
            - ':\Windows\System32\offdmpsvc.dll'
            - ':\Windows\System32\shellchromeapi.dll'
            - ':\Windows\System32\TSMSISrv.dll'
            - ':\Windows\System32\TSVIPSrv.dll'
            - ':\Windows\System32\wbem\wbemcomn.dll'
            - ':\Windows\System32\WLBSCTRL.dll'
            - ':\Windows\System32\wow64log.dll'
            - ':\Windows\System32\WptsExtensions.dll'
    filter_main_ms_signed:
        Signed: 'true'
        SignatureStatus: 'Valid'
        # There could be other signatures (please add when found)
        Signature: 'Microsoft Windows'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Obfuscated Ordinal Call Via Rundll32
id: 43fa5350-db63-4b8f-9a01-789a427074e1
status: test
description: Detects execution of "rundll32" with potential obfuscated ordinal calls
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52tAmVLg1KM&t=2070s
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-17
modified: 2025-02-23
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027.010
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'rundll32'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '#+'
            - '#-'
            # ordinal can be represented by adding any number of zeros in front ordinal number, for e.g. 000000024
            - '#0'
            # ordinal is 16 bit ordinal, so if you make the number large enough (don't fit in 16 bit space), then it normally wraps around.
            # for e.g ordinal 24 can be also represented by 65560 (65536+24)
            - '#655'
            - '#656'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potential SAP NetViewer Webshell Command Execution
id: 94e12f41-6cb3-45c5-97b1-c783a7bf2e72
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects potential command execution via webshell in SAP NetViewer through JSP files with cmd parameter.
    This rule is created to detect exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-31324, which allows remote code execution via a webshell.
references:
    - https://blog.eclecticiq.com/china-nexus-nation-state-actors-exploit-sap-netweaver-cve-2025-31324-to-target-critical-infrastructures
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-05-14
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - cve.2025-31324
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection_uri:
        cs-uri-stem|contains|all:
            - '/irj/'
            - '.jsp'
    selection_query:
        - cs-uri-query|startswith:
              - 'cmd='
              - 'command='
              - 'exec_cmd='
              - 'exec='
        - cs-uri-query|contains:
              - '/dev/tcp'
              - '/etc/passwd'
              - '%2fdev%2ftcp' # URL encoded of /dev/tcp
              - '%2fetc%2fpasswd' # URL encoded of /etc/passwd
              - '=uname'
              - '=whoami'
              - 'ifconfig'
              - 'ping'
              - 'pwd'
        - cs-uri-query|contains|all:
              - 'echo'
              - 'base64'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate applications using cmd parameter for non-malicious purposes
level: high

title: Potentially Suspicious File Download From File Sharing Domain Via PowerShell.EXE
id: b6e04788-29e1-4557-bb14-77f761848ab8
related:
    - id: 8b48ad89-10d8-4382-a546-50588c410f0d
      type: similar
    - id: d635249d-86b5-4dad-a8c7-d7272b788586
      type: similar
    - id: 52182dfb-afb7-41db-b4bc-5336cb29b464
      type: similar
    - id: ae02ed70-11aa-4a22-b397-c0d0e8f6ea99
      type: similar
    - id: e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97
      type: similar
    - id: 7b434893-c57d-4f41-908d-6a17bf1ae98f
      type: similar
    - id: 8518ed3d-f7c9-4601-a26c-f361a4256a0c
      type: similar
    - id: 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794
      type: similar
    - id: 56454143-524f-49fb-b1c6-3fb8b1ad41fb
      type: similar
    - id: a0d7e4d2-bede-4141-8896-bc6e237e977c
      type: similar
    - id: 297ae038-edc2-4b2e-bb3e-7c5fc94dd5c7
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious file downloads from file sharing domains using PowerShell.exe
references:
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers
    - https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/iocs/blob/344203de742bb7e68bd56618f66d34be95a9f9fc/FIN7VEEAM/iocs.csv
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/17/new-ttps-observed-in-mint-sandstorm-campaign-targeting-high-profile-individuals-at-universities-and-research-orgs/
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/slashandgrab-screen-connect-post-exploitation-in-the-wild-cve-2024-1709-cve-2024-1708
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-02-23
modified: 2026-03-29
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_websites:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: You might want to baseline the github domain before including it
            # - '.githubusercontent.com'       # Includes both gists and github repositories / Michael Haag (idea).
            - '0x0.st'
            - 'anonfiles.com'
            - 'bashupload.com'
            - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
            - 'chunk.io'
            - 'ddns.net'
            - 'dl.dropboxusercontent.com'
            - 'ghostbin.co'
            # - 'github.com'  See note above
            - 'glitch.me'
            - 'gofile.io'
            - 'hastebin.com'
            - 'mediafire.com'
            - 'mega.nz'
            - 'onrender.com'
            - 'pages.dev'
            - 'paste.ee'
            - 'pastebin.com'
            - 'pastebin.pl'
            - 'pastetext.net'
            - 'pixeldrain.com'
            - 'privatlab.com'
            - 'privatlab.net'
            - 'send.exploit.in'
            - 'sendspace.com'
            - 'storage.googleapis.com'
            - 'storjshare.io'
            - 'supabase.co'
            - 'temp.sh'
            - 'transfer.sh'
            - 'trycloudflare.com'
            - 'ufile.io'
            - 'w3spaces.com'
            - 'workers.dev'
            - 'x0.at'
    selection_download:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.DownloadString('
            - '.DownloadFile('
            - 'Invoke-WebRequest '
            - 'iwr '
            - 'wget '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Scheduled Tasks Names Used By SVR For GraphicalProton Backdoor - Task Scheduler
id: 2bfc1373-0220-4fbd-8b10-33ddafd2a142
related:
    - id: 8fa65166-f463-4fd2-ad4f-1436133c52e1 # Security-Audting Eventlog
      type: similar
status: test
description: Hunts for known SVR-specific scheduled task names
author: CISA
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a
date: 2023-12-18
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: taskscheduler
    definition: 'Requirements: The "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" is disabled by default and needs to be enabled in order for this detection to trigger'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 129 # Task Created
            - 140 # Task Updated
            - 141 # Task Deleted
        TaskName:
            - '\defender'
            - '\Microsoft\DefenderService'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\Application Experience\StartupAppTaskCheck'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\Application Experience\StartupAppTaskCkeck'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\ATPUpd'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\Data Integrity Scan\Data Integrity Update'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\DefenderUPDService'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\IISUpdateService'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\Speech\SpeechModelInstallTask'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\WiMSDFS'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Defender Update Service'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Service Update'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\CheckReporting'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\SubmitReporting'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Filtering Platform\BfeOnServiceStart'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsDefenderService'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsDefenderService2'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\Scheduled AutoCheck'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\Scheduled Check'
            - '\WindowUpdate'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Startup Item File Created - MacOS
id: dfe8b941-4e54-4242-b674-6b613d521962
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation of a startup item plist file, that automatically get executed at boot initialization to establish persistence.
    Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence.
    Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1037.005/T1037.005.md
    - https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html
author: Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-14
modified: 2024-08-11
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1037.005
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: macos
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - '/Library/StartupItems/'
            - '/System/Library/StartupItems'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.plist'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: low

title: Suspicious Get Local Groups Information
id: cef24b90-dddc-4ae1-a09a-8764872f69fc
related:
    - id: fa6a5a45-3ee2-4529-aa14-ee5edc9e29cb
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of PowerShell modules and cmdlets to gather local group information.
    Adversaries may use local system permission groups to determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group such as the local administrators group.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-12
modified: 2025-08-22
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1069.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_localgroup:
        - Payload|contains:
              - 'get-localgroup '
              - 'get-localgroupmember '
        - ContextInfo|contains:
              - 'get-localgroup '
              - 'get-localgroupmember '
    selection_wmi_module:
        - Payload|contains:
              - 'get-wmiobject '
              - 'gwmi '
              - 'get-ciminstance '
              - 'gcim '
        - ContextInfo|contains|all:
              - 'get-wmiobject '
              - 'gwmi '
              - 'get-ciminstance '
              - 'gcim '
    selection_wmi_class:
        - Payload|contains: 'win32_group'
        - ContextInfo|contains: 'win32_group'
    condition: selection_localgroup or all of selection_wmi_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrator script
level: low

title: UAC Bypass Using ChangePK and SLUI
id: 503d581c-7df0-4bbe-b9be-5840c0ecc1fc
status: test
description: Detects an UAC bypass that uses changepk.exe and slui.exe (UACMe 61)
references:
    - https://mattharr0ey.medium.com/privilege-escalation-uac-bypass-in-changepk-c40b92818d1b
    - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
    - https://medium.com/falconforce/falconfriday-detecting-uac-bypasses-0xff16-86c2a9107abf
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\changepk.exe'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\slui.exe'
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'High'
            - 'System'
            - 'S-1-16-16384' # System
            - 'S-1-16-12288' # High
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high