Sigma rules: 38

title: Antivirus - Exploitation Framework Signature
id: 238527ad-3c2c-4e4f-a1f6-92fd63adb864
status: stable
description: |
    Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports an exploitation framework.
    This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/925b0b28472d4d79b4bf92050e38cc2b8f722691c713fc28743ac38551bc3797
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/8f8daabe1c8ceb5710949283818e16c4aa8059bf2ce345e2f2c90b8692978424
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d9669f7e3eb3a9cdf6a750eeb2ba303b5ae148a43e36546896f1d1801e912466
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2018-09-09
modified: 2026-06-15
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    category: antivirus
detection:
    selection:
        Signature|contains:
            - 'ATK/Cobalt'
            - 'Backdoor.Cobalt'
            - 'Beacon'
            - 'Brutel'
            - 'BruteR'
            - 'CbltStr'
            - 'CobaltStr'
            - 'COBALT.SMD'
            - 'COBEACON'
            - 'Cometer'
            - 'Exploit.Script.CVE'
            - 'IISExchgSpawnCMD'
            - 'Metasploit'
            - 'Meterpreter'
            - 'MeteTool'
            - 'Mpreter'
            - 'MsfShell'
            - 'PowerSploit'
            - 'Razy'
            - 'Rozena'
            - 'Sbelt'
            - 'Seatbelt'
            - 'Sliver'
            - 'Swrort'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: Arbitrary DLL or Csproj Code Execution Via Dotnet.EXE
id: d80d5c81-04ba-45b4-84e4-92eba40e0ad3
status: test
description: Detects execution of arbitrary DLLs or unsigned code via a ".csproj" files via Dotnet.EXE.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Dotnet/
    - https://twitter.com/_felamos/status/1204705548668555264
    - https://bohops.com/2019/08/19/dotnet-core-a-vector-for-awl-bypass-defense-evasion/
author: Beyu Denis, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-18
modified: 2025-10-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\dotnet.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: '.NET Host'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '.csproj'
            - '.csproj"'
            - '.dll'
            - '.dll"'
            - ".csproj'"
            - ".dll'"
    filter_optional_notepadplus_plus:
        ParentImage:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Notepad++\notepad++.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Notepad++\notepad++.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'C:\ProgramData\CSScriptNpp\'
            - '-cscs_path:'
            - '\cs-script\cscs.dll'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrator usage
level: medium

title: Atlassian Bitbucket Command Injection Via Archive API
id: 65c0a0ab-d675-4441-bd6b-d3db226a2685
status: test
description: Detects attempts to exploit the Atlassian Bitbucket Command Injection CVE-2022-36804
references:
    - https://twitter.com/_0xf4n9x_/status/1572052954538192901
    - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/09/20/cve-2022-36804-easily-exploitable-vulnerability-in-atlassian-bitbucket-server-and-data-center/
    - https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/bitbucket-server-and-data-center-advisory-2022-08-24-1155489835.html
    - https://blog.assetnote.io/2022/09/14/rce-in-bitbucket-server/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-29
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2022-36804
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query|contains|all:
            - '/rest/api/latest/projects/'
            - 'prefix='
            - '%00--exec'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Web vulnerability scanners
level: high

title: AWS SAML Provider Deletion Activity
id: ccd6a6c8-bb4e-4a91-9d2a-07e632819374
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the deletion of an AWS SAML provider, potentially indicating malicious intent to disrupt administrative or security team access.
    An attacker can remove the SAML provider for the information security team or a team of system administrators, to make it difficult for them to work and investigate at the time of the attack and after it.
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteSAMLProvider.html
author: Ivan Saakov
date: 2024-12-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1531
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
        eventName: 'DeleteSAMLProvider'
        status: 'success'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Automated processes using tools like Terraform may trigger this alert.
    - Legitimate administrative actions by authorized system administrators could cause this alert. Verify the user identity, user agent, and hostname to ensure they are expected.
    - Deletions by unfamiliar users should be investigated. If the behavior is known and expected, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: Copy Passwd Or Shadow From TMP Path
id: fa4aaed5-4fe0-498d-bbc0-08e3346387ba
status: test
description: Detects when the file "passwd" or "shadow" is copied from tmp path
references:
    - https://blogs.blackberry.com/
    - https://twitter.com/Joseliyo_Jstnk/status/1620131033474822144
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-01-31
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.001
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '/cp'
    selection_path:
        CommandLine|contains: '/tmp/'
    selection_file:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'passwd'
            - 'shadow'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Curl File Upload To File Sharing Websites
id: e328cc73-f92a-42fb-b3fa-7c2cffda981a
related:
    - id: 00bca14a-df4e-4649-9054-3f2aa676bc04
      type: derived
    - id: 7d1aaf3d-4304-425c-b7c3-162055e0b3ab
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: Detects usage of curl to upload files to known file sharing domains, which may indicate data exfiltration.
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
references:
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/advanced-backdoor-squidoor/
date: 2026-03-29
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1567.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'curl.exe'
    selection_cli_domain:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '0x0.st'
            - 'bashupload.com'
            - 'chunk.io'
            - 'file.io'
            - 'filebin.net'
            - 'pastebin'
            - 'send.firefox.com'
            - 'temp.sh'
            - 'transfer.sh'
            - 'ufile.io'
            - 'uploadfiles.io'
            - 'wetransfer.com'
            - 'x0.at'
    selection_cli_flags:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - ' --form'
              - ' --upload-file'
              - ' --data'
              - ' -X POST'
              - ' --request POST '
        - CommandLine|re:
              - '\s-[FTd]\s' # We use regex to ensure a case sensitive argument detection
              - '\s-sT\s'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate file uploads to these services by administrators or developers
level: high

title: Findstr GPP Passwords
id: 91a2c315-9ee6-4052-a853-6f6a8238f90d
status: test
description: Look for the encrypted cpassword value within Group Policy Preference files on the Domain Controller. This value can be decrypted with gpp-decrypt.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.006/T1552.006.md#atomic-test-1---gpp-passwords-findstr
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-27
modified: 2023-11-11
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.006
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\find.exe'
              - '\findstr.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'FIND.EXE'
              - 'FINDSTR.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'cpassword'
            - '\sysvol\'
            - '.xml'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_findstr_gpp_passwords/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: GPP Passwords (findstr)
      technique: T1552.006
      atomic_guid: 870fe8fb-5e23-4f5f-b89d-dd7fe26f3b5f

title: FortiGate - New Local User Created
id: ddbbe845-1d74-43a8-8231-2156d180234d
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the creation of a new local user on a Fortinet FortiGate Firewall.
    The new local user could be used for VPN connections.
references:
    - https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-535
    - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/fortios-log-message-reference/398/event
    - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/cli-reference/109120963/config-user-local
    - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/fortios-log-message-reference/44547/44547-logid-event-config-objattr
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) (InTheCyber)
date: 2025-11-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.001
logsource:
    product: fortigate
    service: event
detection:
    selection:
        action: 'Add'
        cfgpath: 'user.local'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - A local user can be created for legitimate purposes. Investigate the user details to determine if it is authorized.
level: medium

title: Get-ADUser Enumeration Using UserAccountControl Flags
id: 96c982fe-3d08-4df4-bed2-eb14e02f21c8
status: test
description: Detects AS-REP roasting is an attack that is often-overlooked. It is not very common as you have to explicitly set accounts that do not require pre-authentication.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.md#atomic-test-11---get-aduser-enumeration-using-useraccountcontrol-flags-as-rep-roasting
    - https://shellgeek.com/useraccountcontrol-flags-to-manipulate-properties/
author: frack113
date: 2022-03-17
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        # 4194304 DONT_REQ_PREAUTH
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Get-ADUser'
            - '-Filter'
            - 'useraccountcontrol'
            - '-band'
            - '4194304'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_as_rep_roasting/info.yml

title: Google Cloud Service Account Disabled or Deleted
id: 13f81a90-a69c-4fab-8f07-b5bb55416a9f
status: test
description: Identifies when a service account is disabled or deleted in Google Cloud.
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/reference/rest/v1/projects.serviceAccounts
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-08-14
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1531
logsource:
    product: gcp
    service: gcp.audit
detection:
    selection:
        gcp.audit.method_name|endswith:
            - .serviceAccounts.disable
            - .serviceAccounts.delete
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Service Account being disabled or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - Service Account disabled or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: Hermetic Wiper TG Process Patterns
id: 2f974656-6d83-4059-bbdf-68ac5403422f
status: test
description: Detects process execution patterns found in intrusions related to the Hermetic Wiper malware attacks against Ukraine in February 2022
references:
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ukraine-wiper-malware-russia
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-25
modified: 2022-09-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        Image|endswith: '\policydefinitions\postgresql.exe'
    selection2:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE\temp\sys.tmp'
              - ' 1> \\\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__16'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'powershell -c '
              - '\comsvcs.dll MiniDump '
              - '\winupd.log full'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Legitimate Application Dropped Archive
id: 654fcc6d-840d-4844-9b07-2c3300e54a26
status: test
description: Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write an archive to disk
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326
author: frack113, Florian Roth
date: 2022-08-21
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables
            - \winword.exe
            - \excel.exe
            - \powerpnt.exe
            - \msaccess.exe
            - \mspub.exe
            - \eqnedt32.exe
            - \visio.exe
            - \wordpad.exe
            - \wordview.exe
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - \certutil.exe
            - \certoc.exe
            - \CertReq.exe
            # - \bitsadmin.exe (depends on the environment; comment in if you're sure that bitsadmin doesn't do that in your env)
            - \Desktopimgdownldr.exe
            - \esentutl.exe
            # - \expand.exe
            - \finger.exe
            # Executables that should never drop an executable to disk (but may after a previous process injection or if it's malware that uses a legitimate name)
            - \notepad.exe
            - \AcroRd32.exe
            - \RdrCEF.exe
            - \mshta.exe
            - \hh.exe
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.zip'
            - '.rar'
            - '.7z'
            - '.diagcab'
            - '.appx'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: New member added to an Exchange administration group (high risk)
description: Detects scenarios where a new member is added to a sensitive group related to Exchange server
references:
- https://msexchangeguru.com/2015/12/18/rbac-2016/
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account%20manipulation
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 4728 # security global group member added
      - 4756 # universal group member added
      - 4732 # local and domain local group member added
    TargetUserName:
      #- 'Exchange Trusted Subsystem' > See related rule for DC sync group change
      #- 'Exchange Windows Permissions' > See related rule for DC sync group change
      - 'Exchange Organization Administrators'
      - 'Exchange Public Folder Administrators'
      - 'Exchange Recipient Administrators'
      - 'Security Administrator'
      - 'Exchange Domain Servers'
      - 'Exchange Enterprise Servers'
      - 'Exchange Servers'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Exchange administrator updating server configuration
- Exchange upgrade or migration
level: medium

title: Non Interactive PowerShell Process Spawned
id: f4bbd493-b796-416e-bbf2-121235348529
status: test
description: Detects non-interactive PowerShell activity by looking at the "powershell" process with a non-user GUI process such as "explorer.exe" as a parent.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200925032237/https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190410151110.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements)
date: 2019-09-12
modified: 2025-02-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    filter_main_generic:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - ':\Windows\explorer.exe'
            - ':\Windows\System32\CompatTelRunner.exe'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\explorer.exe'
    filter_main_windows_update:
        ParentImage: ':\$WINDOWS.~BT\Sources\SetupHost.exe' # During Windows updates/upgrades
        # CommandLine: powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Restricted -Command Write-Host 'Final result: 1';
    filter_optional_vscode:
        # Triggered by VsCode when you open a Shell inside the workspace
        ParentImage|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Programs\Microsoft VS Code\Code.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: ' --ms-enable-electron-run-as-node '
    filter_optional_terminal:
        ParentImage|contains: ':\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.WindowsTerminal_'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\WindowsTerminal.exe'
    filter_optional_defender:
        ParentImage|endswith: ':\Program Files\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\SenseIR.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Likely. Many admin scripts and tools leverage PowerShell in their BAT or VB scripts which may trigger this rule often. It is best to add additional filters or use this to hunt for anomalies
level: low

title: Okta User Session Start Via An Anonymising Proxy Service
id: bde30855-5c53-4c18-ae90-1ff79ebc9578
status: test
description: Detects when an Okta user session starts where the user is behind an anonymising proxy service.
references:
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
    - https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection
author: kelnage
date: 2023-09-07
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: okta
    service: okta
detection:
    selection:
        eventType: 'user.session.start'
        securityContext.isProxy: 'true'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - If a user requires an anonymising proxy due to valid justifications.
level: high

title: Potential Baby Shark Malware Activity
id: 2b30fa36-3a18-402f-a22d-bf4ce2189f35
status: test
description: Detects activity that could be related to Baby Shark malware
references:
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-babyshark-malware-targets-u-s-national-security-think-tanks/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-02-24
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1012
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1218.005
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'powershell.exe mshta.exe http'
              - '.hta'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'reg query "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default"'
              - 'cmd.exe /c taskkill /im cmd.exe'
              - "(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).UploadFile('http"
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Credential Dumping Attempt Using New NetworkProvider - CLI
id: baef1ec6-2ca9-47a3-97cc-4cf2bda10b77
related:
    - id: 0442defa-b4a2-41c9-ae2c-ea7042fc4701
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when an attacker tries to add a new network provider in order to dump clear text credentials, similar to how the NPPSpy tool does it
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/setup-upgrade-and-drivers/network-provider-settings-removed-in-place-upgrade
    - https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/PasswordStealing/NPPSpy
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-23
modified: 2023-02-02
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\'
            - '\NetworkProvider'
    # filter:
    #     CommandLine|contains:
    #         - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\WebClient\NetworkProvider'
    #         - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanWorkstation\NetworkProvider'
    #         - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\RDPNP\NetworkProvider'
    #         - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\P9NP\NetworkProvider' # Related to WSL remove the comment if you use WSL in your ENV
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Other legitimate network providers used and not filtred in this rule
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_registry_new_network_provider/info.yml

title: Potential Provisioning Registry Key Abuse For Binary Proxy Execution - REG
id: 7021255e-5db3-4946-a8b9-0ba7a4644a69
related:
    - id: 7f5d1c9a-3e83-48df-95a7-2b98aae6c13c # CLI Generic
      type: similar
    - id: f9999590-1f94-4a34-a91e-951e47bedefd # CLI Abuse
      type: similar
    - id: 2a4b3e61-9d22-4e4a-b60f-6e8f0cde6f25 # CLI Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential abuse of the provisioning registry key for indirect command execution through "Provlaunch.exe".
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Provlaunch/
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1674399582162153472
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-08-02
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: The registry key "\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\" and its subkey must be monitored'
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potentially Suspicious Compression Tool Parameters
id: 27a72a60-7e5e-47b1-9d17-909c9abafdcd
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious command line arguments of common data compression tools
references:
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1184067445612535811
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-10-15
modified: 2023-08-29
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1560.001
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        OriginalFileName:
            - '7z*.exe'
            - '*rar.exe'
            - '*Command*Line*RAR*'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -p'
            - ' -ta'
            - ' -tb'
            - ' -sdel'
            - ' -dw'
            - ' -hp'
    filter_main_generic:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - ':\Program Files\'
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potentially Suspicious WDAC Policy File Creation
id: 1d2de8a6-4803-4fde-b85b-f58f3aa7a705
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policy file creation from abnormal processes that could be abused by attacker to block EDR/AV components while allowing their own malicious code to run on the system.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/deployment/deploy-appcontrol-policies-using-group-policy
    - https://beierle.win/2024-12-20-Weaponizing-WDAC-Killing-the-Dreams-of-EDR/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/deployment/appcontrol-deployment-guide
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/deployment/deploy-appcontrol-policies-with-script
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/deployment/deploy-appcontrol-policies-with-memcm
author: X__Junior
date: 2025-02-07
modified: 2026-05-18
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_target:
        # This is a default location but unfortunately it could be any path configured in Group Policy Management Editor.
        # No file extension needed because any extension would work, check first reference.
        TargetFilename|contains: '\Windows\System32\CodeIntegrity\'
    filter_main_images:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\Microsoft.ConfigurationManagement.exe' # Replace with full path to avoid false negatives
            - '\WDAC Wizard.exe' # Replace with full path to avoid false negatives
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7-preview\pwsh.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7\pwsh.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell_ise.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell_ise.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe'
    filter_main_cli:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'ConvertFrom-CIPolicy -XmlFilePath'
              - '-BinaryFilePath '
        - CommandLine|contains: 'CiTool --update-policy'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'Copy-Item -Path'
              - '-Destination'
    filter_main_system:
        Image: 'System'
    filter_main_wuauclt:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\wuauclt.exe'
    filter_main_wuaucltcore:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\UUS\arm64\wuaucltcore.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\UUS\Packages\Preview\arm64\wuaucltcore.exe'
    condition: selection_target and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrators and security vendors could leverage WDAC, apply additional filters as needed.
level: medium

title: Process Explorer Driver Creation By Non-Sysinternals Binary
id: de46c52b-0bf8-4936-a327-aace94f94ac6
status: test
description: |
    Detects creation of the Process Explorer drivers by processes other than Process Explorer (procexp) itself.
    Hack tools or malware may use the Process Explorer driver to elevate privileges, drops it to disk for a few moments, runs a service using that driver and removes it afterwards.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/process-explorer
    - https://github.com/Yaxser/Backstab
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/stopping-vulnerable-driver-attacks
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2023/04/19/aukill-edr-killer-malware-abuses-process-explorer-driver/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-05
modified: 2026-06-29
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\PROCEXP'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.sys'
    filter_main_process_explorer:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\procexp.exe'
            - '\procexp64.exe'
            - '\procexp64a.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Some false positives may occur with legitimate renamed process explorer binaries
level: high

title: PSexec application execution
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker installs and executes PSexec.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0008-Lateral%20Movement/T1021.002%20-SMB%20Windows%20Admin%20Shares
- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029/
- https://pentera.io/blog/135-is-the-new-145/
- https://nv2lt.github.io/windows/smb-psexec-smbexec-winexe-how-to/
- https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/traces-of-windows-remote-command-execution.html
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1569.002
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection_process_child:
    NewProcessName|endswith: \PSEXESVC.exe

  selection_process_parent:
    ParentProcessName|endswith: \PSEXESVC.exe
    Version: 2  # parent process name is available starting Windows 10 / Server 2016 and higher

  condition: selection_process_child or selection_process_parent
falsepositives:
- Administrator activity
level: medium

title: Rclone Config File Creation
id: 34986307-b7f4-49be-92f3-e7a4d01ac5db
status: test
description: Detects Rclone config files being created
references:
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/05/27/detecting-rclone-an-effective-tool-for-exfiltration/
author: Aaron Greetham (@beardofbinary) - NCC Group
date: 2021-05-26
modified: 2023-05-09
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1567.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - ':\Users\'
            - '\.config\rclone\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Rclone usage
level: medium

title: SCM Database Privileged Operation
id: dae8171c-5ec6-4396-b210-8466585b53e9
status: test
description: Detects non-system users performing privileged operation os the SCM database
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190826-RemoteSCMHandle/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Tim Shelton
date: 2019-08-15
modified: 2022-09-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4674
        ObjectType: 'SC_MANAGER OBJECT'
        ObjectName: 'servicesactive'
        PrivilegeList: 'SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege'
    filter:
        SubjectLogonId: '0x3e4'
        ProcessName|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\services.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Service Binary in Suspicious Folder
id: a07f0359-4c90-4dc4-a681-8ffea40b4f47
related:
    - id: c0abc838-36b0-47c9-b3b3-a90c39455382
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detect the creation of a service with a service binary located in a suspicious directory
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2022-05-02
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_service_start:
        TargetObject|startswith: 'HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Start'
        Image|contains:
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Perflogs\'
            - '\ADMIN$\'
            - '\Temp\'
        Details:
            - 'DWORD (0x00000000)'  # boot
            - 'DWORD (0x00000001)'  # System
            - 'DWORD (0x00000002)'  # Automatic
            # 3 - Manual , 4 - Disabled
    selection_service_imagepath:
        TargetObject|startswith: 'HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\ImagePath'
        Details|contains:
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Perflogs\'
            - '\ADMIN$\'
            - '\Temp\'
    filter_optional_avast:
        Image|contains|all: # Filter FP with Avast software
            - '\Common Files\'
            - '\Temp\'
    filter_optional_mbamservice:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\CurrentControlSet\Services\MBAMInstallerService\ImagePath'
        Details|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Temp\MBAMInstallerService.exe"'
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\services.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_creation_service_susp_folder/info.yml

title: SMB insecure guest authentication activated (native)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to enable insecure guest authentication in order to access a remote storage device (NAS) in order to perform some data exfiltration or lateral movement.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/customize/desktop/unattend/microsoft-windows-workstationservice-allowinsecureguestauth
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.002 # Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares 
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1562.010 # Impair Defenses: Downgrade Attack  
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    Channel: Microsoft-Windows-SMBClient/Security
    EventID: 31018
    RegName: AllowInsecureGuestAuth
    RegValue: 1
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Admin activity (backup configuration) 
level: medium

title: Suspicious Binary Writes Via AnyDesk
id: 2d367498-5112-4ae5-a06a-96e7bc33a211
status: test
description: |
    Detects AnyDesk writing binary files to disk other than "gcapi.dll".
    According to RedCanary research it is highly abnormal for AnyDesk to write executable files to disk besides gcapi.dll,
    which is a legitimate DLL that is part of the Google Chrome web browser used to interact with the Google Cloud API. (See reference section for more details)
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/misbehaving-rats/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/02/24/confluence-exploit-leads-to-lockbit-ransomware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-28
modified: 2025-02-24
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\AnyDesk.exe'
            - '\AnyDeskMSI.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
    filter_dlls:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\gcapi.dll'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious DNS Query Indicating Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object SPN Spoofing
id: e7a21b5f-d8c4-4ae5-b8d9-93c5d3f28e1c
related:
    - id: b07e58cf-cacc-4135-8473-ccb2eba63dd2 # Potential Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object Spoofing
      type: similar
    - id: 5588576c-5898-4fac-bcdd-7475a60e8f43 # Suspicious DNS Query Indicating Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object Spoofing - Network
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects DNS queries containing patterns associated with Kerberos coercion attacks via DNS object spoofing.
    The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
    Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
    It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
    to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
references:
    - https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025
    - https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/10/using-kerberos-for-authentication-relay.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-06-20
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1557.001
    - attack.t1187
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: dns_query
detection:
    selection:
        QueryName|contains|all:
            - 'UWhRCA'
            - 'BAAAA'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Provlaunch.EXE Child Process
id: f9999590-1f94-4a34-a91e-951e47bedefd
related:
    - id: 7f5d1c9a-3e83-48df-95a7-2b98aae6c13c # CLI Generic
      type: similar
    - id: 2a4b3e61-9d22-4e4a-b60f-6e8f0cde6f25 # CLI Registry
      type: similar
    - id: 7021255e-5db3-4946-a8b9-0ba7a4644a69 # Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of "provlaunch.exe" which might indicate potential abuse to proxy execution.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Provlaunch/
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1674399582162153472
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\provlaunch.exe'
    selection_child:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\calc.exe'
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\notepad.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        - Image|contains:
              - ':\PerfLogs\'
              - ':\Temp\'
              - ':\Users\Public\'
              - '\AppData\Temp\'
              - '\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
              - '\Windows\Tasks\'
              - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high