Detection rules › Sigma
Sigma rules: 39
Added Owner To Application
#Detects when a new owner is added to an application. This gives that account privileges to make modifications and configuration changes to the application.
Known False Positives
- When a new application owner is added by an administrator
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access |
Telemetry Coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Azure | Add owner to application |
Rules Detecting the Same Action
These rules filter on the same operation.
- [Entra ID] Application Assigned Administrator Permissions Immediately After Obtaining Role Management Permissions (Kusto)
- [Entra ID] Application Granted Administrative Permission to Assign Microsoft Entra ID Roles (Kusto)
- Added Credentials to Existing Application (Sigma)
- Admin promotion after Role Management Application Permission Grant (Kusto)
- App Granted Microsoft Permissions (Sigma)
- App Granted Privileged Delegated Or App Permissions (Sigma)
- Application AppID Uri Configuration Changes (Sigma)
- Application ID URI Changed (Kusto)
Rule Body
title: Added Owner To Application
id: 74298991-9fc4-460e-a92e-511aa60baec1
status: test
description: Detects when a new owner is added to an application. This gives that account privileges to make modifications and configuration changes to the application.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#new-owner
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-06-02
tags:
- attack.t1552
- attack.credential-access
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
properties.message: Add owner to application
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- When a new application owner is added by an administrator
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
properties.message: Add owner to application
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
properties.message | eq |
| field:"properties.message" kind:eq value:"Add owner to application" |
ADExplorer Writing Complete AD Snapshot Into .dat File
#Detects the dual use tool ADExplorer writing a complete AD snapshot into a .dat file. This can be used by attackers to extract data for Bloodhound, usernames for password spraying or use the meta data for social engineering. The snapshot doesn't contain password hashes but there have been cases, where administrators put passwords in the comment field.
Known False Positives
- Legitimate use of ADExplorer by administrators creating .dat snapshots
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 11: FileCreate |
Rule Body
title: ADExplorer Writing Complete AD Snapshot Into .dat File
id: 0a1255c5-d732-4b62-ac02-b5152d34fb83
related:
- id: 9212f354-7775-4e28-9c9f-8f0a4544e664
type: similar
status: experimental
description: Detects the dual use tool ADExplorer writing a complete AD snapshot into a .dat file. This can be used by attackers to extract data for Bloodhound, usernames for password spraying or use the meta data for social engineering. The snapshot doesn't contain password hashes but there have been cases, where administrators put passwords in the comment field.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/de-de/sysinternals/downloads/adexplorer
- https://github.com/c3c/ADExplorerSnapshot.py/tree/f700904defac330802bbfedd1d8ffd9248f4ee24
- https://www.packetlabs.net/posts/scattered-spider-is-a-young-ransomware-gang-exploiting-large-corporations/
- https://www.nccgroup.com/us/research-blog/lapsus-recent-techniques-tactics-and-procedures/
- https://trustedsec.com/blog/adexplorer-on-engagements
author: Arnim Rupp (Nextron Systems), Thomas Patzke
date: 2025-07-09
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1087.002
- attack.t1069.002
- attack.t1482
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\ADExp.exe'
- '\ADExplorer.exe'
- '\ADExplorer64.exe'
- '\ADExplorer64a.exe'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.dat'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of ADExplorer by administrators creating .dat snapshots
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\ADExp.exe'
- '\ADExplorer.exe'
- '\ADExplorer64.exe'
- '\ADExplorer64a.exe'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.dat'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with |
TargetFilename | ends_with |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:ends_with value:".dat" |
Apache Spark Shell Command Injection - Weblogs
#Detects attempts to exploit an apache spark server via CVE-2014-6287 from a weblogs perspective
Known False Positives
- Web vulnerability scanners
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access |
Rule Body
title: Apache Spark Shell Command Injection - Weblogs
id: 1a9a04fd-02d1-465c-abad-d733fd409f9c
status: test
description: Detects attempts to exploit an apache spark server via CVE-2014-6287 from a weblogs perspective
references:
- https://github.com/W01fh4cker/cve-2022-33891/blob/fd973b56e78bca8822caa3a2e3cf1b5aff5d0950/cve_2022_33891_poc.py
- https://sumsec.me/2022/CVE-2022-33891%20Apache%20Spark%20shell%20command%20injection.html
- https://github.com/apache/spark/pull/36315/files
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-19
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1190
- cve.2022-33891
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection:
cs-uri-query|contains: '?doAs=`'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Web vulnerability scanners
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
cs-uri-query|contains: '?doAs=`'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
cs-uri-query | match |
| field:"cs-uri-query" kind:match value:"?doAs=`" |
Arbitrary File Download Via Squirrel.EXE
#Detects the usage of the "Squirrel.exe" to download arbitrary files. This binary is part of multiple Electron based software installations (Slack, Teams, Discord, etc.)
Known False Positives
- Expected FP with some Electron based applications such as (1Clipboard, Beaker Browser, Caret, Discord, GitHub Desktop, etc.)
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule Body
title: Arbitrary File Download Via Squirrel.EXE
id: 1e75c1cc-c5d4-42aa-ac3d-91b0b68b3b4c
related:
- id: 45239e6a-b035-4aaf-b339-8ad379fcb67e
type: similar
- id: fa4b21c9-0057-4493-b289-2556416ae4d7
type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
Detects the usage of the "Squirrel.exe" to download arbitrary files. This binary is part of multiple Electron based software installations (Slack, Teams, Discord, etc.)
references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Squirrel/
- http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/03/30/sqirrel-packages-manager-as-a-lolbin-a-k-a-many-electron-apps-are-lolbins-by-default/
- http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/08/16/squirrel-as-a-lolbin/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Karneades / Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2022-06-09
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\squirrel.exe'
- '\update.exe'
selection_download_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' --download '
- ' --update '
- ' --updateRollback='
selection_download_http_keyword:
CommandLine|contains: 'http'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Expected FP with some Electron based applications such as (1Clipboard, Beaker Browser, Caret, Discord, GitHub Desktop, etc.)
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
all of selection_*Stage 1: selection_img
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\squirrel.exe'
- '\update.exe'
Stage 2: selection_download_cli
selection_download_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' --download '
- ' --update '
- ' --updateRollback='
Stage 3: selection_download_http_keyword
selection_download_http_keyword:
CommandLine|contains: 'http'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with |
Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
#Detects usage of the "FromBase64String" function in the commandline which is used to decode a base64 encoded string
Known False Positives
- Administrative script libraries
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule Body
title: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
id: e32d4572-9826-4738-b651-95fa63747e8a
status: test
description: Detects usage of the "FromBase64String" function in the commandline which is used to decode a base64 encoded string
references:
- https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/6af876ee72b51676c82a2db8d2cd3639
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-01-29
modified: 2023-01-26
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1140
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains: '::FromBase64String('
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrative script libraries
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_frombase64string/info.yml
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
CommandLine|contains: '::FromBase64String('
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match value:"::FromBase64String(" |
Certificate Request Export to Exchange Webserver
#Detects a write of an Exchange CSR to an untypical directory or with aspx name suffix which can be used to place a webshell
Known False Positives
- Unlikely
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence |
Rule Body
title: Certificate Request Export to Exchange Webserver
id: b7bc7038-638b-4ffd-880c-292c692209ef
status: test
description: Detects a write of an Exchange CSR to an untypical directory or with aspx name suffix which can be used to place a webshell
references:
- https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1429175908905127938
author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2023-01-23
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1505.003
logsource:
service: msexchange-management
product: windows
detection:
keywords_export_command:
'|all':
- 'New-ExchangeCertificate'
- ' -GenerateRequest'
- ' -BinaryEncoded'
- ' -RequestFile'
keywords_export_params:
- '\\\\localhost\\C$'
- '\\\\127.0.0.1\\C$'
- 'C:\\inetpub'
- '.aspx'
condition: keywords_export_command and keywords_export_params
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
keywords_export_command and keywords_export_paramsStage 1: keywords_export_command
keywords_export_command:
'|all':
- 'New-ExchangeCertificate'
- ' -GenerateRequest'
- ' -BinaryEncoded'
- ' -RequestFile'
Stage 2: keywords_export_params
keywords_export_params:
- '\\\\localhost\\C$'
- '\\\\127.0.0.1\\C$'
- 'C:\\inetpub'
- '.aspx'
CodeIntegrity - Blocked Driver Load With Revoked Certificate
#Detects blocked load attempts of revoked drivers
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry Coverage
Rule Body
title: CodeIntegrity - Blocked Driver Load With Revoked Certificate
id: 9b72b82d-f1c5-4632-b589-187159bc6ec1
status: test
description: Detects blocked load attempts of revoked drivers
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-tag-explanations
- Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-06
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1543
logsource:
product: windows
service: codeintegrity-operational
detection:
selection:
EventID: 3023 # The driver %2 is blocked from loading as the driver has been revoked by Microsoft.
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
EventID: 3023
CodePage Modification Via MODE.COM To Russian Language
#Detects a CodePage modification using the "mode.com" utility to Russian language. This behavior has been used by threat actors behind Dharma ransomware.
Known False Positives
- Russian speaking people changing the CodePage
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule Body
title: CodePage Modification Via MODE.COM To Russian Language
id: 12fbff88-16b5-4b42-9754-cd001a789fb3
related:
- id: d48c5ffa-3b02-4c0f-9a9e-3c275650dd0e
type: derived
status: test
description: |
Detects a CodePage modification using the "mode.com" utility to Russian language.
This behavior has been used by threat actors behind Dharma ransomware.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/intl/code-page-identifiers
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/mode
- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/mode.com-59D1ED51ACB8C3D50F1306FD75F20E99.html
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5e75ef02517afd6e8ba6462b19217dc4a5a574abb33d10eb0f2bab49d8d48c22/behavior
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2024-01-17
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
# VT Query: behavior:"mode con cp select=1251"
# VT Query: behavior:"mode con cp select=866"
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\mode.com'
- OriginalFileName: 'MODE.COM'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' con '
- ' cp '
- ' select='
CommandLine|endswith:
- '=1251' # ANSI Cyrillic; Cyrillic (Windows) - Observed ITW by Dharma ransomware
- '=866' # OEM Russian; Cyrillic (DOS) - Observed ITW by other malware
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Russian speaking people changing the CodePage
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
all of selection_*Stage 1: selection_img
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\mode.com'
- OriginalFileName: 'MODE.COM'
Stage 2: selection_cli
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' con '
- ' cp '
- ' select='
CommandLine|endswith:
- '=1251'
- '=866'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | ends_with |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:ends_with |
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\mode.com" |
OriginalFileName | eq |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"MODE.COM" |
CVE-2024-1708 - ScreenConnect Path Traversal Exploitation
#This detects file modifications to ASPX and ASHX files within the root of the App_Extensions directory, which is allowed by a ZipSlip vulnerability in versions prior to 23.9.8. This occurs during exploitation of CVE-2024-1708.
Known False Positives
- This will occur legitimately as well and will result in some benign activity.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | No specific technique |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 11: FileCreate |
Rule Body
title: CVE-2024-1708 - ScreenConnect Path Traversal Exploitation
id: 44d7af7e-88e6-4490-be11-55f7ff4d9fc1
related:
- id: 4c198a60-7d05-4daf-8bf7-4136fb6f5c62
type: similar
status: test
description: |
This detects file modifications to ASPX and ASHX files within the root of the App_Extensions directory, which is allowed by a ZipSlip vulnerability in versions prior to 23.9.8. This occurs during exploitation of CVE-2024-1708.
references:
- https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/security-bulletins/connectwise-screenconnect-23.9.8
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-1709
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/a-catastrophe-for-control-understanding-the-screenconnect-authentication-bypass
author: Matt Anderson, Andrew Schwartz, Caleb Stewart, Huntress
date: 2024-02-21
tags:
- attack.persistence
- cve.2024-1708
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\ScreenConnect.Service.exe'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- 'ScreenConnect\\App_Extensions\\*.ashx'
- 'ScreenConnect\\App_Extensions\\*.aspx'
filter_main_legit_extension:
TargetFilename|contains: 'ScreenConnect\App_Extensions\\*\\'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- This will occur legitimately as well and will result in some benign activity.
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not 1 of filter_main_*Stage 1: selection
selection:
Image|endswith: '\ScreenConnect.Service.exe'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- 'ScreenConnect\\App_Extensions\\*.ashx'
- 'ScreenConnect\\App_Extensions\\*.aspx'
Stage 2: not filter_main_legit_extension
filter_main_legit_extension:
TargetFilename|contains: 'ScreenConnect\App_Extensions\\*\\'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\ScreenConnect.Service.exe" |
TargetFilename | ends_with |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:ends_with |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
TargetFilename | match | ScreenConnect\App_Extensions\\*\\ | excludes:TargetFilename field:"TargetFilename" value:"ScreenConnect\App_Extensions\\*\\" |
Denied RDP login with valid credentials
#Detects scenarios where an attacker tries to move laterally using RDP and access attempt is blocked due to restricted logon policies.
Known False Positives
- Miss configured adminitrative rights or VDI software (CITRIX, AppV, ThinApp, ...)
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Lateral Movement |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4825: A user was denied the access to Remote Desktop. |
Rule Body
title: Denied RDP login with valid credentials
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker tries to move laterally using RDP and access attempt is blocked due to restricted logon policies.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0008-Lateral%20Movement/T1021.001-Remote%20Desktop%20Protocol
- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4825
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.001 # Remote desktop
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4825
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Miss configured adminitrative rights or VDI software (CITRIX, AppV, ThinApp, ...)
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
EventID: 4825
Dfsvc.EXE Initiated Network Connection Over Uncommon Port
#Detects an initiated network connection over uncommon ports from "dfsvc.exe". A utility used to handled ClickOnce applications.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 3: Network connection |
Rule Body
title: Dfsvc.EXE Initiated Network Connection Over Uncommon Port
id: 4c5fba4a-9ef6-4f16-823d-606246054741
status: test
description: Detects an initiated network connection over uncommon ports from "dfsvc.exe". A utility used to handled ClickOnce applications.
references:
- https://posts.specterops.io/less-smartscreen-more-caffeine-ab-using-clickonce-for-trusted-code-execution-1446ea8051c5
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-12
modified: 2024-01-31
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1203
- detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|contains: ':\Windows\Microsoft.NET\'
Image|endswith: '\dfsvc.exe'
Initiated: 'true'
filter_main_known_ports:
DestinationPort:
- 80
- 443
filter_optional_dns_ipv6:
# Based on VT. More than 140 binaries made communication over DNS
DestinationIsIpv6: 'true'
DestinationPort: 53
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*Stage 1: selection
selection:
Image|contains: ':\Windows\Microsoft.NET\'
Image|endswith: '\dfsvc.exe'
Initiated: 'true'
Stage 2: not filter_main_known_ports
filter_main_known_ports:
DestinationPort:
- 80
- 443
Stage 3: not filter_optional_dns_ipv6
filter_optional_dns_ipv6:
DestinationIsIpv6: 'true'
DestinationPort: 53
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\dfsvc.exe" |
Image | match |
| field:"Image" kind:match value:":\Windows\Microsoft.NET\" |
Initiated | eq |
| field:"Initiated" kind:eq value:"true" |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
DestinationPort | eq | 443 | excludes:DestinationPort field:"DestinationPort" value:"443" |
DestinationPort | eq | 80 | excludes:DestinationPort field:"DestinationPort" value:"80" |
DestinationIsIpv6 | eq | true | excludes:DestinationIsIpv6 field:"DestinationIsIpv6" value:"true" |
DestinationPort | eq | 53 | excludes:DestinationPort field:"DestinationPort" value:"53" |
Diagnostic Library Sdiageng.DLL Loaded By Msdt.EXE
#Detects both of CVE-2022-30190 (Follina) and DogWalk vulnerabilities exploiting msdt.exe binary to load the "sdiageng.dll" library
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 7: Image loaded |
Rule Body
title: Diagnostic Library Sdiageng.DLL Loaded By Msdt.EXE
id: ec8c4047-fad9-416a-8c81-0f479353d7f6
status: test
description: Detects both of CVE-2022-30190 (Follina) and DogWalk vulnerabilities exploiting msdt.exe binary to load the "sdiageng.dll" library
references:
- https://www.securonix.com/blog/detecting-microsoft-msdt-dogwalk/
author: Greg (rule)
date: 2022-06-17
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1202
- cve.2022-30190
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\msdt.exe'
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\sdiageng.dll'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
Image|endswith: '\msdt.exe'
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\sdiageng.dll'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\msdt.exe" |
ImageLoaded | ends_with |
| field:"ImageLoaded" kind:ends_with value:"\sdiageng.dll" |
DNS Query To AzureWebsites.NET By Non-Browser Process
#Detects a DNS query by a non browser process on the system to "azurewebsites.net". The latter was often used by threat actors as a malware hosting and exfiltration site.
Known False Positives
- Likely with other browser software. Apply additional filters for any other browsers you might use.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Command & Control |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 22: DNSEvent (DNS query) |
Rule Body
title: DNS Query To AzureWebsites.NET By Non-Browser Process
id: e043f529-8514-4205-8ab0-7f7d2927b400
related:
- id: 5c80b618-0dbb-46e6-acbb-03d90bcb6d83
type: derived
status: test
description: |
Detects a DNS query by a non browser process on the system to "azurewebsites.net". The latter was often used by threat actors as a malware hosting and exfiltration site.
references:
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/wip26-espionage-threat-actors-abuse-cloud-infrastructure-in-targeted-telco-attacks/
- https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/threat-intelligence/harvester-new-apt-attacks-asia
- https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/
- https://intezer.com/blog/research/how-we-escaped-docker-in-azure-functions/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-06-24
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1219.002
logsource:
product: windows
category: dns_query
detection:
selection:
QueryName|endswith: 'azurewebsites.net'
filter_optional_chrome:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
filter_optional_firefox:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
filter_optional_ie:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
filter_optional_edge_1:
- Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\'
- Image|endswith: '\WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
- Image:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
filter_optional_edge_2:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
Image|endswith:
- '\msedge.exe'
- '\msedgewebview2.exe'
filter_optional_safari:
Image|endswith: '\safari.exe'
filter_optional_defender:
Image|endswith:
- '\MsMpEng.exe' # Microsoft Defender executable
- '\MsSense.exe' # Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection Service Executable
filter_optional_brave:
Image|endswith: '\brave.exe'
Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\BraveSoftware\'
filter_optional_maxthon:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Maxthon\'
Image|endswith: '\maxthon.exe'
filter_optional_opera:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Programs\Opera\'
Image|endswith: '\opera.exe'
filter_optional_seamonkey:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\SeaMonkey\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\SeaMonkey\'
Image|endswith: '\seamonkey.exe'
filter_optional_vivaldi:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Vivaldi\'
Image|endswith: '\vivaldi.exe'
filter_optional_whale:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Naver\Naver Whale\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Naver\Naver Whale\'
Image|endswith: '\whale.exe'
filter_optional_tor:
Image|contains: '\Tor Browser\'
filter_optional_whaterfox:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Waterfox\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Waterfox\'
Image|endswith: '\Waterfox.exe'
filter_optional_midori:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Programs\midori-ng\'
Image|endswith: '\Midori Next Generation.exe'
filter_optional_slimbrowser:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\SlimBrowser\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\SlimBrowser\'
Image|endswith: '\slimbrowser.exe'
filter_optional_flock:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Flock\'
Image|endswith: '\Flock.exe'
filter_optional_phoebe:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Phoebe\'
Image|endswith: '\Phoebe.exe'
filter_optional_falkon:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Falkon\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Falkon\'
Image|endswith: '\falkon.exe'
filter_optional_avant:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Avant Browser\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Avant Browser\'
Image|endswith: '\avant.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Likely with other browser software. Apply additional filters for any other browsers you might use.
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*Stage 1: selection
selection:
QueryName|endswith: 'azurewebsites.net'
Stage 2: not filter_optional_*
filter_optional_chrome:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
filter_optional_firefox:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
filter_optional_ie:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
filter_optional_edge_1:
- Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\'
- Image|endswith: '\WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
- Image:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
filter_optional_edge_2:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
Image|endswith:
- '\msedge.exe'
- '\msedgewebview2.exe'
filter_optional_safari:
Image|endswith: '\safari.exe'
filter_optional_defender:
Image|endswith:
- '\MsMpEng.exe'
- '\MsSense.exe'
filter_optional_brave:
Image|endswith: '\brave.exe'
Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\BraveSoftware\'
filter_optional_maxthon:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Maxthon\'
Image|endswith: '\maxthon.exe'
filter_optional_opera:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Programs\Opera\'
Image|endswith: '\opera.exe'
filter_optional_seamonkey:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\SeaMonkey\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\SeaMonkey\'
Image|endswith: '\seamonkey.exe'
filter_optional_vivaldi:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Vivaldi\'
Image|endswith: '\vivaldi.exe'
filter_optional_whale:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Naver\Naver Whale\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Naver\Naver Whale\'
Image|endswith: '\whale.exe'
filter_optional_tor:
Image|contains: '\Tor Browser\'
filter_optional_whaterfox:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Waterfox\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Waterfox\'
Image|endswith: '\Waterfox.exe'
filter_optional_midori:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Programs\midori-ng\'
Image|endswith: '\Midori Next Generation.exe'
filter_optional_slimbrowser:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\SlimBrowser\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\SlimBrowser\'
Image|endswith: '\slimbrowser.exe'
filter_optional_flock:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Flock\'
Image|endswith: '\Flock.exe'
filter_optional_phoebe:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Phoebe\'
Image|endswith: '\Phoebe.exe'
filter_optional_falkon:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Falkon\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Falkon\'
Image|endswith: '\falkon.exe'
filter_optional_avant:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Avant Browser\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Avant Browser\'
Image|endswith: '\avant.exe'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
QueryName | ends_with |
| field:"QueryName" kind:ends_with value:"azurewebsites.net" |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
Forest Blizzard APT - JavaScript Constrained File Creation
#Detects the creation of JavaScript files inside of the DriverStore directory. Forest Blizzard used this to exploit the CVE-2022-38028 vulnerability in Windows Print Spooler service by modifying a JavaScript constraints file and executing it with SYSTEM-level permissions.
Known False Positives
- Unlikely
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Impairment |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 11: FileCreate |
Rule Body
title: Forest Blizzard APT - JavaScript Constrained File Creation
id: ec7c4e9b-9bc9-47c7-a32f-b53b598da642
status: test
description: |
Detects the creation of JavaScript files inside of the DriverStore directory.
Forest Blizzard used this to exploit the CVE-2022-38028 vulnerability in Windows Print Spooler service by modifying a JavaScript constraints file and executing it with SYSTEM-level permissions.
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/04/22/analyzing-forest-blizzards-custom-post-compromise-tool-for-exploiting-cve-2022-38028-to-obtain-credentials/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-04-23
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685.001
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\'
TargetFilename|endswith: '\.js'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\'
TargetFilename|endswith: '\.js'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
TargetFilename | ends_with |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:ends_with value:"\.js" |
TargetFilename | starts_with |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:starts_with value:"C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\" |
GCP Access Policy Deleted
#Detects when an access policy that is applied to a GCP cloud resource is deleted. An adversary would be able to remove access policies to gain access to a GCP cloud resource.
Known False Positives
- Legitimate administrative activities
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry Coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| GCP | any: accesscontextmanager.googleapis.com (any method) |
Rule Body
title: GCP Access Policy Deleted
id: 32438676-1dba-4ac7-bf69-b86cba995e05
status: test
description: |
Detects when an access policy that is applied to a GCP cloud resource is deleted.
An adversary would be able to remove access policies to gain access to a GCP cloud resource.
references:
- https://cloud.google.com/access-context-manager/docs/audit-logging
- https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/understanding-audit-logs
- https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/reference/audit/auditlog/rest/Shared.Types/AuditLog
author: Bryan Lim
date: 2024-01-12
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo.permission:
- 'accesscontextmanager.accessPolicies.delete'
- 'accesscontextmanager.accessPolicies.accessLevels.delete'
- 'accesscontextmanager.accessPolicies.accessZones.delete'
- 'accesscontextmanager.accessPolicies.authorizedOrgsDescs.delete'
data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo.granted: 'true'
data.protoPayload.serviceName: 'accesscontextmanager.googleapis.com'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative activities
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo.permission:
- 'accesscontextmanager.accessPolicies.delete'
- 'accesscontextmanager.accessPolicies.accessLevels.delete'
- 'accesscontextmanager.accessPolicies.accessZones.delete'
- 'accesscontextmanager.accessPolicies.authorizedOrgsDescs.delete'
data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo.granted: 'true'
data.protoPayload.serviceName: 'accesscontextmanager.googleapis.com'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo.granted | eq |
| field:"gcp::authorization_granted" kind:eq value:"true" |
data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo.permission | eq |
| field:"gcp::authorization_permission" kind:eq |
data.protoPayload.serviceName | eq |
| field:"gcp::service_name" kind:eq value:"accesscontextmanager.googleapis.com" |
GoToAssist Temporary Installation Artefact
#An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)
Known False Positives
- Legitimate use
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Command & Control |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 11: FileCreate |
Rule Body
title: GoToAssist Temporary Installation Artefact
id: 5d756aee-ad3e-4306-ad95-cb1abec48de2
status: test
description: |
An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.
These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.
Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-4---gotoassist-files-detected-test-on-windows
author: frack113
date: 2022-02-13
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1219.002
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\LogMeInInc\GoToAssist Remote Support Expert\'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_gotoopener_artefact/info.yml
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\LogMeInInc\GoToAssist Remote Support Expert\'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
TargetFilename | match |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:match value:"\AppData\Local\Temp\LogMeInInc\GoToAssist Remote Support Expert\" |
Host set with unconstrained delegation
#Detects scenarios where an attacker modifies host delegation settings for privilege escalation.
Known False Positives
- Rare administrator modifying host delegation settings
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4742: A computer account was changed. |
Rule Body
title: Host set with unconstrained delegation
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker modifies host delegation settings for privilege escalation.
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account%20manipulation
- https://dirkjanm.io/krbrelayx-unconstrained-delegation-abuse-toolkit/
- https://www.alsid.com/crb_article/kerberos-delegation/
- https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/s4u2pwnage/
- https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-kerberos-constrained-delegation
- https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/delegating-like-a-boss-abusing-kerberos-delegation-in-active-directory/
- https://stealthbits.com/blog/what-is-kerberos-delegation-an-overview-of-kerberos-delegation/
- https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1
- https://pentestlab.blog/2022/03/21/unconstrained-delegation/
- https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/delegations#talk
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection: # Delegation to any service, Kerberos only
EventID: 4742
UserAccountControl: '%%2093' # Enable option "Trust this computer for delegation to any service (Kerberos only)"
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Rare administrator modifying host delegation settings
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
EventID: 4742
UserAccountControl: '%%2093'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
UserAccountControl | eq |
| field:"UserAccountControl" kind:eq value:"%%2093" |
Injected Browser Process Spawning Rundll32 - GuLoader Activity
#Detects the execution of installed GuLoader malware on the host. GuLoader is initiating network connections via the rundll32.exe process that is spawned via a browser parent(injected) process.
Known False Positives
- Unlikely
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule Body
title: Injected Browser Process Spawning Rundll32 - GuLoader Activity
id: 89e1490f-1a3e-452a-bbb8-b68a5f58072f
status: test
description: |
Detects the execution of installed GuLoader malware on the host.
GuLoader is initiating network connections via the rundll32.exe process that is spawned via a browser parent(injected) process.
references:
- Internal Research
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2023-08-07
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1055
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\chrome.exe'
- '\firefox.exe'
- '\msedge.exe'
Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
CommandLine|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\chrome.exe'
- '\firefox.exe'
- '\msedge.exe'
Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
CommandLine|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | ends_with |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:ends_with value:"\rundll32.exe" |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\rundll32.exe" |
ParentImage | ends_with |
| field:"ParentImage" kind:ends_with |
Kaspersky Endpoint Security Stopped Via CommandLine - Linux
#Detects execution of the Kaspersky init.d stop script on Linux systems either directly or via systemctl. This activity may indicate a manual interruption of the antivirus service by an administrator, or it could be a sign of potential tampering or evasion attempts by malicious actors.
Known False Positives
- System administrator manually stopping Kaspersky services
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Impairment |
Telemetry Coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Linux | Event ID 1: Process Create |
Rule Body
title: Kaspersky Endpoint Security Stopped Via CommandLine - Linux
id: 36388120-b3f1-4ce9-b50b-280d9a7f4c04
status: experimental
description: |
Detects execution of the Kaspersky init.d stop script on Linux systems either directly or via systemctl.
This activity may indicate a manual interruption of the antivirus service by an administrator, or it could be a sign of potential tampering or evasion attempts by malicious actors.
references:
- https://support.kaspersky.com/KES4Linux/12.0.0/en-US/197929.htm
author: Milad Cheraghi
date: 2025-10-18
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: linux
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
# Note: Add the list of shells allowed in your environment that can be used to run init.d scripts.
- '/systemctl'
- '/bash'
- '/sh'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'stop'
- 'kesl'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- System administrator manually stopping Kaspersky services
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '/systemctl'
- '/bash'
- '/sh'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'stop'
- 'kesl'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with |
Kerberos key list attack for credential dumping
#Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to forge a special Kerberos service ticket in order to extract credentials from Read Only Domain Controllers (RODC).
Known False Positives
- Applications or services performing delegation activities, ADFS servers
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4769: A Kerberos service ticket was requested. |
Rule Body
title: Kerberos key list attack for credential dumping
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to forge a special Kerberos service ticket in order to extract credentials from Read Only Domain Controllers (RODC).
references:
- https://www.secureauth.com/blog/the-kerberos-key-list-attack-the-return-of-the-read-only-domain-controllers/
- https://www.tarlogic.com/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003 # credential dumping
- attack.t1558 # forget ticket
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4769
Status: 0x0 # Success
TicketOptions: '0x10000' # proxiable ticket
filter:
- IpAddress: '%domain_controllers_ips%' # reduce amount of false positives
- TargetUserName: '%account_allowed_proxy%' # accounts allowed to perform proxiable requests
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Applications or services performing delegation activities, ADFS servers
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not filterStage 1: selection
selection:
EventID: 4769
Status: 0x0
TicketOptions: '0x10000'
Stage 2: not filter
filter:
- IpAddress: '%domain_controllers_ips%'
- TargetUserName: '%account_allowed_proxy%'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Status | eq |
| field:"Status" kind:eq value:"0" |
TicketOptions | eq |
| field:"TicketOptions" kind:eq value:"0x10000" |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
IpAddress | eq | %domain_controllers_ips% | excludes:IpAddress field:"IpAddress" value:"%domain_controllers_ips%" |
TargetUserName | eq | %account_allowed_proxy% | excludes:TargetUserName field:"TargetUserName" value:"%account_allowed_proxy%" |
macOS Sudo Privilege Escalation Attempts
#Detects sudo command execution and privilege escalation attempts from the com.apple.sudo subsystem. Monitors for both successful and failed sudo attempts which may indicate privilege escalation activities or credential abuse.
Known False Positives
- Legitimate administrative tasks
- System maintenance operations
- Software installations requiring elevated privileges
- Authorized privileged user activities
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation |
Rule Body
title: macOS Sudo Privilege Escalation Attempts
id: 8f79e9a5-56d3-451d-9c2a-81d8cbe7be61
status: experimental
description: 'Detects sudo command execution and privilege escalation attempts from
the
com.apple.sudo subsystem. Monitors for both successful and failed sudo attempts
which may indicate privilege escalation activities or credential abuse.
'
author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
date: 2025/10/31
modified: 2025/10/31
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
logsource:
product: macos
service: unifiedlog
detection:
selection_subsystem:
subsystem: com.apple.sudo
selection_keywords:
message|contains:
- COMMAND
- authentication
- sudo
- root
condition: selection_subsystem and selection_keywords
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative tasks
- System maintenance operations
- Software installations requiring elevated privileges
- Authorized privileged user activities
fields:
- subsystem
- category
- process
- message
- level
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1548.003
- attack.t1078
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection_subsystem and selection_keywordsStage 1: selection_subsystem
selection_subsystem:
subsystem: com.apple.sudo
Stage 2: selection_keywords
selection_keywords:
message|contains:
- COMMAND
- authentication
- sudo
- root
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
message | match |
| field:"message" kind:match |
subsystem | eq |
| field:"subsystem" kind:eq value:"com.apple.sudo" |
Malicious IP Address Sign-In Suspicious
#Indicates sign-in from a malicious IP address known to be malicious at time of sign-in.
Known False Positives
- We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Command & Control |
Rule Body
title: Malicious IP Address Sign-In Suspicious
id: 36440e1c-5c22-467a-889b-593e66498472
status: test
description: Indicates sign-in from a malicious IP address known to be malicious at time of sign-in.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#malicious-ip-address
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-07
tags:
- attack.t1090
- attack.command-and-control
logsource:
product: azure
service: riskdetection
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'suspiciousIPAddress'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
riskEventType: 'suspiciousIPAddress'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
riskEventType | eq |
| field:"azure_ad::risk_event_types" kind:eq value:"suspiciousIPAddress" |
Mavinject Inject DLL Into Running Process
#Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool "Mavinject" via the "INJECTRUNNING" flag
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule Body
title: Mavinject Inject DLL Into Running Process
id: 4f73421b-5a0b-4bbf-a892-5a7fb99bea66
related:
- id: 17eb8e57-9983-420d-ad8a-2c4976c22eb8
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool "Mavinject" via the "INJECTRUNNING" flag
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1056.004/T1056.004.md
- https://posts.specterops.io/mavinject-exe-functionality-deconstructed-c29ab2cf5c0e
- https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/941315826107510784
- https://reaqta.com/2017/12/mavinject-microsoft-injector/
- https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/776122138063409152 # Deleted tweet
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/3742
- https://github.com/keyboardcrunch/SentinelOne-ATTACK-Queries/blob/6a228d23eefe963ca81f2d52f94b815f61ef5ee0/Tactics/DefenseEvasion.md#t1055-process-injection
author: frack113, Florian Roth
date: 2021-07-12
modified: 2022-12-05
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1055.001
- attack.t1218.013
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains: ' /INJECTRUNNING '
filter:
ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\AppVClient.exe' # This parent is the expected process to launch "mavinject"
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_mavinject_process_injection/info.yml
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not filterStage 1: selection
selection:
CommandLine|contains: ' /INJECTRUNNING '
Stage 2: not filter
filter:
ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\AppVClient.exe'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match value:" /INJECTRUNNING " |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
ParentImage | eq | C:\Windows\System32\AppVClient.exe | excludes:ParentImage field:"ParentImage" value:"C:\Windows\System32\AppVClient.exe" |
Nohup Execution
#Detects usage of nohup which could be leveraged by an attacker to keep a process running or break out from restricted environments
Known False Positives
- Administrators or installed processes that leverage nohup
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution |
Telemetry Coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Linux | Event ID 1: Process Create |
Rule Body
title: Nohup Execution
id: e4ffe466-6ff8-48d4-94bd-e32d1a6061e2
status: test
description: Detects usage of nohup which could be leveraged by an attacker to keep a process running or break out from restricted environments
references:
- https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/nohup/
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nohup
- https://www.computerhope.com/unix/unohup.htm
author: 'Christopher Peacock @SecurePeacock, SCYTHE @scythe_io'
date: 2022-06-06
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.004
logsource:
product: linux
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/nohup'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrators or installed processes that leverage nohup
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
Image|endswith: '/nohup'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"/nohup" |
Pandemic Registry Key
#Detects Pandemic Windows Implant
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Command & Control |
Telemetry Coverage
Rule Body
title: Pandemic Registry Key
id: 47e0852a-cf81-4494-a8e6-31864f8c86ed
status: test
description: Detects Pandemic Windows Implant
references:
- https://wikileaks.org/vault7/#Pandemic
- https://twitter.com/MalwareJake/status/870349480356454401
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-06-01
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1105
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: registry_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\null\Instance'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
TargetObject|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\null\Instance'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
TargetObject | match |
| field:"TargetObject" kind:match value:"\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\null\Instance" |
Potential Defense Evasion Activity Via Emoji Usage In CommandLine - 2
#Detects the usage of emojis in the command line, this could be a sign of potential defense evasion activity.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth | No specific technique |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule Body
title: Potential Defense Evasion Activity Via Emoji Usage In CommandLine - 2
id: c98f2a0d-e1b8-4f76-90d3-359caf88d6b9
status: test
description: Detects the usage of emojis in the command line, this could be a sign of potential defense evasion activity.
author: '@Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport'
references:
- Internal Research
tags:
- attack.stealth
date: 2022-12-05
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- '🤷🏼'
- '🤷🏼♂️'
- '🙎🏼♀️'
- '🙎🏼'
- '🙎🏼♂️'
- '🙍🏼♀️'
- '🙍🏼'
- '🙍🏼♂️'
- '💇🏼♀️'
- '💇🏼'
- '💇🏼♂️'
- '💆🏼♀️'
- '💆🏼'
- '💆🏼♂️'
- '🧖🏼♀️'
- '🧖🏼'
- '🧖🏼♂️'
- '💃🏼'
- '🕺🏼'
- '🕴🏼'
- '👩🏼🦽'
- '🧑🏼🦽'
- '👨🏼🦽'
- '👩🏼🦼'
- '🧑🏼🦼'
- '👨🏼🦼'
- '🚶🏼♀️'
- '🚶🏼'
- '🚶🏼♂️'
- '👩🏼🦯'
- '🧑🏼🦯'
- '👨🏼🦯'
- '🧎🏼♀️'
- '🧎🏼'
- '🧎🏼♂️'
- '🏃🏼♀️'
- '🏃🏼'
- '🏃🏼♂️'
- '🧍🏼♀️'
- '🧍🏼'
- '🧍🏼♂️'
- '👭🏼'
- '🧑🏼🤝🧑🏼'
- '👬🏼'
- '👫🏼'
- '🧗🏼♀️'
- '🧗🏼'
- '🧗🏼♂️'
- '🏇🏼'
- '🏂🏼'
- '🏌🏼♀️'
- '🏌🏼'
- '🏌🏼♂️'
- '🏄🏼♀️'
- '🏄🏼'
- '🏄🏼♂️'
- '🚣🏼♀️'
- '🚣🏼'
- '🚣🏼♂️'
- '🏊🏼♀️'
- '🏊🏼'
- '🏊🏼♂️'
- '⛹🏼♀️'
- '⛹🏼'
- '⛹🏼♂️'
- '🏋🏼♀️'
- '🏋🏼'
- '🏋🏼♂️'
- '🚴🏼♀️'
- '🚴🏼'
- '🚴🏼♂️'
- '🚵🏼♀️'
- '🚵🏼'
- '🚵🏼♂️'
- '🤸🏼♀️'
- '🤸🏼'
- '🤸🏼♂️'
- '🤽🏼♀️'
- '🤽🏼'
- '🤽🏼♂️'
- '🤾🏼♀️'
- '🤾🏼'
- '🤾🏼♂️'
- '🤹🏼♀️'
- '🤹🏼'
- '🤹🏼♂️'
- '🧘🏼♀️'
- '🧘🏼'
- '🧘🏼♂️'
- '🛀🏼'
- '🛌🏼'
- '👋🏽'
- '🤚🏽'
- '🖐🏽'
- '✋🏽'
- '🖖🏽'
- '👌🏽'
- '🤌🏽'
- '🤏🏽'
- '✌🏽'
- '🤞🏽'
- '🫰🏽'
- '🤟🏽'
- '🤘🏽'
- '🤙🏽'
- '🫵🏽'
- '🫱🏽'
- '🫲🏽'
- '🫳🏽'
- '🫴🏽'
- '👈🏽'
- '👉🏽'
- '👆🏽'
- '🖕🏽'
- '👇🏽'
- '☝🏽'
- '👍🏽'
- '👎🏽'
- '✊🏽'
- '👊🏽'
- '🤛🏽'
- '🤜🏽'
- '👏🏽'
- '🫶🏽'
- '🙌🏽'
- '👐🏽'
- '🤲🏽'
- '🙏🏽'
- '✍🏽'
- '💪🏽'
- '🦵🏽'
- '🦶🏽'
- '👂🏽'
- '🦻🏽'
- '👃🏽'
- '👶🏽'
- '👧🏽'
- '🧒🏽'
- '👦🏽'
- '👩🏽'
- '🧑🏽'
- '👨🏽'
- '👩🏽🦱'
- '🧑🏽🦱'
- '👨🏽🦱'
- '👩🏽🦰'
- '🧑🏽🦰'
- '👨🏽🦰'
- '👱🏽♀️'
- '👱🏽'
- '👱🏽♂️'
- '👩🏽🦳'
- '🧑🏽🦳'
- '👨🏽🦳'
- '👩🏽🦲'
- '🧑🏽🦲'
- '👨🏽🦲'
- '🧔🏽♀️'
- '🧔🏽'
- '🧔🏽♂️'
- '👵🏽'
- '🧓🏽'
- '👴🏽'
- '👲🏽'
- '👳🏽♀️'
- '👳🏽'
- '👳🏽♂️'
- '🧕🏽'
- '👮🏽♀️'
- '👮🏽'
- '👮🏽♂️'
- '👷🏽♀️'
- '👷🏽'
- '👷🏽♂️'
- '💂🏽♀️'
- '💂🏽'
- '💂🏽♂️'
- '🕵🏽♀️'
- '🕵🏽'
- '🕵🏽♂️'
- '👩🏽⚕️'
- '🧑🏽⚕️'
- '👨🏽⚕️'
- '👩🏽🌾'
- '🧑🏽🌾'
- '👨🏽🌾'
- '👩🏽🍳'
- '🧑🏽🍳'
- '👨🏽🍳'
- '👩🏽🎓'
- '🧑🏽🎓'
- '👨🏽🎓'
- '👩🏽🎤'
- '🧑🏽🎤'
- '👨🏽🎤'
- '👩🏽🏫'
- '🧑🏽🏫'
- '👨🏽🏫'
- '👩🏽🏭'
- '🧑🏽🏭'
- '👨🏽🏭'
- '👩🏽💻'
- '🧑🏽💻'
- '👨🏽💻'
- '👩🏽💼'
- '🧑🏽💼'
- '👨🏽💼'
- '👩🏽🔧'
- '🧑🏽🔧'
- '👨🏽🔧'
- '👩🏽🔬'
- '🧑🏽🔬'
- '👨🏽🔬'
- '👩🏽🎨'
- '🧑🏽🎨'
- '👨🏽🎨'
- '👩🏽🚒'
- '🧑🏽🚒'
- '👨🏽🚒'
- '👩🏽✈️'
- '🧑🏽✈️'
- '👨🏽✈️'
- '👩🏽🚀'
- '🧑🏽🚀'
- '👨🏽🚀'
- '👩🏽⚖️'
- '🧑🏽⚖️'
- '👨🏽⚖️'
- '👰🏽♀️'
- '👰🏽'
- '👰🏽♂️'
- '🤵🏽♀️'
- '🤵🏽'
- '🤵🏽♂️'
- '👸🏽'
- '🫅🏽'
- '🤴🏽'
- '🥷🏽'
- '🦸🏽♀️'
- '🦸🏽'
- '🦸🏽♂️'
- '🦹🏽♀️'
- '🦹🏽'
- '🦹🏽♂️'
- '🤶🏽'
- '🧑🏽🎄'
- '🎅🏽'
- '🧙🏽♀️'
- '🧙🏽'
- '🧙🏽♂️'
- '🧝🏽♀️'
- '🧝🏽'
- '🧝🏽♂️'
- '🧛🏽♀️'
- '🧛🏽'
- '🧛🏽♂️'
- '🧜🏽♀️'
- '🧜🏽'
- '🧜🏽♂️'
- '🧚🏽♀️'
- '🧚🏽'
- '🧚🏽♂️'
- '👼🏽'
- '🤰🏽'
- '🫄🏽'
- '🫃🏽'
- '🤱🏽'
- '👩🏽🍼'
- '🧑🏽🍼'
- '👨🏽🍼'
- '🙇🏽♀️'
- '🙇🏽'
- '🙇🏽♂️'
- '💁🏽♀️'
- '💁🏽'
- '💁🏽♂️'
- '🙅🏽♀️'
- '🙅🏽'
- '🙅🏽♂️'
- '🙆🏽♀️'
- '🙆🏽'
- '🙆🏽♂️'
- '🙋🏽♀️'
- '🙋🏽'
- '🙋🏽♂️'
- '🧏🏽♀️'
- '🧏🏽'
- '🧏🏽♂️'
- '🤦🏽♀️'
- '🤦🏽'
- '🤦🏽♂️'
- '🤷🏽♀️'
- '🤷🏽'
- '🤷🏽♂️'
- '🙎🏽♀️'
- '🙎🏽'
- '🙎🏽♂️'
- '🙍🏽♀️'
- '🙍🏽'
- '🙍🏽♂️'
- '💇🏽♀️'
- '💇🏽'
- '💇🏽♂️'
- '💆🏽♀️'
- '💆🏽'
- '💆🏽♂️'
- '🧖🏽♀️'
- '🧖🏽'
- '🧖🏽♂️'
- '💃🏽'
- '🕺🏽'
- '🕴🏽'
- '👩🏽🦽'
- '🧑🏽🦽'
- '👨🏽🦽'
- '👩🏽🦼'
- '🧑🏽🦼'
- '👨🏽🦼'
- '🚶🏽♀️'
- '🚶🏽'
- '🚶🏽♂️'
- '👩🏽🦯'
- '🧑🏽🦯'
- '👨🏽🦯'
- '🧎🏽♀️'
- '🧎🏽'
- '🧎🏽♂️'
- '🏃🏽♀️'
- '🏃🏽'
- '🏃🏽♂️'
- '🧍🏽♀️'
- '🧍🏽'
- '🧍🏽♂️'
- '👭🏽'
- '🧑🏽🤝🧑🏽'
- '👬🏽'
- '👫🏽'
- '🧗🏽♀️'
- '🧗🏽'
- '🧗🏽♂️'
- '🏇🏽'
- '🏂🏽'
- '🏌🏽♀️'
- '🏌🏽'
- '🏌🏽♂️'
- '🏄🏽♀️'
- '🏄🏽'
- '🏄🏽♂️'
- '🚣🏽♀️'
- '🚣🏽'
- '🚣🏽♂️'
- '🏊🏽♀️'
- '🏊🏽'
- '🏊🏽♂️'
- '⛹🏽♀️'
- '⛹🏽'
- '⛹🏽♂️'
- '🏋🏽♀️'
- '🏋🏽'
- '🏋🏽♂️'
- '🚴🏽♀️'
- '🚴🏽'
- '🚴🏽♂️'
- '🚵🏽♀️'
- '🚵🏽'
- '🚵🏽♂️'
- '🤸🏽♀️'
- '🤸🏽'
- '🤸🏽♂️'
- '🤽🏽♀️'
- '🤽🏽'
- '🤽🏽♂️'
- '🤾🏽♀️'
- '🤾🏽'
- '🤾🏽♂️'
- '🤹🏽♀️'
- '🤹🏽'
- '🤹🏽♂️'
- '🧘🏽♀️'
- '🧘🏽'
- '🧘🏽♂️'
- '🛀🏽'
- '🛌🏽'
- '👋🏾'
- '🤚🏾'
- '🖐🏾'
- '✋🏾'
- '🖖🏾'
- '👌🏾'
- '🤌🏾'
- '🤏🏾'
- '✌🏾'
- '🤞🏾'
- '🫰🏾'
- '🤟🏾'
- '🤘🏾'
- '🤙🏾'
- '🫵🏾'
- '🫱🏾'
- '🫲🏾'
- '🫳🏾'
- '🫴🏾'
- '👈🏾'
- '👉🏾'
- '👆🏾'
- '🖕🏾'
- '👇🏾'
- '☝🏾'
- '👍🏾'
- '👎🏾'
- '✊🏾'
- '👊🏾'
- '🤛🏾'
- '🤜🏾'
- '👏🏾'
- '🫶🏾'
- '🙌🏾'
- '👐🏾'
- '🤲🏾'
- '🙏🏾'
- '✍🏾'
- '💪🏾'
- '🦵🏾'
- '🦶🏾'
- '👂🏾'
- '🦻🏾'
- '👃🏾'
- '👶🏾'
- '👧🏾'
- '🧒🏾'
- '👦🏾'
- '👩🏾'
- '🧑🏾'
- '👨🏾'
- '👩🏾🦱'
- '🧑🏾🦱'
- '👨🏾🦱'
- '👩🏾🦰'
- '🧑🏾🦰'
- '👨🏾🦰'
- '👱🏾♀️'
- '👱🏾'
- '👱🏾♂️'
- '👩🏾🦳'
- '🧑🏾🦳'
- '👨🏾🦳'
- '👩🏾🦲'
- '🧑🏾🦲'
- '👨🏾🦲'
- '🧔🏾♀️'
- '🧔🏾'
- '🧔🏾♂️'
- '👵🏾'
- '🧓🏾'
- '👴🏾'
- '👲🏾'
- '👳🏾♀️'
- '👳🏾'
- '👳🏾♂️'
- '🧕🏾'
- '👮🏾♀️'
- '👮🏾'
- '👮🏾♂️'
- '👷🏾♀️'
- '👷🏾'
- '👷🏾♂️'
- '💂🏾♀️'
- '💂🏾'
- '💂🏾♂️'
- '🕵🏾♀️'
- '🕵🏾'
- '🕵🏾♂️'
- '👩🏾⚕️'
- '🧑🏾⚕️'
- '👨🏾⚕️'
- '👩🏾🌾'
- '🧑🏾🌾'
- '👨🏾🌾'
- '👩🏾🍳'
- '🧑🏾🍳'
- '👨🏾🍳'
- '👩🏾🎓'
- '🧑🏾🎓'
- '👨🏾🎓'
- '👩🏾🎤'
- '🧑🏾🎤'
- '👨🏾🎤'
- '👩🏾🏫'
- '🧑🏾🏫'
- '👨🏾🏫'
- '👩🏾🏭'
- '🧑🏾🏭'
- '👨🏾🏭'
- '👩🏾💻'
- '🧑🏾💻'
- '👨🏾💻'
- '👩🏾💼'
- '🧑🏾💼'
- '👨🏾💼'
- '👩🏾🔧'
- '🧑🏾🔧'
- '👨🏾🔧'
- '👩🏾🔬'
- '🧑🏾🔬'
- '👨🏾🔬'
- '👩🏾🎨'
- '🧑🏾🎨'
- '👨🏾🎨'
- '👩🏾🚒'
- '🧑🏾🚒'
- '👨🏾🚒'
- '👩🏾✈️'
- '🧑🏾✈️'
- '👨🏾✈️'
- '👩🏾🚀'
- '🧑🏾🚀'
- '👨🏾🚀'
- '👩🏾⚖️'
- '🧑🏾⚖️'
- '👨🏾⚖️'
- '👰🏾♀️'
- '👰🏾'
- '👰🏾♂️'
- '🤵🏾♀️'
- '🤵🏾'
- '🤵🏾♂️'
- '👸🏾'
- '🫅🏾'
- '🤴🏾'
- '🥷🏾'
- '🦸🏾♀️'
- '🦸🏾'
- '🦸🏾♂️'
- '🦹🏾♀️'
- '🦹🏾'
- '🦹🏾♂️'
- '🤶🏾'
- '🧑🏾🎄'
- '🎅🏾'
- '🧙🏾♀️'
- '🧙🏾'
- '🧙🏾♂️'
- '🧝🏾♀️'
- '🧝🏾'
- '🧝🏾♂️'
- '🧛🏾♀️'
- '🧛🏾'
- '🧛🏾♂️'
- '🧜🏾♀️'
- '🧜🏾'
- '🧜🏾♂️'
- '🧚🏾♀️'
- '🧚🏾'
- '🧚🏾♂️'
- '👼🏾'
- '🤰🏾'
- '🫄🏾'
- '🫃🏾'
- '🤱🏾'
- '👩🏾🍼'
- '🧑🏾🍼'
- '👨🏾🍼'
- '🙇🏾♀️'
- '🙇🏾'
- '🙇🏾♂️'
- '💁🏾♀️'
- '💁🏾'
- '💁🏾♂️'
- '🙅🏾♀️'
- '🙅🏾'
- '🙅🏾♂️'
- '🙆🏾♀️'
- '🙆🏾'
- '🙆🏾♂️'
- '🙋🏾♀️'
- '🙋🏾'
- '🙋🏾♂️'
- '🧏🏾♀️'
- '🧏🏾'
- '🧏🏾♂️'
- '🤦🏾♀️'
- '🤦🏾'
- '🤦🏾♂️'
- '🤷🏾♀️'
- '🤷🏾'
- '🤷🏾♂️'
- '🙎🏾♀️'
- '🙎🏾'
- '🙎🏾♂️'
- '🙍🏾♀️'
- '🙍🏾'
- '🙍🏾♂️'
- '💇🏾♀️'
- '💇🏾'
- '💇🏾♂️'
- '💆🏾♀️'
- '💆🏾'
- '💆🏾♂️'
- '🧖🏾♀️'
- '🧖🏾'
- '🧖🏾♂️'
- '💃🏾'
- '🕺🏾'
- '👩🏾🦽'
- '🧑🏾🦽'
- '👨🏾🦽'
- '👩🏾🦼'
- '🧑🏾🦼'
- '👨🏾🦼'
- '🚶🏾♀️'
- '🚶🏾'
- '🚶🏾♂️'
- '👩🏾🦯'
- '🧑🏾🦯'
- '👨🏾🦯'
- '🧎🏾♀️'
- '🧎🏾'
- '🧎🏾♂️'
- '🏃🏾♀️'
- '🏃🏾'
- '🏃🏾♂️'
- '🧍🏾♀️'
- '🧍🏾'
- '🧍🏾♂️'
- '👭🏾'
- '🧑🏾🤝🧑🏾'
- '👬🏾'
- '👫🏾'
- '🧗🏾♀️'
- '🧗🏾'
- '🧗🏾♂️'
- '🏇🏾'
- '🏂🏾'
- '🏌🏾♀️'
- '🏌🏾'
- '🏌🏾♂️'
- '🏄🏾♀️'
- '🏄🏾'
- '🏄🏾♂️'
- '🚣🏾♀️'
- '🚣🏾'
- '🚣🏾♂️'
- '🏊🏾♀️'
- '🏊🏾'
- '🏊🏾♂️'
- '⛹🏾♀️'
- '⛹🏾'
- '⛹🏾♂️'
- '🏋🏾♀️'
- '🏋🏾'
- '🏋🏾♂️'
- '🚴🏾♀️'
- '🚴🏾'
- '🚴🏾♂️'
- '🚵🏾♀️'
- '🚵🏾'
- '🚵🏾♂️'
- '🤸🏾♀️'
- '🤸🏾'
- '🤸🏾♂️'
- '🤽🏾♀️'
- '🤽🏾'
- '🤽🏾♂️'
- '🤾🏾♀️'
- '🤾🏾'
- '🤾🏾♂️'
- '🤹🏾♀️'
- '🤹🏾'
- '🤹🏾♂️'
- '🧘🏾♀️'
- '🧘🏾'
- '🧘🏾♂️'
- '🛀🏾'
- '🛌🏾'
- '👋🏿'
- '🤚🏿'
- '🖐🏿'
- '✋🏿'
- '🖖🏿'
- '👌🏿'
- '🤌🏿'
- '🤏🏿'
- '✌🏿'
- '🤞🏿'
- '🫰🏿'
- '🤟🏿'
- '🤘🏿'
- '🤙🏿'
- '🫵🏿'
- '🫱🏿'
- '🫲🏿'
- '🫳🏿'
- '🫴🏿'
- '👈🏿'
- '👉🏿'
- '👆🏿'
- '🖕🏿'
- '👇🏿'
- '☝🏿'
- '👍🏿'
- '👎🏿'
- '✊🏿'
- '👊🏿'
- '🤛🏿'
- '🤜🏿'
- '👏🏿'
- '🫶🏿'
- '🙌🏿'
- '👐🏿'
- '🤲🏿'
- '🙏🏿'
- '✍🏿'
- '🤳🏿'
- '💪🏿'
- '🦵🏿'
- '🦶🏿'
- '👂🏿'
- '🦻🏿'
- '👃🏿'
- '👶🏿'
- '👧🏿'
- '🧒🏿'
- '👦🏿'
- '👩🏿'
- '🧑🏿'
- '👨🏿'
- '👩🏿🦱'
- '🧑🏿🦱'
- '👨🏿🦱'
- '👩🏿🦰'
- '🧑🏿🦰'
- '👨🏿🦰'
- '👱🏿♀️'
- '👱🏿'
- '👱🏿♂️'
- '👩🏿🦳'
- '🧑🏿🦳'
- '👨🏿🦳'
- '👩🏿🦲'
- '🧑🏿🦲'
- '👨🏿🦲'
- '🧔🏿♀️'
- '🧔🏿'
- '🧔🏿♂️'
- '👵🏿'
- '🧓🏿'
- '👴🏿'
- '👲🏿'
- '👳🏿♀️'
- '👳🏿'
- '👳🏿♂️'
- '🧕🏿'
- '👮🏿♀️'
- '👮🏿'
- '👮🏿♂️'
- '👷🏿♀️'
- '👷🏿'
- '👷🏿♂️'
- '💂🏿♀️'
- '💂🏿'
- '💂🏿♂️'
- '🕵🏿♀️'
- '🕵🏿'
- '🕵🏿♂️'
- '👩🏿⚕️'
- '🧑🏿⚕️'
- '👨🏿⚕️'
- '👩🏿🌾'
- '🧑🏿🌾'
- '👨🏿🌾'
- '👩🏿🍳'
- '🧑🏿🍳'
- '👨🏿🍳'
- '👩🏿🎓'
- '🧑🏿🎓'
- '👨🏿🎓'
- '👩🏿🎤'
- '🧑🏿🎤'
- '👨🏿🎤'
- '👩🏿🏫'
- '🧑🏿🏫'
- '👨🏿🏫'
- '👩🏿🏭'
- '🧑🏿🏭'
- '👨🏿🏭'
- '👩🏿💻'
- '🧑🏿💻'
- '👨🏿💻'
- '👩🏿💼'
- '🧑🏿💼'
- '👨🏿💼'
- '👩🏿🔧'
- '🧑🏿🔧'
- '👨🏿🔧'
- '👩🏿🔬'
- '🧑🏿🔬'
- '👨🏿🔬'
- '👩🏿🎨'
- '🧑🏿🎨'
- '👨🏿🎨'
- '👩🏿🚒'
- '🧑🏿🚒'
- '👨🏿🚒'
- '👩🏿✈️'
- '🧑🏿✈️'
- '👨🏿✈️'
- '👩🏿🚀'
- '🧑🏿🚀'
- '👨🏿🚀'
- '👩🏿⚖️'
- '🧑🏿⚖️'
- '👨🏿⚖️'
- '👰🏿♀️'
- '👰🏿'
- '👰🏿♂️'
- '🤵🏿♀️'
- '🤵🏿'
- '🤵🏿♂️'
- '👸🏿'
- '🫅🏿'
- '🤴🏿'
- '🥷🏿'
- '🦸🏿♀️'
- '🦸🏿'
- '🦸🏿♂️'
- '🦹🏿♀️'
- '🦹🏿'
- '🦹🏿♂️'
- '🤶🏿'
- '🧑🏿🎄'
- '🎅🏿'
- '🧙🏿♀️'
- '🧙🏿'
- '🧙🏿♂️'
- '🧝🏿♀️'
- '🧝🏿'
- '🧝🏿♂️'
- '🧛🏿♀️'
- '🧛🏿'
- '🧛🏿♂️'
- '🧜🏿♀️'
- '🧜🏿'
- '🧜🏿♂️'
- '🧚🏿♀️'
- '🧚🏿'
- '🧚🏿♂️'
- '👼🏿'
- '🤰🏿'
- '🫄🏿'
- '🫃🏿'
- '🤱🏿'
- '👩🏿🍼'
- '🧑🏿🍼'
- '👨🏿🍼'
- '🙇🏿♀️'
- '🙇🏿'
- '🙇🏿♂️'
- '💁🏿♀️'
- '💁🏿'
- '💁🏿♂️'
- '🙅🏿♀️'
- '🙅🏿'
- '🙅🏿♂️'
- '🙆🏿♀️'
- '🙆🏿'
- '🙆🏿♂️'
- '🙋🏿♀️'
- '🙋🏿'
- '🙋🏿♂️'
- '🧏🏿♀️'
- '🧏🏿'
- '🧏🏿♂️'
- '🤦🏿♀️'
- '🤦🏿'
- '🤦🏿♂️'
- '🤷🏿♀️'
- '🤷🏿'
- '🤷🏿♂️'
- '🙎🏿♀️'
- '🙎🏿'
- '🙎🏿♂️'
- '🙍🏿♀️'
- '🙍🏿'
- '🙍🏿♂️'
- '💇🏿♀️'
- '💇🏿'
- '💇🏿♂️'
- '💆🏿♀️'
- '💆🏿'
- '💆🏿♂️'
- '🧖🏿♀️'
- '🧖🏿'
- '🧖🏿♂️'
- '💃🏿'
- '🕺🏿'
- '🕴🏿'
- '👩🏿🦽'
- '🧑🏿🦽'
- '👨🏿🦽'
- '👩🏿🦼'
- '🧑🏿🦼'
- '👨🏿🦼'
- '🚶🏿♀️'
- '🚶🏿'
- '🚶🏿♂️'
- '👩🏿🦯'
- '🧑🏿🦯'
- '👨🏿🦯'
- '🧎🏿♀️'
- '🧎🏿'
- '🧎🏿♂️'
- '🏃🏿♀️'
- '🏃🏿'
- '🏃🏿♂️'
- '🧍🏿♀️'
- '🧍🏿'
- '🧍🏿♂️'
- '👭🏿'
- '🧑🏿🤝🧑🏿'
- '👬🏿'
- '👫🏿'
- '🧗🏿♀️'
- '🧗🏿'
- '🧗🏿♂️'
- '🏇🏿'
- '🏂🏿'
- '🏌🏿♀️'
- '🏌🏿'
- '🏌🏿♂️'
- '🏄🏿♀️'
- '🏄🏿'
- '🏄🏿♂️'
- '🚣🏿♀️'
- '🚣🏿'
- '🚣🏿♂️'
- '🏊🏿♀️'
- '🏊🏿'
- '🏊🏿♂️'
- '⛹🏿♀️'
- '⛹🏿'
- '⛹🏿♂️'
- '🏋🏿♀️'
- '🏋🏿'
- '🏋🏿♂️'
- '🚴🏿♀️'
- '🚴🏿'
- '🚴🏿♂️'
- '🚵🏿♀️'
- '🚵🏿'
- '🚵🏿♂️'
- '🤸🏿♀️'
- '🤸🏿'
- '🤸🏿♂️'
- '🤽🏿♀️'
- '🤽🏿'
- '🤽🏿♂️'
- '🤾🏿♀️'
- '🤾🏿'
- '🤾🏿♂️'
- '🤹🏿♀️'
- '🤹🏿'
- '🤹🏿♂️'
- '🧘🏿♀️'
- '🧘🏿'
- '🧘🏿♂️'
- '🛀🏿'
- '🛌🏿'
- '🐶'
- '🐱'
- '🐭'
- '🐹'
- '🐰'
- '🦊'
- '🐻'
- '🐼'
- '🐻❄️'
- '🐨'
- '🐯'
- '🦁'
- '🐮'
- '🐷'
- '🐽'
- '🐸'
- '🐵'
- '🙈'
- '🙉'
- '🙊'
- '🐒'
- '🐔'
- '🐧'
- '🐦'
- '🐤'
- '🐣'
- '🐥'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- '🤷🏼'
- '🤷🏼♂️'
- '🙎🏼♀️'
- '🙎🏼'
- '🙎🏼♂️'
- '🙍🏼♀️'
- '🙍🏼'
- '🙍🏼♂️'
- '💇🏼♀️'
- '💇🏼'
- '💇🏼♂️'
- '💆🏼♀️'
- '💆🏼'
- '💆🏼♂️'
- '🧖🏼♀️'
- '🧖🏼'
- '🧖🏼♂️'
- '💃🏼'
- '🕺🏼'
- '🕴🏼'
- '👩🏼🦽'
- '🧑🏼🦽'
- '👨🏼🦽'
- '👩🏼🦼'
- '🧑🏼🦼'
- '👨🏼🦼'
- '🚶🏼♀️'
- '🚶🏼'
- '🚶🏼♂️'
- '👩🏼🦯'
- '🧑🏼🦯'
- '👨🏼🦯'
- '🧎🏼♀️'
- '🧎🏼'
- '🧎🏼♂️'
- '🏃🏼♀️'
- '🏃🏼'
- '🏃🏼♂️'
- '🧍🏼♀️'
- '🧍🏼'
- '🧍🏼♂️'
- '👭🏼'
- '🧑🏼🤝🧑🏼'
- '👬🏼'
- '👫🏼'
- '🧗🏼♀️'
- '🧗🏼'
- '🧗🏼♂️'
- '🏇🏼'
- '🏂🏼'
- '🏌🏼♀️'
- '🏌🏼'
- '🏌🏼♂️'
- '🏄🏼♀️'
- '🏄🏼'
- '🏄🏼♂️'
- '🚣🏼♀️'
- '🚣🏼'
- '🚣🏼♂️'
- '🏊🏼♀️'
- '🏊🏼'
- '🏊🏼♂️'
- '⛹🏼♀️'
- '⛹🏼'
- '⛹🏼♂️'
- '🏋🏼♀️'
- '🏋🏼'
- '🏋🏼♂️'
- '🚴🏼♀️'
- '🚴🏼'
- '🚴🏼♂️'
- '🚵🏼♀️'
- '🚵🏼'
- '🚵🏼♂️'
- '🤸🏼♀️'
- '🤸🏼'
- '🤸🏼♂️'
- '🤽🏼♀️'
- '🤽🏼'
- '🤽🏼♂️'
- '🤾🏼♀️'
- '🤾🏼'
- '🤾🏼♂️'
- '🤹🏼♀️'
- '🤹🏼'
- '🤹🏼♂️'
- '🧘🏼♀️'
- '🧘🏼'
- '🧘🏼♂️'
- '🛀🏼'
- '🛌🏼'
- '👋🏽'
- '🤚🏽'
- '🖐🏽'
- '✋🏽'
- '🖖🏽'
- '👌🏽'
- '🤌🏽'
- '🤏🏽'
- '✌🏽'
- '🤞🏽'
- '🫰🏽'
- '🤟🏽'
- '🤘🏽'
- '🤙🏽'
- '🫵🏽'
- '🫱🏽'
- '🫲🏽'
- '🫳🏽'
- '🫴🏽'
- '👈🏽'
- '👉🏽'
- '👆🏽'
- '🖕🏽'
- '👇🏽'
- '☝🏽'
- '👍🏽'
- '👎🏽'
- '✊🏽'
- '👊🏽'
- '🤛🏽'
- '🤜🏽'
- '👏🏽'
- '🫶🏽'
- '🙌🏽'
- '👐🏽'
- '🤲🏽'
- '🙏🏽'
- '✍🏽'
- '💪🏽'
- '🦵🏽'
- '🦶🏽'
- '👂🏽'
- '🦻🏽'
- '👃🏽'
- '👶🏽'
- '👧🏽'
- '🧒🏽'
- '👦🏽'
- '👩🏽'
- '🧑🏽'
- '👨🏽'
- '👩🏽🦱'
- '🧑🏽🦱'
- '👨🏽🦱'
- '👩🏽🦰'
- '🧑🏽🦰'
- '👨🏽🦰'
- '👱🏽♀️'
- '👱🏽'
- '👱🏽♂️'
- '👩🏽🦳'
- '🧑🏽🦳'
- '👨🏽🦳'
- '👩🏽🦲'
- '🧑🏽🦲'
- '👨🏽🦲'
- '🧔🏽♀️'
- '🧔🏽'
- '🧔🏽♂️'
- '👵🏽'
- '🧓🏽'
- '👴🏽'
- '👲🏽'
- '👳🏽♀️'
- '👳🏽'
- '👳🏽♂️'
- '🧕🏽'
- '👮🏽♀️'
- '👮🏽'
- '👮🏽♂️'
- '👷🏽♀️'
- '👷🏽'
- '👷🏽♂️'
- '💂🏽♀️'
- '💂🏽'
- '💂🏽♂️'
- '🕵🏽♀️'
- '🕵🏽'
- '🕵🏽♂️'
- '👩🏽⚕️'
- '🧑🏽⚕️'
- '👨🏽⚕️'
- '👩🏽🌾'
- '🧑🏽🌾'
- '👨🏽🌾'
- '👩🏽🍳'
- '🧑🏽🍳'
- '👨🏽🍳'
- '👩🏽🎓'
- '🧑🏽🎓'
- '👨🏽🎓'
- '👩🏽🎤'
- '🧑🏽🎤'
- '👨🏽🎤'
- '👩🏽🏫'
- '🧑🏽🏫'
- '👨🏽🏫'
- '👩🏽🏭'
- '🧑🏽🏭'
- '👨🏽🏭'
- '👩🏽💻'
- '🧑🏽💻'
- '👨🏽💻'
- '👩🏽💼'
- '🧑🏽💼'
- '👨🏽💼'
- '👩🏽🔧'
- '🧑🏽🔧'
- '👨🏽🔧'
- '👩🏽🔬'
- '🧑🏽🔬'
- '👨🏽🔬'
- '👩🏽🎨'
- '🧑🏽🎨'
- '👨🏽🎨'
- '👩🏽🚒'
- '🧑🏽🚒'
- '👨🏽🚒'
- '👩🏽✈️'
- '🧑🏽✈️'
- '👨🏽✈️'
- '👩🏽🚀'
- '🧑🏽🚀'
- '👨🏽🚀'
- '👩🏽⚖️'
- '🧑🏽⚖️'
- '👨🏽⚖️'
- '👰🏽♀️'
- '👰🏽'
- '👰🏽♂️'
- '🤵🏽♀️'
- '🤵🏽'
- '🤵🏽♂️'
- '👸🏽'
- '🫅🏽'
- '🤴🏽'
- '🥷🏽'
- '🦸🏽♀️'
- '🦸🏽'
- '🦸🏽♂️'
- '🦹🏽♀️'
- '🦹🏽'
- '🦹🏽♂️'
- '🤶🏽'
- '🧑🏽🎄'
- '🎅🏽'
- '🧙🏽♀️'
- '🧙🏽'
- '🧙🏽♂️'
- '🧝🏽♀️'
- '🧝🏽'
- '🧝🏽♂️'
- '🧛🏽♀️'
- '🧛🏽'
- '🧛🏽♂️'
- '🧜🏽♀️'
- '🧜🏽'
- '🧜🏽♂️'
- '🧚🏽♀️'
- '🧚🏽'
- '🧚🏽♂️'
- '👼🏽'
- '🤰🏽'
- '🫄🏽'
- '🫃🏽'
- '🤱🏽'
- '👩🏽🍼'
- '🧑🏽🍼'
- '👨🏽🍼'
- '🙇🏽♀️'
- '🙇🏽'
- '🙇🏽♂️'
- '💁🏽♀️'
- '💁🏽'
- '💁🏽♂️'
- '🙅🏽♀️'
- '🙅🏽'
- '🙅🏽♂️'
- '🙆🏽♀️'
- '🙆🏽'
- '🙆🏽♂️'
- '🙋🏽♀️'
- '🙋🏽'
- '🙋🏽♂️'
- '🧏🏽♀️'
- '🧏🏽'
- '🧏🏽♂️'
- '🤦🏽♀️'
- '🤦🏽'
- '🤦🏽♂️'
- '🤷🏽♀️'
- '🤷🏽'
- '🤷🏽♂️'
- '🙎🏽♀️'
- '🙎🏽'
- '🙎🏽♂️'
- '🙍🏽♀️'
- '🙍🏽'
- '🙍🏽♂️'
- '💇🏽♀️'
- '💇🏽'
- '💇🏽♂️'
- '💆🏽♀️'
- '💆🏽'
- '💆🏽♂️'
- '🧖🏽♀️'
- '🧖🏽'
- '🧖🏽♂️'
- '💃🏽'
- '🕺🏽'
- '🕴🏽'
- '👩🏽🦽'
- '🧑🏽🦽'
- '👨🏽🦽'
- '👩🏽🦼'
- '🧑🏽🦼'
- '👨🏽🦼'
- '🚶🏽♀️'
- '🚶🏽'
- '🚶🏽♂️'
- '👩🏽🦯'
- '🧑🏽🦯'
- '👨🏽🦯'
- '🧎🏽♀️'
- '🧎🏽'
- '🧎🏽♂️'
- '🏃🏽♀️'
- '🏃🏽'
- '🏃🏽♂️'
- '🧍🏽♀️'
- '🧍🏽'
- '🧍🏽♂️'
- '👭🏽'
- '🧑🏽🤝🧑🏽'
- '👬🏽'
- '👫🏽'
- '🧗🏽♀️'
- '🧗🏽'
- '🧗🏽♂️'
- '🏇🏽'
- '🏂🏽'
- '🏌🏽♀️'
- '🏌🏽'
- '🏌🏽♂️'
- '🏄🏽♀️'
- '🏄🏽'
- '🏄🏽♂️'
- '🚣🏽♀️'
- '🚣🏽'
- '🚣🏽♂️'
- '🏊🏽♀️'
- '🏊🏽'
- '🏊🏽♂️'
- '⛹🏽♀️'
- '⛹🏽'
- '⛹🏽♂️'
- '🏋🏽♀️'
- '🏋🏽'
- '🏋🏽♂️'
- '🚴🏽♀️'
- '🚴🏽'
- '🚴🏽♂️'
- '🚵🏽♀️'
- '🚵🏽'
- '🚵🏽♂️'
- '🤸🏽♀️'
- '🤸🏽'
- '🤸🏽♂️'
- '🤽🏽♀️'
- '🤽🏽'
- '🤽🏽♂️'
- '🤾🏽♀️'
- '🤾🏽'
- '🤾🏽♂️'
- '🤹🏽♀️'
- '🤹🏽'
- '🤹🏽♂️'
- '🧘🏽♀️'
- '🧘🏽'
- '🧘🏽♂️'
- '🛀🏽'
- '🛌🏽'
- '👋🏾'
- '🤚🏾'
- '🖐🏾'
- '✋🏾'
- '🖖🏾'
- '👌🏾'
- '🤌🏾'
- '🤏🏾'
- '✌🏾'
- '🤞🏾'
- '🫰🏾'
- '🤟🏾'
- '🤘🏾'
- '🤙🏾'
- '🫵🏾'
- '🫱🏾'
- '🫲🏾'
- '🫳🏾'
- '🫴🏾'
- '👈🏾'
- '👉🏾'
- '👆🏾'
- '🖕🏾'
- '👇🏾'
- '☝🏾'
- '👍🏾'
- '👎🏾'
- '✊🏾'
- '👊🏾'
- '🤛🏾'
- '🤜🏾'
- '👏🏾'
- '🫶🏾'
- '🙌🏾'
- '👐🏾'
- '🤲🏾'
- '🙏🏾'
- '✍🏾'
- '💪🏾'
- '🦵🏾'
- '🦶🏾'
- '👂🏾'
- '🦻🏾'
- '👃🏾'
- '👶🏾'
- '👧🏾'
- '🧒🏾'
- '👦🏾'
- '👩🏾'
- '🧑🏾'
- '👨🏾'
- '👩🏾🦱'
- '🧑🏾🦱'
- '👨🏾🦱'
- '👩🏾🦰'
- '🧑🏾🦰'
- '👨🏾🦰'
- '👱🏾♀️'
- '👱🏾'
- '👱🏾♂️'
- '👩🏾🦳'
- '🧑🏾🦳'
- '👨🏾🦳'
- '👩🏾🦲'
- '🧑🏾🦲'
- '👨🏾🦲'
- '🧔🏾♀️'
- '🧔🏾'
- '🧔🏾♂️'
- '👵🏾'
- '🧓🏾'
- '👴🏾'
- '👲🏾'
- '👳🏾♀️'
- '👳🏾'
- '👳🏾♂️'
- '🧕🏾'
- '👮🏾♀️'
- '👮🏾'
- '👮🏾♂️'
- '👷🏾♀️'
- '👷🏾'
- '👷🏾♂️'
- '💂🏾♀️'
- '💂🏾'
- '💂🏾♂️'
- '🕵🏾♀️'
- '🕵🏾'
- '🕵🏾♂️'
- '👩🏾⚕️'
- '🧑🏾⚕️'
- '👨🏾⚕️'
- '👩🏾🌾'
- '🧑🏾🌾'
- '👨🏾🌾'
- '👩🏾🍳'
- '🧑🏾🍳'
- '👨🏾🍳'
- '👩🏾🎓'
- '🧑🏾🎓'
- '👨🏾🎓'
- '👩🏾🎤'
- '🧑🏾🎤'
- '👨🏾🎤'
- '👩🏾🏫'
- '🧑🏾🏫'
- '👨🏾🏫'
- '👩🏾🏭'
- '🧑🏾🏭'
- '👨🏾🏭'
- '👩🏾💻'
- '🧑🏾💻'
- '👨🏾💻'
- '👩🏾💼'
- '🧑🏾💼'
- '👨🏾💼'
- '👩🏾🔧'
- '🧑🏾🔧'
- '👨🏾🔧'
- '👩🏾🔬'
- '🧑🏾🔬'
- '👨🏾🔬'
- '👩🏾🎨'
- '🧑🏾🎨'
- '👨🏾🎨'
- '👩🏾🚒'
- '🧑🏾🚒'
- '👨🏾🚒'
- '👩🏾✈️'
- '🧑🏾✈️'
- '👨🏾✈️'
- '👩🏾🚀'
- '🧑🏾🚀'
- '👨🏾🚀'
- '👩🏾⚖️'
- '🧑🏾⚖️'
- '👨🏾⚖️'
- '👰🏾♀️'
- '👰🏾'
- '👰🏾♂️'
- '🤵🏾♀️'
- '🤵🏾'
- '🤵🏾♂️'
- '👸🏾'
- '🫅🏾'
- '🤴🏾'
- '🥷🏾'
- '🦸🏾♀️'
- '🦸🏾'
- '🦸🏾♂️'
- '🦹🏾♀️'
- '🦹🏾'
- '🦹🏾♂️'
- '🤶🏾'
- '🧑🏾🎄'
- '🎅🏾'
- '🧙🏾♀️'
- '🧙🏾'
- '🧙🏾♂️'
- '🧝🏾♀️'
- '🧝🏾'
- '🧝🏾♂️'
- '🧛🏾♀️'
- '🧛🏾'
- '🧛🏾♂️'
- '🧜🏾♀️'
- '🧜🏾'
- '🧜🏾♂️'
- '🧚🏾♀️'
- '🧚🏾'
- '🧚🏾♂️'
- '👼🏾'
- '🤰🏾'
- '🫄🏾'
- '🫃🏾'
- '🤱🏾'
- '👩🏾🍼'
- '🧑🏾🍼'
- '👨🏾🍼'
- '🙇🏾♀️'
- '🙇🏾'
- '🙇🏾♂️'
- '💁🏾♀️'
- '💁🏾'
- '💁🏾♂️'
- '🙅🏾♀️'
- '🙅🏾'
- '🙅🏾♂️'
- '🙆🏾♀️'
- '🙆🏾'
- '🙆🏾♂️'
- '🙋🏾♀️'
- '🙋🏾'
- '🙋🏾♂️'
- '🧏🏾♀️'
- '🧏🏾'
- '🧏🏾♂️'
- '🤦🏾♀️'
- '🤦🏾'
- '🤦🏾♂️'
- '🤷🏾♀️'
- '🤷🏾'
- '🤷🏾♂️'
- '🙎🏾♀️'
- '🙎🏾'
- '🙎🏾♂️'
- '🙍🏾♀️'
- '🙍🏾'
- '🙍🏾♂️'
- '💇🏾♀️'
- '💇🏾'
- '💇🏾♂️'
- '💆🏾♀️'
- '💆🏾'
- '💆🏾♂️'
- '🧖🏾♀️'
- '🧖🏾'
- '🧖🏾♂️'
- '💃🏾'
- '🕺🏾'
- '👩🏾🦽'
- '🧑🏾🦽'
- '👨🏾🦽'
- '👩🏾🦼'
- '🧑🏾🦼'
- '👨🏾🦼'
- '🚶🏾♀️'
- '🚶🏾'
- '🚶🏾♂️'
- '👩🏾🦯'
- '🧑🏾🦯'
- '👨🏾🦯'
- '🧎🏾♀️'
- '🧎🏾'
- '🧎🏾♂️'
- '🏃🏾♀️'
- '🏃🏾'
- '🏃🏾♂️'
- '🧍🏾♀️'
- '🧍🏾'
- '🧍🏾♂️'
- '👭🏾'
- '🧑🏾🤝🧑🏾'
- '👬🏾'
- '👫🏾'
- '🧗🏾♀️'
- '🧗🏾'
- '🧗🏾♂️'
- '🏇🏾'
- '🏂🏾'
- '🏌🏾♀️'
- '🏌🏾'
- '🏌🏾♂️'
- '🏄🏾♀️'
- '🏄🏾'
- '🏄🏾♂️'
- '🚣🏾♀️'
- '🚣🏾'
- '🚣🏾♂️'
- '🏊🏾♀️'
- '🏊🏾'
- '🏊🏾♂️'
- '⛹🏾♀️'
- '⛹🏾'
- '⛹🏾♂️'
- '🏋🏾♀️'
- '🏋🏾'
- '🏋🏾♂️'
- '🚴🏾♀️'
- '🚴🏾'
- '🚴🏾♂️'
- '🚵🏾♀️'
- '🚵🏾'
- '🚵🏾♂️'
- '🤸🏾♀️'
- '🤸🏾'
- '🤸🏾♂️'
- '🤽🏾♀️'
- '🤽🏾'
- '🤽🏾♂️'
- '🤾🏾♀️'
- '🤾🏾'
- '🤾🏾♂️'
- '🤹🏾♀️'
- '🤹🏾'
- '🤹🏾♂️'
- '🧘🏾♀️'
- '🧘🏾'
- '🧘🏾♂️'
- '🛀🏾'
- '🛌🏾'
- '👋🏿'
- '🤚🏿'
- '🖐🏿'
- '✋🏿'
- '🖖🏿'
- '👌🏿'
- '🤌🏿'
- '🤏🏿'
- '✌🏿'
- '🤞🏿'
- '🫰🏿'
- '🤟🏿'
- '🤘🏿'
- '🤙🏿'
- '🫵🏿'
- '🫱🏿'
- '🫲🏿'
- '🫳🏿'
- '🫴🏿'
- '👈🏿'
- '👉🏿'
- '👆🏿'
- '🖕🏿'
- '👇🏿'
- '☝🏿'
- '👍🏿'
- '👎🏿'
- '✊🏿'
- '👊🏿'
- '🤛🏿'
- '🤜🏿'
- '👏🏿'
- '🫶🏿'
- '🙌🏿'
- '👐🏿'
- '🤲🏿'
- '🙏🏿'
- '✍🏿'
- '🤳🏿'
- '💪🏿'
- '🦵🏿'
- '🦶🏿'
- '👂🏿'
- '🦻🏿'
- '👃🏿'
- '👶🏿'
- '👧🏿'
- '🧒🏿'
- '👦🏿'
- '👩🏿'
- '🧑🏿'
- '👨🏿'
- '👩🏿🦱'
- '🧑🏿🦱'
- '👨🏿🦱'
- '👩🏿🦰'
- '🧑🏿🦰'
- '👨🏿🦰'
- '👱🏿♀️'
- '👱🏿'
- '👱🏿♂️'
- '👩🏿🦳'
- '🧑🏿🦳'
- '👨🏿🦳'
- '👩🏿🦲'
- '🧑🏿🦲'
- '👨🏿🦲'
- '🧔🏿♀️'
- '🧔🏿'
- '🧔🏿♂️'
- '👵🏿'
- '🧓🏿'
- '👴🏿'
- '👲🏿'
- '👳🏿♀️'
- '👳🏿'
- '👳🏿♂️'
- '🧕🏿'
- '👮🏿♀️'
- '👮🏿'
- '👮🏿♂️'
- '👷🏿♀️'
- '👷🏿'
- '👷🏿♂️'
- '💂🏿♀️'
- '💂🏿'
- '💂🏿♂️'
- '🕵🏿♀️'
- '🕵🏿'
- '🕵🏿♂️'
- '👩🏿⚕️'
- '🧑🏿⚕️'
- '👨🏿⚕️'
- '👩🏿🌾'
- '🧑🏿🌾'
- '👨🏿🌾'
- '👩🏿🍳'
- '🧑🏿🍳'
- '👨🏿🍳'
- '👩🏿🎓'
- '🧑🏿🎓'
- '👨🏿🎓'
- '👩🏿🎤'
- '🧑🏿🎤'
- '👨🏿🎤'
- '👩🏿🏫'
- '🧑🏿🏫'
- '👨🏿🏫'
- '👩🏿🏭'
- '🧑🏿🏭'
- '👨🏿🏭'
- '👩🏿💻'
- '🧑🏿💻'
- '👨🏿💻'
- '👩🏿💼'
- '🧑🏿💼'
- '👨🏿💼'
- '👩🏿🔧'
- '🧑🏿🔧'
- '👨🏿🔧'
- '👩🏿🔬'
- '🧑🏿🔬'
- '👨🏿🔬'
- '👩🏿🎨'
- '🧑🏿🎨'
- '👨🏿🎨'
- '👩🏿🚒'
- '🧑🏿🚒'
- '👨🏿🚒'
- '👩🏿✈️'
- '🧑🏿✈️'
- '👨🏿✈️'
- '👩🏿🚀'
- '🧑🏿🚀'
- '👨🏿🚀'
- '👩🏿⚖️'
- '🧑🏿⚖️'
- '👨🏿⚖️'
- '👰🏿♀️'
- '👰🏿'
- '👰🏿♂️'
- '🤵🏿♀️'
- '🤵🏿'
- '🤵🏿♂️'
- '👸🏿'
- '🫅🏿'
- '🤴🏿'
- '🥷🏿'
- '🦸🏿♀️'
- '🦸🏿'
- '🦸🏿♂️'
- '🦹🏿♀️'
- '🦹🏿'
- '🦹🏿♂️'
- '🤶🏿'
- '🧑🏿🎄'
- '🎅🏿'
- '🧙🏿♀️'
- '🧙🏿'
- '🧙🏿♂️'
- '🧝🏿♀️'
- '🧝🏿'
- '🧝🏿♂️'
- '🧛🏿♀️'
- '🧛🏿'
- '🧛🏿♂️'
- '🧜🏿♀️'
- '🧜🏿'
- '🧜🏿♂️'
- '🧚🏿♀️'
- '🧚🏿'
- '🧚🏿♂️'
- '👼🏿'
- '🤰🏿'
- '🫄🏿'
- '🫃🏿'
- '🤱🏿'
- '👩🏿🍼'
- '🧑🏿🍼'
- '👨🏿🍼'
- '🙇🏿♀️'
- '🙇🏿'
- '🙇🏿♂️'
- '💁🏿♀️'
- '💁🏿'
- '💁🏿♂️'
- '🙅🏿♀️'
- '🙅🏿'
- '🙅🏿♂️'
- '🙆🏿♀️'
- '🙆🏿'
- '🙆🏿♂️'
- '🙋🏿♀️'
- '🙋🏿'
- '🙋🏿♂️'
- '🧏🏿♀️'
- '🧏🏿'
- '🧏🏿♂️'
- '🤦🏿♀️'
- '🤦🏿'
- '🤦🏿♂️'
- '🤷🏿♀️'
- '🤷🏿'
- '🤷🏿♂️'
- '🙎🏿♀️'
- '🙎🏿'
- '🙎🏿♂️'
- '🙍🏿♀️'
- '🙍🏿'
- '🙍🏿♂️'
- '💇🏿♀️'
- '💇🏿'
- '💇🏿♂️'
- '💆🏿♀️'
- '💆🏿'
- '💆🏿♂️'
- '🧖🏿♀️'
- '🧖🏿'
- '🧖🏿♂️'
- '💃🏿'
- '🕺🏿'
- '🕴🏿'
- '👩🏿🦽'
- '🧑🏿🦽'
- '👨🏿🦽'
- '👩🏿🦼'
- '🧑🏿🦼'
- '👨🏿🦼'
- '🚶🏿♀️'
- '🚶🏿'
- '🚶🏿♂️'
- '👩🏿🦯'
- '🧑🏿🦯'
- '👨🏿🦯'
- '🧎🏿♀️'
- '🧎🏿'
- '🧎🏿♂️'
- '🏃🏿♀️'
- '🏃🏿'
- '🏃🏿♂️'
- '🧍🏿♀️'
- '🧍🏿'
- '🧍🏿♂️'
- '👭🏿'
- '🧑🏿🤝🧑🏿'
- '👬🏿'
- '👫🏿'
- '🧗🏿♀️'
- '🧗🏿'
- '🧗🏿♂️'
- '🏇🏿'
- '🏂🏿'
- '🏌🏿♀️'
- '🏌🏿'
- '🏌🏿♂️'
- '🏄🏿♀️'
- '🏄🏿'
- '🏄🏿♂️'
- '🚣🏿♀️'
- '🚣🏿'
- '🚣🏿♂️'
- '🏊🏿♀️'
- '🏊🏿'
- '🏊🏿♂️'
- '⛹🏿♀️'
- '⛹🏿'
- '⛹🏿♂️'
- '🏋🏿♀️'
- '🏋🏿'
- '🏋🏿♂️'
- '🚴🏿♀️'
- '🚴🏿'
- '🚴🏿♂️'
- '🚵🏿♀️'
- '🚵🏿'
- '🚵🏿♂️'
- '🤸🏿♀️'
- '🤸🏿'
- '🤸🏿♂️'
- '🤽🏿♀️'
- '🤽🏿'
- '🤽🏿♂️'
- '🤾🏿♀️'
- '🤾🏿'
- '🤾🏿♂️'
- '🤹🏿♀️'
- '🤹🏿'
- '🤹🏿♂️'
- '🧘🏿♀️'
- '🧘🏿'
- '🧘🏿♂️'
- '🛀🏿'
- '🛌🏿'
- '🐶'
- '🐱'
- '🐭'
- '🐹'
- '🐰'
- '🦊'
- '🐻'
- '🐼'
- '🐻❄️'
- '🐨'
- '🐯'
- '🦁'
- '🐮'
- '🐷'
- '🐽'
- '🐸'
- '🐵'
- '🙈'
- '🙉'
- '🙊'
- '🐒'
- '🐔'
- '🐧'
- '🐦'
- '🐤'
- '🐣'
- '🐥'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Potential POWERTRASH Script Execution
#Detects potential execution of the PowerShell script POWERTRASH
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| PowerShell | Event ID 4104: Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
Rule Body
title: Potential POWERTRASH Script Execution
id: 4e19528a-f081-40dd-be09-90c39352bd64
status: test
description: Detects potential execution of the PowerShell script POWERTRASH
references:
- https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-04
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.g0046
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: bade5735-5ab0-4aa7-a642-a11be0e40872
detection:
selection:
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'IO.Compression.DeflateStream'
- 'IO.MemoryStream'
- '::FromBase64String'
- 'GetDelegateForFunctionPointer'
- '.Invoke()'
- 'GlobalAssemblyCache'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'IO.Compression.DeflateStream'
- 'IO.MemoryStream'
- '::FromBase64String'
- 'GetDelegateForFunctionPointer'
- '.Invoke()'
- 'GlobalAssemblyCache'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
ScriptBlockText | match |
| field:"ScriptBlockText" kind:match |
Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling
#Detects potential use of an SSH utility to establish RDP over a reverse SSH Tunnel. This can be used by attackers to enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Lateral Movement |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule Body
title: Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling
id: 8a3038e8-9c9d-46f8-b184-66234a160f6f
status: test
description: Detects potential use of an SSH utility to establish RDP over a reverse SSH Tunnel. This can be used by attackers to enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination.
references:
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/potential-remote-desktop-tunneling-detected.html
author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-27
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains: ':3389' # RDP port and usual SSH tunneling related switches in command line
selection_opt:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -L '
- ' -P '
- ' -R '
- ' -pw '
- ' -ssh '
condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
all of selection*Stage 1: selection
selection:
CommandLine|contains: ':3389'
Stage 2: selection_opt
selection_opt:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -L '
- ' -P '
- ' -R '
- ' -pw '
- ' -ssh '
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Potentially Suspicious Powershell Script Execution From Temp Folder
#Detects a potentially suspicious powershell script executions from temporary folder
Known False Positives
- Administrative scripts
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule Body
title: Potentially Suspicious Powershell Script Execution From Temp Folder
id: a6a39bdb-935c-4f0a-ab77-35f4bbf44d33
status: test
description: Detects a potentially suspicious powershell script executions from temporary folder
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/13/microsoft-discovers-threat-actor-targeting-solarwinds-serv-u-software-with-0-day-exploit/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton
date: 2021-07-14
modified: 2026-02-17
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- '\Windows\Temp'
- '\Temporary Internet'
- '\AppData\Local\Temp'
- '\AppData\Roaming\Temp'
- '%TEMP%'
- '%TMP%'
- '%LocalAppData%\Temp'
filter_optional_vscode:
CommandLine|contains: '-WindowStyle hidden -Verb runAs'
filter_optional_amazon_ec2:
CommandLine|contains: '\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Temp\Amazon\EC2-Windows\'
filter_optional_generic:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' >'
- 'Out-File'
- 'ConvertTo-Json'
filter_optional_chocolatey_installer:
ParentImage:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\Msiexec.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Msiexec.exe'
Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '-NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command'
- 'AppData\Local\Temp\'
- 'Install-Chocolatey.ps1'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Administrative scripts
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_script_exec_from_temp_folder/info.yml
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*Stage 1: selection
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- '\Windows\Temp'
- '\Temporary Internet'
- '\AppData\Local\Temp'
- '\AppData\Roaming\Temp'
- '%TEMP%'
- '%TMP%'
- '%LocalAppData%\Temp'
Stage 2: not filter_optional_*
filter_optional_vscode:
CommandLine|contains: '-WindowStyle hidden -Verb runAs'
filter_optional_amazon_ec2:
CommandLine|contains: '\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Temp\Amazon\EC2-Windows\'
filter_optional_generic:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' >'
- 'Out-File'
- 'ConvertTo-Json'
filter_optional_chocolatey_installer:
ParentImage:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\Msiexec.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Msiexec.exe'
Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '-NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command'
- 'AppData\Local\Temp\'
- 'Install-Chocolatey.ps1'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
Rundll32 Execution With Uncommon DLL Extension
#Detects the execution of rundll32 with a command line that doesn't contain a common extension
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule Body
title: Rundll32 Execution With Uncommon DLL Extension
id: c3a99af4-35a9-4668-879e-c09aeb4f2bdf
status: test
description: Detects the execution of rundll32 with a command line that doesn't contain a common extension
references:
- https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1481630810495139841?s=12
author: Tim Shelton, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Yassine Oukessou
date: 2022-01-13
modified: 2024-04-04
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218.011
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
filter_main_null:
CommandLine: null
filter_main_empty:
CommandLine: ''
filter_main_known_extension:
- CommandLine|contains:
# Note: This aims to cover: single and double quotes in addition to spaces and comma "," usage.
- '.cpl '
- '.cpl,'
- '.cpl"'
- ".cpl'"
- '.dll '
- '.dll,'
- '.dll"'
- ".dll'"
- '.inf '
- '.inf,'
- '.inf"'
- ".inf'"
- CommandLine|endswith:
# Note: This aims to cover: single and double quotes in addition to spaces and comma "," usage.
- '.cpl'
- '.dll'
- '.inf'
filter_main_localserver:
CommandLine|contains: ' -localserver '
filter_main_zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc:
ParentImage|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ':\Windows\Installer\'
- '.tmp'
- 'zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc'
filter_optional_EdgeUpdate:
ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
- ':\Users\'
- '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\Install\{'
- '\EDGEMITMP_'
- '.tmp\setup.exe'
- '--install-archive='
- '--previous-version='
- '--msedgewebview --verbose-logging --do-not-launch-msedge --user-level'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_uncommon_dll_extension/info.yml
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*Stage 1: selection
selection:
- Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
Stage 2: not filter_main_*
filter_main_null:
CommandLine: null
filter_main_empty:
CommandLine: ''
filter_main_known_extension:
- CommandLine|contains:
- '.cpl '
- '.cpl,'
- '.cpl"'
- ".cpl'"
- '.dll '
- '.dll,'
- '.dll"'
- ".dll'"
- '.inf '
- '.inf,'
- '.inf"'
- ".inf'"
- CommandLine|endswith:
- '.cpl'
- '.dll'
- '.inf'
filter_main_localserver:
CommandLine|contains: ' -localserver '
filter_main_zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc:
ParentImage|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ':\Windows\Installer\'
- '.tmp'
- 'zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc'
Stage 3: not filter_optional_EdgeUpdate
filter_optional_EdgeUpdate:
ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
- ':\Users\'
- '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\Install\{'
- '\EDGEMITMP_'
- '.tmp\setup.exe'
- '--install-archive='
- '--previous-version='
- '--msedgewebview --verbose-logging --do-not-launch-msedge --user-level'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\rundll32.exe" |
OriginalFileName | eq |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"RUNDLL32.EXE" |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
Service Installation in Suspicious Folder
#Detects service installation in suspicious folder appdata
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Service-Control-Manager | Event ID 7045: A service was installed in the system. |
Rule Body
title: Service Installation in Suspicious Folder
id: 5e993621-67d4-488a-b9ae-b420d08b96cb
status: test
description: Detects service installation in suspicious folder appdata
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems)
references:
- Internal Research
date: 2022-03-18
modified: 2024-01-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- car.2013-09-005
- attack.t1543.003
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
ImagePath|contains:
- '\AppData\'
- '\\\\127.0.0.1'
- '\\\\localhost'
filter_optional_zoom:
ServiceName: 'Zoom Sharing Service'
ImagePath|contains: ':\Program Files\Common Files\Zoom\Support\CptService.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*Stage 1: selection
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
ImagePath|contains:
- '\AppData\'
- '\\\\127.0.0.1'
- '\\\\localhost'
Stage 2: not filter_optional_zoom
filter_optional_zoom:
ServiceName: 'Zoom Sharing Service'
ImagePath|contains: ':\Program Files\Common Files\Zoom\Support\CptService.exe'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
ImagePath | match |
| field:"ImagePath" kind:match |
Provider_Name | eq |
| field:"Provider_Name" kind:eq value:"Service Control Manager" |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
ImagePath | match | :\Program Files\Common Files\Zoom\Support\CptService.exe | excludes:ImagePath field:"ImagePath" value:":\Program Files\Common Files\Zoom\Support\CptService.exe" |
ServiceName | eq | Zoom Sharing Service | excludes:ServiceName field:"ServiceName" value:"Zoom Sharing Service" |
SQL Server - Member got new privileges added on a database
#Detects scenarios where an attacker grants new privileges on a database level
Known False Positives
- DBA activity
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| MSSQLSERVER | Event ID 33205 |
Rule Body
title: SQL Server - Member got new privileges added on a database
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker grants new privileges on a database level
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account%20manipulation
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/security/auditing/sql-server-audit-action-groups-and-actions
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/security/authentication-access/server-level-roles
tags:
- attack.account_manipulation
- attack.t1098
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
product: mssql
category: application
detection:
selection: # GRANT [Privilege] TO [DEMO\svc-netwrix-db]
EventID: 33205
action_id:
- G # GRANT
- GWG # GRANT WITH GRANT
class_type: DB # DATABASE
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- DBA activity
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
EventID: 33205
action_id:
- G
- GWG
class_type: DB
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
action_id | eq |
| field:"action_id" kind:eq |
class_type | eq |
| field:"class_type" kind:eq value:"DB" |
Start Windows Service Via Net.EXE
#Detects the usage of the "net.exe" command to start a service using the "start" flag
Known False Positives
- Legitimate administrator or user executes a service for legitimate reasons.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule Body
title: Start Windows Service Via Net.EXE
id: 2a072a96-a086-49fa-bcb5-15cc5a619093
status: test
description: Detects the usage of the "net.exe" command to start a service using the "start" flag
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.md
author: Timur Zinniatullin, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-21
modified: 2023-03-05
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1569.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\net.exe'
- '\net1.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'net.exe'
- 'net1.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains: ' start ' # space character after the 'start' keyword indicates that a service name follows, in contrast to `net start` discovery expression
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrator or user executes a service for legitimate reasons.
level: low
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
all of selection_*Stage 1: selection_img
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\net.exe'
- '\net1.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'net.exe'
- 'net1.exe'
Stage 2: selection_cli
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains: ' start '
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match value:" start " |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with |
OriginalFileName | eq |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq |
Suspicious AgentExecutor PowerShell Execution
#Detects execution of the AgentExecutor.exe binary. Which can be abused as a LOLBIN to execute powershell scripts with the ExecutionPolicy "Bypass" or any binary named "powershell.exe" located in the path provided by 6th positional argument
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule Body
title: Suspicious AgentExecutor PowerShell Execution
id: c0b40568-b1e9-4b03-8d6c-b096da6da9ab
related:
- id: 7efd2c8d-8b18-45b7-947d-adfe9ed04f61
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of the AgentExecutor.exe binary. Which can be abused as a LOLBIN to execute powershell scripts with the ExecutionPolicy "Bypass" or any binary named "powershell.exe" located in the path provided by 6th positional argument
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), memory-shards
references:
- https://twitter.com/lefterispan/status/1286259016436514816
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Agentexecutor/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/intune-management-extension
- https://twitter.com/jseerden/status/1247985304667066373/photo/1
date: 2022-12-24
modified: 2024-08-07
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\AgentExecutor.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'AgentExecutor.exe'
selection_cli:
# Example:
# AgentExecutor.exe -powershell [scriptPath] [outputFilePath] [errorFilePath] [timeoutFilePath] [timeoutSeconds] [powershellPath] [enforceSignatureCheck] [runAs32BitOn64]
# Note:
# - If [timeoutSeconds] is NULL then it defaults to 60000
# - If [enforceSignatureCheck] is:
# - "NULL" or "1" then a PowerShell instance is spawned with the args: "-NoProfile -executionPolicy allsigned -file "
# - Else a PowerShell instance is spawned with the args: "-NoProfile -executionPolicy bypass -file "
# - [powershellPath] is always concatendated to "powershell.exe"
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -powershell' # Also covers the "-powershellDetection" flag
- ' -remediationScript'
filter_main_pwsh:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\'
filter_main_intune:
ParentImage|endswith: '\Microsoft.Management.Services.IntuneWindowsAgent.exe'
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*Stage 1: selection_img
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\AgentExecutor.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'AgentExecutor.exe'
Stage 2: selection_cli
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -powershell'
- ' -remediationScript'
Stage 3: not filter_main_*
filter_main_pwsh:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\'
filter_main_intune:
ParentImage|endswith: '\Microsoft.Management.Services.IntuneWindowsAgent.exe'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\AgentExecutor.exe" |
OriginalFileName | eq |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"AgentExecutor.exe" |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match | C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\ | excludes:CommandLine field:"CommandLine" value:"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\" |
CommandLine | match | C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\ | excludes:CommandLine field:"CommandLine" value:"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\" |
ParentImage | ends_with | \Microsoft.Management.Services.IntuneWindowsAgent.exe | excludes:ParentImage field:"ParentImage" value:"\Microsoft.Management.Services.IntuneWindowsAgent.exe" |
Suspicious Encoded And Obfuscated Reflection Assembly Load Function Call
#Detects suspicious base64 encoded and obfuscated "LOAD" keyword used in .NET "reflection.assembly"
Known False Positives
- Unlikely
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule Body
title: Suspicious Encoded And Obfuscated Reflection Assembly Load Function Call
id: 9c0295ce-d60d-40bd-bd74-84673b7592b1
related:
- id: 62b7ccc9-23b4-471e-aa15-6da3663c4d59
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious base64 encoded and obfuscated "LOAD" keyword used in .NET "reflection.assembly"
references:
- https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine/blob/20a569fa21625086433dcce8bb2765d0ea08dcb6/yara/mal_revil.yar
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.appdomain.load?view=net-7.0
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-01
modified: 2023-04-06
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1027
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
# ::("L"+"oad")
- 'OgA6ACgAIgBMACIAKwAiAG8AYQBkACIAKQ'
- 'oAOgAoACIATAAiACsAIgBvAGEAZAAiACkA'
- '6ADoAKAAiAEwAIgArACIAbwBhAGQAIgApA'
# ::("Lo"+"ad")
- 'OgA6ACgAIgBMAG8AIgArACIAYQBkACIAKQ'
- 'oAOgAoACIATABvACIAKwAiAGEAZAAiACkA'
- '6ADoAKAAiAEwAbwAiACsAIgBhAGQAIgApA'
# ::("Loa"+"d")
- 'OgA6ACgAIgBMAG8AYQAiACsAIgBkACIAKQ'
- 'oAOgAoACIATABvAGEAIgArACIAZAAiACkA'
- '6ADoAKAAiAEwAbwBhACIAKwAiAGQAIgApA'
# ::('L'+'oad')
- 'OgA6ACgAJwBMACcAKwAnAG8AYQBkACcAKQ'
- 'oAOgAoACcATAAnACsAJwBvAGEAZAAnACkA'
- '6ADoAKAAnAEwAJwArACcAbwBhAGQAJwApA'
# ::('Lo'+'ad')
- 'OgA6ACgAJwBMAG8AJwArACcAYQBkACcAKQ'
- 'oAOgAoACcATABvACcAKwAnAGEAZAAnACkA'
- '6ADoAKAAnAEwAbwAnACsAJwBhAGQAJwApA'
# ::('Loa'+'d')
- 'OgA6ACgAJwBMAG8AYQAnACsAJwBkACcAKQ'
- 'oAOgAoACcATABvAGEAJwArACcAZAAnACkA'
- '6ADoAKAAnAEwAbwBhACcAKwAnAGQAJwApA'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'OgA6ACgAIgBMACIAKwAiAG8AYQBkACIAKQ'
- 'oAOgAoACIATAAiACsAIgBvAGEAZAAiACkA'
- '6ADoAKAAiAEwAIgArACIAbwBhAGQAIgApA'
- 'OgA6ACgAIgBMAG8AIgArACIAYQBkACIAKQ'
- 'oAOgAoACIATABvACIAKwAiAGEAZAAiACkA'
- '6ADoAKAAiAEwAbwAiACsAIgBhAGQAIgApA'
- 'OgA6ACgAIgBMAG8AYQAiACsAIgBkACIAKQ'
- 'oAOgAoACIATABvAGEAIgArACIAZAAiACkA'
- '6ADoAKAAiAEwAbwBhACIAKwAiAGQAIgApA'
- 'OgA6ACgAJwBMACcAKwAnAG8AYQBkACcAKQ'
- 'oAOgAoACcATAAnACsAJwBvAGEAZAAnACkA'
- '6ADoAKAAnAEwAJwArACcAbwBhAGQAJwApA'
- 'OgA6ACgAJwBMAG8AJwArACcAYQBkACcAKQ'
- 'oAOgAoACcATABvACcAKwAnAGEAZAAnACkA'
- '6ADoAKAAnAEwAbwAnACsAJwBhAGQAJwApA'
- 'OgA6ACgAJwBMAG8AYQAnACsAJwBkACcAKQ'
- 'oAOgAoACcATABvAGEAJwArACcAZAAnACkA'
- '6ADoAKAAnAEwAbwBhACcAKwAnAGQAJwApA'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Suspicious LNK Double Extension File Created
#Detects the creation of files with an "LNK" as a second extension. This is sometimes used by malware as a method to abuse the fact that Windows hides the "LNK" extension by default.
Known False Positives
- Some tuning is required for other general purpose directories of third party apps
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 11: FileCreate |
Rule Body
title: Suspicious LNK Double Extension File Created
id: 3215aa19-f060-4332-86d5-5602511f3ca8
related:
- id: b4926b47-a9d7-434c-b3a0-adc3fa0bd13e
type: derived
status: test
description: |
Detects the creation of files with an "LNK" as a second extension. This is sometimes used by malware as a method to abuse the fact that Windows hides the "LNK" extension by default.
references:
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-june-mustang-panda/
- https://www.anomali.com/blog/china-based-apt-mustang-panda-targets-minority-groups-public-and-private-sector-organizations
- https://www.cybereason.com/blog/research/a-bazar-of-tricks-following-team9s-development-cycles
- https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1235135745611960321
- https://twitter.com/luc4m/status/1073181154126254080
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2022-11-07
modified: 2023-10-18
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036.007
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|endswith: '.lnk'
TargetFilename|contains:
- '.doc.'
- '.docx.'
- '.jpg.'
- '.pdf.'
- '.ppt.'
- '.pptx.'
- '.xls.'
- '.xlsx.'
filter_main_recent:
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\'
filter_optional_office_recent:
Image|endswith:
# Note: Some additional office application might need to be added
- '\excel.exe'
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\winword.exe'
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\'
filter_optional_office_excel:
Image|endswith: '\excel.exe'
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel'
filter_optional_office_powerpoint:
Image|endswith: '\powerpnt.exe'
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\PowerPoint'
filter_optional_office_word:
Image|endswith: '\winword.exe'
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Word'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Some tuning is required for other general purpose directories of third party apps
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_lnk_double_extension/info.yml
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*Stage 1: selection
selection:
TargetFilename|endswith: '.lnk'
TargetFilename|contains:
- '.doc.'
- '.docx.'
- '.jpg.'
- '.pdf.'
- '.ppt.'
- '.pptx.'
- '.xls.'
- '.xlsx.'
Stage 2: not filter_main_recent
filter_main_recent:
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\'
Stage 3: not filter_optional_*
filter_optional_office_recent:
Image|endswith:
- '\excel.exe'
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\winword.exe'
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\'
filter_optional_office_excel:
Image|endswith: '\excel.exe'
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel'
filter_optional_office_powerpoint:
Image|endswith: '\powerpnt.exe'
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\PowerPoint'
filter_optional_office_word:
Image|endswith: '\winword.exe'
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Word'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
TargetFilename | ends_with |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:ends_with value:".lnk" |
TargetFilename | match |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:match |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
TargetFilename | match | \AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\ | excludes:TargetFilename field:"TargetFilename" value:"\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\" |
Image | ends_with | \excel.exe | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\excel.exe" |
Image | ends_with | \powerpnt.exe | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\powerpnt.exe" |
Image | ends_with | \winword.exe | excludes:Image field:"Image" value:"\winword.exe" |
TargetFilename | match | \AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\ | excludes:TargetFilename field:"TargetFilename" value:"\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\" |
TargetFilename | match | \AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel | excludes:TargetFilename field:"TargetFilename" value:"\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel" |
TargetFilename | match | \AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\PowerPoint | excludes:TargetFilename field:"TargetFilename" value:"\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\PowerPoint" |
TargetFilename | match | \AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Word | excludes:TargetFilename field:"TargetFilename" value:"\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Word" |
Suspicious Svchost Process Access
#Detects suspicious access to the "svchost" process such as that used by Invoke-Phantom to kill the thread of the Windows event logging service.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Impairment |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 10: ProcessAccess |
Rule Body
title: Suspicious Svchost Process Access
id: 166e9c50-8cd9-44af-815d-d1f0c0e90dde
status: test
description: Detects suspicious access to the "svchost" process such as that used by Invoke-Phantom to kill the thread of the Windows event logging service.
references:
- https://github.com/hlldz/Invoke-Phant0m
- https://twitter.com/timbmsft/status/900724491076214784
author: Tim Burrell
date: 2020-01-02
modified: 2023-01-30
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685.001
logsource:
category: process_access
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetImage|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
GrantedAccess: '0x1F3FFF'
CallTrace|contains: 'UNKNOWN'
filter_main_msbuild:
SourceImage|contains: ':\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
SourceImage|endswith: '\MSBuild\Current\Bin\MSBuild.exe'
# Just to make sure it's "really" .NET :)
CallTrace|contains:
- 'Microsoft.Build.ni.dll'
- 'System.ni.dll'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not 1 of filter_main_*Stage 1: selection
selection:
TargetImage|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
GrantedAccess: '0x1F3FFF'
CallTrace|contains: 'UNKNOWN'
Stage 2: not filter_main_msbuild
filter_main_msbuild:
SourceImage|contains: ':\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
SourceImage|endswith: '\MSBuild\Current\Bin\MSBuild.exe'
CallTrace|contains:
- 'Microsoft.Build.ni.dll'
- 'System.ni.dll'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CallTrace | match |
| field:"CallTrace" kind:match value:"UNKNOWN" |
GrantedAccess | eq |
| field:"GrantedAccess" kind:eq value:"0x1F3FFF" |
TargetImage | ends_with |
| field:"TargetImage" kind:ends_with value:":\Windows\System32\svchost.exe" |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CallTrace | match | Microsoft.Build.ni.dll | excludes:CallTrace field:"CallTrace" value:"Microsoft.Build.ni.dll" |
CallTrace | match | System.ni.dll | excludes:CallTrace field:"CallTrace" value:"System.ni.dll" |
SourceImage | ends_with | \MSBuild\Current\Bin\MSBuild.exe | excludes:SourceImage field:"SourceImage" value:"\MSBuild\Current\Bin\MSBuild.exe" |
SourceImage | match | :\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\ | excludes:SourceImage field:"SourceImage" value:":\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\" |
T1047 Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack
#Detects a threat actor creating a file named wbemcomn.dll in the C:\Windows\System32\wbem\ directory over the network for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Lateral Movement |
Telemetry Coverage
Rule Body
title: T1047 Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack
id: f6c68d5f-e101-4b86-8c84-7d96851fd65c
status: test
description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.
references:
- https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteWMIWbemcomnDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-02-24
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1047
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.002
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5145
RelativeTargetName|endswith: '\wbem\wbemcomn.dll'
filter:
SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not filterStage 1: selection
selection:
EventID: 5145
RelativeTargetName|endswith: '\wbem\wbemcomn.dll'
Stage 2: not filter
filter:
SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
RelativeTargetName | ends_with |
| field:"RelativeTargetName" kind:ends_with value:"\wbem\wbemcomn.dll" |
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
SubjectUserName | ends_with | $ | excludes:SubjectUserName field:"SubjectUserName" value:"$" |
Tor Client/Browser Execution
#Detects the use of Tor or Tor-Browser to connect to onion routing networks
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Command & Control |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule Body
title: Tor Client/Browser Execution
id: 62f7c9bf-9135-49b2-8aeb-1e54a6ecc13c
status: test
description: Detects the use of Tor or Tor-Browser to connect to onion routing networks
references:
- https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/detecting-tor-use-with-logpoint/
author: frack113
date: 2022-02-20
modified: 2025-10-27
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Description: 'Tor Browser'
- Product: 'Tor Browser'
- Image|endswith:
- '\tor.exe'
- '\Tor Browser\Browser\firefox.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_browsers_tor_execution/info.yml
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
- Description: 'Tor Browser'
- Product: 'Tor Browser'
- Image|endswith:
- '\tor.exe'
- '\Tor Browser\Browser\firefox.exe'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Description | eq |
| field:"Description" kind:eq value:"Tor Browser" |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with |
Product | eq |
| field:"Product" kind:eq value:"Tor Browser" |
UAC Bypass Using MSConfig Token Modification - File
#Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a msconfig GUI hack (UACMe 55)
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 11: FileCreate |
Rule Body
title: UAC Bypass Using MSConfig Token Modification - File
id: 41bb431f-56d8-4691-bb56-ed34e390906f
status: test
description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a msconfig GUI hack (UACMe 55)
references:
- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-30
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1548.002
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
TargetFilename|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Temp\pkgmgr.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
TargetFilename|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Temp\pkgmgr.exe'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
TargetFilename | ends_with |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:ends_with value:"\AppData\Local\Temp\pkgmgr.exe" |
TargetFilename | starts_with |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:starts_with value:"C:\Users\" |
UNC4841 - Potential SEASPY Execution
#Detects execution of specific named binaries which were used by UNC4841 to deploy their SEASPY backdoor
Known False Positives
- Unlikely
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | No specific technique |
Telemetry Coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Linux | Event ID 1: Process Create |
Rule Body
title: UNC4841 - Potential SEASPY Execution
id: f6a711f3-d032-4f9e-890b-bbe776236c84
status: test
description: Detects execution of specific named binaries which were used by UNC4841 to deploy their SEASPY backdoor
references:
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/barracuda-esg-exploited-globally
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-16
tags:
- attack.execution
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
product: linux
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '/BarracudaMailService'
- '/resize2fstab'
- '/resize_reisertab'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '/BarracudaMailService'
- '/resize2fstab'
- '/resize_reisertab'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with |
Webserver IIS configuration edited (SYSMON)
#Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to edit IIS configuration file in order to load a module.
Known False Positives
- rare administrator change
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 11: FileCreate |
Rule Body
title: Webserver IIS configuration edited (SYSMON)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to edit IIS configuration file in order to load a module.
requirements: requires to update SYSMON configuration to include the IIS application path.
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/26/malicious-iis-extensions-quietly-open-persistent-backdoors-into-servers/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/get-started/planning-your-iis-architecture/introduction-to-applicationhostconfig
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1505.004
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
EventID: 11
TargetFilename|endswith: '\inetsrv\config\applicationHost.config'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- rare administrator change
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
EventID: 11
TargetFilename|endswith: '\inetsrv\config\applicationHost.config'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
TargetFilename | ends_with |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:ends_with value:"\inetsrv\config\applicationHost.config" |
Windows AMSI Related Registry Tampering Via CommandLine
#Detects tampering of AMSI (Anti-Malware Scan Interface) related registry values via command line tools such as reg.exe or PowerShell. AMSI provides a generic interface for applications and services to integrate with antimalware products. Adversaries may disable AMSI to evade detection of malicious scripts and code execution.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Impairment |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule Body
title: Windows AMSI Related Registry Tampering Via CommandLine
id: 7dbbcac2-57a0-45ac-b306-ff30a8bd2981
related:
- id: aa37cbb0-da36-42cb-a90f-fdf216fc7467 # AMSI Disabled via Registry Modification
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects tampering of AMSI (Anti-Malware Scan Interface) related registry values via command line tools such as reg.exe or PowerShell.
AMSI provides a generic interface for applications and services to integrate with antimalware products.
Adversaries may disable AMSI to evade detection of malicious scripts and code execution.
references:
- https://github.com/arttoolkit/arttoolkit.github.io/blob/16d6230d009e58fd6f773f5317fd4d14c1f26004/_wadcoms/AMSI-Bypass-Jscript_amsienable.md
- https://mostafayahiax.medium.com/hunting-for-amsi-bypassing-methods-9886dda0bf9d
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2019/02/macros-and-more-with-sharpshooter-v2-0/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-25
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_key:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings'
- 'AmsiEnable'
selection_reg_img:
- Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
selection_reg_cmd:
CommandLine|contains: 'add'
selection_powershell_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
selection_powershell_cmd:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Set-ItemProperty'
- 'New-ItemProperty'
- 'sp '
condition: selection_key and (all of selection_powershell_* or all of selection_reg_*)
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_amsi_registry_tampering/info.yml
simulation:
- type: atomic-red-team
name: AMSI Bypass - Create AMSIEnable Reg Key
technique: T1562.001
atomic_guid: 728eca7b-0444-4f6f-ac36-437e3d751dc0
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection_key and (all of selection_powershell_* or all of selection_reg_*)Stage 1: selection_key
selection_key:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings'
- 'AmsiEnable'
Stage 2: selection_powershell_img
selection_powershell_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
Stage 3: selection_powershell_cmd
selection_powershell_cmd:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Set-ItemProperty'
- 'New-ItemProperty'
- 'sp '
Stage 4: selection_reg_img
selection_reg_img:
- Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
Stage 5: selection_reg_cmd
selection_reg_cmd:
CommandLine|contains: 'add'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with |
OriginalFileName | eq |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq |
WinRAR Creating Files in Startup Locations
#Detects WinRAR creating files in Windows startup locations, which may indicate an attempt to establish persistence by adding malicious files to the Startup folder. This kind of behaviour has been associated with exploitation of WinRAR path traversal vulnerability CVE-2025-6218 or CVE-2025-8088.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry Coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 11: FileCreate |
Rule Body
title: WinRAR Creating Files in Startup Locations
id: 74a2b37d-fea4-41e0-9ac7-c9fbcf1f60cc
status: experimental
description: |
Detects WinRAR creating files in Windows startup locations, which may indicate an attempt to establish persistence by adding malicious files to the Startup folder.
This kind of behaviour has been associated with exploitation of WinRAR path traversal vulnerability CVE-2025-6218 or CVE-2025-8088.
references:
- https://github.com/mulwareX/CVE-2025-6218-POC
- https://x.com/0x534c/status/1944694507787710685
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/update-winrar-tools-now-romcom-and-others-exploiting-zero-day-vulnerability/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-07-16
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1547.001
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\WinRAR.exe'
- '\Rar.exe'
TargetFilename|contains: '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\WinRAR.exe'
- '\Rar.exe'
TargetFilename|contains: '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with |
TargetFilename | match |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:match value:"\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\" |