Sigma rules: 3a

title: Automated Collection Bookmarks Using Get-ChildItem PowerShell
id: e0565f5d-d420-4e02-8a68-ac00d864f9cf
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts.
    Browser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about
    internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1217/T1217.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-13
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1217
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Get-ChildItem'
            - ' -Recurse '
            - ' -Path '
            - ' -Filter Bookmarks'
            - ' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue'
            - ' -Force'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low

title: Compressed File Extraction Via Tar.EXE
id: bf361876-6620-407a-812f-bfe11e51e924
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of "tar.exe" in order to extract compressed file.
    Adversaries may abuse various utilities in order to decompress data to avoid detection.
references:
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/chromeloader-malware/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Tar/
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/cicada-apt10-japan-espionage
author: AdmU3
date: 2023-12-19
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1560
    - attack.t1560.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\tar.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'bsdtar'
    selection_extract:
        CommandLine|contains: '-x'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Likely
level: low

title: CVE-2022-31659 VMware Workspace ONE Access RCE
id: efdb2003-a922-48aa-8f37-8b80021a9706
status: test
description: Detects possible exploitation of VMware Workspace ONE Access Admin Remote Code Execution vulnerability as described in CVE-2022-31659
references:
    - https://petrusviet.medium.com/dancing-on-the-architecture-of-vmware-workspace-one-access-eng-ad592ae1b6dd
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-12
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2022-31659
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/SAAS/jersey/manager/api/migrate/tenant' # Investigate the contents of the post body and look for any suspicious hosts that might be controlled by the attacker
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Vulnerability scanners
    - Legitimate access to the URI
level: medium

title: Disk Image Creation Via Hdiutil - MacOS
id: 1cf98dc2-fcb0-47c9-8aea-654c9284d1ae
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the hdiutil utility in order to create a disk image.
references:
    - https://www.loobins.io/binaries/hdiutil/
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/from-the-front-linesunsigned-macos-orat-malware-gambles-for-the-win/
    - https://ss64.com/mac/hdiutil.html
author: Omar Khaled (@beacon_exe)
date: 2024-08-10
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: /hdiutil
        CommandLine|contains: 'create'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of hdiutil by administrators and users.
level: medium

title: File Download Via Curl.EXE
id: 9a517fca-4ba3-4629-9278-a68694697b81
related:
    - id: bbeaed61-1990-4773-bf57-b81dbad7db2d # Basic curl execution
      type: derived
    - id: e218595b-bbe7-4ee5-8a96-f32a24ad3468 # Suspicious curl execution
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects file download using curl.exe
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200128160046/https://twitter.com/reegun21/status/1222093798009790464
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-05
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
        - Product: 'The curl executable'
    selection_remote:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -O'  # covers the alias for --remote-name and --output
            - '--remote-name'
            - '--output'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Scripts created by developers and admins
    - Administrative activity
    - The "\Git\usr\bin\sh.exe" process uses the "--output" flag to download a specific file in the temp directory with the pattern "gfw-httpget-xxxxxxxx.txt "
level: medium

title: File With Suspicious Extension Downloaded Via Bitsadmin
id: 5b80a791-ad9b-4b75-bcc1-ad4e1e89c200
status: test
description: Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file with a suspicious extension
references:
    - https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin
    - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-28
modified: 2023-05-30
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1197
    - attack.s0190
    - attack.t1036.003
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\bitsadmin.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'bitsadmin.exe'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /transfer '
            - ' /create '
            - ' /addfile '
    selection_extension:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.7z'
            - '.asax'
            - '.ashx'
            - '.asmx'
            - '.asp'
            - '.aspx'
            - '.bat'
            - '.cfm'
            - '.cgi'
            - '.chm'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.dll'
            - '.gif'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.jsp'
            - '.jspx'
            - '.log'
            - '.png'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.psm1'
            - '.rar'
            - '.scf'
            - '.sct'
            - '.txt'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.war'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.wsh'
            - '.xll'
            - '.zip'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_susp_extensions/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Windows - BITSAdmin BITS Download
      technique: T1105
      atomic_guid: a1921cd3-9a2d-47d5-a891-f1d0f2a7a31b

title: Hide Schedule Task Via Index Value Tamper
id: 5b16df71-8615-4f7f-ac9b-6c43c0509e61
related:
    - id: acd74772-5f88-45c7-956b-6a7b36c294d2
      type: similar
    - id: 526cc8bc-1cdc-48ad-8b26-f19bff969cec
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
  Detects when the "index" value of a scheduled task is modified from the registry
  Which effectively hides it from any tooling such as "schtasks /query" (Read the referenced link for more information about the effects of this technique)
references:
    - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/06/20/defending-against-scheduled-task-attacks-in-windows-environments
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-26
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\'
            - 'Index'
        Details: DWORD (0x00000000)
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: HTTP Request to Low Reputation TLD or Suspicious File Extension
id: 68c2c604-92ad-468b-bf4a-aac49adad08c
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects HTTP requests to low reputation TLDs (e.g. .xyz, .top, .ru) or ending in suspicious file extensions (.exe, .dll, .hta), which may indicate malicious activity.
references:
    - https://www.howtogeek.com/137270/50-file-extensions-that-are-potentially-dangerous-on-windows
    - https://www.spamhaus.org/reputation-statistics/cctlds/domains/
author: '@signalblur, Corelight'
date: 2025-02-26
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.command-and-control
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: http
detection:
    # Suspicious TLD in the 'host' field OR malicious file extension in the 'uri' field.
    selection_suspicious_tld:
        host|endswith:
            - '.bid'
            - '.by'
            - '.cf'
            - '.click'
            - '.cm'
            - '.ga'
            - '.gq'
            - '.ir'
            - '.kp'
            - '.loan'
            - '.ml'
            - '.mm'
            - '.party'
            - '.pw'
            - '.ru'
            - '.su'
            - '.sy'
            - '.tk'
            - '.top'
            - '.tv'
            - '.ve'
            - '.work'
            - '.xyz'
    selection_malicious_ext:
        uri|endswith:
            - '.bat'
            - '.bin'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.cpl'
            - '.dll'
            - '.dylib'
            - '.elf'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.iso'
            - '.jar'
            - '.js'
            - '.lnk'
            - '.msi'
            - '.pif'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.py'
            - '.reg'
            - '.scr'
            - '.sh'
            - '.so'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.wsf'
    selection_malicious_mime:
        resp_mime_types:
            - 'application/vnd.microsoft.portable-executable'
            - 'application/x-bat'
            - 'application/x-dosexec'
            - 'application/x-elf'
            - 'application/x-iso9660-image'
            - 'application/x-java-archive'
            - 'application/x-ms-shortcut'
            - 'application/x-msdos-program'
            - 'application/x-msdownload'
            - 'application/x-python-code'
            - 'application/x-sh'
    condition: selection_suspicious_tld and 1 of selection_malicious_*
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate software downloads from low quality TLDs
level: medium

title: LSASS Process Reconnaissance Via Findstr.EXE
id: fe63010f-8823-4864-a96b-a7b4a0f7b929
status: test
description: Detects findstring commands that include the keyword lsass, which indicates recon actviity for the LSASS process PID
references:
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/08/recent-cyber-attack.html?m=1
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-12
modified: 2024-06-04
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.006
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_findstr_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\find.exe'
              - '\findstr.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'FIND.EXE'
              - 'FINDSTR.EXE'
    selection_findstr_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: 'lsass'
    selection_special:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' /i "lsass'
            - ' /i lsass.exe'
            - 'findstr "lsass'
            - 'findstr lsass'
            - 'findstr.exe "lsass'
            - 'findstr.exe lsass'
    condition: all of selection_findstr_* or selection_special
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_findstr_lsass/info.yml

title: MSSQL Server Failed Logon
id: 218d2855-2bba-4f61-9c85-81d0ea63ac71
related:
    - id: ebfe73c2-5bc9-4ed9-aaa8-8b54b2b4777d
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects failed logon attempts from clients to MSSQL server.
references:
    - https://cybersecthreat.com/2020/07/08/enable-mssql-authentication-log-to-eventlog/
    - https://www.experts-exchange.com/questions/27800944/EventID-18456-Failed-to-open-the-explicitly-specified-database.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), j4son
date: 2023-10-11
modified: 2024-06-26
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
    definition: 'Requirements: Must enable MSSQL authentication.'
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name|contains: 'MSSQL' # Note: We use contains to account for other third party providers - See https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/4876
        EventID: 18456
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - This event could stem from users changing an account's password that's used to authenticate via a job or an automated process. Investigate the source of such events and mitigate them
level: low

title: Mustang Panda Dropper
id: 2d87d610-d760-45ee-a7e6-7a6f2a65de00
status: test
description: Detects specific process parameters as used by Mustang Panda droppers
references:
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/7ca5661d-a67b-43ec-98c1-dd7a8103c256/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/b12cccf3-1c22-4e28-9d3e-c7a6062f3914/
    - https://www.anomali.com/blog/china-based-apt-mustang-panda-targets-minority-groups-public-and-private-sector-organizations
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community
date: 2019-10-30
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.t1587.001
    - attack.resource-development
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cli:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'Temp\wtask.exe /create'
              - '%windir:~-3,1%%PUBLIC:~-9,1%'
              - '/tn "Security Script '
              - '%windir:~-1,1%'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '/E:vbscript'
              - 'C:\Users\'
              - '.txt'
              - '/F'
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: 'Temp\winwsh.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Notepad Password Files Discovery
id: 3b4e950b-a3ea-44d3-877e-432071990709
status: experimental
description: Detects the execution of Notepad to open a file that has the string "password" which may indicate unauthorized access to credentials or suspicious activity.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/02/24/confluence-exploit-leads-to-lockbit-ransomware/
    - https://intel.thedfirreport.com/eventReports/view/57  # Private Report
author: 'The DFIR Report'
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
date: 2025-02-21
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\notepad.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith:
        # Note: Commandline to contain a file with the string password and a specific extension
            - 'password*.txt'
            - 'password*.csv'
            - 'password*.doc'
            - 'password*.xls'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of opening files from remote hosts by administrators or users. However, storing passwords in text readable format could potentially be a violation of the organization's policy. Any match should be investigated further.
level: low

title: Potential CVE-2023-25717 Exploitation Attempt
id: 043c1609-0e32-4462-a6f2-5a0c2da3fafe
status: test
description: Detects a potential exploitation attempt of CVE-2023-25717 a Remote Code Execution via an unauthenticated HTTP GET Request, in Ruckus Wireless Admin
references:
    - https://cybir.com/2023/cve/proof-of-concept-ruckus-wireless-admin-10-4-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-csrf-ssrf/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-30
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2023-25717
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'GET'
        cs-uri-query|contains|all:
            - '/forms/doLogin'
            - 'login_username'
            - 'password'
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '$('
            - '%24%28' # URL Encode version of "$("
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Vulnerability scanners
    - Some rare false positives may occur if the password contains the characters "$(". Apply addition indicators such as executed commands to remove FP
level: high

title: Proxy Execution Via Wuauclt.EXE
id: af77cf95-c469-471c-b6a0-946c685c4798
related:
    - id: ba1bb0cb-73da-42de-ad3a-de10c643a5d0
      type: obsolete
    - id: d7825193-b70a-48a4-b992-8b5b3015cc11
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the use of the Windows Update Client binary (wuauclt.exe) for proxy execution.
references:
    - https://dtm.uk/wuauclt/
    - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest-campaign/
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Sreeman, FPT.EagleEye Team
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2023-11-11
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wuauclt.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wuauclt.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'UpdateDeploymentProvider'
            - 'RunHandlerComServer'
    filter_main_generic:
        # Note: Please enhance this if you find the full path
        CommandLine|contains: ' /UpdateDeploymentProvider UpdateDeploymentProvider.dll '
    filter_main_wuaueng:
        # Note: Please enhance this if you find the full path
        CommandLine|contains: ' wuaueng.dll '
    filter_main_uus:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\Windows\UUS\Packages\Preview\amd64\updatedeploy.dll /ClassId'
            - ':\Windows\UUS\amd64\UpdateDeploy.dll /ClassId'
    filter_main_winsxs:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
            - '\UpdateDeploy.dll /ClassId '
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PUA - SoftPerfect Netscan Execution
id: ca387a8e-1c84-4da3-9993-028b45342d30
status: test
description: |
    Detects usage of SoftPerfect's "netscan.exe". An application for scanning networks.
    It is actively used in-the-wild by threat actors to inspect and understand the network architecture of a victim.
references:
    - https://www.protect.airbus.com/blog/uncovering-cyber-intruders-netscan/
    - https://secjoes-reports.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/Sockbot%2Bin%2BGoLand.pdf
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/black-basta-ransomware-attacks-deploy-custom-edr-evasion-tools-tied-to-fin7-threat-actor/
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/yanluowang-ransomware-attacks-continue
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/07/13/climbing-mount-everest-black-byte-bytes-back/
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-exchange-servers-hacked-to-deploy-hive-ransomware/
    - https://www.softperfect.com/products/networkscanner/
author: '@d4ns4n_ (Wuerth-Phoenix)'
date: 2024-04-25
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\netscan.exe'
        - Product: 'Network Scanner'
        - Description: 'Application for scanning networks'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrator activity
level: medium

title: Run Once Task Configuration in Registry
id: c74d7efc-8826-45d9-b8bb-f04fac9e4eff
status: test
description: Rule to detect the configuration of Run Once registry key. Configured payload can be run by runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup
references:
    - https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/990717080805789697
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Runonce/
author: 'Avneet Singh @v3t0_, oscd.community'
date: 2020-11-15
modified: 2024-03-25
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\StubPath'
    filter_optional_chrome:
        Details|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\'
            - '\Installer\chrmstp.exe" --configure-user-settings --verbose-logging --system-level' # In some cases the Details will contain an additional flag called "--channel=stable" at the end
    filter_optional_edge:
        Details|contains:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\'
        Details|endswith: '\Installer\setup.exe" --configure-user-settings --verbose-logging --system-level --msedge --channel=stable'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate modification of the registry key by legitimate program
level: medium

title: Service StartupType Change Via Sc.EXE
id: 85c312b7-f44d-4a51-a024-d671c40b49fc
status: test
description: Detect the use of "sc.exe" to change the startup type of a service to "disabled" or "demand"
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/38283b775552da8981452941ea74191aa0d203edd3f61fb2dee7b0aea3514955
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-01
modified: 2023-03-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' config '
            - 'start'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'disabled'
            - 'demand'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - False positives may occur with troubleshooting scripts
level: medium

title: Stop Windows Service Via Sc.EXE
id: 81bcb81b-5b1f-474b-b373-52c871aaa7b1
related:
    - id: eb87818d-db5d-49cc-a987-d5da331fbd90
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the stopping of a Windows service via the "sc.exe" utility
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc742107(v=ws.11)
author: Jakob Weinzettl, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-03-05
modified: 2024-01-18
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1489
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: ' stop '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - There are many legitimate reasons to stop a service. This rule isn't looking for any suspicious behavior in particular. Filter legitimate activity accordingly
level: low
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sc_stop_service/info.yml

title: Suspicious Binary In User Directory Spawned From Office Application
id: aa3a6f94-890e-4e22-b634-ffdfd54792cc
status: test
description: Detects an executable in the users directory started from one of the Microsoft Office suite applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio)
references:
    - https://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-not-finished-morphisec-spots-new-campaign
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/23160972c6ae07f740800fa28e421a81d7c0ca5d5cab95bc082b4a986fbac57
author: Jason Lynch
date: 2019-04-02
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.g0046
    - car.2013-05-002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\WINWORD.EXE'
            - '\EXCEL.EXE'
            - '\POWERPNT.exe'
            - '\MSPUB.exe'
            - '\VISIO.exe'
            - '\MSACCESS.exe'
            - '\EQNEDT32.exe'
            # - '\OUTLOOK.EXE' too many FPs
        Image|startswith: 'C:\users\'
        Image|endswith: '.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\Teams.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Child Process of Notepad++ Updater - GUP.Exe
id: bb0e87ce-c89f-4857-84fa-095e4483e9cb
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious child process creation by the Notepad++ updater process (gup.exe).
    This could indicate potential exploitation of the updater component to deliver unwanted malware.
references:
    - https://notepad-plus-plus.org/news/v889-released/
    - https://www.heise.de/en/news/Notepad-updater-installed-malware-11109726.html
    - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-chrysalis-backdoor-dive-into-lotus-blossoms-toolkit/
    - https://www.validin.com/blog/exploring_notepad_plus_plus_network_indicators/
    - https://securelist.com/notepad-supply-chain-attack/118708/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-02-03
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1195.002
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1557
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\gup.exe'
    selection_child_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
    selection_child_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'bitsadmin'
            - 'certutil'
            - 'curl'
            - 'finger'
            - 'forfiles'
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'wget'
    condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_child_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious CustomShellHost Execution
id: 84b14121-9d14-416e-800b-f3b829c5a14d
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of CustomShellHost.exe where the child isn't located in 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'. CustomShellHost is a known LOLBin that can be abused by attackers for defense evasion techniques.
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/180
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/CustomShellHost/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-19
modified: 2025-10-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1216
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\CustomShellHost.exe'
    filter_main_explorer:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - False positives are unlikely, investigate matches carefully.
level: high

title: Suspicious File Characteristics Due to Missing Fields
id: 9637e8a5-7131-4f7f-bdc7-2b05d8670c43
status: test
description: Detects Executables in the Downloads folder without FileVersion,Description,Product,Company likely created with py2exe
references:
    - https://securelist.com/muddywater/88059/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/276a765a10f98cda1a38d3a31e7483585ca3722ecad19d784441293acf1b7beb/detection
author: Markus Neis, Sander Wiebing
date: 2018-11-22
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.006
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection1:
        Description: '\?'
        FileVersion: '\?'
    selection2:
        Description: '\?'
        Product: '\?'
    selection3:
        Description: '\?'
        Company: '\?'
    folder:
        Image|contains: '\Downloads\'
    condition: (selection1 or selection2 or selection3) and folder
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In TMP
id: 3da70954-0f2c-4103-adff-b7440368f50e
status: test
description: |
  Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data local temporary folder.
  This driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230331181619/https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/
author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes)
date: 2019-04-08
modified: 2026-06-29
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: 'PROCEXP152.sys'
    filter:
        Image|contains:
            - '\procexp64.exe'
            - '\procexp64a.exe'
            - '\procexp.exe'
            - '\procmon64.exe'
            - '\procmon64a.exe'
            - '\procmon.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Other legimate tools using this driver and filename (like Sysinternals). Note - Clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the driver filename. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.
level: medium

title: Suspicious Registry Modification From ADS Via Regini.EXE
id: 77946e79-97f1-45a2-84b4-f37b5c0d8682
related:
    - id: 5f60740a-f57b-4e76-82a1-15b6ff2cb134
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the import of an alternate data stream with regini.exe, regini.exe can be used to modify registry keys.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regini/
    - https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/regini
author: Eli Salem, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\regini.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'REGINI.EXE'
    selection_re:
        CommandLine|re: ':[^ \\]'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: System Information Discovery Via Wmic.EXE
id: d85ecdd7-b855-4e6e-af59-d9c78b5b861e
related:
    - id: 9d5a1274-922a-49d0-87f3-8c653483b909
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the WMI command-line (WMIC) utility to identify and display various system information,
    including OS, CPU, GPU, disk drive names, memory capacity, display resolution, baseboard, BIOS,
    and GPU driver products/versions.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/a2ccd19c37d0278b4ffa8583add3cf52060a5418/atomics/T1082/T1082.md#atomic-test-25---system-information-discovery-with-wmic
    - https://nwgat.ninja/getting-system-information-with-wmic-on-windows/
    - https://blog.sekoia.io/aurora-a-rising-stealer-flying-under-the-radar
    - https://blog.cyble.com/2023/01/18/aurora-a-stealer-using-shapeshifting-tactics/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/a6aa0057-82ec-451f-8f99-55650ca537da/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d6f6bc10ae0e634ed4301d584f61418cee18e5d58ad9af72f8aa552dc4aaeca3/behavior
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-12-19
modified: 2024-01-15
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1082
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_wmic:
        - Description: 'WMI Commandline Utility'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\WMIC.exe'
    selection_get:
        CommandLine|contains: 'get'
    selection_classes:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'baseboard'
            - 'bios'
            - 'cpu'
            - 'diskdrive'
            - 'logicaldisk'
            - 'memphysical'
            - 'os'
            - 'path'
            - 'startup'
            - 'win32_videocontroller'
    selection_attributes:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'caption'
            - 'command'
            - 'driverversion'
            - 'maxcapacity'
            - 'name'
            - 'osarchitecture'
            - 'product'
            - 'size'
            - 'smbiosbiosversion'
            - 'version'
            - 'videomodedescription'
    filter_optional_vmtools:
        ParentCommandLine|contains: '\VMware\VMware Tools\serviceDiscovery\scripts\'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - VMWare Tools serviceDiscovery scripts
# Note: Might be upgraded to a medium detection rules after some time
level: low

title: Time Travel Debugging Utility Usage - Image
id: e76c8240-d68f-4773-8880-5c6f63595aaf
status: test
description: Detects usage of Time Travel Debugging Utility. Adversaries can execute malicious processes and dump processes, such as lsass.exe, via tttracer.exe.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Tttracer/
    - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1196390321783025666
    - https://twitter.com/oulusoyum/status/1191329746069655553
author: 'Ensar Şamil, @sblmsrsn, @oscd_initiative'
date: 2020-10-06
modified: 2022-12-02
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\ttdrecord.dll'
            - '\ttdwriter.dll'
            - '\ttdloader.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage by software developers/testers
level: high

title: Uncommon Network Connection Initiated By Certutil.EXE
id: 0dba975d-a193-4ed1-a067-424df57570d1
status: test
description: |
    Detects a network connection initiated by the certutil.exe utility.
    Attackers can abuse the utility in order to download malware or additional payloads.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-02
modified: 2024-05-31
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationPort:
            - 80
            - 135
            - 443
            - 445
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high