IAM Access Key Created

Status: test
Severity: medium
Log source: product aws, service cloudtrail
Author: nishikawaakira (@nishikawaakira)
Source: github.com/Yamato-Security/suzaku-rules

Detects when an IAM access key is created via CreateAccessKey. Attackers create access keys for persistence after compromising an account, often targeting an existing user or a newly created backdoor user. Note: This is different from CreateApiKey (AppSync/API Gateway).

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1098.001` Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials

Event coverage

Provider	Event
AWS-iam	CreateAccessKey

Rules detecting the same action

Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.

AWS IAM Backdoor Users Keys (Sigma)
AWS IAM S3Browser User or AccessKey Creation (Sigma)
AWS IAM Sensitive Operations via Lambda Execution Role (Elastic)
AWS IAM User Created Access Keys For Another User (Elastic)
AWS Sensitive IAM Operations Performed via CloudShell (Elastic)
AWS User API Key Created (Panther)
High-Risk Cross-Cloud User Impersonation (Kusto)
IAM Access Key Creation Attempt (Sigma)

Rule body yaml

title: IAM Access Key Created
id: 2c4d6e8f-0a1b-3c5d-7e9f-1a2b3c4d5e6f
status: test
description: |
    Detects when an IAM access key is created via CreateAccessKey.
    Attackers create access keys for persistence after compromising an account,
    often targeting an existing user or a newly created backdoor user.
    Note: This is different from CreateApiKey (AppSync/API Gateway).
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001/
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_CreateAccessKey.html
author: nishikawaakira (@nishikawaakira)
date: 2026-05-03
modified: 2026-05-29
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098.001
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
        eventName: CreateAccessKey
    filter:
        errorCode|exists: true
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate key rotation by administrators or automation
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection and not filter

Stage 1: `selection`

selection:
    eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
    eventName: CreateAccessKey

Stage 2: `not filter`

filter:
    errorCode|exists: true

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`errorCode`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`eventName`	eq	`CreateAccessKey`
`eventSource`	eq	`iam.amazonaws.com`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

IAM Access Key Created

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection`

Stage 2: `not filter`

Exclusions

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

IAM Access Key Created

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection

Stage 2: not filter

Exclusions

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection`

Stage 2: `not filter`