Detection rules › Sigma
IAM Login Profile Created
Establishes persistence by creating a Login Profile on an existing IAM user. This allows an attacker to access an IAM user intended to be used programmatically through the AWS console usual login process. This can also be detected with UpdateLoginProfile events. If an account is meant to be used only programmatically, it should not have a login profile.
Known false positives
- Legitimate creation of a login profile by an administrator.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence |
Telemetry coverage
Rules detecting the same action
These rules filter on the same operation.
- AWS IAM Credentials Added to a Bedrock API Key Phantom User (Elastic)
- AWS IAM Login Profile Added for Root (Elastic)
- AWS IAM Login Profile Added to User (Elastic)
- AWS IAM Login Profile Created or Modified for an IAM User (Elastic)
- AWS IAM S3Browser LoginProfile Creation (Sigma)
- AWS User Login Profile Created or Modified (Panther)
Rule body
title: IAM Login Profile Created
id: 2070cb71-0958-4504-906f-f8d4163d7505
status: test
description: |
Establishes persistence by creating a Login Profile on an existing IAM user.
This allows an attacker to access an IAM user intended to be used programmatically through the AWS console usual login process.
This can also be detected with UpdateLoginProfile events.
If an account is meant to be used only programmatically, it should not have a login profile.
references:
- https://aws-samples.github.io/threat-technique-catalog-for-aws/Techniques/T1098.001.html
- https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.persistence.iam-create-user-login-profile/
- https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/tales-from-the-cloud-trenches-ecs-crypto-mining/
- https://permiso.io/blog/s/approach-to-detection-androxgh0st-greenbot-persistence/
- https://permiso.io/blog/s/unmasking-guivil-new-cloud-threat-actor/
- https://blog.darklab.hk/2021/07/06/trouble-in-paradise/
- https://expel.com/blog/incident-report-from-cli-to-console-chasing-an-attacker-in-aws/
- https://permiso.io/blog/lucr-3-scattered-spider-getting-saas-y-in-the-cloud
author: Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
date: 2025-08-02
modified: 2025-08-02
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098.001 # Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
eventName: 'CreateLoginProfile'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate creation of a login profile by an administrator.
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
eventName: 'CreateLoginProfile'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
eventName | eq |
| field:"aws::eventName" kind:eq value:"CreateLoginProfile" |
eventSource | eq |
| field:"aws::eventSource" kind:eq value:"iam.amazonaws.com" |