Detection rules › Sigma
IAM Login Profile Created
Establishes persistence by creating a Login Profile on an existing IAM user. This allows an attacker to access an IAM user intended to be used programmatically through the AWS console usual login process. This can also be detected with UpdateLoginProfile events. If an account is meant to be used only programmatically, it should not have a login profile.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | T1098.001 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event |
|---|---|
| AWS-iam | CreateLoginProfile |
Rules detecting the same action
Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.
- AWS IAM Login Profile Added for Root (Elastic)
- AWS IAM Login Profile Added to User (Elastic)
- AWS IAM S3Browser LoginProfile Creation (Sigma)
- AWS User Login Profile Created or Modified (Panther)
Rule body yaml
title: IAM Login Profile Created
id: 2070cb71-0958-4504-906f-f8d4163d7505
status: test
description: |
Establishes persistence by creating a Login Profile on an existing IAM user.
This allows an attacker to access an IAM user intended to be used programmatically through the AWS console usual login process.
This can also be detected with UpdateLoginProfile events.
If an account is meant to be used only programmatically, it should not have a login profile.
references:
- https://aws-samples.github.io/threat-technique-catalog-for-aws/Techniques/T1098.001.html
- https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.persistence.iam-create-user-login-profile/
- https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/tales-from-the-cloud-trenches-ecs-crypto-mining/
- https://permiso.io/blog/s/approach-to-detection-androxgh0st-greenbot-persistence/
- https://permiso.io/blog/s/unmasking-guivil-new-cloud-threat-actor/
- https://blog.darklab.hk/2021/07/06/trouble-in-paradise/
- https://expel.com/blog/incident-report-from-cli-to-console-chasing-an-attacker-in-aws/
- https://permiso.io/blog/lucr-3-scattered-spider-getting-saas-y-in-the-cloud
author: Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
date: 2025-08-02
modified: 2025-08-02
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098.001 # Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
eventName: 'CreateLoginProfile'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate creation of a login profile by an administrator.
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
eventName: 'CreateLoginProfile'
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
eventName | eq |
|
eventSource | eq |
|