AWS User Login Profile Was Modified

Status: test
Severity: high
Log source: product aws, service cloudtrail
Author: toffeebr33k
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects activity when someone is changing passwords on behalf of other users. An attacker with the "iam:UpdateLoginProfile" permission on other users can change the password used to login to the AWS console on any user that already has a login profile setup.

Known false positives

Legitimate user account administration

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1098` Account Manipulation
Privilege Escalation	`T1098` Account Manipulation

Telemetry coverage

Platform	Record / event type
AWS	CloudTrail event `UpdateLoginProfile`: Changes the password of the console login profile for the specified IAM user.

Rules detecting the same action

These rules filter on the same operation.

AWS IAM Credentials Added to a Bedrock API Key Phantom User (Elastic)
AWS IAM Login Profile Created or Modified for an IAM User (Elastic)
AWS User Login Profile Created or Modified (Panther)
DEPRECATED - AWS User Login Profile Modified (Panther)

Rule body

title: AWS User Login Profile Was Modified
id: 055fb148-60f8-462d-ad16-26926ce050f1
status: test
description: |
    Detects activity when someone is changing passwords on behalf of other users.
    An attacker with the "iam:UpdateLoginProfile" permission on other users can change the password used to login to the AWS console on any user that already has a login profile setup.
references:
    - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/AWS-IAM-Privilege-Escalation
author: toffeebr33k
date: 2021-08-09
modified: 2024-04-26
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
        eventName: 'UpdateLoginProfile'
    filter_main_user_identity:
        userIdentity.arn|fieldref: requestParameters.userName
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate user account administration
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection and not 1 of filter_main_*

Stage 1: `selection`

selection:
    eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
    eventName: 'UpdateLoginProfile'

Stage 2: `not filter_main_user_identity`

filter_main_user_identity:
    userIdentity.arn|fieldref: requestParameters.userName

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

Field	Kind	Excluded values	Search
`userIdentity.arn`	cross_field_compare	`requestParameters.userName`	`excludes:userIdentity.arn` `field:"userIdentity.arn" value:"requestParameters.userName"`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

Field	Kind	Values	Search
`eventName`	eq	`UpdateLoginProfile`	`field:"aws::eventName" kind:eq value:"UpdateLoginProfile"`
`eventSource`	eq	`iam.amazonaws.com`	`field:"aws::eventSource" kind:eq value:"iam.amazonaws.com"`