Microsoft Defender security components disabled (command)

Status: experimental
Severity: medium
Log source: product windows, category process_creation
Author: mdecrevoisier
Source: github.com/mdecrevoisier/SIGMA-detection-rules

Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to disable Defender security features

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Stealth	`T1562.001` Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688	A new process has been created.

Rule body yaml

title: Microsoft Defender security components disabled (command)
description: Detects scenarios where an attacker attempts to disable Defender security features
references:
- https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0005-Defense%20Evasion/T1562.001-Impair%20Defenses-Disable%20or%20Modify%20tool
- https://github.com/swagkarna/Defeat-Defender-V1.2
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/defender/set-mppreference?view=windowsserver2019-ps
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/defender-csp
- https://powershell.one/wmi/root/microsoft/windows/defender/msft_mppreference
- https://gist.github.com/pe3zx/7c5e0080c3b0869ccba1f1dc2ea0c5e0
- https://cloudbrothers.info/en/current-limits-defender-av-tamper-protection/
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1562.001
author: mdecrevoisier
status: experimental
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection: # Set-MpPreference -DisableArchiveScanning $true
  selection:
    EventID: 4688
    EventData|contains|all:
      - Set-MpPreference
      - Add-MpPreference
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '1'
      - '$true'
    CommandLine|contains:
      # Scanning features
      - DisableArchiveScanning
      - DisableRemovableDriveScanning
      - DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan
      - DisableScanningNetworkFiles
      - DisableRestorePoint
      - DisableScriptScanning
      - DisableEmailScanning
      # Parsing features
      - DisableDnsParsing
      - DisableDnsOverTcpParsing
      - DisableSshParsing
      - DisableTlsParsing
      - DisableHttpParsing
      - DisableRdpParsing
      # Misc features
      - DisableAutoExclusions
      - DisableBlockAtFirstSeen
      - DisableCpuThrottleOnIdleScans
      - DisableDatagramProcessing
      - SignatureDisableUpdateOnStartupWithoutEngine
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection

Stage 1: `selection`

selection:
  EventID: 4688
  EventData|contains|all:
    - Set-MpPreference
    - Add-MpPreference
  CommandLine|contains:
    - '1'
    - '$true'
  CommandLine|contains:
    - DisableArchiveScanning
    - DisableRemovableDriveScanning
    - DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan
    - DisableScanningNetworkFiles
    - DisableRestorePoint
    - DisableScriptScanning
    - DisableEmailScanning
    - DisableDnsParsing
    - DisableDnsOverTcpParsing
    - DisableSshParsing
    - DisableTlsParsing
    - DisableHttpParsing
    - DisableRdpParsing
    - DisableAutoExclusions
    - DisableBlockAtFirstSeen
    - DisableCpuThrottleOnIdleScans
    - DisableDatagramProcessing
    - SignatureDisableUpdateOnStartupWithoutEngine

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`CommandLine`	match	`DisableArchiveScanning` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `DisableAutoExclusions` `DisableBlockAtFirstSeen` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `DisableCpuThrottleOnIdleScans` `DisableDatagramProcessing` `DisableDnsOverTcpParsing` `DisableDnsParsing` `DisableEmailScanning` `DisableHttpParsing` `DisableRdpParsing` `DisableRemovableDriveScanning` `DisableRestorePoint` `DisableScanningMappedNetworkDrivesForFullScan` `DisableScanningNetworkFiles` `DisableScriptScanning` corpus 2 (sigma 2) `DisableSshParsing` `DisableTlsParsing` `SignatureDisableUpdateOnStartupWithoutEngine` corpus 2 (sigma 2)
`EventData`	match	`Add-MpPreference` corpus 4 (sigma 4) `Set-MpPreference` corpus 5 (sigma 5)

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Microsoft Defender security components disabled (command)

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Microsoft Defender security components disabled (command)

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection`