Detection rules › Sigma
DNS Query Request By Regsvr32.EXE
Detects DNS queries initiated by "Regsvr32.exe"
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | T1559.001 Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model |
| Stealth | T1218.010 System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32 |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 22 | DNSEvent (DNS query) |
Rule body yaml
title: DNS Query Request By Regsvr32.EXE
id: 36e037c4-c228-4866-b6a3-48eb292b9955
related:
- id: c7e91a02-d771-4a6d-a700-42587e0b1095
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects DNS queries initiated by "Regsvr32.exe"
references:
- https://pentestlab.blog/2017/05/11/applocker-bypass-regsvr32/
- https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/
author: Dmitriy Lifanov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2023-09-18
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1559.001
- attack.t1218.010
logsource:
category: dns_query
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
Image | ends_with |
|