Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In TMP

Status: test
Severity: medium
Log source: category file_event, product windows
Author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes)
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data local temporary folder. This driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU.

Known false positives

Other legimate tools using this driver and filename (like Sysinternals). Note - Clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the driver filename. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Defense Impairment	`T1685` Disable or Modify Tools

Telemetry coverage

Provider	Record / event type
Sysmon	Event ID 11: FileCreate

Rule body

title: Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In TMP
id: 3da70954-0f2c-4103-adff-b7440368f50e
status: test
description: |
  Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data local temporary folder.
  This driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230331181619/https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/
author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes)
date: 2019-04-08
modified: 2026-06-29
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: 'PROCEXP152.sys'
    filter:
        Image|contains:
            - '\procexp64.exe'
            - '\procexp64a.exe'
            - '\procexp.exe'
            - '\procmon64.exe'
            - '\procmon64a.exe'
            - '\procmon.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Other legimate tools using this driver and filename (like Sysinternals). Note - Clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the driver filename. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection and not filter

Stage 1: `selection`

selection:
    TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
    TargetFilename|endswith: 'PROCEXP152.sys'

Stage 2: `not filter`

filter:
    Image|contains:
        - '\procexp64.exe'
        - '\procexp64a.exe'
        - '\procexp.exe'
        - '\procmon64.exe'
        - '\procmon64a.exe'
        - '\procmon.exe'

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

Field	Kind	Excluded values	Search
`Image`	match	`\procexp.exe`	`excludes:Image` `field:"Image" value:"\procexp.exe"`
`Image`	match	`\procexp64.exe`	`excludes:Image` `field:"Image" value:"\procexp64.exe"`
`Image`	match	`\procexp64a.exe`	`excludes:Image` `field:"Image" value:"\procexp64a.exe"`
`Image`	match	`\procmon.exe`	`excludes:Image` `field:"Image" value:"\procmon.exe"`
`Image`	match	`\procmon64.exe`	`excludes:Image` `field:"Image" value:"\procmon64.exe"`
`Image`	match	`\procmon64a.exe`	`excludes:Image` `field:"Image" value:"\procmon64a.exe"`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

Field	Kind	Values	Search
`TargetFilename`	ends_with	`PROCEXP152.sys`	`field:"TargetFilename" kind:ends_with value:"PROCEXP152.sys"`
`TargetFilename`	match	`\AppData\Local\Temp\` corpus 8 (sigma 8)	`field:"TargetFilename" kind:match value:"\AppData\Local\Temp\"`