Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack - File

Status: test
Severity: critical
Log source: category file_event, product windows
Author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects a threat actor creating a file named wbemcomn.dll in the C:\Windows\System32\wbem\ directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Execution	`T1047` Windows Management Instrumentation
Lateral Movement	`T1021.002` Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Telemetry coverage

Provider	Record / event type
Sysmon	Event ID 11: FileCreate

Rule body

title: Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack - File
id: 614a7e17-5643-4d89-b6fe-f9df1a79641c
status: test
description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteWMIWbemcomnDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-12-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image: System
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\wbem\wbemcomn.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection

Stage 1: `selection`

selection:
    Image: System
    TargetFilename|endswith: '\wbem\wbemcomn.dll'

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

Field	Kind	Values	Search
`Image`	eq	`System` corpus 3 (sigma 2, kusto 1)	`field:"Image" kind:eq value:"System"`
`TargetFilename`	ends_with	`\wbem\wbemcomn.dll`	`field:"TargetFilename" kind:ends_with value:"\wbem\wbemcomn.dll"`