Malicious DLL Load By Compromised 3CXDesktopApp

Status: test
Severity: critical
Log source: product windows, category image_load
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
Source: github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects DLL load activity of known compromised DLLs used in by the compromised 3CXDesktopApp

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Stealth	No specific technique

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 7	Image loaded

Rule body yaml

title: Malicious DLL Load By Compromised 3CXDesktopApp
id: d0b65ad3-e945-435e-a7a9-438e62dd48e9
related:
    - id: 3c4b3bbf-36b4-470c-b6cf-f07e8b1c7e26 # Proxy C2
      type: similar
    - id: 76bc1601-9546-4b75-9419-06e0e8d10651 # Proxy GH
      type: similar
    - id: bd03a0dc-5d93-49eb-b2e8-2dfd268600f8 # DNS C2
      type: similar
    - id: 51eecf75-d069-43c7-9ea2-63f75499edd4 # net_connection C2
      type: similar
    - id: 93bbde78-dc86-4e73-9ffc-ff8a384ca89c # ProcCreation Exec
      type: similar
    - id: 63f3605b-979f-48c2-b7cc-7f90523fed88 # ProcCreation ChildProc
      type: similar
    - id: e7581747-1e44-4d4b-85a6-0db0b4a00f2a # ProcCreation Update
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects DLL load activity of known compromised DLLs used in by the compromised 3CXDesktopApp
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/09/27/foggyweb-targeted-nobelium-malware-leads-to-persistent-backdoor/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-03-31
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Hashes|contains:
            # ffmpeg.dll
            - 'SHA256=7986BBAEE8940DA11CE089383521AB420C443AB7B15ED42AED91FD31CE833896'
            - 'SHA1=BF939C9C261D27EE7BB92325CC588624FCA75429'
            - 'MD5=74BC2D0B6680FAA1A5A76B27E5479CBC'
            # d3dcompiler_47.dll
            - 'SHA256=11BE1803E2E307B647A8A7E02D128335C448FF741BF06BF52B332E0BBF423B03'
            - 'SHA1=20D554A80D759C50D6537DD7097FED84DD258B3E'
            - 'MD5=82187AD3F0C6C225E2FBA0C867280CC9'
            # Inner object from ffmpeg.dll
            - 'SHA256=F79C3B0ADB6EC7BCC8BC9AE955A1571AAED6755A28C8B17B1D7595EE86840952'
            - 'SHA1=894E7D4FFD764BB458809C7F0643694B036EAD30'
            - 'MD5=11BC82A9BD8297BD0823BCE5D6202082'
            # ICONIC Stealer payload
            - 'SHA256=8AB3A5EAAF8C296080FADF56B265194681D7DA5DA7C02562953A4CB60E147423'
            - 'SHA1=3B3E778B647371262120A523EB873C20BB82BEAF'
            - 'MD5=7FAEA2B01796B80D180399040BB69835'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection

Stage 1: `selection`

selection:
    Hashes|contains:
        - 'SHA256=7986BBAEE8940DA11CE089383521AB420C443AB7B15ED42AED91FD31CE833896'
        - 'SHA1=BF939C9C261D27EE7BB92325CC588624FCA75429'
        - 'MD5=74BC2D0B6680FAA1A5A76B27E5479CBC'
        - 'SHA256=11BE1803E2E307B647A8A7E02D128335C448FF741BF06BF52B332E0BBF423B03'
        - 'SHA1=20D554A80D759C50D6537DD7097FED84DD258B3E'
        - 'MD5=82187AD3F0C6C225E2FBA0C867280CC9'
        - 'SHA256=F79C3B0ADB6EC7BCC8BC9AE955A1571AAED6755A28C8B17B1D7595EE86840952'
        - 'SHA1=894E7D4FFD764BB458809C7F0643694B036EAD30'
        - 'MD5=11BC82A9BD8297BD0823BCE5D6202082'
        - 'SHA256=8AB3A5EAAF8C296080FADF56B265194681D7DA5DA7C02562953A4CB60E147423'
        - 'SHA1=3B3E778B647371262120A523EB873C20BB82BEAF'
        - 'MD5=7FAEA2B01796B80D180399040BB69835'

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`Hashes`	match	`MD5=11BC82A9BD8297BD0823BCE5D6202082` `MD5=74BC2D0B6680FAA1A5A76B27E5479CBC` `MD5=7FAEA2B01796B80D180399040BB69835` `MD5=82187AD3F0C6C225E2FBA0C867280CC9` `SHA1=20D554A80D759C50D6537DD7097FED84DD258B3E` `SHA1=3B3E778B647371262120A523EB873C20BB82BEAF` `SHA1=894E7D4FFD764BB458809C7F0643694B036EAD30` `SHA1=BF939C9C261D27EE7BB92325CC588624FCA75429` `SHA256=11BE1803E2E307B647A8A7E02D128335C448FF741BF06BF52B332E0BBF423B03` `SHA256=7986BBAEE8940DA11CE089383521AB420C443AB7B15ED42AED91FD31CE833896` `SHA256=8AB3A5EAAF8C296080FADF56B265194681D7DA5DA7C02562953A4CB60E147423` `SHA256=F79C3B0ADB6EC7BCC8BC9AE955A1571AAED6755A28C8B17B1D7595EE86840952`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Malicious DLL Load By Compromised 3CXDesktopApp

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Malicious DLL Load By Compromised 3CXDesktopApp

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection`