Detection rules › Sigma
DLL Sideloading Of ShellChromeAPI.DLL
Detects processes loading the non-existent DLL "ShellChromeAPI". One known example is the "DeviceEnroller" binary in combination with the "PhoneDeepLink" flag tries to load this DLL. Adversaries can drop their own renamed DLL and execute it via DeviceEnroller.exe using this parameter
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 7: Image loaded |
Rule body
title: DLL Sideloading Of ShellChromeAPI.DLL
id: ee4c5d06-3abc-48cc-8885-77f1c20f4451
related:
- id: e173ad47-4388-4012-ae62-bd13f71c18a8
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects processes loading the non-existent DLL "ShellChromeAPI". One known example is the "DeviceEnroller" binary in combination with the "PhoneDeepLink" flag tries to load this DLL.
Adversaries can drop their own renamed DLL and execute it via DeviceEnroller.exe using this parameter
references:
- https://mobile.twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1564131230941122561
- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/DeviceEnroller.exe-24BEF0D6B0ECED36BB41831759FDE18D.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-01
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1574.001
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
# The DLL shouldn't exist on Windows anymore. If for some reason you still have it. You could filter out legitimate calls
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\ShellChromeAPI.dll'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selectionStage 1: selection
selection:
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\ShellChromeAPI.dll'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
ImageLoaded | ends_with |
| field:"ImageLoaded" kind:ends_with value:"\ShellChromeAPI.dll" |