Detection rules › Sigma
Fax Service DLL Search Order Hijack
The Fax service attempts to load ualapi.dll, which is non-existent. An attacker can then (side)load their own malicious DLL using this service.
Known false positives
- Unlikely
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 7: Image loaded |
Rule body
title: Fax Service DLL Search Order Hijack
id: 828af599-4c53-4ed2-ba4a-a9f835c434ea
status: test
description: The Fax service attempts to load ualapi.dll, which is non-existent. An attacker can then (side)load their own malicious DLL using this service.
references:
- https://windows-internals.com/faxing-your-way-to-system/
author: NVISO
date: 2020-05-04
modified: 2022-06-02
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1574.001
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\fxssvc.exe'
ImageLoaded|endswith: 'ualapi.dll'
filter:
ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection and not filterStage 1: selection
selection:
Image|endswith: '\fxssvc.exe'
ImageLoaded|endswith: 'ualapi.dll'
Stage 2: not filter
filter:
ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
ImageLoaded | starts_with | C:\Windows\WinSxS\ | excludes:ImageLoaded field:"ImageLoaded" value:"C:\Windows\WinSxS\" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\fxssvc.exe" |
ImageLoaded | ends_with |
| field:"ImageLoaded" kind:ends_with value:"ualapi.dll" |