macOS Suspicious Keychain Access

Status: experimental
Severity: high
Log source: product macos, service unifiedlog
Author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
Source: github.com/Nebulock-Inc/macos-coresigma

Detects suspicious access to the macOS Keychain, which stores passwords, certificates, and encryption keys. Attackers may attempt to dump credentials or access stored secrets.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Credential Access	`T1555.001` Credentials from Password Stores: Keychain

Rule body yaml

title: macOS Suspicious Keychain Access
id: d4e5f6a7-b8c9-4012-def0-123456789012
status: experimental
description: |
  Detects suspicious access to the macOS Keychain, which stores passwords,
  certificates, and encryption keys. Attackers may attempt to dump credentials
  or access stored secrets.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001/
  - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-keychain-extraction/
author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
date: 2025/01/22
modified: 2025/01/22
logsource:
  product: macos
  service: unifiedlog
detection:
  selection_subsystem:
    subsystem: com.apple.securityd
  selection_keychain:
    message|contains:
      - 'keychain'
      - 'SecKeychainItemCopyContent'
      - 'SecKeychainFindGenericPassword'
      - 'SecKeychainFindInternetPassword'
      - 'security find-generic-password'
      - 'security find-internet-password'
      - 'security dump-keychain'
  selection_suspicious:
    message|contains:
      - 'denied'
      - 'unauthorized'
      - 'failed'
      - 'dump'
      - 'export'
  condition: selection_subsystem and selection_keychain and selection_suspicious
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate password manager applications
  - System services accessing credentials
  - SSH key access
level: high
tags:
  - attack.credential_access
  - attack.t1555.001

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection_subsystem and selection_keychain and selection_suspicious

Stage 1: `selection_subsystem`

selection_subsystem:
  subsystem: com.apple.securityd

Stage 2: `selection_keychain`

selection_keychain:
  message|contains:
    - 'keychain'
    - 'SecKeychainItemCopyContent'
    - 'SecKeychainFindGenericPassword'
    - 'SecKeychainFindInternetPassword'
    - 'security find-generic-password'
    - 'security find-internet-password'
    - 'security dump-keychain'

Stage 3: `selection_suspicious`

selection_suspicious:
  message|contains:
    - 'denied'
    - 'unauthorized'
    - 'failed'
    - 'dump'
    - 'export'

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`message`	match	`SecKeychainFindGenericPassword` `SecKeychainFindInternetPassword` `SecKeychainItemCopyContent` `denied` `dump` `export` `failed` `keychain` `security dump-keychain` `security find-generic-password` `security find-internet-password` `unauthorized`
`subsystem`	eq	`com.apple.securityd`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

macOS Suspicious Keychain Access

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_subsystem`

Stage 2: `selection_keychain`

Stage 3: `selection_suspicious`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

macOS Suspicious Keychain Access

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection_subsystem

Stage 2: selection_keychain

Stage 3: selection_suspicious

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_subsystem`

Stage 2: `selection_keychain`

Stage 3: `selection_suspicious`