macOS Data Destruction Tools

Status: experimental
Severity: high
Log source: product macos, service endpointsecurity
Author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
Source: github.com/Nebulock-Inc/macos-coresigma

Detects execution of data destruction tools (rm, shred, srm, dd) with aggressive or recursive options which may indicate data destruction for impact or anti-forensics. Adversaries use these tools to destroy data, render systems inoperable, or cover tracks.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Stealth	`T1070.004` Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Impact	`T1485` Data Destruction

Rule body yaml

title: macOS Data Destruction Tools
id: e1f2a3b4-c5d6-4e7f-8a9b-0c1d2e3f4a5b
status: experimental
description: 'Detects execution of data destruction tools (rm, shred, srm, dd) with
  aggressive

  or recursive options which may indicate data destruction for impact or anti-forensics.

  Adversaries use these tools to destroy data, render systems inoperable, or cover
  tracks.

  '
author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
date: 2025/10/31
modified: 2025/10/31
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004/
logsource:
  product: macos
  service: endpointsecurity
detection:
  selection_event:
    esf.event_type: 9
    event.action: exec
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - /rm
    - /shred
    - /srm
    - /dd
  selection_dangerous:
    CommandLine|contains:
    - -rf
    - -R
    - --recursive
    - if=/dev/zero
    - if=/dev/random
    - of=/dev/
  condition: selection_event and selection_process and selection_dangerous
falsepositives:
- System maintenance and cleanup operations
- Software uninstallation procedures
- Legitimate disk management tasks
- Development and testing workflows
fields:
- Image
- CommandLine
- ProcessId
- ParentProcessId
- User
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1485
- attack.t1070.004
level: high

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection_event and selection_process and selection_dangerous

Stage 1: `selection_event`

selection_event:
  esf.event_type: 9
  event.action: exec

Stage 2: `selection_process`

selection_process:
  Image|endswith:
  - /rm
  - /shred
  - /srm
  - /dd

Stage 3: `selection_dangerous`

selection_dangerous:
  CommandLine|contains:
  - -rf
  - -R
  - --recursive
  - if=/dev/zero
  - if=/dev/random
  - of=/dev/

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`CommandLine`	match	`--recursive` `-R` `-rf` `if=/dev/random` `if=/dev/zero` `of=/dev/`
`Image`	ends_with	`/dd` `/rm` `/shred` `/srm`
`esf.event_type`	eq	`9`
`event.action`	eq	`exec`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

macOS Data Destruction Tools

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_event`

Stage 2: `selection_process`

Stage 3: `selection_dangerous`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

macOS Data Destruction Tools

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection_event

Stage 2: selection_process

Stage 3: selection_dangerous

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_event`

Stage 2: `selection_process`

Stage 3: `selection_dangerous`