macOS SSH Connection Detection

Status: experimental
Severity: medium
Log source: product macos, service endpointsecurity
Author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
Source: github.com/Nebulock-Inc/macos-coresigma

Detects execution of SSH client or SSH daemon processes which may indicate initial access attempts or remote connections. Monitor for unauthorized SSH connections, especially from unexpected users or to sensitive systems.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Initial Access	`T1078.004` Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Lateral Movement	`T1021.004` Remote Services: SSH

Rule body yaml

title: macOS SSH Connection Detection
id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-4a7b-8c9d-0e1f2a3b4c5d
status: experimental
description: 'Detects execution of SSH client or SSH daemon processes which may indicate

  initial access attempts or remote connections. Monitor for unauthorized SSH

  connections, especially from unexpected users or to sensitive systems.

  '
author: Eric Brown - Nebulock, Inc.
date: 2025/10/31
modified: 2025/10/31
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/
logsource:
  product: macos
  service: endpointsecurity
detection:
  selection_event:
    esf.event_type: 9
    event.action: exec
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - /ssh
    - /sshd
  condition: selection_event and selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate SSH usage by administrators
- Automated scripts using SSH for remote management
- CI/CD pipelines using SSH for deployments
fields:
- Image
- CommandLine
- ProcessId
- ParentProcessId
- User
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1078.004
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.004
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

selection_event and selection_process

Stage 1: `selection_event`

selection_event:
  esf.event_type: 9
  event.action: exec

Stage 2: `selection_process`

selection_process:
  Image|endswith:
  - /ssh
  - /sshd

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`Image`	ends_with	`/ssh` `/sshd`
`esf.event_type`	eq	`9`
`event.action`	eq	`exec`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

macOS SSH Connection Detection

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_event`

Stage 2: `selection_process`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

macOS SSH Connection Detection

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

Stage 1: selection_event

Stage 2: selection_process

Indicators

Stage 0: `condition`

Stage 1: `selection_event`

Stage 2: `selection_process`