detection.wiki

Detection rules › Sigma

OilRig APT Activity

Status
test
Severity
critical
Log source
product windows, category process_creation
Author
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects OilRig activity as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
ExecutionT1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
PersistenceT1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1112 Modify Registry, T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
Privilege EscalationT1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
Defense ImpairmentT1112 Modify Registry
Command & ControlT1071.004 Application Layer Protocol: DNS

Event coverage

ProviderEventTitle
SysmonEvent ID 1Process creation
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4688A new process has been created.

Rule body yaml

title: OilRig APT Activity
id: ce6e34ca-966d-41c9-8d93-5b06c8b97a06
related:
    - id: 53ba33fd-3a50-4468-a5ef-c583635cfa92 # System
      type: similar
    - id: c0580559-a6bd-4ef6-b9b7-83703d98b561 # Security
      type: similar
    - id: 7bdf2a7c-3acc-4091-9581-0a77dad1c5b5 # Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects OilRig activity as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20180402134442/https://nyotron.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Nyotron-OilRig-Malware-Report-March-2018C.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2018-03-23
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.g0049
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.s0111
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_schtasks:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'SC Scheduled Scan'
            - '\microsoft\Taskbar\autoit3.exe'
    selection_temp:
        Image|contains: '\Windows\Temp\DB\'
        Image|endswith: '.exe'
    selection_service:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\Service.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'i'
            - 'u'
    selection_autoit:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\local\microsoft\Taskbar\autoit3.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'nslookup.exe'
            - '-q=TXT'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

1 of selection_*

Stage 1: selection_schtasks

selection_schtasks:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
        - 'SC Scheduled Scan'
        - '\microsoft\Taskbar\autoit3.exe'

Stage 2: selection_temp

selection_temp:
    Image|contains: '\Windows\Temp\DB\'
    Image|endswith: '.exe'

Stage 3: selection_service

selection_service:
    Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\Service.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
        - 'i'
        - 'u'

Stage 4: selection_autoit

selection_autoit:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\local\microsoft\Taskbar\autoit3.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
        - 'nslookup.exe'
        - '-q=TXT'

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
CommandLinematch
  • -q=TXT
  • SC Scheduled Scan
  • \microsoft\Taskbar\autoit3.exe
  • i
  • nslookup.exe
  • u
Imageends_with
  • .exe corpus 4 (sigma 4)
Imageeq
  • C:\Windows\system32\Service.exe
Imagematch
  • \Windows\Temp\DB\
ParentImageends_with
  • \local\microsoft\Taskbar\autoit3.exe