Detection rules › Sigma
Potentially Suspicious CMD Shell Output Redirect
Detects inline Windows shell commands redirecting output via the ">" symbol to a suspicious location. This technique is sometimes used by malicious actors in order to redirect the output of reconnaissance commands such as "hostname" and "dir" to files for future exfiltration.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth | T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
Rule body yaml
title: Potentially Suspicious CMD Shell Output Redirect
id: 8e0bb260-d4b2-4fff-bb8d-3f82118e6892
related:
- id: aa2efee7-34dd-446e-8a37-40790a66efd7
type: derived
- id: 4f4eaa9f-5ad4-410c-a4be-bc6132b0175a
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects inline Windows shell commands redirecting output via the ">" symbol to a suspicious location.
This technique is sometimes used by malicious actors in order to redirect the output of reconnaissance commands such as "hostname" and "dir" to files for future exfiltration.
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-12
modified: 2024-03-19
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'Cmd.Exe'
selection_cli_1:
CommandLine|contains:
# Note: Add more suspicious locations as you find them
# Note: The space from the start is missing to cover append operations ">>"
# Note: We use the "?" to account for both a single and a double quote
# Note: If you want to account for more spaces which is still a valid bypass option. Use a regex with "\s"
- '>?%APPDATA%\'
- '>?%TEMP%\'
- '>?%TMP%\'
- '>?%USERPROFILE%\'
- '>?C:\ProgramData\'
- '>?C:\Temp\'
- '>?C:\Users\Public\'
- '>?C:\Windows\Temp\'
selection_cli_2:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' >'
- '">'
- "'>"
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'C:\Users\'
- '\AppData\Local\'
condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate admin or third party scripts used for diagnostic collection might generate some false positives
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_*Stage 1: selection_img
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'Cmd.Exe'
Stage 2: selection_cli_1
selection_cli_1:
CommandLine|contains:
- '>?%APPDATA%\'
- '>?%TEMP%\'
- '>?%TMP%\'
- '>?%USERPROFILE%\'
- '>?C:\ProgramData\'
- '>?C:\Temp\'
- '>?C:\Users\Public\'
- '>?C:\Windows\Temp\'
Stage 3: selection_cli_2
selection_cli_2:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' >'
- '">'
- "'>"
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'C:\Users\'
- '\AppData\Local\'
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
|
Image | ends_with |
|
OriginalFileName | eq |
|