Detection rules › Sigma

Potentially Suspicious Child Process Of DiskShadow.EXE

Status
test
Severity
medium
Log source
product windows, category process_creation
Author
Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
Source
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma

Detects potentially suspicious child processes of "Diskshadow.exe". This could be an attempt to bypass parent/child relationship detection or application whitelisting rules.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

title: Potentially Suspicious Child Process Of DiskShadow.EXE
id: 9f546b25-5f12-4c8d-8532-5893dcb1e4b8
related:
    - id: fa1a7e52-3d02-435b-81b8-00da14dd66c1 # Diskshadow Script Mode - Execution From Potential Suspicious Location
      type: similar
    - id: 1dde5376-a648-492e-9e54-4241dd9b0c7f # Diskshadow Script Mode - Uncommon Script Extension Execution
      type: similar
    - id: 56b1dde8-b274-435f-a73a-fb75eb81262a # Diskshadow Child Process Spawned
      type: similar
    - id: 0c2f8629-7129-4a8a-9897-7e0768f13ff2 # Diskshadow Script Mode Execution
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious child processes of "Diskshadow.exe". This could be an attempt to bypass parent/child relationship detection or application whitelisting rules.
references:
    - https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration
    - https://medium.com/@cyberjyot/lolbin-execution-via-diskshadow-f6ff681a27a4
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/diskshadow
    - https://www.lifars.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/GriefRansomware_Whitepaper-2.pdf
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-crytox-ransomware
    - https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/evilplayout-attack-against-irans-state-broadcaster/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-15
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\diskshadow.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            # Note: add or remove additional binaries according to your org needs
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False postitve can occur in cases where admin scripts levreage the "exec" flag to execute applications
level: medium

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: condition

selection

Stage 1: selection

selection:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\diskshadow.exe'
    Image|endswith:
        - '\certutil.exe'
        - '\cscript.exe'
        - '\mshta.exe'
        - '\powershell.exe'
        - '\pwsh.exe'
        - '\regsvr32.exe'
        - '\rundll32.exe'
        - '\wscript.exe'

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
Imageends_with
  • \certutil.exe corpus 43 (sigma 43)
  • \cscript.exe corpus 73 (sigma 73)
  • \mshta.exe corpus 67 (sigma 67)
  • \powershell.exe corpus 182 (sigma 182)
  • \pwsh.exe corpus 168 (sigma 168)
  • \regsvr32.exe corpus 65 (sigma 65)
  • \rundll32.exe corpus 95 (sigma 95)
  • \wscript.exe corpus 75 (sigma 75)
ParentImageends_with
  • \diskshadow.exe corpus 2 (sigma 2)