Detection rules › Sigma
Diskshadow Script Mode - Execution From Potential Suspicious Location
Detects execution of "Diskshadow.exe" in script mode using the "/s" flag where the script is located in a potentially suspicious location.
Known false positives
- False positives may occur if you execute the script from one of the paths mentioned in the rule. Apply additional filters that fits your org needs.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule body
title: Diskshadow Script Mode - Execution From Potential Suspicious Location
id: fa1a7e52-3d02-435b-81b8-00da14dd66c1
related:
- id: 1dde5376-a648-492e-9e54-4241dd9b0c7f # Diskshadow Script Mode - Uncommon Script Extension Execution
type: similar
- id: 9f546b25-5f12-4c8d-8532-5893dcb1e4b8 # Potentially Suspicious Child Process Of DiskShadow.EXE
type: similar
- id: 56b1dde8-b274-435f-a73a-fb75eb81262a # Diskshadow Child Process Spawned
type: similar
- id: 0c2f8629-7129-4a8a-9897-7e0768f13ff2 # Diskshadow Script Mode Execution
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of "Diskshadow.exe" in script mode using the "/s" flag where the script is located in a potentially suspicious location.
references:
- https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration
- https://medium.com/@cyberjyot/lolbin-execution-via-diskshadow-f6ff681a27a4
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/diskshadow
- https://www.lifars.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/GriefRansomware_Whitepaper-2.pdf
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-crytox-ransomware
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/evilplayout-attack-against-irans-state-broadcaster/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-15
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- OriginalFileName: 'diskshadow.exe'
- Image|endswith: '\diskshadow.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|windash: '-s '
selection_paths:
CommandLine|contains:
# Note: Add additional susp paths based on your org needs
- ':\Temp\'
- ':\Windows\Temp\'
- '\AppData\Local\'
- '\AppData\Roaming\'
- '\ProgramData\'
- '\Users\Public\'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- False positives may occur if you execute the script from one of the paths mentioned in the rule. Apply additional filters that fits your org needs.
level: medium
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
all of selection_*Stage 1: selection_img
selection_img:
- OriginalFileName: 'diskshadow.exe'
- Image|endswith: '\diskshadow.exe'
Stage 2: selection_cli
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|windash: '-s '
Stage 3: selection_paths
selection_paths:
CommandLine|contains:
- ':\Temp\'
- ':\Windows\Temp\'
- '\AppData\Local\'
- '\AppData\Roaming\'
- '\ProgramData\'
- '\Users\Public\'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\diskshadow.exe" |
OriginalFileName | eq |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"diskshadow.exe" |