Detection rules › Sigma
Copying Sensitive Files with Credential Data
Files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) copying
Known false positives
- Copying sensitive files for legitimate use (eg. backup) or forensic investigation by legitimate incident responder or forensic investigator.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule body
title: Copying Sensitive Files with Credential Data
id: e7be6119-fc37-43f0-ad4f-1f3f99be2f9f
status: test
description: Files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) copying
references:
- https://room362.com/post/2013/2013-06-10-volume-shadow-copy-ntdsdit-domain-hashes-remotely-part-1/
- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
- https://dfironthemountain.wordpress.com/2018/12/06/locked-file-access-using-esentutl-exe/
- https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/2cc01b01132b5c304027a658c698ae09dd6a92bf/yml/OSBinaries/Esentutl.yml
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-22
modified: 2024-06-04
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.002
- attack.t1003.003
- car.2013-07-001
- attack.s0404
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_esent_img:
- Image|endswith: '\esentutl.exe'
- OriginalFileName: '\esentutl.exe'
selection_esent_cli:
CommandLine|contains|windash:
- 'vss'
- ' /m '
- ' /y '
selection_susp_paths:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\config\RegBack\sam'
- '\config\RegBack\security'
- '\config\RegBack\system'
- '\config\sam'
- '\config\security'
- '\config\system ' # space needed to avoid false positives with \config\systemprofile\
- '\repair\sam'
- '\repair\security'
- '\repair\system'
- '\windows\ntds\ntds.dit'
condition: all of selection_esent_* or selection_susp_paths
falsepositives:
- Copying sensitive files for legitimate use (eg. backup) or forensic investigation by legitimate incident responder or forensic investigator.
level: high
Stages and Predicates
Stage 0: condition
all of selection_esent_* or selection_susp_pathsStage 1: selection_esent_img
selection_esent_img:
- Image|endswith: '\esentutl.exe'
- OriginalFileName: '\esentutl.exe'
Stage 2: selection_esent_cli
selection_esent_cli:
CommandLine|contains|windash:
- 'vss'
- ' /m '
- ' /y '
Stage 3: selection_susp_paths
selection_susp_paths:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\config\RegBack\sam'
- '\config\RegBack\security'
- '\config\RegBack\system'
- '\config\sam'
- '\config\security'
- '\config\system '
- '\repair\sam'
- '\repair\security'
- '\repair\system'
- '\windows\ntds\ntds.dit'
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
CommandLine | match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:match |
Image | ends_with |
| field:"Image" kind:ends_with value:"\esentutl.exe" |
OriginalFileName | eq |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"\esentutl.exe" |